All for one and one in all: private military security companies as soldiers,business managers and humanitarians

With governments increasingly contracting private military and security companies (PMSCs) to perform military and police-related tasks, international relations scholars have made attempts to better understand PMSCs and to investigate the reasons for the boom of private security. Rather than focusing on the services these companies offer, which has been a common approach, we offer an identity-based explanation for their surge. We show that PMSCs eclectically assume identities related to the military, business managers and humanitarians, independent of the services they perform, their market segment or their location on the battlefield. This finding points to an important yet little-noted dimension in the private security industry. Although companies are heterogeneous, they also appear increasingly homogeneous because they incorporate a similar set of identities. On the one hand, this enables PMSCs to adapt to any context, client or employee, and, on the other hand, it has constitutive qualities, contributing to an important source of power for the respective companies. These multiple identities contribute to a norm of what a superior security provider should look like.     

Challenging international law: a dilemma of private security companies

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a marked increase in the sale of military services by private security companies (PSCs).1 ?1. The term private security company is used throughout the article instead of private military companies or private military firms. View all notes These companies sell anything from combat support for government military operations to military training and assistance, logistical support and more conventional security protection services. They have undertaken operations in countries as diverse as Sierra Leone, Croatia, and Columbia and now Iraq and Afghanistan. The presence of these companies on the international stage raises fundamental questions about the way war is now being fought. Unfortunately, the legal issues raised by their presence in conflicts have not yet been properly addressed. This article sets out to examine the suitability of international law in defining and controlling the activities of PSCs on the battlefield. It then goes on to discuss the problems associated with national regulation. Here the focus is on the attempts by the United States (US), South Africa, and United Kingdom (UK) governments to introduce effective legislation to control the industry.     

Private Military Services in the UK and Germany: Between Partnership and Regulation1

Abstract

Controversial cases such as the aborted coup in Equatorial Guinea and the employment of private contractors in the Abu Ghraib prison have brought the proliferation of private ‘mercenaries’ to worldwide attention. However, the privatization of military security is more diverse and complex than generally suggested. Specifically, one needs to distinguish between the use of private mercenaries in developing countries and the privatization of military services in Europe. Focussing on the latter, this article proposes that the privatization of military services in industrialized countries can be understood in terms of a shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’. As a consequence, the emergence of a private military industry in Europe is not only characterized by distinct forms of governance failure; European governments have also developed new modes of governance to control the industry. Using the United Kingdom and Germany as examples, this article examines two modes in particular: public private partnerships and governmental regulation.     

Wheeled Warriors: Explaining Variations in the Use of Violence by Private Security Companies in Iraq

This article engages one of the most widely discussed but poorly understood aspects of the Iraq War: the use of violence by private security companies. It explains why, despite sharing several important characteristics—coming from the same general population of military and police veterans, working for the same client during the same time period, performing the same tasks under the same client-imposed rules of engagement, and facing the same kinds of threats in the same general operating environment—the personnel who worked for Blackwater, the chief protector of US State Department employees in Iraq, killed and seriously injured far more people than their counterparts in DynCorp. The article argues that Blackwater's personnel killed and seriously injured far more people in Iraq than their DynCorp counterparts because Blackwater maintained a relatively bellicose military culture that placed strong emphasis on norms encouraging its security teams to exercise personal initiative, proactive use of force, and an exclusive approach to security, which together motivated its personnel to use violence quite freely against anyone suspected of posing a threat. If the trends established during the Iraq and Afghan Wars continue, then private security companies will see extensive employment in future conflicts. These findings, consequently, have implications that extend beyond the Iraq War and the particular firms under study. Indeed, they indicate that governments and other future clients should analyze the military cultures of the firms vying for their business and use the results as a basis for deciding which firms to hire and, to a great extent, represent them in unstable conflict zones.     

Contracting with Whom? The Differential Effects of Investment Treaties on FDI

Under what conditions can governments use international commitments such as Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) to attract foreign direct investment (FDI)? Although numerous studies have attempted to answer this question, none considers how investment treaties may have heterogeneous affects across industry. I argue BIT effect is strongest when the obsolescing bargaining problem between firms and governments is most protracted, namely, when FDI relies on strong contracts between firms and states. Using a time series cross-sectional data set of 114 developing countries from 1985 to 2011, I find BITs are associated with increases in infrastructure investment, an industry particularly reliant on the sanctity of government contracts, but not with total FDI inflows. Moreover, BITs with strong arbitration provisions display the strongest statistical effect on infrastructure investment, while BITs that do not provide investors with such protections are not associated with increased investment. My results have implications for both scholarship on the relationship between governments and multinational firms as well as for the study of international institutions more broadly. To properly ascertain the effects of international treaties and institutions, scholars should consider not just whether institutions constrain or inform—or matter at all—but also the extent to which the targets of institutions have heterogeneous responses to them.     

Security governance and the private military industry in Europe and North America

Even before Iraq, the grow ing use of private military contractors has been widely discussed in the academic and public literature. However, the reasons for the proliferation of private military companies and its implications are frequently generalized due to a lack of suitable theoretical approaches for the analysis of private means of violence in contemporary security. Consequently, this article contends, the analysis of the growth of the private military industry typically conflates two separate developments: the failure of some developing states to provide for their national security and the privatization of military services in industrialized nations in Europe and North America. This article focuses on the latter and argues that the concept of security governance can be used as a theoretical framework for understanding the distinct development, problems and solutions for the governance of the private military industry in developed countries.     

在国际评级市场竞争中扩大中方话语权的对策

信用评级业是维护国家金融主权和经济安全的重要力量,中国信用评级业正开拓国内与国际两个市场,在高度垄断的全球信用评级市场力争扩大国际话语权。而美国评级机构不断加大向其他国家渗透,还借助中国被收购公司的分支机构,迅速将触角伸展到全中国,直接或间接从事所有评级和相关业务。为扩大我国信用评级机构的市场份额,中方应培育扶持民族信用评级机构,设计科学的评级指标体系,加强评级机构行业自律和内部管理制度的建设,依赖自己的力量维护国家金融安全。     

Sovereignty at Sea: States and Security in the Maritime Domain

The oceans present a variety of perils to both states and private actors, ranging from smuggling to direct attacks on vessels. Yet, a disconnect exists between states’ maritime power and sovereign fleets due to the emergence of open shipping registries in the 20th century. How have great powers like the United States responded to threats generated by transit of the oceans for legitimate and illicit purposes? The nature of peacetime security threats that states confront at sea has shaped divergent responses. The main maritime powers draw a distinction between threats aimed at states and threats to commerce. Where perceived threats to the state are concerned, great powers have sought to revise understandings of the protections sovereignty provides—specifically, by seeking expanded interdiction rights—to further their own security goals. When maritime powers perceive that international commerce is under threat, they delegate the sovereign protection function both upward to internationally sanctioned maritime coalitions and outward to private security firms. These policies are responses to the security challenges that result from the decoupling of sovereign power and the merchant fleet that followed the emergence of open shipping registries.     

从印度的经验看中国证券市场国际化的战略选择

证券市场国际化是中国资本市场和经济发展的必然选择。作为新兴市场的印度，证券市场的历史基础与发展势头较好，证券市场的国际化比较成功，与中国的国情也最为相似。通过对印度证券市场及其国际化的措施进行分析，有利于我们进行中国证券市场国际化的战略选择，从而促进中国证券市场的国际化。     

美国选举安全问题:以2016年和2020年总统大选为例

2016年美国总统大选暴露了长期存在于该国选举体系中的风险,"选举安全"迅速成为当代美国国家安全与国土安全领域的重要议题。美国选举安全涉及网络安全、社会安全、政治安全与军事安全,体现出"复合安全问题"的特质。美国联邦与各州政府试图从降低关键基础设施风险、重建选民信任、减少部门壁垒以及填补机制缺失四个层面入手,系统性化解存在于选举系统的各类安全威胁。2020年美国大选期间,原有选举安全风险得到一定程度的缓解,但美国国家安全体制及文化与其选举安全体系的运行逻辑之间仍存在多层矛盾,特别是美国选举体系的产业市场与创新之间的矛盾、国家安全与"言论自由"之间的矛盾、"全政府"与"地方权"之间的矛盾、"网络自由"与"网络主权"之间的矛盾。这些矛盾会长期存在,将使利益攸关方不断发生龃龉,阻碍相关政策深入推进,最终导致美国在选举安全治理上将一直面临难以克服的困境。     

日、美、欧电力市场化改革分析

90年代以来 ,为了适应电力全球化趋势 ,日、美、欧各国实行了多种模式的电力市场化改革。改革的目标是要打破垄断 ,引入竞争机制 ,提高效率 ,降低电价。实现改革目标的基本途径 ,一是对电力工业国有资本实行民营化 ,出售给股民或外国公司等 ;二是打破独家垄断经营 ,培育市场竞争主体 ,建立竞争性电力市场。经济学中对自然垄断的研究是电力市场化改革的理论基础。     

A sub-national approach to state-building and security: the role of municipal institutions in Colombia's DDR process

The Mayoral Offices of the two most important cities in Colombia— Bogotá and Medellín—played a key role in implementing the national policy of DDR that took place under the Presidency of Alvaro Uribe. Both Mayors developed municipal policies to provide services to ex-combatants from paramilitary and guerrilla groups. The analysis of these policies contributes to the understanding of the role that municipal authorities play in underpinning and redefining national policies of security and reintegration of ex-combatants. The dichotomy between military security and human security presents a theoretical framework to study how national and sub-national authorities interact on the basis of their different security needs. Municipal authorities had to address three main challenges in the reintegration of ex-combatants: first, the consequences of a sudden increase in population and the subsequent pressure on security and coexistence; second, the resistance from the recipient communities and having to achieve a balance in the services provided to victims and demobilised; third, how to establish effective collaboration between municipal and national authorities. The DDR was nationally built, but it was consolidated at the sub-national level.     

(Self) Regulating War?: Voluntary Regulation and the Private Security Industry

Private security companies' growing participation in U.S. and international military missions has raised concern about whether the private security industry is subject to sufficient controls. Industry self-regulation is often proposed as part of a multilayered framework of regulations to govern PSCs. But what can self-regulation contribute to regulation of the private security industry? This matters because privatization in the security realm has moved beyond understandings of the proper breakdown of public and private functions concerning the use of force. This article assesses what self-regulation can contribute to the control of this industry and whether the private security industry lends itself to effective self-regulation. It concludes that the private security industry does not exhibit the capacity to adopt and implement effective self-regulation on its own. If self-regulation is to complement state and international regulation, participation in the design and oversight of self-regulation must be broadened beyond private security companies alone.     

中国会计服务出口的机遇与挑战——以东盟市场为例

随着中国与东盟经贸合作的深入开展,会计服务出口的业务发展空间也在不断地扩大。东盟资本市场的发展以及会计、审计准则的国际趋同为中国会计服务出口和拓展东盟市场提供了较好的发展机遇,但我国注册会计师行业在国际客户发展、自主国际品牌建设、国际市场竞争力等方面仍存在一些需突破的难点。     

A Crude Bargain: Great Powers,Oil States,and Petro-Alignment

Abstract

Petro-alignment, a quid pro quo arrangement whereby great powers offer security in exchange for oil states’ friendly oil policies, is a widely used and yet undertheorized energy security strategy. One consequential aspect of this exchange is that great powers choose different levels of security commitment to keep oil producers friendly. With what criteria do great powers rank oil states? How do we conceptualize different types of petro-alignments? What exactly do great powers and oil producers exchange under each petro-alignment type? I posit that a mix of market power and geostrategic location determines the strategic value and vulnerability of individual client oil states, which then generates four corresponding types of petro-alignment—security guarantee, strategic alignment, strategic favor, and neglect. Two carefully selected case comparisons—Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 1970–91, and Azerbaijan and Ecuador in 1990–2013—show how great powers created, utilized, and maintained petro-alignments under the unique logic of oil markets and across varying geopolitical settings. The findings have important implications on great powers’ grand strategies, strategic behaviors of oil states, and the role of oil in international security.     

Capital Account Liberalization,Financial Structure,and Access to Credit in Latin America

This article revisits the question of whether capital account liberalization improves access to credit by advancing and testing a theory of how the structure of the financial sector shapes the willingness and ability of banks and governments to repress the domestic financial sector. In a highly concentrated financial sector, banks and governments are more willing to reap the benefits of financial openness by suppressing liberalizing reforms to domestic financial policies, and they can also better coordinate with one another to stifle these reforms compared to when the financial sector is diffuse. Using a panel dataset of Latin American and Caribbean countries, I find that capital account liberalization leads to a decrease in loans to private firms and households and an increase in loans to governments and state-owned enterprises when the financial sector is highly concentrated. Only when the financial sector is diffuse does capital account liberalization lead to reforms in entry barriers, directed credit programs, and banking sector supervision, which extends to improved access to credit for private firms and households.     

International relations: A theoretical synthesis

If the international system is envisaged as a trading network in which political, cutural and social mesotheses, as well as economic goods and services, are exchanged between Parsonian sectors (political, integrative and adaptive), then the behavior of governments, multinational corporations and other agencies can be modelled on those of actors exercising bounded rationality in a set of highly imperfect markets. Power can be conceptualized as a form of political credit, capable of investment, liable to inflation due to over‐extension, and subject to exhaustion—and the illegitimate substitution of force. Political actors attempt to optimize their legitimacy (or political solvency).

Thus global structure is envisaged as a more or less persistent network of exchanges, which necessarily assumes a market configuration, hierarchical and segmented. Then the nature of international relations varies as a function of the actors’ relative positions within this structure,—above/below, near/far—and of their relative systemic motions—fast/slow, rising/falling, approaching/receding.

It is proposed to accept the market structure as given, including the disparities in capacity between countries and their diverse institutions and cultures, in order to explain changes in international relations, i.e. changes in relative position. It is such change that chiefly concerns decision makers.

Several processes contribute to structural change. First, the great engine of change is “progress”: the market imperative for actors either to rise in the structure or to be taken over by others more progressive than they. Thus the whole system tends to “develop” upward. Second, cycles of deflation and inflation in various forms of “credit” operate to raise or lower the overall height of the market pyramid. Third, disparities in levels between Parsonian sectors give rise to turbulance within the global system.     

Air and Space Power, Lead Turning, the Future

To optimize security investment for the future, the Department of Defense (DoD) should adopt an approach that rewards the services for developing innovative methods to attain national security objectives with the least risk in both blood and treasure. To accomplish this, the DoD may have to re-visit its former practice of providing each service with relatively equal slices of the military budget. Under such an approach, the services are motivated to make incremental changes to the concepts and weapons of the previous war and have little reason to take risks to increase productivity of man and machine alike. What is needed—particularly in these times of increasingly complex national security challenges, rising costs, and shrinking budgets—is a plan for going forward that is centered on a shared vision of the variety of threat conditions we are likely to face, an honest evaluation of their significance, and a mature appraisal of what will be required to deal with them. We should dedicate ourselves to crafting an overall defense strategy that will allow us to shape the environment and act flexibly across the entire range of operations, and that will also provide a framework upon which to base our jointly focused resource and investment decisions.¹     

Arms Production in the Global Village: Options for Adapting to Defense-Industrial Globalization

Few issues are more important to international relations scholars than understanding how globalization is shaping the production of armaments. Within this context, this article examines both whether and how small and medium states can maintain defense-industrial bases capable of contributing to their national security. To preview the conclusion, although defense-industrial self-sufficiency has become an illusion for most states, even small and medium states can develop defense-industrial capabilities that enhance both their ability to autonomously employ their armed forces and secure access to foreign armaments. Moreover, governments possess a range of options for achieving these objectives, including a fundamental choice between accepting foreign direct investment and pursuing unrestrained arms exports. Governments unwilling to sanction foreign ownership of their defense industries can have recourse to unrestricted exports; alternatively, states uncomfortable with liberal exports can encourage foreign direct investment. With this in mind, a lasting diversity is likely to persist in even similarly endowed states’ defense industries and defense-industrial policies.     

The Invisible Hand? Critical Information Infrastructures,Commercialisation and National Security

Corporatisation of critical information infrastructure (CII) is rooted in the ‘privatisation wave’ of the 1980s-90s, when the ground was laid for outsourcing public utilities. Despite well-known risks relating to reliability, resilience, and accountability, commitment to efficiency imperatives have driven governments to outsource key public services and infrastructures. A recent illustrative case with enormous implications is the 2017 Swedish ICT scandal, where outsourcing of CII caused major security breaches. With the transfer of the Swedish Transport Agency’s ICT system to IBM and subcontractors, classified data and protected identities were made accessible to non-vetted foreign private employees – sensitive data could thus now be in anyone’s hands. This case clearly demonstrates accountability gaps that can arise in public-private governance of CII.