Wake-up call for the Lowlands: Dutch counterterrorism from a comparative perspective

The Netherlands is one of the few countries in Western Europe that did not experience massive terrorist attacks and where counterterrorism actions did not feature prominently on the political agenda. Until quite recently, the Netherlands had neither emergency legislation for terrorist incidents nor a specific Act that criminalized terrorist offences. In response to the European Union framework legislation, a bill was produced that penalizes participation in a terrorist organization, flanked by a vast array of other measures. This article analyses the policy, institutional and legislative responses to terrorism in the Netherlands and compares these with responses from other European states. The events of 9/11, as well as the political and public anxiety over the murders of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh, acted as a firm wake-up call for the Netherlands insofar as the threat of terrorism is concerned. Whilst most countries adopted an incremental approach to countering terrorism, the Netherlands witnessed a radical shift in criminal justice and law enforcement policy following these events.     

Cancer,HIV, and terrorism: translating public health models for prevention and control to counter-terrorism

What can cancer and HIV tell us about terrorism? How would we proceed if terrorism were a disease? A comparison of cancer and HIV can suggest alternative ways of conceptualizing terrorism and counter-terrorism using contrasting disease models that emphasize differing connections between etiology and prevention and control. A public health model also can help us think about terrorism as a basic research problem to be translated into therapeutic and preventive applications rather than primarily as a policy or political problem that makes only selective use of research studies. Through this re-conceptualization of terrorism as a basic and translational research challenge, we can draw upon the examples of the U.S. ‘War on Cancer’ and response to the ‘Aids Epidemic’ to help identify gaps in organizing academic and other resources to wage the ‘War on Terrorism.’ Recognizing and addressing these gaps could ultimately pave the way for more effective strategies in understanding and responding to the significant threats posed by terrorism, from the identification of factors that produce terrorist acts to the implementation of informed measures for the prevention and control of terrorist, and even proto-terrorist, activity.     

What Makes Terrorism Salient? Terrorist Strategies,Political Competition,and Public Opinion

This article analyzes the determinants of terrorism saliency in public opinion. It is usually assumed that after a terrorist attack, terrorism becomes automatically salient. However, this assumption is only true in those countries where terrorist attacks are exceptional events. In democracies that have suffered domestic terrorism for decades, the evolution of terrorism saliency does not only depend on the frequency or intensity of terrorist attacks. In this article it is claimed that the tactics carried out by terrorist groups (the type of victim, especially) and the dynamics of political competition (especially the ideology of the incumbent) are also factors that explain the evolution of terrorism saliency. The article also analyzes how these two factors interact with citizens’ predispositions to explain variation in their reactions to terrorist threat. The empirical test relies on a novel database from monthly public opinion surveys in Spain from 1993 to 2012.     

The Homegrown Threat: State Strength,Grievance, and Domestic Terrorism

Scholars maintain that, similar to insurgency, terrorist violence is precipitated by both relative deprivation and state weakness. Yet aggrieved minority groups within a country should turn to terrorism when they are weak relative to the state rather than strong. Empirical evidence shows minority group discrimination and fragile political institutions to independently increase domestic terror attacks. But it remains unclear whether grievances drive domestic terrorism in both strong and weak states. Using data from 172 countries between 1998 and 2007, we find that for strong states the presence of minority discrimination leads to increased domestic terrorism, while for weak states the presence of minority discrimination actually leads to less domestic terrorism. Consequently, increasing state capacity may not be a panacea for antistate violence, as nonstate actors may simply change their strategy from insurgency or guerrilla warfare to terrorism. Efforts to reduce terrorist violence must focus on reducing grievance by eliminating discriminatory policies at the same time that measures to improve state capacity are enacted.     

International Cooperation,Spoiling, and Transnational Terrorism

Do interstate relations influence the sources and targets of transnational terrorism? A considerable body of recent research suggests that the answer to this question is yes, and that one state may sponsor terrorist attacks to weaken the bargaining positions of other states. We suggest, in contrast, that positive or cooperative actions invite terrorist attacks from a different source: nonstate groups wishing to spoil interstate cooperation that they oppose. We assess this argument with a dyadic dataset using monthly data on transnational terrorist attacks and cooperative and noncooperative actions between states. Our results suggest that spoiling in response to interstate cooperation is an important determinant of transnational terrorism.     

Terrorism and Party Systems in the States of India

The incidence of domestic terrorism varies dramatically across the states of India. This study demonstrates that important state-level differences in political party systems help to explain different levels of terrorist activity within the Indian states. Analysis of statistical data on terrorist attacks as well as other political, social, and macroeconomic indicators of the twenty-seven Indian states and the Delhi municipality from 1998 to 2006, determines that Indian states characterized by multiparty electoral competition, a diffusion of legislative seat distribution among parties, and minority party government are more likely to experience terrorist attacks than states with stable, two-party systems and majority party rule. These party system features increase the likelihood that terrorism will occur because they nurture the political conditions under which terrorism is likely to flourish and because they impair government ability to craft coherent and effective responses to terrorism.     

The Evolution of Jihadist Terrorism in Morocco

Over the last few years, Moroccans have been disproportionately involved in jihadist terrorism. Morocco has been increasingly identified as one of the largest producers of terrorists and insurgents in Afghanistan, Iraq, and throughout Europe. This article examines the factors behind the emergence of jihadist terrorism in Morocco, and how this terrorist threat has gone beyond this country's borders. Three factors have contributed to this development: the influence of global jihad on potential Moroccan jihadists; the growing Islamization of the country; and deteriorating socioeconomic conditions. In analyzing these variables, special attention will be paid to the Casablanca terrorist attacks on May 16, 2003, marking the debut of suicide terrorism in Morocco. The article will also examine the principal counterterrorist initiatives Morocco has implemented in response to this threat.     

俄罗斯与美国反恐战略之比较

在当今世界,俄罗斯和美国是遭受恐怖主义威胁最为严重的两个大国,反恐战略在俄罗斯和美国国家安全战略中都是不可或缺的组成部分。俄美两国在反恐战略的形成、恐怖主义威胁判断、反恐目标、军事反恐战略实践和国际反恐合作等方面有相同之处,也存在显著差别。随着俄美领导人的更换,两国反恐战略都在调整,并且选择了不同的战略取向。反恐是俄美两国合作的重要领域,但俄美反恐战略的分歧可能导致双方之间爆发摩擦乃至冲突。     

State Capacity and Terrorism: A Two-Dimensional Approach

Conventional wisdom suggests that dissident groups use terrorism when they face an overwhelmingly more powerful state, yet attacks in developing countries have predominated in the post-Cold War era, suggesting that terrorism is an increasingly weak state phenomenon. Cross-national studies of terrorism find mixed results for how common measures of state capacity influence terrorism. We argue that these indeterminate findings are due in part to a partial understanding of both what constitutes state capacity and how different aspects of state strength or weakness relate to the propensity of groups to use terrorism. We decompose state capacity into two dimensions that we theorize are particularly relevant to dissident groups: military capacity, or the ability to project conventional military force, and bureaucratic/administrative capacity. Our analysis supports the claim that terrorist attacks are more frequently targeted at states with large, technologically sophisticated militaries but less frequently targeted at states with higher bureaucratic and administrative capacity. We also compare two militarily capable states, France and Russia, that have had different recent experiences with terrorism to help illustrate the causal mechanisms involved. Evidence from our models and cases suggest that states can be capable in different ways, and these various capabilities create differing incentives for using terror as a strategic and tactical tool.     

The Escalation of Terrorism: Microlevel Violence and Interstate Conflict

Following the 9/11 attacks, transnational terrorism is seen as a potential catalyst for interstate war. Yet, the willingness of states to fight in response to terrorist violence is puzzling, given that the damage created by terrorism is relatively marginal. This raises the question: if terrorists are so weak and create such little damage, and interstate conflicts are so costly, why are states willing to initiate seemingly ruinous wars to fight terrorist groups? This essay proposes an explanation to address this question using current theoretical and empirical research on terrorism and interstate violence. Recent work indicates that while terrorists appear weak compared to states, terrorists can wield significant coercive power in smaller geographic areas. I argue that if these areas are strategically crucial to the government, such as areas with oil wells or mineral deposits, terrorist activity may precipitously weaken states relative to their rivals. I therefore argue that even if groups are only capable of killing at low levels, terrorism may lead to macrolevel power shifts, which may contribute to interstate violence.     

Preventive War and Permissive Normative Order

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. president George W. Bush articulated a new national security strategy based on striking terrorist organizations and the states that harbor them before they could endanger the United States. Though expressed in the language of preemption, the Bush strategy embodied a far more problematic doctrine of preventive warfare. Whereas the grounds for preemption lie in evidence of a credible, imminent threat, the basis for prevention rests on the suspicion of an incipient, contingent threat. We argue that an American national security strategy that embraces preventive war will set an inauspicious precedent, undermining normative restraints on when and how states may use military force.     

Canada's counter‐terrorism experience

This article traces Canada's experience with modern terrorism from its beginnings in 1963 to the present, with particular emphasis on the policies and crisis management techniques which have evolved over those 30 years. A brief review of the Canadian system of government and constitutional framework is provided to assist with understanding Canada's response to the terrorist threat. While Canadians have largely escaped the tragedies of domestic and international terrorism which have plagued other parts of the world since 1968, it is also true that Canada had an early experience of modern terrorism when the Front de liberation du Quebec (FLQ) began its campaign of politically motivated violence in Montreal on the night of 7 March 1963. Canada has been applauded for the firm and expeditious manner in which it dealt with the FLQ threat, and for the security provided for major international events held on Canadian soil (e.g., 1976 Olympic Games, 1981 Economic Summit). Beginning in 1982, however, a series of terrorist incidents brought about a fundamental reassessment which led to the introduction of major policies and measures ‐ based on the ‘lead Minister’ concept ‐ that continue to form the basis of Canada's approach to counter‐terrorism.     

A Critical Perspective on Terrorism: Case Study of Jundallah and Jeish ul-Adl in Iran

ABSTRACT

An extensive body of traditional terrorism research exists where the focus is on Iran as a terrorist state and a terrorism sponsor. This article explores an alternative terrorism narrative by examining the non-state actors, Jundallah and Jeish ul-Adl. The deficiency of information in the literature is addressed by applying the first and second-order critique approach of Richard Jackson’s knowledge, power and politics theoretical framework in contrast with the traditional terrorism studies approach. A first-order critique seeks to destabilise the accepted knowledge that Iran is both a terrorist state and a terrorism sponsor. This provides the grounds to study other aspects of “knowing” in relation to the second-order critique, where a critical ground outside the discourse suggests that Iranian officials have declared that the non-state terrorist actors of Jundallah and Jeish ul-Adl constitute a threat to Iran’s political stability. The outcome of the analyses here bridges the gap between the new aspect of terrorism, the non-state actors, and critical terrorism studies in order to contest the traditional discussion of terrorism in Iran. The rationale behind new terrorism varies and necessitates that new meanings and strategies be adopted in relation to Iran.     

东南亚反恐难点和走向及云南国际大通道建设的对策

东南亚地区的恐怖袭击活动在最近几年异常活跃 ,恐怖爆炸与袭击此起彼伏 ,形势令人担忧。很显然 ,东南亚已经变成了恐怖分子活动的重灾区之一。日益猖獗的恐怖活动给东南亚地区的安全、稳定与发展造成了极大的威胁。在今后相当一段时间内本地区很可能仍是反恐的主要场所 ①,成为“反恐的第二阵线”(布什语)。伊斯兰教作为东南亚地区的一种外来宗教 ,其传入后大量地融入了当地的本土文化因素 ,因此一般认为东南亚的伊斯兰教是比较温和的。但是巴厘岛爆炸案等事件却使人们开始关注东南亚伊斯兰教极端主义势力。这里恐怖主义网络异常活跃 ,各种…     

The EU's approach post-September 11: global terrorism as a multidimensional law enforcement challenge

In response to the threat of terrorism following 9/11, the European Union has opted for a clear cross-border law enforcement approach that is quite distinct from the putative ‘war on terror’. This choice has been determined by factors of history, divergent threat perceptions, relative value orientations and restricted competences. And yet, far from limiting itself to a traditional ‘internal’ law enforcement focus, the EU has developed an extensive multidimensional approach that combines legislative and operational, repressive and preventive, internal and external, as well as institutional, measures. But weaknesses persist: the preference given by member states to instruments of cooperation and coordination, rather than integration, as well as the poor implementation of many agreed-upon measures, negatively weigh against the effectiveness of the EU's multidimensional law enforcement approach. Legitimacy deficits also exist owing to limited parliamentary and judicial control. These deficits will need to be addressed to reinforce the credibility of the EU's approach as a viable ‘European’ alternative to the US ‘war on terror’.     

Immigrants and undesirables: “terrorism” and the “terrorist” in 1930s France

This article investigates French understandings of the terms “terrorism” and “terrorist” in the period of the late Third Republic when a series of assassinations, murders and bombings suggested that France was dangerously exposed to the threat of terror. The article deconstructs contemporary understandings of the phenomenon, showing that, if a variety of actions were labelled “terrorist”, the term was deployed in particular in relation to matters of foreignness. It was believed that immigrants, refugees and foreign secret agents imported terrorist violence to France. French citizens did not – could not even – perpetrate terrorism. Parallels may be drawn between discussions of citizenship in the wake of twenty-first century acts of terrorism and manifestations of such violence during the 1930s when notions of terrorism, Frenchness and foreignness were intimately connected.     

Information terrorism: Political violence in the information age

Information warfare represents a threat to American national security and defense. There are two general methods in which a terrorist might employ an information terrorist attack: (1) when information technology (IT) is a target, and/or (2) when IT is the tool of a larger operation. The first method would target an information system for sabotage, either electronic or physical, thus destroying or disrupting the information system itself and any information infrastructure (e.g., power, communications, etc.) dependent upon it. The second would manipulate and exploit an information system, altering or stealing data, or forcing the system to perform a function for which it was not meant (such as spoofing air traffic control). A perennial dilemma of combating terrorism in a democratic society is finding the right balance between civil liberties and civil security. The special problems associated with IT are examined. The US national security establishment needs to use a flexible, integrated response to counter information terrorists ‐ one which employs information warfare tactics tailored to counter gray‐area phenomena, but which also pools resources from ‘conventional’ counter‐terrorism and law enforcement authorities.     

新时期东南亚地区反恐斗争的难点及走势

"9·11"事件已过去近10年,其间世界各地的恐怖事件不断,东南亚地区也不例外,这对东南亚地区的安全、稳定与发展造成了极大的威胁。面对恐怖主义的威胁,东南亚各国政府日渐认识到合作反恐的重要性。     

Framing terrorism: geography-based media coverage variations of the 2004 commuter train bombings in Madrid and the 2009 twin suicide car bombings in Baghdad

Written media mould how civil society perceives acts of terrorism. In employing different framing techniques, news articles develop a unique narrative that influences how readers comprehend an attack. Past studies of the relationship between the media and terrorism ignore how media portrayals of terrorist attacks vary based on the attacks’ geographic location. By comparing two similar terrorist attacks, one that occurred in the West – Madrid, Spain – and the other in the East – Baghdad, Iraq – the paper seeks to explore how media coverage of terrorist attacks that occur in different geographic locations varies. Employing news frame analysis reveals how coverage of the 11 March 2004 commuter train bombings in Madrid differs from the 25 October 2009 double suicide bombings in Baghdad. Coverage of an attack on a Western nation compared to one on an Eastern nation contributes to Islamophobia and exacerbates an us–them mentality. Simply accepting information published in news articles at face value inhibits forming rational conclusions about the nature of terrorism.