The Dearth of Jointly Dyadic Democratic Interventions

The Democratic Peace Proposition, which states that no two democracies have ever gone to war with each other, has been questioned by scholars who claim that such pacific behavior among free states does not apply to lower forms of conflict. In particular, Kegley and Hermann contend that democracies intervene in the affairs of other liberal states via overt military acts or covert machinations. In many cases, they argue that dyadic democratic interventions (DDIs) occur more frequently than would be expected given the number of jointly democratic dyads in the international system. I examine their research design and suggest changes to their concepts of states, interventions, and regime type, as well as their sample size and definition of dyads in the international system. I implement these changes and retest such arguments on a sample of interventions from 1945 to 1991. I find 11 cases where a democracy intervenes against another democracy, but these cases are rare in comparison to interventions conducted by democratic and/or autocratic states in undemocratic states, or by autocratic states against democratic states. Furthermore, these DDIs are less likely to occur than the presence of democracy in the international system would suggest.     

Incomplete Democratization and the Outbreak of Military Disputes

Whereas most research on the democratic peace has focused on relations within pairs of states, research on the relationship between democratization and armed conflict has centered primarily on the behavior of individual states. Moreover, the existing literature has placed primary emphasis on explaining the effects of democratization on war, rather than military disputes more generally. In this article, we find that certain types of democratic transitions markedly increase the risk of such disputes within dyads, even when economic and political relations between states are taken into account. Particularly prone to violence are dyads in which either state undergoes an incomplete democratic transition; that is, a shift from an autocratic to a partially democratic (or anocratic) regime that stalls prior to the establishment of consolidated democratic institutions.     

Inequality Amid Equality: Military Capabilities and Conflict Behavior in Balanced Dyads

Studies of power parity and conflict implicitly assume all balanced dyads are created equal. However, variation exists within the capabilities of the states in these particular dyads. I address the question of what affects the likelihood of conflict onset within relatively balanced dyads. I argue uncertainty—in particular the uncertainty of the expected costs of conflict—determines the likelihood of conflict among these dyads. More uncertainty of costs means a greater likelihood of miscalculation leading to bargaining errors. First, I argue as an opponent’s capabilities increase, uncertainty of costs increase and the likelihood of conflict increases. Second, military action serves a purpose in bargaining and can help reduce uncertainty by signaling a state’s willingness to inflict and endure costs in order to gain a better settlement. Third, information transmission is likely to be effective only when states have the capability to inflict significant costs. As such, while greater capabilities will lead to a high likelihood of conflict onset, they also lead to a reduced likelihood of conflict escalation. The testing of nondirected dyads from 1946 to 2001 supports the theory’s implications.     

The Democratic Peace Through the Lens of Culture, 1820–1989

This article examines the extent to which cultural similarity vitiates the relationship between joint democracy and the incidence of interstate war. Previous empirical findings which suggest that cultural/normative explanations of the democratic peace are more robust than institutional/structural ones invite an analysis of the impact of broader cultural factors on the relationship between joint democracy and war involvement. The author suggests several ways that cultural factors might mitigate the democratic peace phenomenon and conducts a multivariate logistic analysis of state dyads from 1820 to 1989 to test the main query. Of the cultural variables, religious similarity within dyads is associated with a decreased likelihood of war onset, while both ethnic and linguistic similarity have the opposite effect. Democratic dyads, on average, have higher religious similarity levels than nondemocratic dyads, which, ostensibly, might play a role in reducing conflict within democratic dyads. However, the findings clearly demonstrate that although cultural factors are significant correlates of war they do not vitiate the impact of joint democracy on war. It appears that where a pair of states share a common democratic political culture it exerts a conflict dampening impact that overrides ethnic, linguistic, or religious factors.     

Intergovernmental Organization Memberships: Examining Political Community and the Attributes of International Organizations

Why are states jointly members in certain intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) but not others? Despite the proliferation of IGOs and renewed interest in this topic, we lack systematic research to answer this question. Our theory of political community explains why dyads of states are likely to be common members in particular types of IGOs. We analyze and compare functionalist and Deutschian communitarian perspectives about IGO memberships. We test our theory using newly available data on IGO mandates and institutional structure, which allows us to make specific predictions about the types of IGO to which dyads become members. We show that dyads that are economically dependent, and/or democratic and enjoying enduring peace, are more likely to join those IGOs that possess high levels of institutional structure. Militarized interstate conflicts reduce the likelihood of states sharing membership in common IGO, but not substantially, whereas development and alliances also increase IGO memberships between states. Trade ties, however, are the most important determinant of joint membership between states in the most institutionalized IGOs, which is congruent with security communities.     

Demand for democracy in resilient authoritarianism: evidence from rural China

This article investigates the sources of public demand for democratic institutions under authoritarian rule. While a growing body of literature recognizes that in authoritarian polities such as China, economic development does not lead to democratization in a linear fashion, our understanding of the sources of democratization in resilient authoritarianism remains limited. This article provides an empirical test of the three most compelling theories to subsequently emerge: modernization theory, social capital theory, and institutional theory. The results of a survey conducted in the countryside of Zhejiang and Sichuan provinces provide support for the institutional approach in understanding public demand for democracy in rural China, while the modernization theory and social capital theory are shown to be less useful. Specifically, results show that people working in the government system are core supporters of the regime, whereas income, education attainment, social trust, and one’s satisfaction with regime institutions turn out to be irrelevant and do not serve as direct sources of public demand for democracy. These results extend our understanding of the complex interaction between an authoritarian regime and its people, shedding new light on the democratic prospects for resilient authoritarianism.     

The impact of leader turnover on the onset and the resolution of WTO disputes

When national leaders are replaced, the incoming leader often represents different interests to those of his predecessor. Such shifts in national priorities affect both the onset of WTO disputes and the resolution of ongoing disputes. In particular, leader turnover increases the likelihood that a nation will be involved in a WTO dispute as either plaintiff or defendant, and, if a dispute is ongoing, then leader change in a defendant state increases the likelihood of significant concessions by the defendant. The impact of leader change on both the initiation and settlement of disputes is greater in non-democratic states than democratic states.     

A process tracing plausibility probe of uneven democratization's effects on cooperative dyads: The case of Zambia and Zimbabwe 1980–1993

In this article we conduct a plausibility probe of the hypothesis that uneven democratization decreases cooperation within primarily cooperative dyads. This hypothesis is derived from a combination of Remmer's theory of democratization and international cooperation with democratic peace theory. The case of cooperation and conflict between two small powers, Zambia and Zimbabwe, from the latter's independence in 1980 to 1993 fits Eckstein's criteria for a useful plausibility probe. In addition to overall, bilateral and regional interactions between the two countries, we examine relations in the political, economic, strategic, and physical environment issue areas. Methodologically, we combine time series analysis of events coded in the COPDAB format and interviews with policy makers. We find that, although net cooperation between the two countries remained positive during the entire 1980–1993 period, it decreased significantly overall and in economic issues after the beginning of the Zambian democratic transition in June 1990. Our data allow us to trace the process involved in this decline in net cooperation, ruling out some alternative explanations but not concurrent Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), and showing how even slightly uneven democratization was an important cause because it decreased similarity and trust, while not decreasing transparency, and increased uncertainty and thus nationalist responses. We conclude that this plausibility probe justifies further systematic research on the effects of uneven democratization on cooperative dyads to test our hypothesis on cases with and without SAPs, and suggests the utility of further probes of the effects of different types of uneven change on various types of dyads.     

Overcoming the weight of history: 'Getting to yes' in the Peru-Ecuador border dispute

This article presents and analyzes the elements of the Western Hemisphere's longest standing boundary dispute and the crucial role of the region's oldest multilateral conflict resolution mechanism in working out an historic agreement in October 1998. Other factors in combination were also critical for success: an existing international legal framework, multilevel bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, decisive leadership and statecraft, and public diplomacy. The analysis suggests that the final settlement is a significant milestone in international diplomacy, demonstrating that even the most deeply ingrained differences between states can be resolved by the patient and persistent efforts of all parties involved.     

Explaining Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo

This study explains the behavior of democratic states during wars of choice using an integrated decision model. Integrated models are an attractive choice for explaining multifaceted decisions, particularly when simpler, existing theories have an uneven or only partial ability to explain conflict behavior. To illustrate these points, this study assesses the behavior of key NATO members during the 1999 intervention in Kosovo. I compare the behavior of France, Germany, Italy, the U.K., and the U.S. with the expectations of theories of collective action, balance of threat neorealism, public opinion, and government institutional structures. As an alternative, I introduce a simple, integrated, decision-making model that incorporates the core concepts from the other explanations in a staged, conditional manner. The integrated model does a better job of explaining state behavior in Kosovo than do existing theories. The integrated model also is applicable to other conflicts. The results of this study, and the potential of integrated models, have implications for our thinking about foreign policy analysis, for behavior during military interventions and the fight against terrorism, and for future U.S. leadership of alliance and coalition war efforts.     

Deadly Doves: Liberal Nationalism and the Democratic Peace in the Soviet Successor States

This article's purpose is to assess the arguments of democratic peace scholars as they apply to the states of the former Soviet Union. The claim that liberalism is associated with nonviolent means of conflict resolution, in particular, is questionable in the case of newly independent states, in which liberalism bears a closer resemblance to nineteenth-century European liberal nationalism than it does to the universalist liberalism envisioned by theories of the democratic peace. I argue that this nonuniversalist form of liberalism is in fact widespread among the Soviet successor states and that, as a result, liberalism's implications for peace are not nearly as benign as had previously been believed. In other regards, however, the attitudes of elites, the mass public, and liberals are in fact fairly consistent with those posited by democratic peace theory, though relative elite bellicosity declines as the policy-making arena broadens. A democratic peace in the region is therefore viable but particularly vulnerable to national issues, as well as to the effects of concentration of political power in the hands of a narrow group of elites.     

Overcoming the weight of history: ‘Getting to yes’ in the Peru‐Ecuador border dispute

This article presents and analyzes the elements of the Western Hemisphere's longest standing boundary dispute and the crucial role of the region's oldest multilateral conflict resolution mechanism in working out an historic agreement in October 1998. Other factors in combination were also critical for success: an existing international legal framework, multilevel bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, decisive leadership and statecraft, and public diplomacy. The analysis suggests that the final settlement is a significant milestone in international diplomacy, demonstrating that even the most deeply ingrained differences between states can be resolved by the patient and persistent efforts of all parties involved.     

The Chicken or the Egg?: A Coevolutionary Approach to Disputed Issues and Militarized Conflict

Is state behavior influenced by the context in which it occurs, or does context arise because of the way in which states behave? I investigate these questions in the context of international disputes over issues and states’ militarized behavior. The prevalent assumption in interstate conflict research is that disputed issues are exogenous to militarization patterns. I question the validity of this assumption, arguing there are reasons to suspect certain states self-select into disputes. I use a coevolution modeling strategy to allow the existence of disputes and states’ behavior to mutually affect one another. I find disputes are not exogenous to states’ militarized behavior. States that resort to militarized behavior are more likely to dispute an issue than peaceful states. I also find evidence of behavioral contagion among states engaged in disputes: Militarized behavior begets militarized behavior.     

“Opportunity” and “willingness’ as ordering concepts in the study of war

The peace through trade hypothesis receives extensive support from a large empirical literature. However, extant research does not isolate whether this relationship holds for states that have fought in the past, or whether its influence following armed disputes is dependent upon the ways in which states settle their conflicts. Additionally, although recent research finds that imposed settlements are more pacifying than other forms of political settlement, these studies tend not to isolate factors associated with variation in the stability of imposed settlements. In this article, we examine how settlements condition the influence of trade on conflict recurrence, both to overcome a limitation in extant studies of trade and conflict, which tend to ignore the way states settle prior disputes, and to further an understanding of how post-conflict state interaction varies by (and within) settlement type. Looking at dyadic trade and recurrent conflict from 1885 to 2000, we find that imposed settlements foster a pacifying effect of trade, while negotiated settlements and failures to reach settlement lead to relationships in which trade has crosscutting effects on the stability of peace, resulting in an overall null effect of trade on conflict recurrence.     

Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior

This article investigates the influence of transnational ethnic alliances on the international interactions of states. Transnational ethnic alliances exist when both states in a dyad contain members of the same ethnic group. We argue that two types of dyads will experience higher levels of conflict than other dyads: (1) those where an advantaged minority in state A has an ethnic tie to a nonadvantaged minority in state B, and (2) those with a transnational ethnic alliance where the group in one of the states is politically mobilized. Using data from the COPDAB, Minorities at Risk, Polity II, COW, and Penn World Tables projects we find support for these contentions.     

Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics

Instead of assuming that all actors are equally likely to clash, and that they do so independently of previous clashes, rivalry analysis can focus on the small number of feuding dyads that cause much of the trouble in the international system. But the value added of this approach will hinge in part on how rivalries are identified. Rivalry dyads are usually identified by satisfying thresholds in the frequency of militarized disputes occurring within some prespecified interval of time. But this approach implies a number of analytical problems including the possibility that rivalry analyses are simply being restricted to a device for distinguishing between states that engage in frequent and infrequent conflict. An alternative approach defines rivalry as a perceptual categorizing process in which actors identify which states are sufficiently threatening competitors to qualify as enemies. A systematic approach to identifying these strategic rivalries is elaborated. The outcome, 174 rivalries in existence between 1816 and 1999 are named and compared to the rivalry identification lists produced by three dispute density approaches. The point of the comparison is not necessarily to assert the superiority of one approach over others as it is to highlight the very real costs and benefits associated with different operational assumptions. The question must also be raised whether all approaches are equally focused on what we customarily mean by rivalries. Moreover, in the absence of a consensus on basic concepts and measures, rivalry findings will be anything but additive even if the subfield continues to be monopolized by largely divergent dispute density approaches.     

Letting “the people(s)” decide: peace referendums and power-sharing settlements

Referendums have been used to legitimate power-sharing settlements in deeply divided societies transitioning from conflict. This article assesses the capacity of referendum rules to facilitate the “voice” of multiple groups or “peoples” in the decision to share power as a “constitutional moment.” Drawing on the constitutional referendums in Northern Ireland in 1998 and Iraq in 2005, the author demonstrates that referendum rules matter in highlighting the variable degrees of support for the elite-negotiated deal on the part of the contending groups. The institutional design process prior to the referendum is crucial for incentivising groups to support the settlement, particularly the previously dominant group. When faced with a choice between a simple majority threshold and countermajoritarian procedures, majoritarianism is appropriate only in so far as the main groups see their constitutional preferences satisfied and concurrent majorities can be secured. A qualified majority referendum threshold to protect a minority group is appropriate for divided states where the groups are regionally concentrated and when the groups agree to such rules. Important for the legitimation of power-sharing, referendums highlight the likely variable extent of approval on the part of the main groups, necessitating ongoing efforts to foster public support for the deal.     

Holding Out for Concession: The Quest for Gain in the Negotiation of International Agreements

This study examines partition's success in ending old and preventing new ethnic conflicts. Opponents of partition often claim that partition only invites (further) conflict by its inability to divide existing multiethnic countries in ways satisfying to all concerned ethnic groups. In contrast, proponents of partition argue that partition is the only ethnic conflict solution that provides ethnic separation, an element that is key if conflict prevention is of concern. By separating the belligerent groups, partition provides safety and a decrease in the need for interaction between groups that do not get along. When domestic and international violence is considered, partition's consequences largely depend on the timing of partition. In cases of partitions resulting from ethnic secessionist conflicts, there is a widespread continuation of serious domestic conflict but its frequency does decrease significantly, to a level that can be considered "normal." Internationally, dyads made up of violently partitioned countries avoid militarized conflict in more than one-third of the cases. In cases of peaceful (i.e., preventative) ethnic partitions, domestic conflict starts up in about half of the cases, but despite the significant increase in its frequency, the frequency remains "normal." Internationally, dyads made up of peacefully partitioned countries avoid militarized conflict almost completely. Accordingly, peaceful ethnic partitions produce dyads that are significantly less likely to engage in militarized conflicts and wars than dyads emerging from violent ethnic partitions. Contrary to some expectations, partitions do not create overwhelmingly nondemocratic countries; however, in cases of violent ethnic secessions, democratic institutions do not exhibit significant pacifying effect on subsequent domestic conflict. Important caveats notwithstanding, the overall results indicate that peaceful ethnic partitions have conflict management potential.