Pioneers of peace research — Lewis Fry Richardson: Apostle of math

Most studies of economic sanctions have concluded that they are ineffective as instruments of foreign policy. In a previous effort, we applied the spatial model of bargaining to the question of sanctions effectiveness to identify the‐conditions under which sanctions can be expected to “work.” In this paper, we refine that analysis by examining the impact of domestic politics in the state that is the target of the sanctions. Sanction episodes may be examples of two‐level games in which the domestic game within both parties affects the international game and vice‐versa. Here, we take a first cut of applying this approach to the analysis of sanctions effectiveness. We extend the spatial model to focus on how sanctions affect the internal political bargaining within the target state. From this, we determine how state policy should change (or not) as a result of the sanctions. We use the basic model to identify general hypotheses regarding the nature of sanctions and their effectiveness and we evaluate some of these hypotheses using cases in which the United States imposed sanctions on Latin American countries for human rights violations.     

Strategic Demands, Credible Threats, and Economic Coercion Outcomes

The crisis bargaining literature sees demands as endogenous to crises. However, despite the parallels between military and economic coercion, sanctions researchers have preferred to analyze economic coercion after demands have been issued, and have not explored sufficiently the possibility that when senders formulate their policy objectives, they consider the international constraints imposed by the capabilities and interests of target states. I complement the sanctions literature by deriving the implications of strategic goal formulation in a game theoretic model of economic coercion that assumes endogenous demands. The model explains the inconsistent empirical relationship between sanctions costs and outcomes as well as the paradoxical tendency of senders to select into difficult disputes. I find that threats are not always more effective than sanctions and suggest what an optimal sanctions policy might look like.     

Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations

A half-decade after the first systematic applications of prospect theory to international relations, scholars continue to debate its potential utility as a theoretical framework. Key questions include the validity of the experimental findings themselves, their relevance for real-world international behavior that involves high-stakes decisions by collective actors in interactive settings, and the conceptual status of prospect theory with respect to rational choice. In this essay I assess theoretical and methodological debates over these issues. I review work in social psychology and experimental economics and conclude that challenges to the external validity of prospect theory-based hypotheses for international behavior are much more serious than challenges to their internal validity. I emphasize the similarities between prospect theory and expected-utility theory, argue that hypotheses regarding loss aversion and the reflection effect are easily subsumed within the latter, and that evidence of framing effects and nonlinear responses to probabilities are more problematic for the theory. I conclude that priorities for future research include the construction of hypotheses on the framing of foreign policy decisions and research designs for testing them; the incorporation of framing, loss aversion, and the reflection effect into theories of collective and interactive decision making; and experimental research that is sensitive to the political and strategic context of foreign policy decision making.     

Sleeping With Your Friends' Enemies: An Explanation of Sanctions-Busting Trade

Research indicates that if third parties provide assistance to sanctioned states, the sanctions are less likely to be successful. However, the scholarship on the profile of sanctions busters and their motivations remains underdeveloped. Drawing on the realist and liberal paradigms, this piece develops two competing theories to account for third-party sanctions-busting. The hypotheses drawn from these theories build upon existing work on sanctions, the political determinants of international trade, and the effects of indirect interstate relationships. A quantitative analysis develops a new measure to identify sanctions-busting behavior for a dataset covering 77 sanctions cases from 1950 to 1990. The liberal and realist explanations are then tested. The results offer strong support for the liberal theory of sanctions-busting and less support for the realist theory. In particular, the analysis reveals a counter-intuitive finding that a sender's close allies are more likely to sanctions-bust on the target's behalf than are other states.     

The impact of human rights INGO activities on economic sanctions

What impact do human rights international non-governmental organizations (hereafter HROs) have on the initiation of economic sanctions? The extant literatures on sanctions and transnational non-state groups have largely overlooked the role, if any, the activities of these transnational non-state actors have on the use of economic coercion as a popular policy tool. In this study, we argue that HROs could affect sanction decisions through two distinct mechanisms: information production (“shaming and blaming”) and local empowerment (local presence). By bringing poor human rights performers into the international spotlight, we argue that this effect should hold even after accounting for human rights practices in the targeted countries. Using dyadic data on HROs and economic sanctions, we find robust support for our basic argument that HRO activities increase the likelihood of sanction events against repressive regimes. Additionally, much of the empirical support highlights the role of information production, as opposed to local empowerment, in leading to sanction onset. Overall, our findings indicate that HROs are powerful actors in influencing foreign policy decisions between states.     

Power Politics or Public Pandering? An Empirical Investigation of Economic Sanctions and Presidential Approval

How do economic sanctions affect presidential approval? Competing claims have been made about the domestic political consequences of economic sanctions. One claim is that sanctions are unpopular because they have negative economic consequences; another claim is that sanctions are popular because they project an image of strength; and another claim is that sanctions are neither popular nor unpopular because the public is uninformed about international affairs. These arguments imply competing identification restrictions. I test these competing models using a Bayesian Structural Vector Autoregression (B-SVAR) model. The results show that sanctions have a moderate negative effect on presidential approval. I use these findings as a basis for a broader set of auxiliary analyses. Despite received wisdom, sanctions imposed for different reasons against different target states do not produce disparate effects on public opinion. These analyses resolve an important empirical dilemma that weighs on a range of theoretical perspectives in the sanctions literature and highlights fruitful avenues for future research.     

When Do States Say Uncle? Network Dependence and Sanction Compliance

In this article we address the long-debated question of when and why states comply with sanctions. While the literature remains indeterminate as to whether the key mechanisms driving sanction compliance are tied to interstate relations, intrastate constraints, or a dynamic combination of the two, our theoretical framework and methodological approach provide a novel perspective that incorporates insights drawn from network theory to explain the time until countries comply. Specifically, we argue that reciprocity, a concept with deep roots in both network theory and international relations, has largely been overlooked in the study of sanction compliance. Though often ignored, this concept captures an essential aspect of how cooperation is fostered in the international system and allows us to better analyze the strategic environment underlying sanctioning behavior. Given the theoretical importance of reciprocity in understanding interstate relations, we provide an approach that integrates estimations of this type of network interdependency into extant frameworks for modeling the time until countries comply with sanctions. Our results highlight that reciprocity not only has a substantive effect in explaining the duration of sanctions but that models excluding this concept from their specifications do notably worse in terms of their predictive performance.     

Sanctions and Democracy

How do economic sanctions affect democratization, and should the former be used to promote the latter? Imposing economic pain on large swaths of an already vulnerable population in order to nudge democratic change poses thorny issues. Does it work, in terms of securing democratic outcomes? Even if it did, is this way of achieving change justifiable? We explore the connections between the normative and positive sides of the argument for sanctions in light of theoretical and normative progress in two decades of post-Cold War research on democracy. We argue that some sanctions policies used under specific conditions are more justifiable, but there are other sanctions policies that are less justifiable.     

From the Outside Looking In: The Effect of Trading Blocs on Trade Disputes in the GATT/WTO

The increasing number and expansion of trading blocs is an important dimension of the contemporary international economy. This study examines the effects of such trading blocs on third parties and on the multilateral trading system. It is argued that trading blocs have negative economic effects on economic sectors in non-members' states. These sectors urge their governments to take political action vis-à-vis the trading bloc. Governments have several policy choices on their menu, and the attractiveness of these policies is determined by domestic and international incentives and constraints. I argue that filing a complaint in the GATT/WTO is an attractive and effective policy tool in the hands of third parties' governments. Thus, I hypothesize that the existence, deepening, and widening of trading blocs result in an increase in the number of complaints filed against their members in the multilateral trading system. I examine these propositions in the context of three important trading blocs—namely, the EU, NAFTA, and Mercosur—in the period 1948–2000. To test these hypotheses a time-series cross-section count model is performed. Controlling for conventional alternative explanations, the empirical analysis supports the theoretical framework.     

Alliance formation and national security

The premise that nations form alliances in order to improve their security is widespread in the study of international relations. Yet in spite of the crucial role played by this assumption, the claims of policy makers and statesmen form our only evidence that it is the need for greater national security which motivates the formation of alliances. What is more, we have no systematic evidence that the concern for national security would be a consistent predictor in the face of other plausible goals. Our intent in this paper is to supply this evidence.

From the assumption that greater national security is a primary incentive to form an alliance, we construct a series of hypotheses, each building successively on the previous hypothesis to predict conditions at the individual, dyadic and systemic levels of analysis. By constructing an indicator of national security, we are able to test these hypotheses against historical information about European alliances from 1815 to 1965. Our evidence that security considerations are indeed central to alliance behavior improves the empirical and theoretical foundation of a considerable body of studies in international relations and foreign policy preceding this one.     

The mix that makes unipolarity: hegemonic purpose and international constraints

The nature of a global arena dominated by one great power remains a critical subject for understanding international relations. Brooks and Wohlforth's recent book makes an important contribution by arguing that unipolarity poses few constraints to the hegemon and that the United States today should pursue a policy of primacy. The puzzle is that the United States has mostly resisted a primacy policy since becoming the sole superpower, and when it has done so, has often been less successful than the promise of its power advantage. Explaining this puzzle requires building on ‘the no constraint’ approach to develop a positive theory based on hegemonic purpose, a reformulated notion of constraints, and how purpose and constraints interact to shape outcomes. This reformulation suggests that any American strategy that looks like ‘primacy’ is unlikely to succeed.     

Contextualizing change in Turkish foreign policy: the promise of the ‘two-good’ theory

The level of activism in Turkey's foreign policy has reached unprecedented levels during the country's modern history. This increased activism contrasts starkly with Turkey's characteristically traditional status quo orientation evinced during the Cold War. This study aims to establish a theoretical foundation to explain this multifaceted change in Turkish foreign policy. In doing so, it contends that the ‘two-good’ theory of foreign policy renders considerable analytical leverage for contextualizing recent changes in Turkish foreign policy. The theory posits that change in a country's foreign policy is contingent upon its willingness and capability to actively promote its interests. Furthermore, the ‘two-good’ theory postulates the method a country might employ to implement its foreign policy is a function of these two factors as well. The theory leads to two testable hypotheses regarding Turkish foreign policy. This study supports these hypotheses with qualitative and quantitative evidence.     

Altering conflict attitudes through prenegotiation contact

This experiment investigates the hypothesis that prenegotiation contact improves conflict attitudes between adversaries. Many different literatures theoretically support variations on this theme, but there has been very little empirical work which directly tests the idea. Using experimental methodology and an international conflict simulation to collect data, the findings from this study demonstrate that there is a strong recasting effect associated with prenegotiation contact. Attitudes are changed in relation to the conflict in general, views of the opponent, and views of self. While the results strongly support the positive effect of prenegotiation contact upon conflict attitudes, important questions are raised regarding other theoretical and empirical dimensions of the process as it relates to international conflict resolution.     

The Determinants of Economic Sanctions Success and Failure

In this article, we consider the puzzle of whether unilateral or multilateral sanctions are more likely to be successful in changing a targeted state's behavior. Policymakers maintain that multilateral sanctioning efforts will be more likely to succeed, while the majority of empirical academic research suggests otherwise. We present an argument, based on multidimensional spatial models, to explain why multilateral sanctions may not be more effective than unilateral sanctions. We present the basic model and show that they can explain why, in general, multilateral sanctions fail more often than do unilateral sanctions. We also show that the model leads to additional, testable hypotheses. We conduct a simple empirical test of the major hypothesis produced by the spatial application and show that it is consistent with the historical record.     

欧美科技制裁协作的动力与分歧：基于欧盟的视角

科技制裁在持续的军事冲突中发挥着关键作用,在和平时期的地缘政治中也从未消失。欧盟与美国是最大的制裁实施者,双方的制裁协作在多个地区和领域产生了重要影响。虽然欧美科技制裁协作较为频繁,但欧盟和美国在制裁政策上仍存在诸多分歧。文章从欧美价值观、安全威胁和二级制裁这三个维度出发,剖析欧盟与美国进行科技制裁协作的动因与诱发分歧的因素,并选择俄罗斯、伊朗和中国这三个具有代表性和差异性的案例进行比较。欧盟与美国对俄罗斯的制裁协作水平最高;在伊朗案例中,二级制裁因素带来的欧美分歧较为突出;在中国案例中,欧美尚未达成明显的制裁共识。共同价值观、安全威胁的紧迫性、二级制裁压力等要素是促使欧盟参与美国科技制裁的重要动因。然而,不同的外交政策理念、安全认知的错位和二级制裁的反作用力也使欧美分歧难以弥合,大大削减了制裁效率。     

Power,resolve and bargaining in international crises: A spatial theory

In this paper the spatial model of crisis bargaining is utilized to derive a number of hypotheses relating the relative power and resolve of crisis participants to crisis outcomes. The resolve and two power variables are defined and the manner in which they are incorporated into the model is demonstrated. The model, which represents a synthesis of traditional utility based bargaining models and the spatial theory of voting, is then used to establish the theoretical linkages among these variables and all possible outcomes of international crises. Among the more interesting results is that crises in which one party is much more likely to win a war should one occur and the other party is much more resolved are extremely likely to end in war. The paper concludes with a discussion of the relevance of these findings to a number of topics in the international relations literature, including Schelling's strategy of commitment.     

Hearing the Noise: Economic Sanctions Theory and Anomalous Evidence

Our understanding of economic sanctions has progressed significantly over the past three decades. Sanctions scholars have done a remarkable job at using empirical anomalies to guide theoretical developments and then using these to guide the next iteration of data collection and empirical testing. Here, I argue that mounting empirical evidence suggests it is time to develop a new theoretical perspective. I identify a number of empirical results, some unpublished, that are hard to reconcile with existing theory, and I argue that there is enough consistency in these results to suggest which way to turn.     

Images in International Relations: An Experimental Test of Cognitive Schemata

We build on the tradition of studying images in international relations by developing a theory of perceived relationships and their associated images. The psychological theory is connected to a set of assumptions drawn from international relations theory that suggest perceived strategic relationships can be conceived of as a function of perceived relative power, perceived culture, and the perceived threat or perceived opportunity that a subject believes another actor represents. We hypothesize that perceived relationships evoke both cognitive and affective processes that lead to at least four ideal typical images. We further hypothesize that enemy, ally, colony, and degenerate images have identifiable and interrelated components. We test to see if the component parts of these images are related to each other, if the overall image affects the processing and interpretation of new information, and if strategic foreign policy choices follow from the cognitive and affective aspects of the image. The findings indicate that three of the four images are unified schemata, used even by inexperienced analysts. We find further that affect in combination with cognition does predict policy choice in the case of the enemy image. We suggest that image theory is a promising means by which foreign policy and international relations may be fruitfully studied.     

Either with us or against us? Third-country alignment with EU sanctions against Russia/Ukraine

Since the mid-1990s, selected neighbours have in impressive numbers aligned with European Union (EU) foreign policy sanctions. However, much more than for any other sanctions case, neighbours have declined joining recent measures against Russia/Ukraine. This article uses freshly gathered data from the entire period of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to analyse how the practice of alignment influences international relations in Europe. Thereby, the article demonstrates that: (1) sanctions are not a two-party game, but an instrument that impacts broadly on relations with third countries; (2) alignment with sanctions not only articulates similarity, but contributes to normative polarization in wider Europe; (3) for a high-salience case such as Russia sanctions, neighbours are reluctant to be instrumentalized for EU foreign policy purposes.     

Outside the box: Explaining sanctions in pursuit of foreign economic goals*

Despite a marked increase in research on economic sanctions, empirical work has been constrained to a set of cases where sanctions are used for political or security issues, i.e., “high politics.” Since most theories of sanctions are generalizable to cases of political economy, i.e., “low politics,” this ad hoc empirical restriction is puzzling. This paper examines how well the existing theories of economic coercion can explain sanctions used to extract concessions on trade or regulatory issues. These theories are tested on a data set of 86 observations of the United States using or threatening section 301 action against a variety of target states. The results indicate that a conflict expectations approach is able to explain these cases as well as cases of high politics sanctions. Approaches stressing domestic politics or the use of sanctions as signals are of little use.