Present at the Destruction? The Liberal Order in the Trump Era

Abstract

The election of Donald Trump in 2016 sent shock waves across political classes globally and prompted debates about whether his ‘America first’ agenda threatened the liberal international order. During his first year in office, Trump seemed determined to undermine the hallmarks of the liberal international order: democracy, liberal economics and international cooperation. So, are we witnessing the emergence of a “post-liberal” and “post-American” era? Four sources of evidence help frame – if not answer – the question: history, the crisis of liberal democracy, Trump’s world view, and the power of civil society (globally and nationally) to constrain any US President. They yield three main judgements. First, continuity often trumps change in US foreign policy. Second, the liberal international order may have been more fragile pre-Trump than was widely realised. Third, American power must be put at the service of its own democracy if the US is to become the example to the world it used to be.     

Of ‘witch's brews’ and scholarly communities: the dangers and promise of academic parrhesia

In a series of lectures in the early 1980s, Michel Foucault resurrected the Greek word for frankness or truth-telling—‘parrhesia’—to investigate the inter-relationships and tensions that existed between freedom, truth-telling and political power. He concluded that in order for one to ‘tell the truth’ against a powerful superior, one needs the courage to oppose a community of which the parrhesiastes (‘truth teller’) is a member. This paper uses parrhesia to investigate the practice of the international relations (IR) scholar in speaking out against his or her scholarly community. Tony Smith's 2007 book Pact with the devil is used as an example of academic-intellectual parrhesia not only to illustrate the content of a potential form of parrhesia, but to demonstrate the challenges IR scholars who wish to practise academic parrhesia face in criticizing members of their academic community. Smith's critique of democratic peace theory specifically, and liberal IR theory more generally, is particularly noteworthy considering Smith's former position as a leading liberal proponent. The paper reviews, and then supplements and extends, Smith's critique of democratic peace theory.     

The limits to balancing

This article explores the major contribution of Brooks and Wohlforth's World out of balance to debate about the role of American primacy and power in contemporary international affairs. It argues that these authors make a major contribution to our understanding of the present international order but that some key questions about the effectiveness of US primacy remain unaddressed and require different questions and considerations to be debated.     

Why has the United States not bombed Iran? The domestic politics of America's response to Iran's nuclear programme

Why has the United States (US), under both the Bush and Obama administrations, refrained from attacking Iran even though US officials have depicted the Iranian threat in all but apocalyptic terms and even though a loud chorus in Washington has been persistently calling for a preventive strike against Iran? I present an analysis—informed by Graham Allison's famous bureaucratic politics model—of the main political and bureaucratic forces in Washington acting to promote or impede a preventive attack on Iran's nuclear sites. I argue that America's abstention from attacking Iran should be understood not as a coherent national response to Iran's nuclear programme but rather as (in Allison's terms) an ‘intra-national political outcome’ resulting from the ‘pulling’ of ‘Iran Threat’ interests—primarily Vice President Cheney's camp in the Bush White House, members of Congress, and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)—and the countervailing ‘hauling’ of the Pentagon, the military's top brass, the intelligence community and the Department of State. The main reason why neither the Bush nor the Obama administration has opted for a military strike is that the ‘haulers’, who were led by a formidable bureaucratic-political player, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, have had the upper hand over the hawkish ‘pullers’.     

‘I'm glad I'm not a Saudi woman’: the First Gulf War and US encounters with Saudi gender relations

On 6 November 1990, nearly 50 Saudi women staged a protest against the ban on women operating motor vehicles in Saudi Arabia. Occurring in the midst of the First Gulf War, the women's protest was a political statement about the harsh restrictions placed on women in the Middle Eastern country which both reflected and influenced Saudi society’s encounter with their American allies during the war. When United States (US) military personnel flooded into Saudi Arabia during the war, they were shocked at the way American servicewomen were treated by their Saudi allies and the second-class status of Saudi women throughout the country. This article explores Americans' reactions to their encounter with Saudi gender relations during the war and argues that the poor treatment of women in Saudi Arabia—which Americans dubbed ‘gender apartheid’—caused many Americans to question the longstanding US alliance with the conservative Muslim country. In doing so, US journalists, military personnel, scholars and the general public began to demand that concern about women's rights should be integrated seriously into US foreign policy towards the Muslim world.     

An ‘Aladdin's lamp’ for free enterprise: Eisenhower,fiscal conservatism,and Latin American nationalism, 1953–61

This study explores the Eisenhower administration's efforts to promote free trade and investment policies in Latin America. US officials believed that private capital investment, rather than US foreign aid, would best promote Latin American economic development and improve its abiliry to purchase American products. By eliminating the need for foreign aid, Latin American economic autarky complemented Eisenhower's zeal for fiscal conservatism. Although most scholars have focused on the primacy of anti-communism in Eisenhower's inter-American policies, this study contends that economic nationalism posed the greatest threat to Eisenhower's policies. US officials eventually responded by expanding aid to Latin America, but the additional economic aid was always intended to complement private capital, rather than replace it. This article, based upon the papers of influential administration officials and State Department records, sheds considerable light as to why the United States promoted free trade and investment policies in the developing world, as it still does today.     

Global Cities as Market Civilisation

Building upon interdisciplinary efforts to understand the origins, logic and significance of global cities, this article argues that global cities should be seen as a critical component and outcome of a political project to generate a global market society. Global cities should be seen as the successful implementation of free-market political philosophy, constructed and defended by a particular historical configuration of international society. The historical transformation of urban form signalled by the "global city" concept is tightly bound to the neoliberal restructuring of the world economy in the 1970s, underpinned by US hegemonic power. The first part of this article argues that the distinctive historical origin of global cities has shaped their current trajectories and draws the horizon of their future prospects. Having established the connection between liberal world order and global cities, the second part of the article argues that the contemporary form of the global city is under threat from two sources. The first threat is internal to the global city form itself. Global cities have internalised the contradictory forces of market liberalism. They have registered astonishing economic growth over the last four decades, and generated vast material and intellectual resources. But, at the same time, they have become deeply divided and polarised in ways that threaten the urban fabric. The second source of threat comes from the possible weakening or collapse of liberal world order, with the accelerating decline of US hegemony. Drawing on aspects of Karl Polanyi's analysis of the nineteenth-century "great transformation", the article argues that a number of future trajectories for the global city can be identified in the contemporary moment.     

Populist polarization and the slow death of democracy in Ecuador

This article analyses how the interactions between a strong populist government in Ecuador and a weak, divided, and inefficient internal opposition in a context of weak liberal institutions could lead to what Guillermo O'Donnell termed “the slow death of democracy”. Rafael Correa was elected with a substantive project of democratization understood as economic redistribution and social justice. His administration got rid of neoliberal policies and decaying traditional political parties, while simultaneously co-opting social movements, regulating civil society, and colonizing the public sphere. Because the judiciary was subordinated to Correa, social movement activists, journalists, and media owners could not use the legal system to resist Correa's crack down of civil society and regulation of the privately owned media. They took their grievances to supranational organizations like the Organization of American States. When these organizations stepped in to challenge Correa, his government denounced imperialist intervention in his nation's internal affairs, and advocated for the creation of new supranational institutions without US presence.     

Democratic Hegemony and American Hegemony

The emergence of an ‘American democratic empire’, rising from the global informational and transportation revolution, that has its epicentre situated on the territory of the United States (US), has produced a profound metamorphosis in world affairs. National power elites, including those in America, are confronting a dilemma. They are compelled to accept, favour and even defend the so-called globalisation process in order to avoid further erosion of their economic and political power. On the other hand, this process is also directly threatening this same power. The paradox is that the US is the main promoter and defender of last resort of the new global ‘order’, which at the same time is restricting its own margins for sovereign action. The ‘democratic empire’ is thus fostering the rise of a democratic hegemonism at the expense of a ‘US hegemonism’. This democratic hegemonism is a gradually rising—and fragile—consensus on a proliferating set of perceptions and values, stressing individual freedom, responsibility and political and social activism. This consensus arises from the material possibilities of a more individualistic way of life and the increasing capacity of single individuals or organised groups to participate in global and local political decision-making processes. This is a process that favours the empowerment of interest groups whose reference is no longer solely the nation-state. Hence, traditional power elites are progressively losing their ability to present themselves as the ultimate embodiment of a national ‘general interest’. The irony of the seemingly intractable contradiction between US hegemonism and democratic hegemonism is that the actual spreading of the logic of the latter is closely dependent on US power and willingness to defend its own national interest. The greatest challenge for the coming decades will be the construction of supranational governance institutions under democratic hegemony, so as to avoid a classic imperial self-isolation of the US—a situation that would trigger the inevitable demise of democratic hegemonism and, for the time being, of any order as such.     

War Makes the State,but Not as It Pleases: Homeland Security and American Anti-Statism

The shock of war is thought to be closely associated with the growth of the state, in the United States and elsewhere. Yet each proposal to significantly expand state power in the United States since September 11 has been resisted, restrained, or even rejected outright. This outcome—theoretically unexpected and contrary to conventional wisdom—is the result of enduring aspects of America's domestic political structure: the separation of powers at the federal level between three co-equal and overlapping branches, the relative ease with which interest groups access the policy-making process, and the intensity with which executive-branch bureaucracies guard their organizational turf. These persistent aspects of u.s. political life, designed by the nation's founders to impede the concentration of state power, have substantially shaped the means by which contemporary guardians of the American state pursue “homeland security.” War does make the state, but not as it pleases. Theoretical approaches to state building should recognize that domestic political institutions mediate between the international shock of war and domestic state building.     

Assessing the impact of EU governmentality in post-conflict countries: pacification or reconciliation?

European Union (EU) interventions in conflict countries tend to focus on governance reforms of political and economic frameworks instead of the geopolitical context or the underlying power asymmetries that fuel conflict. They follow a liberal pattern often associated with northern donors and the UN system more generally. The EU's approach diverges from prevalent governance paradigms mainly in its engagement with social, identity and socio-economic exclusion. This article examines the EU's ‘peace-as-governance’ model in Cyprus, Georgia, Palestine and Bosnia and Herzegovina. These cases indicate that a tense and contradictory strategic situation may arise from an insufficient redress of underlying conflict issues.     

Just How Special is “Special”: Britain,Cuba, and US Relations 1958–2008 an Overview

In June 2008, despite intense lobbying from the Bush administration, the Council of Ministers of the European Union lifted the diplomatic sanctions on Havana that it had imposed in 2003 and agreed to resume a “comprehensive political dialogue” with the revolutionary regime. Instrumental in this decision was a change in policy by the UK that had hitherto stood against such a normalisation of relations. The move came as a surprise to many who had anticipated that the British would oppose the lifting of sanctions in deference to their “special relationship” with their transatlantic ally. However, as this overview suggests, the UK decision was not unusual. Even from the earliest days of the revolution, the UK has differed with the US over Cuba. By surveying the five decades of the UK–Cuba relationship since 1959 the article explains how the UK has maintained an ambivalent attitude towards Washington's embargo. While recognising US primacy of interest in Cuba, London has consistently attempted to follow an independent policy that at times has come between the close allies. It concludes that although the UK (along with other European partners and Canada) shares the US goal of seeing the end of Communism on the island, it has ironically helped to thwart this ambition. The history of the relationship provides an example of the limitations of unilateral economic sanctions as policy instruments. The failure of the US embargo to affect the behaviour of the Castro regime should be no surprise when Washington's closest ally has never fully agreed to it.     

Fanon,Camus and the global colour line: colonial difference and the rise of decolonial horizons

I focus here on the political stances of Frantz Fanon and Albert Camus regarding the Algerian War of Independence. By examining their reflections on this violent anticolonial struggle, I seek to highlight the role of colonial difference and of racial hierarchies in the constitution of global politics. Fanon's position relies on an ethos of decolonization and on an ethics of difference that—while specific to the Algerian context—also reverberated profoundly among other societies caught in the violence of imperial encounters. Camus' conciliatory approach, however, and his moral equalization of the violence perpetrated by both sides enunciate the inherent racial hierarchies underpinning liberal narratives. I argue that the limits inherent in Fanon's thought—but also its latent potentialities for decolonial thinking—become apparent when examined through the lens of the contemporary activism among North African migrants and their descendants in France. The emergence of self-proclaimed decolonial movements constitutes an attempt to enact a decolonial transnational citizenship, which contests the racial boundaries of French Republicanism. But it also signals a different vision of the universal—one that is entrenched in a terrain of historical specificity and which holds more promise in contesting the global colour line.     

The power of Trump-speak: populist crisis narratives and ontological security

Abstract

For most observers, the election of Donald Trump as the 45th president of the United States (US) came as a shock. This has been widely recast as the culmination of the American public’s long-standing dissatisfaction with the political elite and deep-seated frustrations with broader socio-economic conditions. We argue that the Trump campaign’s success also stemmed from its effective use of an emotionally charged, anti-establishment crisis narrative. With insights from political psychology, we examine the socio-linguistic mechanisms that underlie the effectiveness of ‘Trump-speak’ through both quantitative and qualitative content analysis of Trump’s communications toolkit during the 2016?US presidential election campaign. We show that his leadership legitimation claims rest significantly upon ‘crisis talk’ that puts his audience in a loss frame with nothing to lose and explain why ‘crisis talk’ impacts on political behaviour. As we demonstrate, the crisis stories that political agents tell simultaneously instil ontological insecurity among the American public and serve to transform their anxiety into confidence that the narrator’s policy agendas are the route back to ‘normality’. Through these rhetorical mechanisms, the Trump campaign manipulated individuals’ ontological (in)security as a tool in the politics of reassurance at the broader, societal level.     

Thinking about terrorism and just war

Since 2001 a new urge to moralize the use of violence as an instrument of state policy has appeared in liberal democracies. The American idea of a War against Terror, and the European notion of confronting a global terrorist threat, have together merged with a discourse on humanitarian military action: the political/moral ‘responsibility to protect’ is no longer to be confined to one's own citizens. Renewed interest among academics in ‘just war’ theory, the tradition that seeks to humanize war through law, reflects this development. This article questions the assumption that there is an essential difference between war (civilized violence) and terrorism (barbaric violence). It argues that their similarity appears more clearly if we set intentions aside—such as the deliberate or accidental killing of ‘innocents’—and focus instead on three main facts: (a) modern war strategies and technologies are uniquely destructive, (b) armed hostilities increasingly occupy a single space of violence in which war and peace are not clearly demarcated, and (c) the law of war does not provide a set of ‘civilizing’ rules but a language for legal/moral argument in which the use of punitive violence is itself a central semantic element.     

“Exporting Democracy”? Neoconservatism and the Limits of Military Intervention, 1989–2008

This article challenges the almost universal consensus that post–Cold War neoconservative foreign policy has been characterised by the objective of “exporting democracy” abroad for strategic or moral reasons or both. Instead, the article contends that the touchstone of neoconservatism was the attempt to preserve America's so-called “unipolar moment”—its apparent position as the single pole of power in every region of the world. Moving beyond the abstract and grandiose rhetoric employed by many neocons, the article points out that neocons made a distinction between the respective uses of military and non-military power, arguing that the former should be reserved only for situations where strategic interests were at stake rather than for the sake of ideals. The article goes on to argue that this focus on strategic interests facilitated a close alliance with other conservative nationalists who were also dedicated to maintaining America's position as the single pole of world power. Thus neoconservatism should be analysed and evaluated—by both conservatives and liberal interventionists alike—on the basis that it was a strategy dedicated primarily to preserving American unipolarity, not to the promotion of ideals.     

Democratization and foreign policy in Southeast Asia: the case of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus

Recent democratic transitions in Southeast Asia raise the question as to how we should theorize the relationship between democratization and foreign policy. Many scholars assume that more ‘democratic’ Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members pursue more ‘liberal’ policies than their less-democratic counterparts, but surprisingly little theoretical work investigates the connection. This article argues that such investigations tend to crumble under close scrutiny. Instead, it offers an alternative framework based on an analysis of how different socio-economic interests contend to shape foreign policy in ASEAN states and how these interests are able to organize politically to impose their preferences. The case study of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus, a regional network of legislators campaigning for liberal-interventionist policies on Myanmar, shows how it is these forces, and not the mere presence or absence of formally democratic institutions, that govern the political space available to those seeking to transform ASEAN states' policies.     

Security,economics, and missile diplomacy with North Korea

This article reviews American missile diplomacy with North Korea during the Clinton and Bush administrations. North Korea made some missile concessions, such as agreeing to freeze missile tests, but ultimately did not halt its missile programme. US nonproliferation diplomacy was not successful because it did not address the main drivers behind North Korea's missile programmes – securiry threats, economic compulsions, and domestic political pressures. In the future, international engagement that tackles these causes of proliferation could restrain North Korea's missile advances.     

Let's talk Turkey! US influence on EU–Turkey relations

Turkey is of paramount importance to the United States and to the European Union. The United States is not only the first and foremost partner of both the EU and Turkey. It is also amongst the most committed supporters of Turkey's European integration. In support of Turkey's EU membership bid, Washington has set forth a variety of arguments and has attempted to influence EU decisions at different points in time. US advocacy throughout the 1990s was key to kick-starting Turkey's accession process. By contrast, US influence on Turkey's EU accession decreased visibly in the twenty-first century. The style of US advocacy goes some way towards explaining why this has been the case. When American advocacy has prioritized quiet, behind-closed-doors diplomacy it has tended to be more effective. When instead US officials have relied on loud public diplomacy, European reactions have been generally negative. More importantly however, it is the content of American arguments that has affected their relative impact on European perceptions of Turkey. Depending on whether the US has spoken to the rights-, the interest- or the identity-based logic of enlargement, the influence of the United States on Turkey's EU membership prospects has varied. On the grounds of this analysis, this article concludes by outlining broad policy suggestions regarding how the United States could contribute more effectively to Turkey's European integration.     

Theodore Roosevelt: Imperialist or Global Strategist in the New Expansionist Age?

This article argues that as the first modern US president and an innovative shaper of American foreign relations, Theodore Roosevelt launched the rising United States on the world stage as a major actor in power politics, that American diplomacy came of age with him and not with Woodrow Wilson, and that the secular pragmatist who succeeded because he was abreast of the times should not be begrudged the laurels that are so often bestowed on the religious-minded visionary who failed because he was ahead of his time. In American historiography Wilson has often eclipsed—unfairly and erroneously—the geopolitical and diplomatic skills, professionalism and expertise in foreign policy of Roosevelt. Even as ex-president, Roosevelt would be a force to be reckoned with. The use and misuse of a misconstrued legacy that some have tried to confiscate for their own benefit is perhaps best illustrated by presidential candidate John McCain's reverential claim that he is “a Teddy Roosevelt Republican” rather than a neo-Wilsonian.