The intifada: Two assessments

Zeev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising ‐ Israel's Third Front. Edited and translated by Ina Friedman. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990. Pp.352. $22.95. ISBN 0–67530–3     

Democratization,Instability, and War: Israel's 2006 Conflicts with Hamas and Hezbollah

In 2006 Israel resumed military operations in the Gaza Strip and conducted a war in Lebanon following attacks by Hamas and Hezbollah, respectively. Due to the elections that had recently taken place in the Palestinian territories and Lebanon, these events seem to support the argument that democratizing nations are particularly war-prone. Yet the dynamics this perspective identifies as dangerous were largely absent. To address this puzzle, this paper offers three arguments. First, democratization enhanced the power of groups openly hostile to Israel, increasing Israel's perception of threat. Second, democratization was threatening because it occurred within highly divided societies governed by weak state institutions that allowed radical groups to attain political power. Finally, Israel's response to the increased threat posed by these groups was ultimately counterproductive because it further eroded the capacity of the Palestinian and Lebanese governments, heightened polarization within both societies, and therefore exacerbated the same conditions that made democratization threatening to begin with.     

The demise of Oslo and Hamas’s political engagement

Abstract

This article explores the consequences of the Oslo Accords on the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas. It shows how the movement positioned itself from the onset in opposition to the treaty and ensuing peace negotiations, rejecting the changes which took place within the Palestinian political establishment; namely, the creation of the interim self-governing Palestinian Authority. It demonstrates how Hamas’s refusal to grant the Oslo Accords any legitimacy was a primary factor in its decision to boycott the first Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections in 1996. With the failure of the peace negotiations and the subsequent eruption of the Second Palestinian Intifada, the framework for the implementation of the Oslo Accords was seen to have effectively collapsed. This article argues that it is this perceived ‘demise’ of the peace process which—to a large extent—underpinned Hamas’s decision to participate in the PLC elections a decade later, in 2006. In mapping this transition, the article explores the factors motivating Hamas’s subsequent entry into the Palestinian political establishment.     

Israel's Counter-Terrorism Policy: How Effective?

The percentage of Israelis killed by terrorism is higher than in any other democracy. The article analyzes the threats Israel has faced, the impact terrorism has had on Israel, and the counter-terrorism policies Israel has adopted. Terrorism has had a decisive effect on Israeli elections and national security decisions, but not the economy. Israeli counter-terrorism has often been conducted without a coherent overall policy, has failed to reflect and conflicted with broader objectives, and has greatly undermined Israel's international standing. Conversely, it has enabled Israel to live in relative security and thrive, and provided its leaders with the latitude to pursue various policies, including peace, should they wish to do so.     

Change Nobody Believes In: Obama and the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict

Despite the promise of ‘change’ in President Barack Obama's early dealings with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the policy that has since emanated from the White House was in fact commensurate with those of preceding administrations. Rather than heralding a new direction for American engagement with the conflict, the Obama Administration had displayed more patterns of continuity than change in its dealings with both parties. Specifically, by continuing to act as “Israel's attorney” during negotiations, the Obama team had in effect negated the president's early pledges to act as an honest broker in the conflict. In assessing the (in)effectiveness of the Administration's management of the Israeli–Palestinian issue, it seems that on-going mediation efforts to revive the moribund peace process have exhausted their potential. Arbitration may be explored as a more effective method to resolve the Israeli–Palestinian territorial dispute.     

The Security Imperative in Counterterror Operations: The Israeli Fight Against Suicidal Terror

ABSTRACT

Israel has had a long tradition of fighting international and Palestinian terror. This article looks at how Israel counterterrorism strategy and tactics have developed since the establishment of the State in 1948. By initially providing a working definition of terrorism, the article then goes to show how Israel has sought to defend itself from different Palestinian terror tactics. This article shows how Israeli security forces have struggled safeguarding, and sometimes disregarded Palestinian human rights. This article concludes by arguing that given the responsibility of democratic governments of defending their citizens from imminent terror attacks, such governments often find themselves paradoxically violating human rights. Despite attempts to reduce such human rights abuses, governments will never do so at the expense of their own security.     

“These People Have an Irrevocable Right to Self-Government”: United States Policy and the Palestinian Question, 1977–1979

Upon entering office, Carter Administration officials placed a heavy emphasis on integrating human rights into United States foreign policy. They also sought to contain festering Arab–Israeli tensions in the Middle East. The intersection of these two issues was the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. This article examines the Administration's attempts to solve that conflict and to bring peace to the region. It argues that policymakers developed a sincere dedication to safeguarding Palestinian rights, but that their understanding of those rights was limited in scope and defined through the lens of United States security and strategic interests. In spite of a good-faith effort to satisfy Palestinian desires while maintaining a constructive relationship with Israel, the Administration ultimately failed to alter the status quo because of regional developments. As Washington's strategic thinking changed, so did the urgency of Palestinian rights.     

Osirak and the Counter-Proliferation Puzzle

This article focuses on the efforts made by Israel to stymie Iraq's nuclear program from 1974 to 1981. It argues that to fully understand the effects of Israel's campaign, its nonmilitary components need to be addressed, rather than focusing chiefly on the 1981 bombing of the Osirak reactor. While existing views hold that the bombing was counterproductive, this study finds Israel's overall campaign to have been a sophisticated and effective effort at curtailing Saddam Hussein's program. The campaign's main achievement was in buying time that allowed external events to take place, building towards the eventual collapse of Saddam's nuclear program. While Israel's campaign demonstrates that counterproliferation can work, there are instances where it can be highly counterproductive. Buying time can also be achieved without the use of force, through coercive means, as demonstrated by the Iranian case over the previous decade. However, various gradations of military intervention remain an important tool for preventing nuclear proliferation, as demonstrated by the cases of Osirak and the 2007 destruction of the Syrian nuclear reactor in al-Kibar.     

The intifada: Palestinian adaptation to Israeli counterinsurgency tactics

In December 1987 the uprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip significantly changed the nature of the Palestinian threat to Israel and pushed the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians into the forefront of the Palestinian‐Israeli conflict. This article examines the effects of the Israeli counterinsurgency tactics on the Palestinian strategy from the period of 1967 through 1987. It proposes that the implementation of Israel's counterinsurgency policy since 1967 was a crucial factor in creating the conditions for revolution and influencing the Palestinians’ adaptation of their tactics, culminating in the intifada.     

The militant palestinian organizations and the Arab‐Israeli peace process

The current Arab‐Israeli peace negotiations have normalized frequent and open contacts between Israel and its neighbors. This new situation is primarily the result of Operation ‘Desert Storm’ and the Soviet Union's dissolution. Both events forced the Middle Eastern states and sub‐national organizations to re‐evaluate their perceptions of one another, as well as of the degree of support they might expect from their superpower patrons. This article begins by examining the ways in which these events have affected those countries and organizations which chose to participate in the peace process and finally focuses on the policies of the Palestinian national movement ‐ specifically the groups which are opposed to the negotiations and have vowed to undermine them. It argues that these groups seek to subvert any peace treaty which the talks may produce and that the moderate Palestinian leadership has proven incapable of controlling them. It concludes that unless this occurs, it will be impossible to implement any agreement.     

Ballots,Bargains, and Bombs: Terrorist Targeting of Spoiler Opportunities

Benjamin Netanyahu's come-from-behind victory over Shimon Peres in the Israeli national elections of May 1996, following an apparent intensification of Palestinian terrorism over the course of that spring, reminded observers of the political ramifications of terrorism. Since May 1996 was also the month in which Israel reentered Final Status negotiations with a Palestinian delegation in Taba, Egypt, the timing of this surge in violence encourages us to ask if terrorists regularly conceive of elections and rounds of negotiations as “spoiler opportunities,” or opportune times to undermine peaceful political processes. We address this question in the context of Israel's long‐running experience with elections, negotiations, and terrorism. We hypothesize that attacks resulting in fatalities are likely to increase in periods immediately surrounding Israeli general elections and key rounds of negotiations affecting the fate of the Palestinian population. Negative binomial event count analyses of the period 1970–2007 suggest that violent opponents indeed viewed the periods preceding negotiations and the ends of electoral cycles as “spoiler opportunities.”     

Foreign affairs in the Italian party congresses; the PCI

Incentives are capable of creating favourable environments in which peace processes can make progress. This is especially true for mega incentives, which can assist in overcoming political and socio-psychological barriers to peace. In Israeli–Arab peacemaking, incentives have not yet proven efficient. To date, they have been used in a limited and inefficient manner. In 2010, the US offered Israel incentives in return for an extension of Israel's settlement freeze. This move failed due to unfavourable political conditions and scepticism regarding its ability to bring about a major breakthrough. Nevertheless, it signaled that incentives are now an integral tool in US diplomacy and could serve as a step towards crafting a multi-national mega incentive package for Middle East peace.     

Millenarian groups and law enforcement agencies: The lessons of Waco

Why do violent movements participate in elections? To answer this question, we examine Hamas's formation of the Reform and Change Party and its iconic victory in the 2006 elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council. We argue that Hamas's formation of this party was a logical step, following nearly two decades of participation in local and municipal elections. Hamas's need to attract resources from external donors, who make funding decisions based on civilian support for the movement, best explains why Hamas decided to participate in local elections in the early 1990s, taking Hamas on a path that eventually led to its 2006 legislative victory. Hamas's foray into elections was consistent with its dual strategy of directing violence against Israel and building Palestinian support through welfare services. We demonstrate that changes in political opportunities (Fatah's decline and the increase in Hamas's popularity), institutional incentives (lax electoral laws and the holding of municipal elections), and the rise of moderate voices within Hamas explain the timing of its entry into legislative elections. Finally, we discuss Hamas's electoral victory, the need for cooperation between Fatah and Hamas, and the role played by international actors as significant factors influencing prospects for peace and democratization in the region.     

The nature of Islamic fundamentalism in Israel

This article focuses on the nature of Islamic fundamentalism in Israel. The interplay of Islamic fundamentalism's attitude toward the Israeli‐Palestinian conflict and the extent of the movement's integration into Israeli political life is explored. In addressing these themes, the history of Israeli Islamic fundamentalism is reviewed from the pre‐state period through the present, as are effects of both internal and external factors on the movement's development. In general, the movement has followed a pragmatic line, although its future endeavors and nature will undoubtedly be influenced by the continuing peace process.     

What Makes Negative Frames Resonant? Hamas and the Appeal of Opposition to the Peace Process

Increasingly, scholars are applying Social Movement Theory to explore how radical Islamist groups strategically employ framing to legitimize the use of violence. What has not been explicitly examined, however, is under what conditions radical frames are more resonant with the public than more moderate alternatives. This article argues that the strength of a particular frame depends on the credibility of the competing claim-makers. Drawing on public opinion polls from the Palestinian Territories, the article shows that the resonance of Hamas’ frames vis-à-vis the peace process between 1993 and 2006 depended on the ability of the Palestinian leadership to maintain its legitimacy. Since the Gaza take-over and Hamas’ shift to a position of leadership rather than opposition party, the organization's inability to deliver in the economic realm or to even feign any progress regarding the peace process damaged its credibility and reputation. Accordingly, its frames vis-à-vis the peace process also started losing their resonance with the public. An understanding of the dynamics of credibility can also help explain the continued moves towards national reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah.     

Influencing Negotiation Willingness in the Middle East: The Potential Contributions of Private Actors

Numerous efforts to solve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict through diplomacy have taken place over the last four decades. To shed light on this dilemma in this article, the role that private actors and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can play to enhance the negotiation willingness of nonstate armed groups was examined. It was argued that the NGOs in particular could play key roles in promoting the negotiation willingness of nonstate actors and also in influencing their internal dynamics and increasing their cohesion. Specifically, we examine two pairs of efforts to resolve the conflict in Israel and Palestine: the “Road Map” and the track two Geneva Initiative of 2003, and the Olmert Peace Plan and Jimmy Carter's visit to the Middle East in 2008. In the first pair, NGO efforts yielded unexpected results. The Palestinians were ready to compromise even though the deal offered by the Israelis did not seem very generous. In the second pair, the reaction of the Palestinians to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's generous peace offer seemed especially puzzling, illustrating, the internal dynamics between the Palestinian factions. Negotiation willingness was closely related to cohesion, and that cohesion plays an important role in conflict negotiations. President Jimmy Carter's efforts in 2008 to enhance cohesion among the Palestinians illustrated the potential that NGOs have to complement official negotiations.     

(En)gendered Security? The Complexities of Women's Inclusion in Peace Processes

As peacebuilding discourses increasingly stress the importance of including women, to what degree have security-related practices taken heed? It has been over 10 years since the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security, yet it remains a “confused and confusing” tool for scholars and practitioners in assessing women's inclusion in peacebuilding. This article adds to our understanding on women and peacebuilding by engaging 1325 as an operationalizable concept and then applying it to peace agreements to understand how women's security is addressed as part of formal peace processes. Given previous difficulties in operationalizing 1325’s mandate, this article engages it as a three-level concept useful for studying the ways in which women are “brought into” security, called (en)gendered security. Using this concept of (en)gendered security, I assess intrastate peace agreements between 1991 and 2010 to elucidate where and how women are included in peace processes. This article illustrates the potential of a systematized and practical approach to security embodied in 1325 and a preliminary discussion of what accounts for better approaches to (en)gendered security during peacebuilding.     

Israel's entry to Africa, 1956–61

From 1956 to 1961, Israel established a presence in Africa that constituted a remarkable diplomatic achievement. When the Gold Coast became Ghana in March 1957, Israel's consulate in Accra became its first embassy in Africa. Israel experienced its first serious setback in Africa in January 1961, when Ghana, Guinea and Mali signed an anti‐Israel declaration at the Casablanca conference. This initiative of Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser condemned Israel as ‘an instrument in the service of imperialism’. Yet while Israel feared it had lost what it had achieved in sub‐Saharan Africa since 1957, the toll was primarily psychological, for the Israelis had, by 1961, achieved their main objective in Africa.     

A critical analysis of the NBC news special “six days plus twenty years: A dream is dying”

The July 1, 1987 NBC News documentary on Israel's occupation of the West Bank neglected the context of the occupation, failing to give any historical perspective on the Israeli‐Palestinian dispute. The nature of the Palestinian opposition— characterized by intransigence and violence—was virtually ignored by NBC. The unbalanced coverage of the conflict served only to confuse the viewer and distort the salient issues involved.     

The “Somalinisation” of terrorism and counterterrorism in Kenya: the case of refoulement

Kenya’s state discourse on terrorism and counterterrorism securitises Somali refugees and refugee camps. Using the securitisation theory, a perspective of social constructivism as a theoretical framework, the article attempts to establish the relationship between the securitisation of Somali refugees and refugee camps and refoulement as a measure to counter the securitisation. The arguments raised are the speech acts of Kenya’s securitising actors expressed in the terrorism discourse present Somali refugees and refugee camps as existential threats to peace and security in the country. Consequently, their speech acts expressed in the counterterrorism discourse present non-refoulement of the refugees as an existential threat to national security so as to justify, to the targeted audience, the adoption of refoulement, a norm-violating measure, to counter the fear of the threat of terrorism from Somali refugees and refugee camps. Terrorism and counterterrorism in Kenya have, therefore, been “Somalinised”. The conclusion offers ways of preventing the “Somalinisation” of terrorism and counterterrorism in Kenya.