导致1963年柬埔寨王国拒绝美援的诸因素分析

1963年柬埔寨王国拒绝美援是1965年柬埔寨与美国断交的前奏,它连同柬埔寨与美国断交一起对冷战时期东南亚地区的历史产生了重要的影响。柬埔寨在1963年拒绝美援是邻国因素、美国因素、中国因素和柬埔寨自身因素等要素合力的结果。对影响1963年柬埔寨王国拒绝美援的诸因素的分析将有助于我们较好地理解亚洲冷战的复杂性,更好地理解制约美国亚洲冷战战略得以有效实施的因素。     

美国学者戴度与我省东南亚问题学者进行座谈

美国全球战略委员会研究与规划主任戴度(F ank Tato),应中国国际友好联络会的邀请来华访问,1989年7月24日上午与我省东南亚问题学者进行了座谈。 戴度在50年代到70年代曾先后在美国驻东南业务国使馆任职,对东南亚事务较为熟悉。在座谈中,双方就越南从柬埔寨撤军、红色高棉问题和中国在解决柬埔寨问题上的作用等问题广泛交换了意见。我方研究人员认为,尽管越南在主观上极不愿意从柬埔寨撤军,但在强大的国际压力下,以及为了摆脱经济困境,它最终不得不从柬埔寨撤军。红色高棉虽然在执政时期犯了一些错误,但长期以来它一直是柬埔寨抗击越南侵略的主要力量,它在柬埔寨有     

我国第三代领导人与柬埔寨

1989年6月 ,江泽民同志在中共中央召开的第十三次全国代表大会上当选为中共中央总书记 ,形成了以他为核心的我国第三代领导人。按照我国第二代领导人邓小平所说的主持正义、反对霸权、政治解决柬埔寨问题的理论 ,江泽民总书记努力推动柬埔寨恢复和平 ,促成5个常任理事国就政治解决柬埔寨问题达成框架文件。他同越南新领导人共同举行高峰会谈 ,双方达成了共识。江泽民经过几年的努力 ,联合国秘书长在巴黎举行国际会议 ,就政治解决柬埔寨问题签署了最终协定。中国参与联合国对柬埔寨的监督检察 ,越南全部撤军 ,柬埔寨走向和平统一。此后柬全国…     

回忆新中国第一代领导人对柬埔寨的帮助

１９７０年３月 ,美国扩大对越南的侵略战争 ,扶持柬埔寨内阁首相朗诺发动军事政变 ,推翻国家元首西哈努克 ,建立亲美政权。流亡到北京的西哈努克亲王得到新中国第一代领导人毛泽东、周恩来的热情接待。中国大力支持和帮助西哈努克 ,同意他在北京成立柬埔寨民族统一阵线和团结政府 ,并允许西哈努克及其家属在京长期留住。在中国的全力支持下 ,柬埔寨解放力量经过５年多的艰苦奋斗 ,终于取得了重要胜利。在此期间 ,我作为中国外交部亚洲司的工作人员 ,负责印支三国事务。西哈努克亲王在北京留住５年半期间 ,我参与了接待西哈努克的工作 ,陪同…     

中国与东盟关系大事记（一）（1991～2000年）

1991年 2月12日 中国国务院总理李鹏在北京会见柬埔寨主席西哈努克亲王。 3月14日 中国国务院总理李鹏在北京会见柬埔寨抵抗力量三方领导人，重申中国将继续支持他们为政治解决柬埔寨问题所作的努力。     

建立东盟——中国自由贸易区的机遇与挑战——越南贸易部副部长杜如订在中国（广西）——东西亚经济合作论坛上的讲话

2002年11月4日在柬埔寨首都金边举行的东盟与中国领导人会议上,东盟与中国领导人签署了《东盟与中国全面经济合作框架协议》,包括10年内建立东盟-中国自由贸易区,我们此次论坛是在这次东盟与中国领导人会议后不久召开的.     

柬埔寨文学研究述评

柬埔寨文学是东南亚文学的一个重要组成部分。中国与柬埔寨有着友好悠久的交往史,中国对柬埔寨文学的研究缺乏细化和深入。本文主要对柬埔寨文学在中国的研究情况、特点进行论述,分析存在问题,探究未来走向,以期推进柬埔寨文学研究向纵深发展。     

乔森潘的政治绝唱

2007年底，柬埔寨首都金边的街头书摊出现了一本新书，作者是前红色高棉的高级领导人乔森潘，书的题目是《对截止到民主柬埔寨时代的柬埔寨历史的思考》。该书的首次发行量为5000册，立即引起各界的广泛关注。 人们发现这本书是在2007年11月14日。也就是在这一天，柬埔寨首相洪森派出直升飞机到柬埔寨西北边境小镇拜林把突然中风瘫痪的乔森潘接到了金边，送入了著名的卡尔麦特医院抢救。据乔森潘的家人透露，     

外部渗透和政治纷争打破柬埔寨宗教平和

流亡国外的西藏宗教领袖达赖喇嘛 ,没有能出席2002年12月在柬埔寨首都金边举行的第三届世界佛教大会 ,这是人们预料中的事情。因为柬埔寨在“一个中国”、西藏问题和人权问题上的立场非常明确 ,是东盟国家中在政治和外交上最支持中国的国家之一。日本佛教团体是本次大会的主要赞助者。柬埔寨宗教部官员早在会议前几个月就已经表示 ,“柬埔寨将不邀请达赖喇嘛参加会议 ,我们的政策不允许这样做”。他说 ,“柬埔寨奉行一个中国的政策 ,香港、台湾和西藏是中国的一部分。”柬埔寨总理洪森后来也公开证实达赖将不被邀请。达赖1998年参加了在日本…     

“香火”永续:柬埔寨华人社团百年变迁

自法国殖民时代至今,社团一直是柬埔寨华社的基本组织单位。按照柬埔寨历史发展的分期,柬埔寨华人社会可分为4个发展阶段:即法属柬埔寨的分帮而治时期;柬埔寨民族国家建构初期新老社团融合时期;经历20世纪70-80年代20年战乱和断层后,华人社会的重建时期;以及20世纪90年代以来,随着来柬的中国内地、香港、澳门等地的新移民增多,华人社团进行整合发展的新时期。柬埔寨华人社团的发展因柬埔寨历史的曲折而具有其独特性,因制度体系的数次巨变而屡屡重构,这是柬埔寨华人在当地生存发展呈现出的一个独特面向。     

试论1954年中印总理、中缅总理的互访

朝鲜战争结束后,美国极力拉拢中国周边的亚洲国家组建针对中国的包围圈,为了应对这一情况,中国提出了建立“国际和平统一战线”的外交战略,1954年中印、中缅两国总理互访就是落实“国际和平统一战线”政策的重大举措。在互访过程中,中印、中缅共同提出了和平共处五项原则,中国领导人着力消除了印度、缅甸在华人华侨、边界问题、亚洲国家共产党以及中美关系等问题上的疑虑和担心,从而促进了中印、中缅两国关系,巩固了亚洲国家的中立倾向,为亚非会议的召开奠定了良好的基础。     

柬埔寨：东盟国家中冉冉升起的新星——柬埔寨2007年回顾和2008年展望

2007年对柬埔寨第三届政府来说是本届执政的最后一年，也是关键的一年。这一年的形势比以往任何一年都好，政治稳定，社会安定，经济持续快速发展。执政的人民党，在4月举行的地方选举后，在国家政治中的主导地位得到进一步的确立。政府提出的发展经济的“四角战略”等各项政策获得顺利推行。桑兰西党取代奉辛比克党（简称奉党）成为第二大党后，柬埔寨两党政治局面初步形成。     

The “Japan Card” in the United States Rapprochement with China, 1969–1972

United States rapprochement with China should be re-examined by taking into consideration the American negotiating approach towards Beijing regarding the role of Japan, the United States' major Asian ally and China's long-term rival in East Asia. Whilst announcing the Nixon Doctrine, which increased pressure on Japan to strengthen its defense and regional responsibilities, Nixon and Kissinger used the so-called “Japan Card,” Japan's possible military resurgence and China's long-term fear of it, as a tacit negotiating tool to justify to Chinese leaders the continued United States military presence in East Asia. This article examines the impact of the United States rapprochement with China on the American negotiating process with Chinese leaders for the continuation of the United States–Japan Security Treaty and to what extent it changed China's policy toward American relations with Japan.     

20世纪80年代以来老挝、柬埔寨华人社会发展探析

华人在老挝、柬埔寨两国均有着较为悠久的移民历史,早在数百年前就有华人进入老挝与柬埔寨定居并繁衍生息下来。华人迁入老柬两国,在其漫长的发展历程中,充满了艰辛与苦难。尤其进入近现代,老柬华人几遭灭顶之灾,其境遇令人同情。伴随着中国与东南亚国家关系的逐步改善,现在又处于历史上关系最为良好阶段,老柬华人的权益日益得到保障,地位得到改善,在两国经济与社会发展中日益彰显重要的作用。     

Statecraft and Migration: A Research Note on American Strategies to Use Immigration in Foreign Policy from the Founding Era through the Early Twenty-First Century

How has the United States used migration as part of its statecraft and foreign policy? This question is significant because migration is an important contemporary transnational policy area for the United States; and because a state’s foreign-immigration policy nexus remains an under-explored vantage point for examining diplomatic and international history. This review article answers the question and lays conceptual and empirical ground in the area by examining the historical record and extant research to show that American leaders from the country’s founding through the early twenty-first century have used migration as an instrument of statecraft by primarily attempting to reach three foreign policy objectives: pleasing, harming, and bargaining with states. For each of these categories, the analysis explicates relationships between statecraft and migration for the United States, identifies policy instruments used by American leaders to influence migration for diplomatic and foreign policy objectives, and presents historical cases of American migration policies designed for foreign policy goals. The conclusion provides the research and policy implications of its findings.     

Steadfast Yet Reluctant Allies: Japan and the United Kingdom in the Vietnam War

During the Vietnam War there were high expectations from the Johnson and Nixon Administrations for Japan and Britain to provide practical and political support for American military and strategic objectives in Indochina. The leader of Japan's conservative Liberal Democratic Party, Sato Eisaku, and the British Labour Party's Harold Wilson, balanced political support for the United States with significant public pressure at home to eschew any entanglement in the highly unpopular conflict. As junior allies of the United States both Sato and Wilson did not want to see the United States fail in Vietnam or the communist sphere expand in Southeast Asia. Both leaders accrued significant foreign policy advantages as a result of politically and publicly supporting American actions in Vietnam. But to placate domestic electorates that clearly felt uncomfortable over their governments providing explicit, albeit non-military, support to the United States in Vietnam, Sato and Wilson expended substantial prime ministerial diplomacy in attempting to play a mediatory role in the conflict. Each was highly successful in balancing domestic and American demands, whilst maintaining their security partnerships with the United States.     

Powerless and Frustrated: Britain's Relationship With China During the Opening Years of the Second Sino–Japanese War, 1937–1939

Foreign policy is multi-faceted. It was not only diplomatic, political, socio-cultural, economic, Imperial, and strategic factors that structured—and limited—Britain's foreign policy during the interwar period; so, too, did those of other countries. Given the number and variety of Britain's—and the interconnected other Powers'—interests in China, Britain's relationship with China during the opening years of the Second Sino–Japanese War provides a useful insight which has wider implications on Britain's road to war narrative. Given the topic's neglect, one can be forgiven for inferring that events in Europe entirely eclipsed those of East Asia. This article demonstrates the contrary. As awareness of Chinese suffering spread and as Japanese aggrandisement threatened British interests, sinophilism became vogue once again. However, the often insurmountable obstacles that the interwar period presented to Britain and others—particularly the United States—limited Britain's ability to aid China. It was not for want of fortitude.     

Mixing Grand Strategies: Trump and International Security

ABSTRACT

When a new President is elected in the United States, the first thing analysts do is define that President’s grand strategy; yet, naming Donald Trump’s grand strategy was a difficult task as his pre-election speeches often contradicted traditional US foreign policy norms. Trump’s ambiguous grand strategy combines two US foreign policy strategies: nationalism in the sense that his preference is for unilateral policies prioritising American interests, and a traditional foreign policy approach, as seen in the moves taken against China and Iran. Surprisingly, this grand strategy unintentionally contributes to cooperation in Eurasia, as actors like Russia, China, Turkey, India and the European Union continue to try to balance the threat from the United States instead of competing with each other, while smaller countries are reluctant to challenge the regional powers due to mistrust towards Trump.     

Indonesia Returns to the International Stage: Good News for the United States

Indonesia, the world's fourth largest country, third largest democracy and home to the world's largest community of Muslims, has returned to the international stage. Indonesia's membership in a number of important global communities-it resides physically in Asia but is part of the broader Muslim world, the developing world, and the community of democracies-makes it an important international actor. Many Americans assume that common democratic values will translate into shared foreign policy goals and cooperation between the United States and Indonesia. The two countries do share significant interests, such as counter terrorism, maritime security, and a wariness of China, but also hold starkly different positions on the Middle East peace process and global trade issues. Democracy provides opportunities for the two-thirds of Indonesians who hold anti-American views to influence foreign policy, making it costly for Indonesian leaders to cooperate with the United States. Indonesia's return is good news for America, but the relationship needs to be managed skillfully to maximize benefits for both sides.