Transatlantic cooperation,alliance politics and extended deterrence: European perceptions of nuclear weapons

This article discusses the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) debate regarding American nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) in Europe, given the broad spectrum of views on nuclear issues when comparing individual member states. What is striking is the gap between public attitudes – which are broadly hostile to keeping NSNW in Europe – and elite opinion, which privileges the maintenance of NATO commitments to preserve alliance cohesion. To better understand this tension, this article dissects the elements of extended nuclear deterrence in Europe, addressing the difficulties associated with current nuclear-sharing arrangements. For some NATO states, the alliance's nuclear weapons are a political liability, since nuclear sharing clashes with international disarmament and nonproliferation commitments. For other NATO members, maintaining the status quo is preferable, as long as there is no alliance-wide consensus on the question of NSNW. These debates have been put to rest, for now, with NATO's Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, which reaffirmed the purpose of the alliance's nuclear weapons. However, these divisive debates point to more fundamental issues in alliance management, namely the credibility of American commitments, the sustainability of extended nuclear deterrence in Europe and the inevitable political tensions these questions provoke at the domestic level for NATO allies.     

The first casualty in the war against terror: the fall of NATO and Europe's reluctant coming of age

In 2003, hardly a keynote speech goes by without Western leaders stressing that the transatlantic bond is as important as ever. This is perhaps true – a timelier question is whether the same can be said for the perception of common values and common threats that used to define this partnership and its sole institutional link: NATO. This essay explores five security policy conundrums that point towards a revised burden-sharing and power-sharing in the transatlantic strategic partnership: the UK's ambiguous role in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP); the blocking of the formal bond between NATO and the EU; the implications of a change in US policy towards Europe; NATO's improbable move into soft security and, finally, NATO's invocation of Article 5 in the wake of the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington.     

Nato Enlargement and the Spread of Democracy: Evidence and Expectations

The second enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since the end of the cold war fueled an ongoing debate over whether the alliance contributes to democratization in Europe. In the 1990s, critics warned that the 1999 NATO enlargement would cultivate a new cold war and prove irrelevant to democratic consolidation in central Europe. Events have not borne out these forecasts, however. In Poland, not only did NATO build a civilian consensus in favor of democratic control over the armed forces corresponding to NATO norms, but it also delegitimized Polish arguments for defense self-sufficiency that had derived their credibility from Poland's experience of military vulnerability and foreign domination. Such democratizing and denationalizing trends have contributed to stability in postcommunist Europe. An assessment of the seven states that joined in 2004 similarly reveals some scope for NATO's influence in all cases. The alliance's access to domestic reform processes, however, will be uneven across cases in ways largely consistent with the predictions of the theoretical framework in this article.

     

The Capability–Capacity Crunch: NATO's New Capacities for Intervention

Abstract

In September 2006 NATO's role in Afghanistan expanded to cover the whole of the country. With 32,000 troops under NATO command Stage 4 of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) represents an open-ended commitment to rebuilding a country long torn by war and instability. The Alliance's showpiece for advanced military transformation, the the NATO Response Force (NRF) represents a down payment on the future of transatlantic military co-operation. Taken together these two developments reflect the reality of NATO's new interventionism of an Alliance that bears little or no resemblance to that which won the Cold War. NATO today is an organisation designed for global reach and global effect, undertaking operations at their most robust. Unfortunately, the re-design of NATO's architecture has not been matched by a parallel development in Alliance military capabilities. NATO's big three, the US, Britain and France, have taken steps to improve their military capabilities. However, the transformation of NATO's other militaries has proved slow and uneven, leaving many members unable to fulfil any meaningful role. Thus, as NATO today plans for both robust advanced expeditionary warfare and stabilisation and reconstruction vital to mission success in complex crisis management environments a gap is emerging. Indeed, in an Alliance in which only the Americans can afford both military capability and capacity most NATO Europeans face a capability–capacity crunch, forced to make a choice between small, lethal and expensive professional military forces or larger, cheaper more ponderous stabilisation and reconstruction forces. This article explores the consequences of the crunch and the implications for NATO's current and future role as the Alliance struggles to find a balance between fighting power and staying power.     

NATO Regional peacekeeping center in Central and Eastern Europe: A proposal

Abstract

The article asks what the evolution of NATO–Swedish relations signifies for the understanding of the evolution of security communities. Given the astonishing evolution of NATO and Sweden as a community of practise, it is logical to imagine the two as forming part of the same security community. It could then be argued that common practise can bring about new security communities rather hastily. Analysing NATO's and Sweden's recent discourses on security, the author identifies a significant gap between a principally realist and a predominantly idealist discourse that indicates that the two parties do not share key characteristics of a security community – identities, values and meanings. However, if Libya is the case of the future, the discursive differences may fade and Sweden could more easily pursue its journey towards inclusion in NATO, not as a member of an Alliance, but as a member of NATO as a security community.     

Norway between NATO,the EU,and the US: A Case Study of Post-Cold War Security and Defence Discourse

This article addresses the post-Cold War security and defence discourse in Norway, focusing on the impact of the transformation of NATO, an increasingly ambitious EU within security matters and the transatlantic tensions in the War on Terror. The article argues that changes or continuity in policy result from the discursive battle between various power constellations, which are forcing conflicting understandings of reality on each other. In this battle, the dominant representation frames NATO's transformation as a precondition for national defence with reference to alliance solidarity, loyalty and interoperability. The alternative representation, on the other hand, has framed NATO's transformation as negative for national defence, claiming that forces trained for global, warlike missions are neither capable nor available for national defence tasks such as containment of Russia's strategic interests in the Barents Sea. The EU has been brought into the security and defence discourse only when new integration steps, such as the European security and defence policy and EU Battle Groups, put the question of how far Norway may participate, to a test. However, developments like the slow withering away of NATO and unilateralist US foreign policy on Iraq are contributing to pushing the Norwegian discourse, and hence policy, closer to Europe.     

Transaction Costs and the Establishment of the European Security and Defense Policy

This article explains the establishment of the European Union's Security and Defense Policy (esdp) in 1998–99 and its institutional design. I argue that both the soft balancing explanation and the “second wave” of approaches fall short. In contrast, the article shows that liberal-institutionalist thought and transaction costs economics offer a heuristically promising perspective. Most crucially, the pivotal concept of asset specificity provides explanatory leverage. The combination of risks of opportunism and the non-specificity of esdp's ultimate assets explains why and how the major European powers designed the eu's security and defense pillar in 1998–99. Empirically, I trace how the United Kingdom and France were gradually confronted with not fully credible commitments within nato for crisis management in Europe. Based primarily on the signals sent by us domestic politics, they were increasingly concerned about isolationism and questioned the American commitment to European security. Therefore, they were searching for another institutional option for providing security on a long-term basis. Although this assessment of ex post transaction costs triggered the initial establishment of esdp, ex ante transaction costs were responsible for its more specific design. Given the indirect American threat of disengagement when faced with Europe's aspirations for autonomy, esdp had to be designed in a compatible way with nato. Non-specific, and thus redeployable, military assets represented the institutional solution to the conflict between European autonomy and NATO's primacy. In other words, asset specificity as the key analytical concept of transaction costs economics is what differentiates this argument from previous accounts and provides a more comprehensive framework for understanding both the establishment and design of esdp in 1998–99.     

High Hopes,Bold Aims,Limited Results: Britain and the Establishment of the NATO Mediterranean Command, 1950–1953

Although a great deal has been written about British policy in the Middle East in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the reorganization of the Southern flank of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe after the admission of Greece and Turkey into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the assumption of NATO's naval Mediterranean Command by Britain has attracted little attention. This article analyses British aims and policy on the formation of the Mediterranean Command, the talks between London and Washington concerning the appointment of a Naval Commander-in-Chief, the attitudes of France, Italy, Greece, and Turkey towards British policy, and finally, the establishment of NATO's Mediterranean Command in conjunction with the reorganization of SHAPE's Southern flank. For strategic as well as prestige reasons, Britain tried to retain its traditional dominant eastern Mediterranean position by encouraging the establishment of an Allied naval Mediterranean Command under a British Commander-in-Chief. However, the decline of British military and naval power and political influence meant that Britain secured a compromise settlement which only partially satisfied its aspirations.     

Germany and European security governance: how well does the Birmingham model perform?

Abstract

The expansion of the security agenda after the end of the Cold War, propelled by the blowback of 11 September 2001, raises questions about the German ability and willingness to contribute to the regional and global security governance tasks facing Europe and Germany's continuing fidelity to its post-war European avocation. It also calls for a reconsideration of the Birmingham model of foreign policy analysis, particularly its emphasis on (and interpretation of) the ideational and institutional factors defining the German foreign policy agenda and shaping German foreign policy behaviour, at least with respect to the implementation (rather than formulation) of European Union security policies. Towards assessing the continuing utility of the Birmingham model, this article proceeds in three steps: the presentation of the Birmingham model and its restatement as six conjectures; a discussion of the security governance functions undertaken by the EU and the collective action problem facing Europe (and Germany) in executing them; and an empirical investigation of Germany's contribution to the EU as a security actor since 1990.     

The Balkans and the enlargement of NATO: A sceptical view

Throughout the Cold War, NATO and the USA worked hard to consolidate their strategic presence in Europe, while at the same time containing the Soviet threat. But the road taken by NATO in its effort to reform itself after the collapse of Communism and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, has not been a royal path, smooth and free of risk. NATO's geopolitical and selective way of eastward expansion encourages the creation of new ‘enemy blocs’ with Russia at their epicentre. The clash between NATO and the European Union over defence and security issues becomes all the more obvious. The humanitarian war over Kosovo was a risky affair whose spillover effects are badly felt today with the uprising of Albanian Macedonians; The Kosovo war, moreover, created a unique precedent in the conduct of foreign policy and clearly bordered on ‘double standard’ politics. Last but not least, the wider implications of Turkey's entry into the European Union may not be, in the long run, as positive for NATO as initially thought they would be.

This article offers a critical overview of NATO's reform process in the 1990s and argues that its transformation from a military defence pact into a political organisation upholding and selectively implementing liberal‐democratic principles may lead the alliance into serious political deadlocks in the years to come.     

The EU's security actorness: the case of EUMM in Georgia

This article addresses conceptually the European Union (EU)'s security actorness, explaining its meaning, identifying the factors that are constitutive to the concept, and analyzing whether the EU is a security actor in Georgia, through its increased presence and engagement in the country and its eventual implications for the South Caucasus. The article argues that the complementary nature of the different EU tools deployed on the ground and their comprehensive nature have contributed to the EU's consolidation as a security actor in the South Caucasus. However, and despite the successful assessments of the European Union Monitoring Mission in the context of common security and defense policy development, the mission's deployment and its contribution to regional stability are influenced to a great extent by the role and involvement of external players, in particular in this case, that of Russia.     

Weapons as political symbolism: the role of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

This study evaluates the role of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) for NATO today. Historically, TNWs fulfill five objectives. First, they provide a deterrent by denial capability. Second, TNWs serve to deter TNWs by other countries. Third, as the most ‘useable’ of nuclear weapons, they offer militaries solutions to a small target set of hardened targets. Fourth, they bridge the interface between nuclear and conventional forces, maintaining linkage up the ladder of escalation. Fifth, they serve as a powerful political symbol of an extended deterrent commitment. While the perception is that their utility for NATO in plausible European contingencies is low, we argue that there is variation in the political and military roles of TNWs. We submit that, in general, the first role has lost its significance but the other objectives remain relevant to NATO's present political circumstances, especially as a symbol of the transatlantic relationship and as a safeguard against Russian belligerence. Accordingly, TNWs remain a significant part of NATO's capabilities and should remain deployed in Europe.     

The Common Security and Defence Policy as an act of American hegemony

Abstract

The financial crisis endangers the security of NATO's members and partners. As such, NATO has a formal obligation to mobilize its resources to aid members in overcoming current economic challenges. NATO can play a valuable role on three levels. First, NATO can aid members in rationalizing their military procurement and manpower systems, thus reducing the fiscal burden of maintaining adequate defenses. Second, NATO can press the ECB and the EU to modify arrangements governing the Euro so as to minimize the risk that EMU will collapse. Finally, NATO has a “soft power” role in vigorously defending the liberal economic order and democratic political institutions of the Western Alliance from the ideological attacks that inevitably follow financial crises.     

Imperial re-bordering of Europe: the case of the European Neighbourhood Policy

Debates on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) pivot on questions about what kind of political community the EU is becoming and what are the limits of its power projections in the EU's Neighbourhood. Indeed, with this new ambitious and ambiguous policy the EU's external relations are expanding from purely economic to cultural, political and security functions. The EU's desire and need to export its values and norms beyond its borders raises a set of ontological questions about the nature of the EU.     

Growing Pains at the OSCE: The Rise and Fall of Russia's Pan-European Expectations

After the dissolution of the USSR, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) sought to contribute to the transformation of Russia into a democratic state abiding by the rule of law and by international law. The Yeltsin administration concurred and adopted a generally cooperative posture within the CSCE. However, when Moscow suggested (as a counter-move against NATO's enlargement projects) the elaboration of a legal pan-European security system, the CSCE—now rebaptised OSCE—responded by means of the Istanbul Charter for European Security (1999), an empty text by Russian standards. Feeling that its interests were no longer served, the Putin administration warned that without drastic reforms the Organisation would be ‘doomed to extinction’. In order to defuse the crisis, the OSCE adopted a number of reform measures. Overall, however, the reform process brought very little to a Russia whose obsession with equality of status is now better addressed through bilateral institutional channels with NATO and the EU. In the present circumstances, the fate of the OSCE depends on the political value that the West attaches to this organisation, as well as Russia's wisdom not to break the single European security organisation where its place and role are fully legitimate.     

Saving NATO: Renunciation of the Article 5 Guarantee

The purpose of this article is to offer a radical proposal: NATO should unleash its potential as the world's premier cooperative and collective security organization by stepping down from being a European collective defense alliance. In other words, I argue that without renouncing territorial security guarantees in Europe, NATO will sacrifice its effectiveness in the new security environment.     

Military Alliances in the 21 Century: Still Relevant after all These Years?

While military alliances have always been important to the United States, some experts wonder about their future. In today's uncertain security environment, they question whether these alliances may have outlived their usefulness. The author argues that U.S. national security leaders face some difficult choices as they formulate strategy and determine the number and types of collective security arrangements the nation will require to secure its national interests in the future.     

What Went Wrong with NATO?

This article provides a perspective on strategic trends in the NATO alliance and the broader transatlantic relationship. It evaluates the extent of NATO's successes and failures over the last 15 years in the areas of the Balkans, NATO enlargement, and the international campaign against terrorism. The central conclusion is that, while NATO's members have significant technical reforms available that could help to reinvigorate the institution, none is likely to come to fruition without a major change in strategic concepts on both sides of the Atlantic.     

The Rise of China and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance

The consequences and implications of China's rise have been analyzed and discussed from a number of perspectives. There has been little analysis that specifically evaluates the implications for the Atlantic Alliance, however, and whether an international system defined by U.S.-China bi-polarity would lead to a strengthening or a weakening of the transatlantic relationship. This article argues that China's rise will create security dynamics that likely will lead to a weakening of the Atlantic Alliance. It is unlikely that China's rise will provide NATO with a renewed purpose or give a convincing rationale for alliance cohesion the way the Soviet Union once did. Instead, China's rise will reveal divergent strategic interests and priorities among the members of the Atlantic Alliance, with a real possibility that America's rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific could intensify perceptions on both sides of the Atlantic of NATO's declining geopolitical value and relevance.     

Politicians,Experts and Democracy. Civil–Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe: The Case of Bulgaria

Abstract

Central and Eastern European countries have made significant progress in their efforts to democratize postcommunist civil–military relations. Appointing civilian ministers of defense, improving institutional arrangements and asserting legislative oversight over the armed forces have been key priorities. Problems still abound and levels of reform vary in the region even after NATO's second enlargement since 1989. Challenges remain concerning competent democratic civilian management, and effective defense reform planning and implementation. This article argues that the lack of an integrated Ministry of Defense, the low level of civilian interest in defense matters, the reform-deterrent attitude of political and military elite, and ambiguous institutional lines of authority are factors that still hamper civil–military relations in Bulgaria. I assert that the domestic political environment and international factors together facilitate democratic civilian control over the armed forces.