Navigating two Asias: how Washington deals with the Indo-Pacific’s rising powers

ABSTRACT

The United States has sought over the last two decades to facilitate India’s rise as a means of balancing against China’s ambitions. Notwithstanding the rich literature that has emerged on Sino-Indian dynamics and the U.S.-India-China triad, there has been remarkably little examination of the ways in which the United States navigates its relationships with these two rising powers. This study poses a simple question: to what extent has the United States’ pursuit of its interests with India meant that it has accepted trade-offs with respect to its interests with China? Drawing on government documents, interviews with current and former U.S. officials, and an array of case studies between 2005 and early 2019, this study argues first that the U.S. bureaucracy has long been structured in such a way as to heavily compartment policy decision-making related to South Asia and East Asia, respectively, and to produce a pronounced but largely explicable structural bias toward East Asia; second, that relatively few policy matters have arisen since 2005 that have forced the United States to consider meaningful trade-offs between its India and China equities; and third, that new challenges may arise for Washington as its deals with an increasingly inter-connected Indo-Pacific region, and manages the bureaucratic and policy implications of its renewed emphasis on great power competition.     

A Fragile Relationship: The United States and the Republic Of Korea

As South Korea became economically and militarily stronger and developed democratic institutions, the country was in a position to assume more responsibilities in its partnership with the United States. The necessary changes could be achieved only with difficulties. The efforts of the US administration to stop the nuclear proliferation by North Korea and South Korea's attempts to develop a policy of engagement towards the DPRK resulted in friction between the allies. The dissonance was amplified by efforts of the Rho Moo Hyun government to pursue a foreign policy that was less dependent upon the United States. The change of atmosphere was underlined by anti-American outbursts in South Korea. A new effort to strengthen the partnership is, however, reasonable. For South Korea the United States is still the indispensable ally as long as an attack by North Korea that probably has nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out. For the United States this alliance contributes to maintain America's paramount influence in East Asia. If both countries agree with this rationale they should take steps to accept basic assumptions and policies of the other side. To find a common position towards the nuclear efforts of North Korea is crucial. Even if both sides try to harmonize their policies, success is not guaranteed. Korean nationalism and American dynamics combined with occasional high-handedness are difficult obstacles.     

Why Not Invade North Korea? Threats, Language Games, and U.S. Foreign Policy

International relations theory has difficulty explaining how similar policies produce different outcomes. Iraq and North Korea have been identified as members of the "axis of evil" with weapons of mass destruction programs that threaten the United States. Yet in late 2002, the United States prepared to attack Iraq whereas it chose to negotiate with North Korea, even after North Korea admitted to a secret nuclear program in direct violation of its 1994 agreement with the United States. Moreover, a direct comparison with Iraq shows North Korea to possess the greater material capability to threaten the United States. I argue that a language-based constructivist approach can explain these differences in U.S. foreign policy where other theoretical approaches cannot. By examining the U.S. entanglement in intersected language games—the implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea and the enforcement of United Nations Resolutions in Iraq—it becomes possible to show how the United States could construct North Korea's nuclear program as a manageable threat that could be dealt with diplomatically.     

特朗普执政以来美国对拉美政策的调整及其影响

在美国的全球战略中,拉美地区历来占据着重要而特殊的位置。长期以来,美国视拉美为自己的“后院”,在拉美拥有独一无二的主导权和影响力。特朗普政府执政后,公开祭出“门罗主义”的旗帜,大幅度调整对拉美的政策,展现出更公开的干涉行径、更浓厚的利己色彩、更明显的分化企图和更强烈的排外取向,意在将拉美打造成一个政治上亲近美国、经贸上依赖美国、安全上不威胁美国的“后院”。短期看,特朗普政府对拉美的政策调整取得了一定的成效,对拉美的掌控有所强化。但长期看,美国和拉美地区之间的深层次矛盾和冲突并未完全纾解,在特定的时空背景下甚至存在进一步被激化的可能性;与此同时,特朗普政府对拉政策的调整还加剧了大国在拉美展开战略博弈的风险。特朗普政府的拉美政策如何进一步演变和发展,美拉关系如何变化,这些课题值得中国学界高度关注并深入研究。     

Sino-U.S. Cooperation in North Korean Nuclear Issue

China and the United States have cooperated closely in resolving the second North Korean nuclear crisis.China and the United States have worked together with South Korea, Russia and Japan to prevent the North Korean nuclear issue from spiraling out of control, and they have also tried to make progress in the six-party talks. Despite differences over the issue, both sides are maintaining the momentum of cooperation with increasing mutual understanding and trust. The current U.S.-North Korea rapprochement has progressed quickly, adding a new factor in Sino-U.S. cooperation. Apart from bilateral contact with North Korea, the United States is insisting on a multilateral approach, continuing to persuade China to share responsibility for a nuclear-free Peninsula, and jointly advancing the process in the second phase set forth in the February 13 Agreement on Initial Actions. China's role,therefore, remains indispensable.     

Security, nationalism and the pursuit of nuclear weapons and missiles: The South Korean case, 1970-82

South Korea decided to develop nuclear weapons and surface-to-surface missiles in the early 1970s. The Park Chung-hee administration made the decision because of its concern about a complete withdrawal of US forces from Korea following the Nixon Doctrine. Simultaneously, increasing nationalism within the administration, caused by its tumultuous relations with the United States, further strengthened such pursuits. Later, when faced with the US threat to withdraw security and economic assistance, the administration slowed down active development of nuclear weapons in 1976, but it continued missile development. However, the Chun Doo-hwan administration, inaugurated in 1980 after military coup and massacre, froze all weapons-related nuclear research and the missile programme. The Chun regime made such a change because it needed the support of the US to make up for its weakness in legitimacy and because the Reagan administration provided a solid defence commitment to South Korea.     

The Personalization(s) of Politics: Israel, 1949–2003

The relationship between the United States and Iran has had an important influence on world affairs during the past two decades. Accordingly, the U.S. news media have an instrumental role in portraying U.S.‐Iran relations to the public. The Iranian Revolution and hostage crisis of 1979–1981, the TWA hijacking of 1985, the Irangate controversy of 1986–1987, and the Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991 are examples of important media events that have impacted public opinion regarding U.S. policy toward Iran. This research analyzes government and print media portrayals of the Reagan administration's U.S.‐Iran policy during Irangate. Results supported the prediction that the print media would fulfill their “watchdog” function by providing more critical portrayals of the United States' policy toward Iran than the Tower Commission Report, an investigative document published by President Reagan's Special Review Board. Among the three leading newspapers analyzed, there was significant diversity in the reporting of U.S.‐Iran relations. Results indicate the Reagan administration's attempt to “spin” its version of Irangate did not successfully pressure the media to neglect their watchdog role. Although the Tower Commission Report was less critical of U.S. policy toward Iran than the print media, all four print media sources portrayed the Reagan administration's policy as a flawed approach that degenerated into trading arms for hostages. Implications of these findings for future research are discussed.     

Protecting “The Prize”: Oil and the U.S. National Interest

American national security policy is based on a misunderstanding about U.S. oil interests. Although oil is a vital commodity, potential supply disruptions are less worrisome than scholars, politicians, and pundits presume. This article identifies four adaptive mechanisms that together can compensate for almost all oil shocks, meaning that continuous supply to consumers will limit scarcity-induced price increases. The adaptive mechanisms are not particularly fragile and do not require tremendous foresight by either governments or economic actors. We illustrate these mechanisms at work using evidence from every major oil disruption since 1973. We then identify the small subset of disruptive events that would overwhelm these adaptive mechanisms and therefore seriously harm the United States. Finally, we analyze the utility of U.S. foreign military policy tools in addressing these threats. Our findings suggest that the United States can defend its key interests in the Persian Gulf—the world's most important oil-producing region—with a less-intrusive, “over the horizon” posture.     

The U. S. Policy toward DPRK: Opportunities and Constraints

布什政府上台以来,始终未能阻止朝鲜拥核步伐.朝核试后,美对朝政策有了新的调整,六方会谈得以复会.但美朝双方受各自国家利益和政策目标的限制,在朝鲜半岛无核化问题上的尖锐分歧难以解决,朝核危机仍存在再度升级的可能.     

Keeping Friends Close and Enemies Closer: Classical Realist Statecraft and Economic Exchange in U.S. Interwar Strategy

This article addresses the relationship between economic exchange and grand strategy and explains why rival states exchange with each other. The theoretical debate among realists is defined, while a novel, yet classical, realist exchange theory is proffered and evaluated against the record of U.S.-Japanese exchange, 1918–41. In this particular case, the origins of Japan's oil dependency on the United States are detailed for the first time as is the U.S. policy toward Britain and the Netherlands that created this dependency. The article finds U.S. strategic coordination of Japan's economic vulnerabilities and their use advanced U.S. grand strategy leading into WWII. The article concludes that the July 1941 U.S. oil embargo against Japan was purposeful and the product of a larger policy arc from the early post-WWI period.     

U.S.＇ Middle East Policy

After the 9/11 incident, the United States further shifted its strategic focus on the Middle East. This article analyzes the strategic dilemma faced by the U.S. in the Middle East and the origins of its Middle East strategy. It uses an historical perspective by comparing former strategies with current policy.     

If Not Soft Balancing,Then What? Reconsidering Soft Balancing and U.S. Policy Toward China

Some scholars argue that soft balancing is a typical state behavior against the hegemon under unipolarity. Others contend that soft balancing against the hegemon is ineffective. We challenge both arguments and suggest that soft balancing is not only a product of specific configurations of the power distribution in the system, unipolarity, but also a rational behavior under another condition, economic dependence. We argue that the interplay between power disparity and economic dependence shapes a state's decision in choosing different balancing strategies. The higher the power disparity and economic dependence, the more likely a state chooses soft balancing to pursue its security. Using U.S. policy toward China after the Cold War as a crucial test, we suggest that the huge power gap and increasing economic interdependence between the United States and China shape U.S. soft balancing rather than hard balancing toward China. We conclude that future U.S.-China relations depend on whether the United States declines as a result of China's rise and on the degree of economic interdependence between the two countries.     

The Zimbabwe Issue in Sino-U.S. Ties

The United States has criticized the domestic and foreign policies of the Mugabe regime, and has attempted to raise the Zimbabwe issue in the UN Security Council, thus creating a point of potential conflict in Sino-U.S. relations.China differs from the United States on this issue not because of the measures taken by the Western countries such as economic sanctions and political pressure, but,more significantly, because of the Western conception of democracy and human rights, and the difference between the U.S. and Chinese strategies in Africa. The policies of China and the United States on the Zimbabwe issue can be interpreted as a struggle between two powers in Africa. In the short term, however, it is the Middle East that will continue to preoccupy U.S. foreign policy, and Zimbabwe will not become a major flash point in Sino-U.S. relations.     

War Powers and the Atlantic Divide

As within the United States debates have arisen over how much unilateral power the President has to deploy force, so too debates are being raised across Europe. Depending on each country's history, system of government, and economic status, various historic positions are shifting. Public, as well as elite, voices are shaping the debate. Another point of tension is NATO's changing role as countries develop autonomous war caveats. Extended analysis of how Great Britain and Germany are grappling with these concerns has great import for U.S. policy. Learning to skillfully persuade its European allies will gain the United States better cooperation from those who do not share the U.S. war powers model.     

美国对东南亚外交的未来趋势

布什上任后,美国对东南亚地区越来越关注,美国与东南亚地区各国在贸易、军事合作以及外交关系等方面的互动越来越频繁和深入.很多学者认为这是美国借着打击恐怖主义的契机,开始"重返东南亚"①的表现.从近几年美国在东南亚的一系活动来看,反恐并不是美国的唯一目的,而更多地是为了加强它对这一地区的影响和控制.纵观布什政府在东南亚的一系列外交活动,可以看到三个基本的方向:(1)继续在这一地区推行美国价值观和理念;(2)在加强和巩固与传统盟国如泰国和菲律宾的关系与合作的基础上,拓展新的双边关系;(3)积极参与和建构东南亚地区主义进程,提升美国对东南亚地区主义进程的影响.     

六方会谈与美朝博弈分析

朝核问题的核心是美朝关系问题，美朝之间的博弈影响并左右着六方会谈的进程。美国在既定的对朝战略目标下，在国内强硬派和务实派的政策转换中采取不断变化着的对朝策略；热衷朝美直接对话的朝鲜由于其弱势地位，不得不为应对美国变幻不定的政策措施而变换手法。六方会谈的多边性地位及其维护谈判的公正性正在受到美朝双方博弈的挑战。     

The Confluence of Domestic and International Interests: U.S. Policy Toward Cuba, 1998–2001

This article examines the confluence of forces at work to shape U.S. policy toward Cuba since the late 1990s. Our approach examines four key factors involved in policymaking toward Cuba in this period: (1) the entry of new interest groups into the Cuba policy process and an "entrepreneurial" Congress; (2) the executive's constitutionally based interests; (3) bureaucratic interests; and (4) pressure from outside the United States. We examine U.S.–Cuba policy by describing each determinant in isolation and then by looking at the dynamic interaction among them, showing how they are linked together. In doing so, we argue that an analysis including multiple factors better explains U.S. policy toward Cuba than one that focuses on a single factor such as the power of the Cuban-American community.     

A Fragile Relationship: The United States and the Republic Of Korea

As South Korea became economically and militarily stronger and developed democratic institutions, the country was in a position to assume more responsibilities in its partnership with the United States. The necessary changes could be achieved only with difficulties. The efforts of the US administration to stop the nuclear proliferation by North Korea and South Korea's attempts to develop a policy of engagement towards the DPRK resulted in friction between the allies. The dissonance was amplified by efforts of the Rho Moo Hyun government to pursue a foreign policy that was less dependent upon the United States. The change of atmosphere was underlined by anti-American outbursts in South Korea. A new effort to strengthen the partnership is, however, reasonable. For South Korea the United States is still the indispensable ally as long as an attack by North Korea that probably has nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out. For the United States this alliance contributes to maintain America's paramount influence in East Asia. If both countries agree with this rationale they should take steps to accept basic assumptions and policies of the other side. To find a common position towards the nuclear efforts of North Korea is crucial. Even if both sides try to harmonize their policies, success is not guaranteed. Korean nationalism and American dynamics combined with occasional high-handedness are difficult obstacles.     

The “Japan Card” in the United States Rapprochement with China, 1969–1972

United States rapprochement with China should be re-examined by taking into consideration the American negotiating approach towards Beijing regarding the role of Japan, the United States' major Asian ally and China's long-term rival in East Asia. Whilst announcing the Nixon Doctrine, which increased pressure on Japan to strengthen its defense and regional responsibilities, Nixon and Kissinger used the so-called “Japan Card,” Japan's possible military resurgence and China's long-term fear of it, as a tacit negotiating tool to justify to Chinese leaders the continued United States military presence in East Asia. This article examines the impact of the United States rapprochement with China on the American negotiating process with Chinese leaders for the continuation of the United States–Japan Security Treaty and to what extent it changed China's policy toward American relations with Japan.     

National Security in the Post-Pandemic Era

The geopolitical implications of COVID-19 are profound in the near term, and will have a ripple effect throughout the U.S. economy and the foundations of U.S. power. It could be more strategically contagious over the longer term if it compels a sharp change in how Americans see their role in the world and adapts its conception of national security. This article presents both the economic and fiscal impact of the pandemic in the United States, as well as the likely consequences for national security investments and the Pentagon's budget. It offers three potential defense strategies, at three possible spending levels, to examine options for the next administration.