六方会谈与美朝博弈分析

朝核问题的核心是美朝关系问题，美朝之间的博弈影响并左右着六方会谈的进程。美国在既定的对朝战略目标下，在国内强硬派和务实派的政策转换中采取不断变化着的对朝策略；热衷朝美直接对话的朝鲜由于其弱势地位，不得不为应对美国变幻不定的政策措施而变换手法。六方会谈的多边性地位及其维护谈判的公正性正在受到美朝双方博弈的挑战。     

Sino-U.S. Cooperation in North Korean Nuclear Issue

China and the United States have cooperated closely in resolving the second North Korean nuclear crisis.China and the United States have worked together with South Korea, Russia and Japan to prevent the North Korean nuclear issue from spiraling out of control, and they have also tried to make progress in the six-party talks. Despite differences over the issue, both sides are maintaining the momentum of cooperation with increasing mutual understanding and trust. The current U.S.-North Korea rapprochement has progressed quickly, adding a new factor in Sino-U.S. cooperation. Apart from bilateral contact with North Korea, the United States is insisting on a multilateral approach, continuing to persuade China to share responsibility for a nuclear-free Peninsula, and jointly advancing the process in the second phase set forth in the February 13 Agreement on Initial Actions. China's role,therefore, remains indispensable.     

中国视角：朝核问题现状及解决途径

本文通过对朝鲜拥核的内外部因素分析,重新评估了朝鲜的核政策,反驳了目前西方学者在朝核问题上的6种观点,对朝鲜拥核的动机、强制弃核的效果、朝核问题解决的程序悖论、中国在朝核问题上的作用、朝鲜经济变革的可能性以及六方会谈的未来等进行了论证。本文认为朝鲜弃核进程必须与安全关切紧密联在一起,弃核的实现又与朝鲜的经济改革存在相关性。必须强化六方会谈其他五方与朝鲜的立场和政策更为有效的协调,以多边模式整合碎片化的地区安全局面。     

俄罗斯总统普京的朝鲜半岛政策与朝核立场

20 0 0年普京担任总统后 ,俄罗斯对外政策开始转向以国家利益为目标的实用主义外交。在朝鲜半岛政策上 ,改变了过去“重南轻北”的方针 ,积极发展俄罗斯与朝鲜的关系 ,实行南北朝鲜等距离的平衡政策。普京通过加强与南北朝鲜的关系 ,提高俄罗斯对朝鲜半岛的影响力。俄罗斯坚持朝鲜半岛无核化原则 ,主张以和平方式解决朝鲜核危机 ,反对使用武力和各种制裁措施。建议通过对朝鲜提供安全保证的方式使朝鲜放弃核计划。俄罗斯的原则立场对于解决朝鲜核危机无疑具有建设性作用。     

Putin's foreign policy toward North Korea

Since coming to office in 2000, President of the Russian Federation,Vladimir Putin, has taken a pragmatic and calculating approachto the conduct of foreign policy in order to promote Russia'sgeopolitical and economic interests. For him, a higher profileon Korean issues has been an opportunity to show that Moscowcan influence Pyongyang and play a meaningful role in greatpower diplomacy on the Korean peninsula. As a result of activediplomacy toward North Korea, the two former communist alliesput a period to the deteriorating relations in the 1990s; afterthe September 11 terrorists attack and the launch of the waron terrorism Moscow's influence over Pyongyang reached its peak.The beginning of the North Korean nuclear crisis in October2002, however, relegated Moscow to a marginalized position inthe Korean issue. This paper examines how Putin's pragmaticdiplomacy was put into effect in Russia's foreign policy towardNorth Korea and how circumstances on the Korean peninsula haveaffected Russia–DPRK bilateral relations. An analysisof these factors shows why Russia's role in the ongoing Six-Partyprocess has become insignificant. At the present time, it iscertainly plausible that Russia will not activate diplomaticefforts to solve the North Korean nuclear crisis and will besatisfied with merely securing a seat at the multilateral talksin Northeast Asia.     

Inter-Korean relations and the roles of the US and of the EU

The North Korean nuclear standoff has escalated since North Korea let slip that it was developing nuclear weapons while James Kelly, U.S. Assistant Secretary of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, was visiting Pyongyang in October 2002. The Bush administration has acknowledged that the United States will not discount a preemptive military strike on the suspected nuclear development facilities, and North Korea has stood firm against any pressure to halt its nuclear development from the international community. Dialogue and meetings for international cooperation among the major countries concerned, including Korea, the U.S., Japan and China, have been activated to resolve the nuclear crisis in the Korean Peninsula, especially after the U.S. pronounced an end to its war against Iraq in early May of this year. In the middle of the rapidly changing situation on the Korean peninsula, the inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation initiated by the Sunshine Policy of the Kim Dae Jung administration and followed by the Roh Moo-hyun administrations Policy of Peace and Prosperity are not separable from the nuclear situation. This paper follows recent developments of inter-Korean relations, illustrates South Koreas stance on the issue and suggests the EUs role on the nuclear issue. This is a revised version of the paper presented at the Asia-EU Journalists Seminar organized by the Asia Europe Foundation and the Korea Press Foundation (KPF), held in Brussels, Belgium, May 22 2003. Financial support from the KPF is gratefully acknowledged.     

去冬今春朝鲜形势管窥

去冬今春朝鲜形势沸沸扬扬,有两点尤为引人关注:其一,美朝核风波所以再起绝非偶然,系由美朝双方各自立场相左而引起。风波事态发展严峻,但还不致引发美国对朝实施类似对伊拉克的“外科手术式”打击。在中国卓有成效的斡旋之下,在北京召开的中、美、朝3方会谈,展现了和平解决朝核问题的曙光;其二,朝鲜推出的经济秩序调整和增设特区的举措,不否认对其活化濒临崩溃的经济具有重大意义,却因受一系列的制约因素影响,导致通货膨胀发生,个别特区建设搁浅。朝鲜距全面复苏经济、实现良性循环尚任重道远。     

当前朝鲜对外政策的特点及走向分析

朝鲜外交政策的基本目标是通过外交手段为确保国家生存权利、巩固和扩大国家生存空间创造条件。朝鲜总体外交战略是两轴战略,基本外交战略是先军战略,安保外交战略是均衡战略加搭便车战略,对南外交战略是民族共助加追求经济实利战略,对外经济合作战略是有限制的开放战略。朝美核危机最终通过和平解决的可能性还是大于通过其他方式解决的可能性。美伊战争的进程和结果将对朝美关系产生重大影响。     

Why Not Invade North Korea? Threats, Language Games, and U.S. Foreign Policy

International relations theory has difficulty explaining how similar policies produce different outcomes. Iraq and North Korea have been identified as members of the "axis of evil" with weapons of mass destruction programs that threaten the United States. Yet in late 2002, the United States prepared to attack Iraq whereas it chose to negotiate with North Korea, even after North Korea admitted to a secret nuclear program in direct violation of its 1994 agreement with the United States. Moreover, a direct comparison with Iraq shows North Korea to possess the greater material capability to threaten the United States. I argue that a language-based constructivist approach can explain these differences in U.S. foreign policy where other theoretical approaches cannot. By examining the U.S. entanglement in intersected language games—the implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea and the enforcement of United Nations Resolutions in Iraq—it becomes possible to show how the United States could construct North Korea's nuclear program as a manageable threat that could be dealt with diplomatically.     

South Korea's Faustian Attitude: The Republic of Korea's Decision to Send Troops to Iraq Revisited

South Korea sent troops to Iraq not because of any perceived threat from an Iraqi nuclear programme, but to seek influence over American foreign policy towards North Korea. At no point did the general public support the American invasion and war in Iraq; most South Koreans also opposed sending troops to Iraq. However, the government chose to send first non-combat and later combat troops to Iraq, and the public approved of the former choice and support was growing for the latter. The liberal President Roh Moo-Hyun had to persuade the public on this issue, even in opposition to his core supporters, risking political isolation. What the public and the President aimed at was a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and business opportunities. The national interest that South Korea pursued in sending troops to Iraq was policy influence over the US guarantee not to use military power against North Korea.     

The EU,regional cooperation,and the North Korean nuclear crisis

North Korea poses a security threat by developing nuclear weapons. To address this source of regional insecurity, institutionalized frameworks of regional cooperation have been employed. Despite its usefulness as an alternative route to deal with the North Korean case, controversies still remain in terms of its relevance and effectiveness. Even so, the regional integration, consistently promoted by the EU as an integral part of its Asian policy, still requires systematic evaluation. This paper thus examines how and under which conditions regional integration can make a contribution to the transformation of the current crisis. In answering this question, it concludes that a long-term model-setting effect is hard to disregard, in spite of the mixed view of substantial compulsory and social learning effects. The underlying reasons are the ontological-seeking activities of North Korea, along with regional and global actors’ reservations about the contributions of the EU as a key security provider in Asian affairs and in its promotion of the regional integration scheme.     

朝核问题考验奥巴马亚洲外交

奥巴马的亚洲政策初显其“灵巧外交”的轮廓，即在坚持基本战略的前提下，注重加强与新兴力量的关系，通过加强对话合作来增加美国对亚洲地区的影响力。然而，极有可能陷入复杂甚至是危险僵局的朝核问题正在考验着美国新政府的亚洲政策。朝核问题不仅反映美朝关系的战略瓶颈，而且受到与朝核问题的变化有着重要相关利益的日、韩的牵制．还要受到美国内一些政治势力的牵制。     

The Twin Peaks of Pyongyang

The United States has been negotiating with North Korea in an effort to have it renounce its nuclear program for over a decade, since Washington negotiated an Agreed Framework in 1994. In this time, North Korea has only amassed more plutonium. The negotiations are hindered by mutual distrust and hostility, but it is doubtful whether any change in Washington's attitude toward the dprk would help solve the nuclear issue. It is the Kim regime that is the core problem. Until the regime is removed, there can be no durable peace in the region. This article suggests that with the prospect for a negotiated resolution of the nuclear issue remote, and since any attempt to remove the Kim regime militarily would entail huge costs, Washington might consider a third option: directly engaging the North Korean people.     

论苏联解体后的“核遗产”及核扩散危机

苏联解体后其庞大的核武库也一分为四,在核武器系统、核材料、核科学家及核技术等三个层次都出现了失控的核扩散危机。以美国为首的国际社会从各个方面给予了大力援助,使前苏联庞大的"核遗产"得到了妥善的处理。因苏联解体而一度出现的核国家增多的问题得以解决,核扩散危机也基本得到消除。这不仅有效地捍卫了国际核不扩散体制,而且在实践上也是对国际核不扩散机制的补充和发展,对人类社会的和平与安全也是重大的贡献。当朝鲜和伊朗核问题屡成危机而长期困扰国际社会时,我们重温这段历史,也具有深刻的现实意义。     

Quiet diplomacy in a television era: The media and U.S. policy toward the republic of Korea

This study examines the role of television coverage in U.S. policy toward South Korea, focusing on the May 1980 Kwangji incident and the subsequent visit of South Korean president Chun Doo Hwan to the White House in February of 1981. It explores these two episodes in the context of major dimensions of U.S. policy toward Korea and the themes developed through sporadic, low‐level coverage of Korea by mainstream American media over the years. The analysis underscores the political impact of television's dramatic visual focus, its use of consistent visual images, its expansion of the geopolitical scope of the policy process, and its personalization of policy. The dramatically different public interpretations of the Kwangju incident and Chun visit in Korea versus the United States suggests that President Reagan's first major state visit, during which he declared that his administration would pursue “quiet diplomacy” on human rights in Korea, while successful within the United States and in the short term, was damaging over the long term.     

新一轮朝鲜核危机与日、韩、美3国协调体制

新一轮朝鲜半岛核危机正在挑战美国的反恐新战略。同时 ,朝鲜南北和谈、日朝平壤宣言 ,东北亚两大历史事件也冲击了美日、美韩同盟。在这历史性的转换中 ,日、韩、美 3国协调体制将从同盟向外交转换。构筑TCOG和KEDO的新协调体制 ,是这一转换的重要形式。     

Quest for a stronger regional leadership and an upgraded global profile

The Korean economy has suffered two major economic crises over the past 15?years — the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2008 global financial crisis. After analyzing both the changes in policy environments and Korea’s policy responses, the article argues that the ongoing global financial crisis provided a welcomed opportunity for Korea to increase its regional and global influence. Korea’s regional leadership has been strengthened especially in promoting the “development” issue in a number of international forums and in establishing a more effective crisis-prevention framework in the Asian region. As the host country of the 5th G20 Summit Meeting in 2010, Korea initiated a number of global issues, such as “development”, “global financial safety net”, “green growth strategy”, and has been successful in fortifying its position in the global arena. As a result, the global profile of Korea appears to have been raised both substantially and substantively.     

The Bush Administration and the Nuclear Challenges by North Korea

When in October 2002 the US administration confronted the North Koreans with intelligence that the latter had a program to enrich uranium, another nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula was triggered. It quickly developed into a plutonium crisis because the DPRK then started to “defrost” the nuclear facilities that had been frozen by the Agreed Framework and to revive its nuclear weapons program. North Korea told the world that it was building up a nuclear deterrent force. Though the US administration toyed with the idea of working towards a collapse of the DPRK, it ultimately decided to pursue diplomacy. The two Koreas and the four great Pacific powers got involved in the negotiations. The administration insisted on a complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantling of the North Korean nuclear programs. The DPRK was reluctant to proceed with the talks, since it felt that its basic security interests were being disregarded. Three rounds of six-party talks held in Beijing did not surpass the stage of prenegotiations. At the end of 2004, the prospects for the talks were gloomy.¹     

朝鲜半岛新危机与美国东北亚同盟体系新变化

朝鲜半岛危机与美国东北亚同盟体系的构建与演化关系密切。2010年至2011年初,朝鲜半岛危机呈现出新的特点,美日、美韩同盟的演变也进入了新的阶段,呈现出新的变化。此轮朝鲜半岛新危机的特点是,海上危机与核危机并发。美国东北亚同盟体系的新变化是,同盟反应以军事压制为主,双边同盟强化并赋予新的内容,三边同盟趋势化且日韩互动提升。     

A Fragile Relationship: The United States and the Republic Of Korea

As South Korea became economically and militarily stronger and developed democratic institutions, the country was in a position to assume more responsibilities in its partnership with the United States. The necessary changes could be achieved only with difficulties. The efforts of the US administration to stop the nuclear proliferation by North Korea and South Korea's attempts to develop a policy of engagement towards the DPRK resulted in friction between the allies. The dissonance was amplified by efforts of the Rho Moo Hyun government to pursue a foreign policy that was less dependent upon the United States. The change of atmosphere was underlined by anti-American outbursts in South Korea. A new effort to strengthen the partnership is, however, reasonable. For South Korea the United States is still the indispensable ally as long as an attack by North Korea that probably has nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out. For the United States this alliance contributes to maintain America's paramount influence in East Asia. If both countries agree with this rationale they should take steps to accept basic assumptions and policies of the other side. To find a common position towards the nuclear efforts of North Korea is crucial. Even if both sides try to harmonize their policies, success is not guaranteed. Korean nationalism and American dynamics combined with occasional high-handedness are difficult obstacles.