Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior

This article investigates the influence of transnational ethnic alliances on the international interactions of states. Transnational ethnic alliances exist when both states in a dyad contain members of the same ethnic group. We argue that two types of dyads will experience higher levels of conflict than other dyads: (1) those where an advantaged minority in state A has an ethnic tie to a nonadvantaged minority in state B, and (2) those with a transnational ethnic alliance where the group in one of the states is politically mobilized. Using data from the COPDAB, Minorities at Risk, Polity II, COW, and Penn World Tables projects we find support for these contentions.     

联盟的起源：理性主义研究新进展

联盟作为具有战略意义的一种国家间关系,对其研究在国际关系理论中占据了一个十分重要的位置,也有助于学者们将具有普遍意义的国际关系理论运用于具体的国际关系研究。围绕着联盟的起源这一主题,理性主义国际关系理论提出了许多重要的见解。在最近的十多年来,这一主题的研究又与单极体系内的联盟现实相结合,提出和分析了如下方面的核心问题：联盟需要什么样的共同利益基础;制衡性的联盟为何没有出现;国际结构如何塑造大国的联盟选择;地理因素如何影响联盟的形成以及联盟起源的其他根源有哪些。理性主义国际关系理论的这些研究都具有一定的启发意义,但总的来看,现实主义范式的研究占据了主流地位,系统性的理论创新不够,并没有提出解释联盟起源的新的核心概念,即如果把联盟界定为一种明确、稳定的战略关系,而非仅仅是针对安全威胁的军事同盟的话,仅有结构现实主义和威胁平衡理论是不够的;联盟起源的理论研究仍然具有较为广阔的空间。建构一种更加普遍的、有强大解释力的利益关系概念,在此基础上推导出国家的联盟选择战略,将会有助于更加具体深入地了解联盟的起源。     

Financing the United Nations: Explaining variation in how donors provide funding to the UN

When donors contemplate providing financial support to United Nations institutions they encounter a menu of funding options. Some UN institutions require mandatory dues, but most rely substantially on voluntary contributions, which donors can choose to earmark for specific purposes. How donors provide resources has widespread effects on the authority of UN governing bodies, donor control over UN programs, and the efficiency of UN operations. What explains how donors choose to fund UN programs and agencies? We advance a theory that emphasizes member state preferences over the affordability and policy substance of IO activity. Using data from two novel experiments and a case study of U.S. funding practices toward the United Nations (1945–1980s), we provide mixed-method evidence showing that a state is more likely to provide voluntary contributions when its preferences over the affordability and policy of IO activity differ from those of the governing coalition and more likely to provide mandatory contributions when its preferences are consistent with those of the governing coalition. Further, we demonstrate that preferences over policy substance are particularly important in explaining recent trends in donor earmarking.     

How International Reputation Matters: Revisiting Alliance Violations in Context

We investigate the role of international reputation in alliance politics by developing a signaling theory linking past alliance violations with the formation of future alliance commitments. In our theory, past violations Are useful signals of future alliance reliability conditional on whether they effectively separate reliable from unreliable alliance partners. It follows that states evaluating potential alliance partners will interpret past violations in their context when deciding to enter a new alliance, attaching less weight to violations in “harder times,” when many states are defaulting on their alliance commitments together, and more weight to violations in “easier times,” when fewer states are defaulting on their alliances. We test our theory and find that states are empirically more likely to form new alliances with states that violated in harder times compared to states that violated in easier times. The results have important implications for how scholars understand and estimate the impact of international reputation.     

U.S. Foreign Aid and UN Voting: An Analysis of Important Issues

Many previous studies assessed the effectiveness of U.S. foreign aid by focusing on voting coincidence rates of all UN votes and found no relationship between U.S. aid distribution and UN voting coincidence rates. Most UN resolutions, however, are simply not important enough for the U.S. to expend its scarce resources in influencing the outcomes. The U.S. government would not be likely to exercise pressure on all UN resolutions but would do so on issues considered vital to America's national interests. If there is any effect from receiving U.S. foreign aid on political outcomes in the UN, it is therefore most likely to emerge in voting coincidence rates on important issues. Using data collected for sixty-five developing countries between 1984 and 1993, a pooled cross-sectional and time-series research design is adopted to examine this hypothesis. Contrary to the argument that foreign aid is an ineffective policy instrument in the pursuit of America's global influence, the currentfindings suggest that the U.S. government has successfully utilized foreign aid programs to induce foreign policy compliance in the UN on issues that are vital to America's national interests.     

Modeling alliance membership in a three‐dimensional space

Both Altfeld (1984) and Morrow (1991) offer theoretical foundations that explain why alliances form. Security concerns and autonomy desires are the driving force for the pursuit of allies. While this response explains why states become allies, it does not address which do. To explain with which potential allies states choose to share alliance membership, I construct a three‐dimensional space in which security, autonomy, and political system structure are each represented as one of the three dimensions of ally choice. Every state that shared alliance membership with any other given state from 1946–1992, on a yearly basis, is assigned a unique, tri‐component point in the three‐dimensional space. The distances in the space between each state and all other states’ tri‐component points are calculated, and this distance is then incorporated into a probit estimation of ally choice. By examining the role that security and autonomy trade‐offs and level of political system structure similarity play in determining ally choice, I conclude that two states are more likely to share alliance membership the more symmetrical they are in security and autonomy considerations and the more similar they are in political system structure.     

The Effect of Age Structure on the Abrogation of Military Alliances

Scholars of alliance politics have ignored a potentially important factor that shapes foreign policy: the age structure of a state. In this article, we argue that an alliance member is more likely to terminate the alliance in violation of the terms when the state’s youth ratio is high. The demographic pressure of a high youth ratio raises potential for political instability domestically, which in turn increases the risk of radical foreign policy changes. We demonstrate the effects of a state’s age structure on its alliance policy by examining alliance termination by violation from 1950 to 2000. Through quantitative analysis, we find that youth ratio is a strong and significant predictor of alliance abrogation. A brief examination of several examples illustrates two paths by which the pressure created by a high youth ratio contributes to political instability and results in alliance abrogation—leadership change that brings about a new foreign policy and appeasement of the population through abrogation of an unpopular alliance.     

Interaction and participation in sub‐war conflict, 1959–63

This research is concerned with the spread of sub‐war conflicts. It is hypothesized that higher levels of interaction with the contestants in such conflicts increase the probability of participation. A study of the behavior of the states in the CREON data set toward the Cold War during the years 1959–63 supports this contention. Attention then centers on determining the types of states that are most prone toward high levels of interaction. The findings in this section indicate that alliance members have significantly higher levels of interaction than non‐members. For members there is a strong negative logarithmic relationship between a state's geographical distance from the center of conflict and its level of interaction. This suggests that security interests strongly affect the inclination of such states to participate. Among non‐members of alliances, economic involvement in the international system and ties to the Warsaw Treaty Organization are most closely associated with interaction.     

Are Monetary Unions Inevitable?

With the rapid growth of cross-border competition among currencies, informed observers predict that the new monetary unions are virtually inevitable in many parts of the world. In fact, predictions of such alliances are misleading and almost certainly wrong. Monetary unions necessarily imply a measure of collective action in the issue and management of money. An alliance requires allies—other states with similar preferences and a disposition to act cooperatively. A survey of proposed monetary unions shows that willing partners among sovereign states are just not all that plentiful. Conceivably some governments could be attracted to less demanding forms of monetary alliance, depending on bargaining context. But prospects for many full new monetary unions are dim at best.     

Alliance formation and national security

The premise that nations form alliances in order to improve their security is widespread in the study of international relations. Yet in spite of the crucial role played by this assumption, the claims of policy makers and statesmen form our only evidence that it is the need for greater national security which motivates the formation of alliances. What is more, we have no systematic evidence that the concern for national security would be a consistent predictor in the face of other plausible goals. Our intent in this paper is to supply this evidence.

From the assumption that greater national security is a primary incentive to form an alliance, we construct a series of hypotheses, each building successively on the previous hypothesis to predict conditions at the individual, dyadic and systemic levels of analysis. By constructing an indicator of national security, we are able to test these hypotheses against historical information about European alliances from 1815 to 1965. Our evidence that security considerations are indeed central to alliance behavior improves the empirical and theoretical foundation of a considerable body of studies in international relations and foreign policy preceding this one.     

Mediation,Domestic Politics,and the Israeli-Syrian Negotiations, 1991–2000

This paper explains one of the central roles of alliance contracts, the prevention of undesirable military entanglement. The existing literature on alliances argues that entrapment is a major concern for potential and actual alliance partners, but it is difficult to point out clear cases of entrapment. I provide two answers to this puzzle: First, entrapment is a narrower concept than others have realized, and it is rarer than the literature suggests. Second, leaders anticipate entrapment and carefully design alliance agreements before and after states form alliances. I examine the second argument through case studies of us alliance agreements with South Korea, Japan, and Spain.     

Money can't buy you love: the European Union member states and Iranian nuclear programme 2002–2009

The controversy of the Iranian nuclear programme divided the European Union (EU) member states. Whereas some states preferred confrontation, others were in favour of the accommodation. Policy commentators frequently ascribed this difference to diverging economic interests of Europeans, but this link remained underexplored. In this article, the empirical link between the economic interests and positions towards Iran is explored. The analysis rests on the evaluation of both overall and strategic trade flows. The results suggest that while trade played a certain role in the shaping of the policies, the effect of the strength of the alliance with the USA explains a large part of the puzzle. The article thus casts shadow on the established policy narrative of economic interests being the driver of the EU members' Iran policy. In addition, the theoretical implications cast shadow over the applicability of commercial liberalism on instances of confrontation short of war.     

Reassessing Hedging: The Logic of Alignment in East Asia

It is widely claimed that secondary states across East Asia are not purely balancing or bandwagoning, but rather hedging between the United States and China by combining policies of economic and political engagement with risk management. We argue that hedging behavior should not include costless activities that do not require states to face trade-offs in their security choices. We redefine hedging as signaling that generates ambiguity over the extent of a secondary state's shared security interests with great powers. This definition returns the focus to security relationships and better accounts for the trade-off between autonomy and alignment. Based on this definition, we argue that hedging occurs in far narrower (but arguably more interesting) circumstances than is widely believed. Many Asian states have existing treaty alliances with the United States or major territorial conflicts with China, creating path dependencies that reinforce balancing behavior rather than hedging. We therefore clarify cross-national variation in state behavior and contribute to the larger research project on regional responses to China's rise.     

The Nexus of Market Society, Liberal Preferences, and Democratic Peace: Interdisciplinary Theory and Evidence

Drawing on literature from Anthropology, Economics, Political Science and Sociology, an interdisciplinary theory is presented that links the rise of contractual forms of exchange with in a society with the proliferation of liberal values, democratic legitimacy, and peace among democratic nations. The theory accommodates old facts and yields a large number of new and testable ones, including the fact that the peace among democracies is limited to market-oriented states, and that market democracies—but not the other democracies—perceive common interests. Previous research confirms the first hypothesis; examination herein of UN roll call votes confirms the latter: the market democracies agree on global issues. The theory and evidence demonstrate that (a) the peace among democratic states may be a function of common interests derived from common economic structure; (b) all of the empirical research into the democratic peace is underspecified, as no study has considered an interaction of democracy with economic structure; (c) interests can be treated endogenously in social research; and (d) several of the premier puzzles in global politics are causally related—including the peace among democracies and the association of democratic stability and liberal political culture with market-oriented economic development.     

Inter-Rebel Alliances in the Shadow of Foreign Sponsors

From the Patriotic Front struggle against the minority rule in Rhodesia to the seven-party mujaheddin alliance in Afghanistan, inter-rebel alliances make the armed opposition more resilient and successful in the face of government repression. Why then do some rebel groups cooperate with each other while others do not? Drawing on the principal-agent theory, I argue that the presence of foreign sponsors is likely to encourage alliance formation in civil wars especially when two rebel outfits share a state sponsor. Shared sponsors may demand cooperation between their agents and credibly threaten to punish them for non-compliance. They may also insist on the establishment of umbrella institutions to improve their monitoring and sanctioning capacity, and to increase the legitimacy of their agents. I test this argument using the UCDP Actor dataset with new data on alliances between rebel groups. I find strong evidence that shared sponsors increase the probability of inter-rebel alliance.     

Consensus Decisions and Similarity Measures in International Organizations

Voting behavior in international organizations, most notably in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), is often used to infer the similarity of foreign policy preferences of member states. Most of these measures ignore, however, that particular covoting patterns may appear simply by chance (Häge 2011) and that these patterns of agreement (or the absence thereof) are only observable if decisions are reached through roll-call votes. As the relative frequency of roll-call votes changes considerably over time in most international organizations, currently used similarity and affinity measures offer a misleading picture. Based on a complete data set of UNGA resolution decisions, we demonstrate how taking different forms of chance agreement and the relative prevalence of consensus decisions into account affects conclusions about the effect of the similarity of member states’ foreign policy positions on foreign aid allocation.     

Opposites Do Not Attract: The Impact of Domestic Institutions, Power, and Prior Commitments on Alignment Choices

States that choose to involve themselves in an ongoing dispute do so by choosing to align with or against one of the original disputants. What factors lead states to prefer to help one side over the other? We consider the effect of the disputants' power, political and economic institutional similarities between each disputant and the aligning state, and formal alliance commitments between each disputant and the aligning state on these alignment choices. We evaluate these expectations empirically by examining the alignment choices of states that joined with one side or another in a Militarized Interstate Dispute during the period of 1816 to 1986. The results indicate that regardless of regime type, institutional similarities matter to the aligning state's decision. We also find that power concerns matter only to autocracies; democracies do not seem to base their alignment choices on the power of the sides in the dispute. Finally, the evidence indicates that the alignment choices of democracies cannot be anticipated by their prior alliance commitments, although the alignment choices of autocracies can. These results suggest interesting implications for research on the democratic peace, the determinants of threat in the international system, and the impact of selection effects. The consistent empirical evidence that institutional similarity affects alignment decisions also increases our confidence that future investigations of institutional similarity generally, rather than an exclusive focus on joint democracy, will prove fruitful.     

朝鲜半岛新危机与美国东北亚同盟体系新变化

朝鲜半岛危机与美国东北亚同盟体系的构建与演化关系密切。2010年至2011年初,朝鲜半岛危机呈现出新的特点,美日、美韩同盟的演变也进入了新的阶段,呈现出新的变化。此轮朝鲜半岛新危机的特点是,海上危机与核危机并发。美国东北亚同盟体系的新变化是,同盟反应以军事压制为主,双边同盟强化并赋予新的内容,三边同盟趋势化且日韩互动提升。