美国对印度能源安全战略的影响

印度自身能源资源特别是油气资源难以满足其经济快速发展对能源的巨大需求,因而不得不依赖进口油气来填补其国内的能源供需缺口。于是,寻求获得海外油气的稳定供应成为了印度的一个重要目标。在印度实现这一目标的过程中,美国成为了一个重要影响因素,典型例证是印美核协议不仅影响了印度对其发展与伊朗能源项目的态度,而且还影响了印度对伊朗的政策。美国能够影响印度寻求能源安全的根源在于,美国对印度至关重要。     

战略高科技解禁与印美关系

美国自1998年起对印实施高科技贸易制裁,涉及军民＂双用途＂的高科技项目禁运成为影响印美关系的重大障碍。随着近年来印美战略关系日益升温,印美民用核能合作启动,美国支持印度以特殊身份参与国际防扩散和军控机制,印美双方从各自的战略和经济利益出发,力图通过讨价还价推动高科技出口解禁的进程。奥巴马政府新近宣布对印度国防与民用航天部门解除制裁,表明印美双方围绕该重大问题的利益协调已取得突破性进展,美国多年的对印高科技禁运接近尾声。尽管印美围绕印度战略核发展的矛盾继续存在,但高科技贸易解禁将为印美战略关系提供新的活力。     

Is there a U.S.–China–India triangle? – Beijing’s official views

ABSTRACT

This research examines China’s official perspectives on, and interpretation of, U.S.-China-India relations by surveying official, quasi-official, and some most relevant scholarly publications. China’s official line has always emphasized the bilateral nature of the relationship between China and India fending off any third-party interference, including that from the United States. Neither Chinese leaders nor the regime’s official media outlets would speak of China–India relationship with a triangular framework (with a rare exception of the Russia–India–China triangle). In the context of the rapid evolvement of U.S.-India military cooperation, the Chinese official line remains unforthcoming about whether such developments have direct implication for China’s security or national interests. Chinese core official media has in fact minimized the popularization of the idea that containing China is the driving force behind any cooperation between India and the United States.     

Navigating two Asias: how Washington deals with the Indo-Pacific’s rising powers

ABSTRACT

The United States has sought over the last two decades to facilitate India’s rise as a means of balancing against China’s ambitions. Notwithstanding the rich literature that has emerged on Sino-Indian dynamics and the U.S.-India-China triad, there has been remarkably little examination of the ways in which the United States navigates its relationships with these two rising powers. This study poses a simple question: to what extent has the United States’ pursuit of its interests with India meant that it has accepted trade-offs with respect to its interests with China? Drawing on government documents, interviews with current and former U.S. officials, and an array of case studies between 2005 and early 2019, this study argues first that the U.S. bureaucracy has long been structured in such a way as to heavily compartment policy decision-making related to South Asia and East Asia, respectively, and to produce a pronounced but largely explicable structural bias toward East Asia; second, that relatively few policy matters have arisen since 2005 that have forced the United States to consider meaningful trade-offs between its India and China equities; and third, that new challenges may arise for Washington as its deals with an increasingly inter-connected Indo-Pacific region, and manages the bureaucratic and policy implications of its renewed emphasis on great power competition.     

The ‘Demand-Side’: Avoiding a Nuclear-Armed Iran

This article examines the historical record of “nuclear rollback” and the motivations for Iran's apparent pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability in order to identify the broad principles that should guide U.S. and international efforts to resolve the nuclear crisis with Iran.¹ The author argues that Iran, like all states, seeks security and respect. For many Iranians, the past three decades provide proof that such security and respect can only be attained with a strategic nuclear deterrent. In 2009, if the United States can show Tehran a genuine path to security and prestige that does not require nuclear weapons, Tehran might give it serious consideration. However, if the United States and the international community fail to address Iran's legitimate need for security or its desire for international respect, Bowman believes it may only be a matter of time until Iran obtains a nuclear weapons capability.     

The Soldier, The State, and The Clash of Civilizations: The Legacy of Samuel Huntington

The major military challenge that the United States faces today is the war in Afghanistan. The U.S. military is engaged in a grueling counterinsurgency campaign against the Islamist movement known as the Taliban, which is based among Pashtun tribes in Southeastern Afghanistan and Northwestern Pakistan, who have never been permanently subdued by a foreign military force. This challenge comes in the wake of that other grueling counterinsurgency war that the U.S. military has had to conduct in Iraq, where its chief adversary was the Islamist movement known as al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. Moreover, the challenge in Afghanistan comes on what could be the eve of an impending military challenge, perhaps even a war, with Iran, as that Islamist state relentlessly moves toward acquiring nuclear weapons. In its entire history of two- and-a-quarter centuries, the United States has never been engaged in an unbroken succession of three wars, in three different countries. Together, the U.S. wars with or within Islamist countries add up to what is a “long war,” indeed.     

阿富汗大变局:地缘政治和安全格局的演变

当前,阿富汗正在经历重大变局.阿富汗塔利班(阿塔)成功卷土重来,并且完成临时政府组建.尽管仍有多重挑战,但阿塔执政已不存在根本性威胁.这引发阿富汗地缘政治格局和地区安全形势的深度调整.在地缘政治格局方面,整体呈现"美国西方影响力下降,地区国家影响力上升"这一"东升西降"趋势.美国正在从"局内人"变为"局外人",但仍将发...     

The Personalization(s) of Politics: Israel, 1949–2003

The relationship between the United States and Iran has had an important influence on world affairs during the past two decades. Accordingly, the U.S. news media have an instrumental role in portraying U.S.‐Iran relations to the public. The Iranian Revolution and hostage crisis of 1979–1981, the TWA hijacking of 1985, the Irangate controversy of 1986–1987, and the Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991 are examples of important media events that have impacted public opinion regarding U.S. policy toward Iran. This research analyzes government and print media portrayals of the Reagan administration's U.S.‐Iran policy during Irangate. Results supported the prediction that the print media would fulfill their “watchdog” function by providing more critical portrayals of the United States' policy toward Iran than the Tower Commission Report, an investigative document published by President Reagan's Special Review Board. Among the three leading newspapers analyzed, there was significant diversity in the reporting of U.S.‐Iran relations. Results indicate the Reagan administration's attempt to “spin” its version of Irangate did not successfully pressure the media to neglect their watchdog role. Although the Tower Commission Report was less critical of U.S. policy toward Iran than the print media, all four print media sources portrayed the Reagan administration's policy as a flawed approach that degenerated into trading arms for hostages. Implications of these findings for future research are discussed.     

Do nuclear weapons affect the guns-butter trade-off? Evidence on nuclear substitution from Pakistan and beyond

Scholars have argued that acquiring nuclear weapons should allow states the luxury of exiting conventional arms races. In turn, a decreased budgetary focus on conventional arms should make possible greater spending on social welfare. I contest this logic of nuclear substitution by examining its most likely exponent, Pakistan. As a poor, under-developed state, a nuclear Pakistan should have welcomed the opportunity to cease its arms race with India, and spend greater sums on its population's welfare. Instead, I show Pakistan has doubled down on its pre-nuclear conventional posture, mainly because of its revisionism over Kashmir. More generally, I show nuclear substitution should happen only rarely: when a state is satisfied with the territorial status-quo, and its security challenges are amenable to pure nuclear deterrence. An empirical overview of conventional postures in Britain, China, France, India, Israel, the Soviet Union and the United States shows these conditions are met rarely, and never sustained. The argument has implications concerning the marginal welfare effects of nuclear weapons, the stability-instability paradox in South Asia and the standoff between Iran and the West.     

Why Not Invade North Korea? Threats, Language Games, and U.S. Foreign Policy

International relations theory has difficulty explaining how similar policies produce different outcomes. Iraq and North Korea have been identified as members of the "axis of evil" with weapons of mass destruction programs that threaten the United States. Yet in late 2002, the United States prepared to attack Iraq whereas it chose to negotiate with North Korea, even after North Korea admitted to a secret nuclear program in direct violation of its 1994 agreement with the United States. Moreover, a direct comparison with Iraq shows North Korea to possess the greater material capability to threaten the United States. I argue that a language-based constructivist approach can explain these differences in U.S. foreign policy where other theoretical approaches cannot. By examining the U.S. entanglement in intersected language games—the implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea and the enforcement of United Nations Resolutions in Iraq—it becomes possible to show how the United States could construct North Korea's nuclear program as a manageable threat that could be dealt with diplomatically.     

An Analysis of the Indian Modi Administration's Policy on the South China Sea Issue

Geographically,India is not a country in the region of the South China Sea,nor is it a country concerned in the issue on a geopolitical level or a US ally in the Asia-Pacific region.It has been very cautious to avoid taking sides in the South China Sea issue.However,since Modi took office in 2014,changes have taken place in the external environment that India faces,in maritime safety strategy,as well as in India's policies toward the US and China.India is becoming increasingly active in the issue of the South China Sea,voicing criticism and taking precautions against China.While India's policy on the South China Sea will not be completely the same as that of the United States and Japan,due to concerns for its own interests in the future,it is quite possible that India will take advantage of the issue of the South China Sea and will adopt more comprehensive ways to get involved in the issue.     

美印军事合作及其制约因素

军事合作是美印两国关系发展中具有标志性意义的重要组成部分。进入新世纪以来,伴随美印战略伙伴关系的逐步确立,双方在军事防务领域的合作进展迅速。但与此同时,制约双方军事合作发展的因素依然存在,这反映了美印战略伙伴关系亦有其局限性。     

印度的民族问题及与南亚诸国的关系

印度民族的矛盾和问题复杂尖锐，不仅影响了国内政治和社会的稳定和经济发展，还影响了与南亚诸国的关系。本文从分析印度民族问题着手，深入探讨其与南亚诸国的关系。通过它不仅了解印度崛起道路上的艰难，也使我们懂得妥善解决民族问题的重要性。     

美国对东南亚外交的未来趋势

布什上任后,美国对东南亚地区越来越关注,美国与东南亚地区各国在贸易、军事合作以及外交关系等方面的互动越来越频繁和深入.很多学者认为这是美国借着打击恐怖主义的契机,开始"重返东南亚"①的表现.从近几年美国在东南亚的一系活动来看,反恐并不是美国的唯一目的,而更多地是为了加强它对这一地区的影响和控制.纵观布什政府在东南亚的一系列外交活动,可以看到三个基本的方向:(1)继续在这一地区推行美国价值观和理念;(2)在加强和巩固与传统盟国如泰国和菲律宾的关系与合作的基础上,拓展新的双边关系;(3)积极参与和建构东南亚地区主义进程,提升美国对东南亚地区主义进程的影响.     

The Iran Nuclear Issue in Sino-U.S. Relations

The Iran nuclear issue has become the "third factor" in Sino-U.S. relations. Problems began when the U.S. imposed sanctions against Chinese companies, and this became a major issue affecting Sino-U.S. relationship.China and the U.S. have different agendas in dealing the Iran nuclear issue. However, they also share some common ground. Different scenarios regarding the Iran nuclear issue affect Sino- U.S. relations in different ways.     

Nuclear Dominoes: A Self-Defeating Prophecy?

Is the nuclear domino theory historically valid? Despite its longstanding centrality to thinking on nuclear proliferation amongst scholars and policymakers, in recent years a revisionist consensus has emerged in opposition to this traditional view. Based on an analysis of historical evidence from the aftermath of the 1964 Chinese nuclear test, this article argues that scholars have gone too far in rejecting the nuclear domino theory. Reactive proliferation has been more prevalent than commonly believed, and while it is true that only India acquired a nuclear arsenal in response to the Chinese test, to a significant extent this is precisely because the United States was aware of the danger of reactive proliferation and worked to stop it. Finally, the historical evidence suggests that the nuclear domino theory is compatible with both domestic and prestige motivations for proliferation in addition to the security motives normally associated with the theory.     

The U.S.-Indian Nuclear Agreement: Balancing Energy Needs and Nonproliferation Goals

President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India signed a statement of intent in 2005 to allow India access to civilian nuclear technology, despite its not being a signatory to the Nonproliferation Treaty. This deal would reverse decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy, since India was the source for much of U.S. law on this count. It would require Congress to amend that law to create special exceptions for India. Rationales and critiques of the proposed deal have focused on its impact on the future exercise of U.S. authority on nonproliferation policy worldwide. But the broader impact may be felt internally, since nonproliferation decisions have been inextricably linked to national security imperatives. In acknowledging an economic justification for allowing India access to nuclear energy, the deal has also created a new dependency between U.S. national security policy and the energy profile of emerging powers.     

The Iranian Nuclear Negotiations as a Two-Level Game: The Importance of Domestic Politics

In July 2015, after more than a decade of negotiations, the international community and Iran finally reached agreement over Iran’s nuclear programme. All of the work that produced the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action [JCPOA] was nearly undone, however, by the United States Congress, which came close to killing the agreement. This episode emphasises the fact that international negotiations are “two-level games” in which policy-makers must take into account not only their own objectives and those of their interlocutors but also the interests of domestic constituencies if they are to secure the “ratification” of an agreement. In many cases, securing the consent of those constituencies is unproblematic, whether because the matter at hand is uncontroversial, domestic interests are disengaged, or policy-makers have sufficient autonomy from them to ignore their objections. In other cases, however, the domestic game can play a huge part in determining the eventual outcome of the negotiating process. As the intensity of the debate within the United States in 2015 and the narrowness of the margin by which the JCPOA survived suggest, the American–Iranian dimension of the nuclear negotiations falls into the latter category.     

Sino-U.S. Cooperation in North Korean Nuclear Issue

China and the United States have cooperated closely in resolving the second North Korean nuclear crisis.China and the United States have worked together with South Korea, Russia and Japan to prevent the North Korean nuclear issue from spiraling out of control, and they have also tried to make progress in the six-party talks. Despite differences over the issue, both sides are maintaining the momentum of cooperation with increasing mutual understanding and trust. The current U.S.-North Korea rapprochement has progressed quickly, adding a new factor in Sino-U.S. cooperation. Apart from bilateral contact with North Korea, the United States is insisting on a multilateral approach, continuing to persuade China to share responsibility for a nuclear-free Peninsula, and jointly advancing the process in the second phase set forth in the February 13 Agreement on Initial Actions. China's role,therefore, remains indispensable.     

Trade Structure and the Effectiveness of America's "Aggressively Unilateral" Trade Policy

When does America's "aggressively unilateral" trade policy work best to open overseas markets? This paper revisits the determinants and effectiveness of Section 301 of U.S. trade law and develops a modified two-level game model for understanding the conditions under which domestic interests and institutions support the use of aggressive negotiation tactics. It argues that a system-level variable, the structure of trade, systematically affects threat effectiveness by influencing both the level of unity among domestic interest groups and the degree of divided government in the sender of threats (the United States). America's sanction threats will enjoy more unified domestic support and hence be more credible when the dispute involves a country having a competitive trade relationship with the U.S. (such as Japan, Canada, and the European Union) rather than one having a complementary trade relationship with the U.S. (such as China, India, and Brazil). Statistical tests based on the universe of Section 301 cases concluded between 1975 and 1995 yield evidence in support of this contention.