Regional collective security in Europe: Past patterns and future prospects

NATO's entry into the Balkan war raised salient questions about the alliance's broader mission and, more generally, about Europe's security architecture. This article confronts these questions by revisiting the debate about collective defense versus collective security as organizing principles for alliances. NATO is viewed as serving a hybrid role of promoting collective defense and regional collective security. This latter, under‐valued function relates to NATO's role in promoting internal cohesion among its members and is crucial to understanding the alliance's evolution and its persistance long after the Cold War.     

NATO beyond 2000: A new flashpoint for European security

The last decade of the twentieth century witnessed radical and potentially constructive adaptation of NATO. Although retaining its core function of collective defence and serving as the transatlantic security forum for consultation and co‐operation, the Alliance pursued new directions in support of wider stability in Europe through enlargement to its east, forging partnerships with former adversaries, and conducting peace enforcement operations outside the treaty area. But the transformation of NATO remains a work in progress. This article discusses three key questions: the nature of peace support operations, the capability to provide for both collective defence and crisis management, and managing further Alliance enlargement while maintaining a working relationship with Russia.     

Separable but not separate forces: NATO's development of the combined joint task force

This article argues that the Combined Joint Task Force has profoundly affected the European security architecture. The CJTF structure shifted the terms of the European security debate from whether NATO should have a role in the post‐Cold War world to how NATO should act in this new security environment. The CJTF therefore helped NATO to survive its post‐Cold War existential dilemma, and to emerge with the same level of cohesion and cooperation that it possessed during the Cold War.     

波兰加入北约对波俄关系的影响

波兰加入北约使波兰从原来苏联对抗西方的防御区，变成了西方遏制俄罗斯的前沿，使波俄双边依存关系消失、地区安全战略相左、敌对情绪增加，对波俄双边关系的发展造成了一定的负面影响。但是作为地缘近邻国家，尽管波兰把自身安全托付给北约，但也须改善同俄罗斯的关系；虽然俄罗斯对波兰加入北约深感恼怒，但也只好接受现实，希望通过发展与波兰等北约新成员的关系加强俄罗斯在这一地区的影响，改善西部安全环境。同时，波兰加入北约，无疑使波俄关系受到美国以及北约同俄罗斯关系的影响，增加了双边关系的不确定因素。     

The changing role of NATO: exploring the implications for security governance and legitimacy

Abstract

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATOs) changing role was debated in the face of the Strategic Concept adopted in late 2010. Two main roles can be identified in the debate; that of NATO as a defence organisation and a security organisation. The article analyses the implications of these roles for security governance and the Alliance's legitimacy – with emphasis on the novelties associated with the role of NATO as a security organisation. This development suggests an increasing need for security governance, something which is reflected in the debate. However, how for instance decision-making and implementation function in a more fragmented environment is unclear. If NATO develops its role as a security organisation new audiences are introduced that determine its appropriateness and the basis of the Alliance's input and output legitimacy changes.     

The impact of the Iraqi Crisis on the transatlantic link. A summary of views on the US–EU and US–NATO relationship

Lithuania's security orientation has evolved significantly since 1991. It has moved from prioritising Baltic and, then, Nordic, cooperation to focusing on partnership with Poland, and seeking NATO and European Union membership. Initially re‐buffed by both, Lithuania has gradually sought to strengthen its de facto ties with NATO and WEU, and to build up its economic ties with the EU and its member states, in the belief that this provided a form of ‘soft’ security, and prepared the way for eventual membership of NATO and the EU.     

NATO Regional peacekeeping center in Central and Eastern Europe: A proposal

Abstract

The article asks what the evolution of NATO–Swedish relations signifies for the understanding of the evolution of security communities. Given the astonishing evolution of NATO and Sweden as a community of practise, it is logical to imagine the two as forming part of the same security community. It could then be argued that common practise can bring about new security communities rather hastily. Analysing NATO's and Sweden's recent discourses on security, the author identifies a significant gap between a principally realist and a predominantly idealist discourse that indicates that the two parties do not share key characteristics of a security community – identities, values and meanings. However, if Libya is the case of the future, the discursive differences may fade and Sweden could more easily pursue its journey towards inclusion in NATO, not as a member of an Alliance, but as a member of NATO as a security community.     

NATO--Upholding Ethics in International Security Policy

From a vantagepoint of the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington, this commentary assesses the role of NATO in the field of ethics in foreign policy. Jamie Shea interprets the decision to invoke the 'collective defence' Article 5 of the Washington Treaty as a continuation of the acceptance of a shared destiny which is at the heart of ethics in international security policy. The focal point of this argument is the need to develop the capacity to quickly deploy civilian capabilities, such as police, to conflict hot spots. Military success for crisis management missions depends critically on civilian success--and civilian success depends on effective law enforcement. Ultimately, ethics in international affairs does not end with fine principles and stern moral judgements, but rather with credible organisations and capabilities to ensure that democratic values are upheld. NATO is and will remain indispensable to this effort.     

六十年的历程：北约核战略之演变

北约成立60年来，其核战略的制定与演变始终同北约与美国之间的关系紧紧缠绕在一起。北约核战略与美国核战略之间，既存在相互支持、影响和互动关系，又充斥美国和欧洲盟国之间在安全认识上的矛盾和斗争。美国始终关注“先发制人”的核威慑力，而冷战后欧洲更重视核安全而不是超强的核实力。未来，北约的欧洲核力量将会进一步削减，北约将在核不扩散领域发挥更大的作用。     

NATO expansion to Northern Europe

Finland and Sweden have been in the forefront of bilateral aid efforts to the neighbouring Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) especially in the promotion of economic and regional integration. Although Finland and Sweden have refused to contemplate NATO membership themselves, their neighbours are all seeking to enhance their security through NATO membership. It is unlikely that the Baltic States will become part of the Alliance in the short‐term, but new forms of military co‐operation between NATO and its former adversaries are taking place. With the regional security situation in greater flux than at any time during the post‐World War II period, Finland and Sweden are thus being asked to reevaluate their traditional policies of neutrality and non‐alignment. This article seeks to show some of the contemporary security problems facing Finland and Sweden and the range of policies which both Finland and Sweden can pursue.     

The Common Security and Defence Policy as an act of American hegemony

Abstract

The financial crisis endangers the security of NATO's members and partners. As such, NATO has a formal obligation to mobilize its resources to aid members in overcoming current economic challenges. NATO can play a valuable role on three levels. First, NATO can aid members in rationalizing their military procurement and manpower systems, thus reducing the fiscal burden of maintaining adequate defenses. Second, NATO can press the ECB and the EU to modify arrangements governing the Euro so as to minimize the risk that EMU will collapse. Finally, NATO has a “soft power” role in vigorously defending the liberal economic order and democratic political institutions of the Western Alliance from the ideological attacks that inevitably follow financial crises.     

Does Russia need a general staff?

The institutional arrangements and mechanisms for preventing and managing conflicts will determine the future of European security and the balance of power in a wider Europe. Russian policy and Russia‐NATO relations are anaylsed within the context of the ongoing changes at Russia's southern periphery. The embryos of three distinct security systems are developing ‐ a Russia‐led, a NATO‐led and one led by the international community. The article suggests that instability in the southern periphery in the future will require security cooperation and a joint approach by Russia and NATO countries.     

NATO,ballistic missile defense and the future of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

Abstract

Within the next few years, NATO will need to make a collective decision about the future of US tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in Europe. While opinion about the value of these weapons is not as split as conventional wisdom might suggest, and while NATO will remain a nuclear alliance irrespective of this decision, balancing politics and strategy looks likely to be a difficult task. This decision is made far more complex by the determination of NATO officials to link the withdrawal of these weapons to reciprocal reductions in Russian TNW in Europe, and by the possibility of substituting the key strategic and political link they provide with a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system. This article shows how we have arrived at this position, highlights the potential benefits to NATO Europe of BMD, and considers the key questions that the Alliance will face in achieving this. Ultimately, this article shows how the future of TNW in Europe is likely to be linked to whether NATO values arms cuts with Russia, or the deployment of missile defenses, as its central priority.     

The rise and fall of Spain's ‘nuclear exceptionalism’

The present article looks at the evolution of Spanish views on deterrence and non-proliferation. Like every member state of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Spain is covered by the US nuclear umbrella and has accepted the logic of deterrence, while at the same time maintaining a denuclearised status and committing to the goal of disarmament enshrined in the non-proliferation treaty. This article explores the background of Spain's apparently contradictory situation as a denuclearised member of NATO and how it positions itself in regard to the nuclear question in the current security context. It concludes that while Spanish nuclear ‘exceptionalism’ originally rested on the reluctance of the political elites to alter the precarious compromise that once allowed for Spain's accession to NATO as a denuclearised member, it gradually withered away to give way to a close alignment with Alliance policies driven by a desire to preserve strong security links with its partners.     

The American Role in European Defense Reform

In order to influence the direction and outcomes of defense reforms occurring across Europe, the United States needs to refocus its military-to-military engagement programs with its European allies. Instead of seeking to build partner capacity among the newest NATO members or aspirants, Washington will be better served by maintaining and strengthening interoperability with those allies that are adaptive and innovative, deployable and expeditionary, and capable of full spectrum operations—that is, allies such as France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. This finding is based upon what Washington itself sees as the future of conflict and the kinds of coalition partner skills and abilities the United States will need to counter post-International Security Assistance Force International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) threats to U.S. and collective security. Given budget and force structure cuts facing the United States as well, the American military cannot afford to waste its limited security cooperation resources.     

How NATO remembers: explaining institutional memory in NATO crisis management

This article introduces an argument for how institutional memory of crisis management operations develops in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Scholars of European security and of international organisations have examined organisational learning, but have yet to explain its precondition: institutional memory. In a context of increasing turnover due to defence budget cuts, it remains unclear how shared knowledge of strategic errors is acquired. This article finds that the NATO secretariat facilitates practitioners’ use of informal processes for contributing to institutional memory in response to the constraints of existing formal learning processes. These formal processes, including a lessons learned centre and a lessons learned database, inadvertently disincentivise practitioners from contributing such knowledge as using them can incur reputational costs. Drawing on NATO documentation and interviews with 27 NATO elite practitioners, the paper provides evidence that practitioners instead share knowledge through three informal processes: interpersonal communications, private documentation and crisis simulations.     

Power,contribution and dependence in NATO burden sharing

This article offers three new types of variables for computation of the share that NATO countries should contribute to the common defence. I use Uppsala conflict data (UCDP) on conflict participation to reveal how the asymmetry in power that allows the US to define most of the framings on which NATO’s utility calculations are based, compensates for the greater material contribution made to NATO by the US. Then I follow Ringsmose’s model of NATO burden sharing and create two types of variables crucial to the calculation of burden sharing. One reveals the share of US military protection aimed at protecting its NATO allies. The other measures how much US global security efforts against tyranny and terror are dependent on NATO allies. These two variables are developed by means of computer-assisted discourse analysis of US Presidential Papers. The three new variables contribute to a more complex mathematical model on fair burden sharing, indicating at the same time that the imbalance between US and allied contributions is declining. If European allies have ever exploited the United States in the past, then at least the relationship has become more even during the past two decades.     

New threats – different response: EU and NATO and Somali piracy

When the European Union (EU) launched its first military naval mission, EU NAVFOR Somalia, Atalanta, the states who are members of both the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) made a political choice: to prioritize the EU over NATO in their multilateral military efforts to fight piracy and its consequences. Thereby, Atalanta challenges the conventional assumption that EU security cooperation will remain limited. It also challenges the widely held belief that the European states will chose to act through NATO if dealing multilaterally with international security issues. How can we explain this decision? This analysis suggests that it can be explained in two phases where different mechanisms were at work. In the first phase, which can be accounted for from a neo-realist perspective, France, who held the Presidency, used particular favorable geopolitical conditions to put an autonomous EU operation on the agenda. However, agreement on the EU option cannot be explained as a result of strategic bargaining. Instead, in a second phase and in line with an alternative hypothesis building on the theory of communicative action, the EU member states came to support the French suggestion due to legitimacy considerations regarding the legal framework of the two operations.     

Still focused on the Atlantic: accounting for the limited Europeanization of Portuguese security policy

This article examines the limited Europeanization of contemporary Portuguese security policy and highlights how the persistence of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the emergence of the Lusophone world have shaped Portuguese participation in the European Union's (EU's) Common Foreign and Security Policy in recent years, particularly in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions in Africa and in the European Defence Agency's co-operation activities. Europeanization's conceptual weaknesses, combined with the mutually reinforcing nature of transatlantic, EU and Lusophone security co-operation, have reinforced the ambiguous nature of what a “Europeanized” vision for European security might look like, especially given long-standing loyalties to NATO. This affords states considerable margin for manoeuvrability in defining their security priorities, so long as they are seen as being broadly consistent. This article reassesses the appropriateness of the Europeanization concept and shows how Portugal has approached this strategic balancing act, supporting the development of the EU's CSDP whilst remaining loyal to NATO and seeking to develop security relations in the Lusophone world, achieving legitimacy by stressing complementarity and multilateralization in security co-operation.     

The art of commitments: NATO,the EU,and the interplay between law and politics within Europe’s collective defence architecture

Law and politics are the two constituent parts of a collective defence architecture. In Europe, such an architecture currently rests on a series of legal commitments: NATO’s mutual defence clause (Art.5 of the North Atlantic Treaty), but also the EU mutual assistance clause (Art.42.7 TEU) and the EU solidarity clause (Art.222 TFEU). Many asymmetries exist, however, between those legal clauses: they are often overlapping but not always identical with respect to their respective conditions of activation, territorial scopes, binding strengths, and modalities of implementation. Because of those legal asymmetries as well as prevailing political realities, there are many obstacles in fact to a clear-cut division of labour within Europe’s collective defence architecture between NATO and the EU. In Europe, collective defence should thus not be apprehended as a uniform task but rather as the art of balancing multiple legal and political constrains, come what may.