Political Markets, Bond Markets, and the Effects of Uncertainty: A Cross-National Analysis

One of the critical challenges of contemporary democracy is securing a balance between the markets of representation and the markets of exchange and capital within democracies. This article explores the effect that political markets have upon capital markets' performance as measured by the market risks within the long-term government bond markets in nineteen democracies of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) between 1955 and 1992. Our theory linking political markets and capital markets will be developed around the logic of transaction cost economics. We will argue that critical aspects of transaction costs within political markets generate corresponding transaction costs and risks within capital markets thereby reducing market efficiency. Specifically, we demonstrate that, based on cross-national evidence drawn from three panels over the time period 1955–1992, stochastic political markets generate transaction costs within long-term government bond markets, the consequences of which are reflected in rising market risk within these capital markets. Our pooled cross-sectional sample confirms that stochasticity in institutional structure presents trade-offs for democracy. Stochasticity may reflect more responsive and generally sensitive representative institutions, but often at the price of risk-laden capital markets. We consider the implications of these findings at the conclusion of the article.     

Attitudes of the British Political Elite towards the Soviet Union

This article is an examination of the attitudes of the British political elite towards the Soviet Union and an assessment of the influence such attitudes had upon British foreign policy between March and August 1939. Through a detailed analysis of individuals including Cabinet ministers and those politicians elsewhere referred to as the 'anti-appeasers', the article contributes to the 'counterrevisionist' position concerning war origins. Thus it does not accept that the British government was constrained by factors outside of its control and instead argues that an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance was not concluded because of the failure of British ministers to put aside their anti-Soviet prejudices.     

Attitudes of the British Political Elite towards the Soviet Union

This article is an examination of the attitudes of the British political elite towards the Soviet Union and an assessment of the influence such attitudes had upon British foreign policy between March and August 1939. Through a detailed analysis of individuals including Cabinet ministers and those politicians elsewhere referred to as the 'anti-appeasers', the article contributes to the 'counterrevisionist' position concerning war origins. Thus it does not accept that the British government was constrained by factors outside of its control and instead argues that an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance was not concluded because of the failure of British ministers to put aside their anti-Soviet prejudices.     

Political terrorism in South‐East Asia

This article will provide an overview of one specific non‐military threat that is beginning to assume greater prominence on south‐east Asia's broadened security agenda: political terrorism.¹ Although by no means new to the south‐east Asian environment, for much of the twentieth century its importance was sidelined and, in a sense ‘contained’, by the more pressing concern over US‐Soviet nuclear rivalry. With the end of the Cold War, however, the ‘bottle has been uncorked’ on a variety of lower‐level threats, with issues such as terrorism now taking on greater prominence and relevance in their own right as significant regional and national security concerns.²     

日本政坛的“新国家主义”——一股迈向政治大国的暗流

冷战结束后,日本政坛泛起一股“新国家主义”思潮,其目的是谋求日本在国际政治中的大国地位。在这股暗流的涌动下日本鹰派政治家们采取了一系列步骤,其主要表现为:加强以军事同盟为主的日美关系、修改和平宪法进一步强调集体自卫权、美化甚至否定日本侵略亚洲国家的历史、向青少年灌输极端民族主义色彩浓厚的皇国史观、大规模扩充军事力量并鼓吹拥有核武器等,令人堪忧。这股暗流必将对亚太地区的政治局势的走向以及我国的国家安全产生不确定因素,颇值关注。     

The Spirit of Ulysses? Ideology and British Appeasement in the 1930s

The British government's appeasement of fascism in the 1930s derived not only from economic, political, and strategic constraints, but also from the personal ideologies of the policy makers. Widespread guilt about the terms of the Versailles Treaty and tensions with France created sympathy for German revisionism, but the Cabinet properly recognized that Nazi Germany represented the gravest threat to peace in the 1930s. Fear of war and the recognition that Britain would have to tolerate peaceful change underlay attempts to appease the dictators, culminating in the Munich agreement in September 1938. After Munich, continued German belligerence, the Kristallnacht, and British intelligence assessments indicating that Hitler was prepared to attack the Western powers led to a reassessment of appeasement. The British government gave security guarantees to several European countries, seeking to deter future aggression and to lay the groundwork for a successful war against Germany should it prove necessary. While most of the British elite detested communism, anti-communist views did not govern British policy; security considerations required Soviet support in Eastern Europe, and Britain and France made a determined effort to secure Soviet support for the Peace Front.     

The MAD Who Wasn't There: Soviet Reactions to the Late Cold War Nuclear Balance

What do nuclear weapons mean for the stability of the military balance? Mutually assured destruction (MAD) describes a stalemated balance of power where nuclear adversaries possess survivable retaliatory capabilities that ensure neither side can escape devastation in an all-out nuclear war. Moreover, the strong form of this empirical claim, which one might term “deep MAD,” is that mutual vulnerability is an inalterable and unchangeable condition. Drawing from recently declassified primary sources, we test several of deep MAD's premises and predictions on one of its foundational cases: Soviet nuclear policy during the second half of the Cold War. We find that Soviet leaders remained seriously concerned about the nuclear balance even in an allegedly deep-MAD environment where warheads numbered in the tens of thousands. Indeed, Soviet leaders were uncertain that they could indefinitely maintain a secure second strike despite strenuous efforts. The reason for these discrepancies, we argue, is that the nuclear balance is actually more malleable than commonly admitted. The possibility that MAD might one day be escaped meant that US attempts to manipulate the nuclear balance during the latter part of the Cold War could carry political weight, even while MAD was still possible.     

Explaining Civil-Military Relations in Complex Political Environments: India and Pakistan in Comparative Perspective

This article argues that military intervention into politics can only be understood by studying both the nature of threats and of domestic political arrangements. I offer a theory of the military in politics built around the interaction between threat configuration, political institutionalization, and civilian government legitimacy. The argument is tested with paired-comparison case studies of Indian and Pakistani civil-military relations since independence. Despite their similarities at the time of partition, these two militaries took completely different political trajectories. The cases reveal how structures of domestic politics interact with military threat perceptions to explain civilians' ability to maintain varying levels of control over the military.     

Refugee movements in the post-Cold War era

"This article briefly describes the scope and dimensions of contemporary refugee movements by analyzing some of the forces which shape these flows. Democratization, problems of nationality and minority rights, and structural, political, economic, environmental and social changes in the post-Cold War world (especially in large parts of the developing world and in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union), are likely to result in growing numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons in the years ahead. Refugees and asylum seekers are increasingly regarded not only as a major humanitarian challenge but as a political problem and a threat to the national security of Western states. Refugee policy involves much more than defining or adjudicating claims for asylum, safe haven and refugee status for those who seek to enter or stay in the West. It is now apparent that an effective response to these issues will have to involve major Western foreign policy and international actions." (SUMMARY IN ENG)     

Youth employment and post-war development in Jaffna,northern Sri Lanka

Jaffna District in northern Sri Lanka has recently emerged from three decades of violence and isolation, leading to a diverse array of political, social and economic issues. This article critically analyses the links between youth employment and the post-war reconstruction and development of this region. Unemployment among youth is regarded as a potential threat to the stability of the country during the post-war period, and it is argued that only through the active engagement of Sri Lanka’s youth population can the threat of a resurgence in violence be fully eliminated. The article, which is based on recent field research, examines the extent of youth unemployment within Jaffna District, and considers how government, non-government and community-based actors are working together to solve related problems.     

Information warfare and nuclear conflict termination

This study considers the possible implications of information warfare for efforts to terminate a nuclear war, or a war between nuclear armed states that is about to go nuclear. Information warfare could interfere with some of the requirements for nuclear conflict termination in at least five ways: by increasing the difficulty of accurate communication between heads of state; by decreasing the likelihood of military compliance with terms of ceasefire or settlement; by reinforcing mass images of the enemy that make it more difficult for leaders to negotiate; and by making battle damage assessment more complicated; and by increasing the amount of uncertainty within an already chaotic government decision‐making process and within a possibly acephalous military instrument.     

“Only the USSR Has … Clean Hands”: The Soviet Perspective on the Failure of Collective Security and the Collapse of Czechoslovakia, 1934–1938 (Part 1)

The first part of this two part essay is a re-examination of the Czechoslovak crisis (1934–1938) based on papers from the Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii in Moscow. The essay is also grounded in British, French, and Romanian archives and the standard published collections, including the American and German series. It is about the development and conduct of Soviet collective security policy in the key years leading to the “Munich crisis” in September 1938. Evidence from the Moscow archives demonstrates that the Soviet government was serious about collective security and that it was ready to participate in an anti-Nazi alliance. Its initiatives were repeatedly rebuffed in Europe, notably in Paris and London. Even in Prague, the Czechoslovak president, Eduard Bene?, was an undependable ally. These rebuffs led the Soviet government to be cautious during the Munich crisis. The Soviet Union would not act unilaterally, but what it actually did do was intended to defend Czechoslovak security within the constraints of Anglo–French abandonment in which Bene?? himself was complicit.     

A Review of: “Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes, (eds.). Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy.”

Because of its dynamic nature, those confronting the al-Qaeda threat must follow its evolution very closely. As demonstrated here, this task is particularly challenging when counterterrorism is carried out under the aegis of international organizations. This article explores the threat identification function of the al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee (also known as the 1267 Committee) charged with supervising the UN sanctions regime against al-Qaeda and its associates. Examination of the role of threat identification in the committee's work, and of the content of the threat analysis presented in the periodic reports of its subsidiary monitoring team, suggests the marginality of strategic threat assessment and underscores the constraints created by bureaucratic and political factors. The article also demonstrates the failure of the Committee and the monitoring team to thoroughly engage in central questions regarding al-Qaeda's nature, objectives, and organizational strategy.     

Eisenhower's disarmament dilemma: From chance for peace to open skies proposal

President Eisenhower's image as a promoter of ‘peace and nuclear disarmament’ was established through speeches he made such as ‘Atoms for Peace’ (December 1953) and ‘Open Skies’ proposal (July 1955). However, Eisenhower's approach to the subject cannot be grasped without an understanding of his attitude towards the relationship between arms, war and disarmament. As he saw it, not only would the mere existence of nuclear weapons not trigger a war, they were actually the best guarantee against the eruption of a global conflagration. The real threat to world security was the repressive, closed, totalitarian and expansionist Soviet regime. War could be prevented only by a dramatic change in the competing ‐ and threatening ‐ ideology and social structure embedded in the Soviet system. Until then, the existence of nuclear weapons would ensure the free world's safety.     

Accredited to Africa: British diplomatic representation and African experience,c. 1960–95

This article examines the 1960 soviet attack on Dag Hammarskjold and its proposal to reform the office of the UN Secretary-General into a troika and the Soviet lines, the article seeks to show that the British had sufficiant concerns about the direction Hammarskjold was taking the office of Secretary-General to be more in line with Soviet attitudes than they would have been willing to admit publicly. British support for Hammarskjold in the Congo crisis was not unqualified and the article notes that following Hammarskjold's death, it was not Britain's interest to see Hammarskjold's successor being given the political freedom he had enjoyed.     

Stalin's Demands: Constructions of the "Soviet Other" in Turkey's Foreign Policy, 1919–1945

Standard accounts on Turkey's foreign policy identify Molotov's communication of 1945 (better known as "Stalin's demands") as the catalyst behind Turkey's post-WWII decision to strain its relations with the USSR and turn to the United States (US) for defense support. The aim here is to complement these accounts which have stressed the military and ideological threat posed by the USSR as the catalyst behind Turkey's foreign policy change, by offering an analysis that explores the conditions of possibility for such change. The aim here is not to question the seriousness of the risks involved in failing to stand firm against the USSR in the immediate post-WWII period. Nor is it to dispute the appropriateness of Turkey's search for "Western" allies at a time when its economic, political and military vulnerabilities were acknowledged by friend and foe alike. The following mediates through accounts that stress the military threat and those that emphasize the ideological threat and presents an analysis that looks into the production of representations of the USSR as a "threat" to Turkey and the context which allowed for the production of such representations of the USSR.     

Charting the Ethics of the English School: What "Good" is There in a Middle-Ground Ethics?

This article aims to advance our understanding of the development of English School thinking on international ethics by outlining three phases of ethical inquiry within the British Committee. The article argues that, throughout the life of the Committee, its outlook was conditioned by a pervading moral skepticism, which was reflected in the School's commitment to a "middle-ground ethics"; however, at various times the Committee members' views changed about how maximalist the "good" could be that oriented this ethical position. Awareness of this ebb and flow helps us better understand Hedley Bull's characterization of the ethics of pluralism and solidarism within the School as well as the precise challenge contemporary English School theorists face if they are to move beyond the normative cul-de-sac that British Committee members encountered in each phase of their ethical discussions.     

Framing terror: an experimental framing effects study of the perceived threat of terrorism

An exploratory framing effects experiment was conducted to test whether three controversial news portrayals (or frames) of the terrorist threat increase subjects' perceptions of the danger. A total of 176 subjects were exposed to one of eight different article treatments. The subjects reported higher levels of perceived threat when the danger was associated with ‘radical Islamic groups’ (as compared to homegrown terrorists) and ‘nuclear’ technology (as compared to conventional weapons). Contrary to conventional wisdom, however, this study also showed that the term ‘terrorism’ itself did not affect the perceived threat. These results provide support for a theory of framing that explains the precise ways in which a particular set of communicating texts (terrorism news frames) influence human consciousness. Further theoretical details, as well as the social and political implications of this study, are discussed.     

The British and the 1960 soviet attack on the office of united nations secretary-general

This article examines the 1960 soviet attack on Dag Hammarskjold and its proposal to reform the office of the UN Secretary-General into a troika and the Soviet lines, the article seeks to show that the British had sufficiant concerns about the direction Hammarskjold was taking the office of Secretary-General to be more in line with Soviet attitudes than they would have been willing to admit publicly. British support for Hammarskjold in the Congo crisis was not unqualified and the article notes that following Hammarskjold's death, it was not Britain's interest to see Hammarskjold's successor being given the political freedom he had enjoyed.     

Eisenhower's disarmament dilemma: From chance for peace to open skies proposal

President Eisenhower's image as a promoter of 'peace and nuclear disarmament' was established through speeches he made such as 'Atoms for Peace' (December 1953) and 'Open Skies' proposal (July 1955). However, Eisenhower's approach to the subject cannot be grasped without an understanding of his attitude towards the relationship between arms, war and disarmament. As he saw it, not only would the mere existence of nuclear weapons not trigger a war, they were actually the best guarantee against the eruption of a global conflagration. The real threat to world security was the repressive, closed, totalitarian and expansionist Soviet regime. War could be prevented only by a dramatic change in the competing - and threatening - ideology and social structure embedded in the Soviet system. Until then, the existence of nuclear weapons would ensure the free world's safety.