From self-reliant churches to self-governing communities: comparing the indigenization of Christianity and democracy in sub-Saharan Africa

Christian missionaries, especially from Anglo-American Protestant denominations, have been remarkably successful in their effort to plant ‘self-propagating, self-supporting, self-governing’ churches throughout the world and especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Today's international non-governmental organizations and inter-governmental organizations engaged in development, humanitarian assistance, peace-building and human rights resemble ‘secular missionaries’ spreading their gospel of democracy, good governance, peace, justice and sustainable development. This article investigates the extent to which today's secular missionaries might learn from the indigenization of Christianity in sub-Saharan Africa. I conclude that an essential ingredient in the missionary strategy of evangelization is conspicuously absent in contemporary programmes of development, democratization, or peace-building. In particular, the extensive efforts devoted by Protestant missionaries to the translation of their Biblical message into local languages and symbolic repertoires bear little resemblance to efforts to transplant Western ideals of universal human rights or the institutional templates of democratic governance first developed in the United States and Western Europe.     

The Effects of Majority State Ownership of Significant Economic Sectors on Corruption: A Cross-Regional Comparison

Given both corruption's and bureaucratic inefficiency's importance for development and good governance, understanding their causes is paramount. This paper argues that majority state ownership of most the most important economic sectors of a country results in higher levels of corruption and inefficiency. When political and managerial elites both own and manage the country's most important economic resources, they have greater incentives for corrupt or inefficient behavior. These elites use national resources at their disposal more for short-term personal and political goals than for long-term economic ones. This paper tests this hypothesis on a relatively underused, but often cited, data set from the 1980s. Using a cross-national, regression analysis, this paper finds that the best predictors a country's level of corruption or bureaucratic inefficiency are these: majority state ownership of significant economic sectors, levels of GDP per capita, levels of government spending, and levels of democracy. Other factors, such as common law heritage, percent of population that is Protestant, federalism, economic freedoms, or mineral/ oil exporting, were not consistent, significant predictors of either bureaucratic inefficiency or corruption. We also argue that Tobit may be the best estimation procedure for these data.     

Are lions democrats? The impact of democratization on economic growth in Africa, 1980–2010

If we look back at the past two decades, timing seems to point to a close connection between democratic reforms and economic growth in sub-Saharan states. Most countries in the area introduced multiparty politics and made dramatic – if incomplete – democratic progress between 1990 and 1994. Quite strikingly, it is exactly from 1994 to 1995 (and particularly from 2000) that the region began to undergo a period of significant economic progress. Because of the undeniable temporal sequence experienced in the region – that is, first political reforms, then economic growth – some observers pointed to a nexus between democratic progress and economic performance. But is there evidence in support of a causal relationship? As of today, no empirical research has been conducted on the democracy–growth nexus in the early twenty-first century's so-called “emerging Africa”. To fill this gap, we discuss the different arguments claiming an economic advantage of democracies, we present our theoretical framework and carry out an empirical analysis of the growth impact of political regimes in 43 sub-Saharan states for the entire 1980–2010 period. Our findings confirm that African countries, many of which had long suffered the combination of authoritarian rule and predatory practices, derived some economic dividends from democratic progress.     

‘Big Men’ Rule: Presidential Power,Regime Type and Democracy in 30 African Countries

This article provides a systematic overview of the institutional basis of presidential power in 30 sub-Saharan African countries, using a broad comparative scheme to assess presidential power developed by Siaroff (2003). The dual purpose is, first, to compare the power of African presidents to patterns found by Siaroff for countries worldwide, looking particularly at the relation between regime type and presidential power; and second, to make a preliminary analysis of the political consequences of high levels of presidential power in the light of earlier theoretical claims associating it with regime problems such as democratic breakdown.

The article's comparative framework illustrates the high levels of institutional power of presidents in 30 African countries. As argued by Siaroff, regime type tells us little about presidential power; in these African cases, semi-presidential systems score even higher than presidential systems. One ‘parliamentary’ system also shows a high degree of presidential power. Moreover, there is very little difference in presidential power between democracies and non-democracies, and ‘minimal’ electoral democracies score higher on average than non-democracies and liberal democracies.

Examination of the consequences of high levels of presidential power also shows that more than a quarter (28.6 per cent) of such regimes experienced a democratic breakdown, although this is not a statistically significant level. A weak correlation is found between presidential power and freedom and democracy ratings, again not at a statistically significant level, while correlations with governance ratings are strong and statistically significant. A repeated measures test, however, does show a statistically significant relation with freedom and democracy. Although more research is needed, including a larger N and more variation in the independent variable, the evidence supports intuitive knowledge: a high degree of presidential power bodes ill for democracy and good governance in Africa.     

Divulging data: Domestic determinants of international information sharing

Information is a core input of governance that is often disrupted by the processes associated with globalization. To mitigate potential governance failures, states turn to information sharing – the exchange of sensitive data between governments. Such exchanges, however, come with considerable risks. Building on work in International Relations and organizational sociology stressing the importance of institutional similarity, we argue that states commit to information sharing based on their beliefs as to the reliability and predictability of potential partners – an assessment that involves a relative evaluation of domestic institutions. We test our argument on institutional similarity with a new dataset of mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) – a critical example of information-sharing agreements. The empirical analysis finds substantial support for our argument: states with similar legal institutions are much more likely to sign MLATs. The article contributes to a range of research concerned with the politics of globalization, especially as it relates to enforcement cooperation, the role of domestic institutions, and information flows.     

Defending democracy with international law: preventing coup attempts with democracy clauses

In recent decades many regional inter-governmental organizations have adopted agreements committing all member states to maintain democratic governments, and specifying punishments to be levied against member states that revert to authoritarianism. These treaties have a surprisingly high enforcement rate – nearly all states subject to them that have experienced governmental succession by coup have been suspended by the relevant IGO(s). However, relatively little is known about whether these treaties are deterring coups. This article offers an original theory of how these international agreements could deter coups d’état, focusing on the way that a predictably adverse international reaction complicates the incentives of potential coup participants. An analysis of the likelihood of coups for the period of 1991–2008 shows that states subject to democracy were on average less likely to experience coups, but that this finding was not statistically significant in most models. However, when restricting the analysis to democracies, middle-income states with democracy clauses were significantly less likely to experience coup attempts. Moreover, the African democracy regime appears to be particularly effective, significantly reducing the likelihood of coup attempts for middle-income states regardless of regime type.     

Globalization,democratization, and the Arab uprising: the international factor in MENA's failed democratization

What explains the almost wholly negative impact of international factors on post-uprising democratization prospects? This article compares the utility of rival “diffusionist” and neo-Gramscian political economy frames to explain this. Multiple international factors deter democratization. The failure of Western democracy promotion is rooted in the contradiction between the dominance of global finance capital and the norm of democratic equality; in the periphery, neo-liberalism is most compatible with hybrid regimes and, at best, “low intensity democracy”. In MENA, neo-liberalism generated crony capitalism incompatible with democratization; while this also sparked the uprisings, these have failed to address class inequalities. Moreover at the normative level, MENA hosts the most credible counter-hegemonic ideologies; the brief peaking of democratic ideology in the region during the early uprisings soon declined amidst regional discourse wars. Non-democrats – coercive regime remnants and radical charismatic movements – were empowered by the competitive interference of rival powers in uprising states. The collapse of many uprising states amidst a struggle for power over the region left an environment uncongenial to democratization.     

Do new democracies deliver social welfare? Political regimes and health policy in Ghana and Cameroon

Democratic reform processes often go hand in hand with expectations of social welfare improvements. While the connection between the emergence of democracy and the development of welfare states in the West has been the object of several studies, however, there is a scant empirical literature on the effects of recent democratization processes on welfare policies in developing countries. This is particularly true for Africa. In a dramatically poor environment, Africans often anticipated that the democratic reforms many sub-Saharan states undertook during the early 1990s would deliver welfare dividends. This article investigates whether and how the advent of democracy affected social policies – focusing, in particular, on health policy – by examining one of the continent's most successful cases of recent democratization (Ghana) and comparing it with developments in a country of enduring authoritarian rule (Cameroon). Evidence shows that democracy can indeed be instrumental to the expansion and strengthening of social policies. In Ghana, new participatory and competitive pressures pushed the government towards devising and adopting an ambitious health reform. Despite façade elections, no similar pressures could be detected in undemocratic Cameroon and health policy remained almost entirely dictated by foreign donors.     

Playing by the rules of the game: partisan use of recall referendums in Colombia

As a bottom-up mechanism of direct democracy, recall can be triggered by citizens to remove elected officials through a vote, which is expected to increase accountability. Contradicting this hope, previous research has suggested that intensive use of recall referendums became an instrument of party competition. However, empirical evidence is scant. Thus, focusing on the 107 attempts of activating recall in Colombia during the first half of 2017 this article seeks to understand if recall activations are more likely to reinforce democratic governance (by giving an institutional solution to exceptional problems of legitimacy) or are more likely to erode it (by becoming a weapon to escalate the partisan competition beyond regular elections). We created a dataset to identify who started the recall – partisan, mixed or civil society actors – and for what reasons. Then, we examined to what extent the effective number of parties in the council, the majority reached in the previous election, or the size of the municipality have an effect on the likelihood of recall attempts. The study finds that in Colombia, political leaders (and not specific parties) are the main actors promoting recall.     

Contestation and Transformation. Final Thoughts on the Liberal International Order

Abstract

The liberal international order, the inseparable mix of US geopolitical power and ideational project of organising international relations along normative frameworks such as internationalism, institutionalism and democracy, is reeling under the pressure of profound systemic changes such as greater interconnectedness and multipolarity. Predictions abound that increasing great power competition, most visibly at play in geographical areas of contested orders, will eventually tear it down. However, even if major actors – the US included – display a selective, irregular and often instrumental commitment to the liberal order, they are still repositioning themselves in that order and not outside of it. In addition, conflict is not the default outcome of order contestation, as hybrid forms of governance are possible even in troubled regions. No doubt, the world of tomorrow will be less American-shaped and less liberal, but transformation is a more plausible future than collapse for the liberal order.     

Regime type and good governance in low and high income states: what is the empirical link?

This analysis looks at the link between regime type and good governance across four different levels of development – low income countries, medium-low income countries, medium-high income countries, and high income countries. Through pooled time series analysis of more than 170 countries with yearly or bi-yearly data from 1996 to 2009, I find that democracies are better governed than non-democracies. This relationship is robust across all regime types. Even at a low level of development, countries that elect their representatives in free and fair elections have a better regulatory framework and are more efficient and transparent. The practical implications of this finding are that a democratically governed state will most likely have a superior social and economic track record than a non-democracy.     

‘But you can't compare Malawi and Ireland!’ – shifting boundaries in a globalised world

Although global influences – in the form of international finance coupled with discourses of partnership, participation, good governance, and democracy – exercise an increasing influence on national and local governance arrangements worldwide, comparative studies across the traditional South/North divide remain extremely rare. Drawing on findings from a comparative study of Malawi's PRSP and Ireland's national Social Partnership process, this article demonstrates that a shifting of conceptual boundaries beyond traditionally delineated geographic borders is not just valid but essential, in that it helps to reveal new perspectives on the politics underlying globalised development processes and the transformative potential of those processes.     

The power of arms: rethinking armed parties and democratization through the Palestinian elections

This article examines the role of armed parties in democratization. Usually considered volatile and thus excluded from the democratic process, we argue instead that in certain circumstances, armed parties can have a productive role in elections aimed at democratization – most notably by contributing to the balance of power between incumbents and opposition, both before, during and after elections. An in-depth analysis of the 2006 Palestinian elections, placed in comparative context, shows how arms affect the calculus of voters, opposition elites, and incumbents to make elections more competitive and democracy more likely. The article then directly addresses the objection that postponing disarmament fosters civil war, arguing rather that postponing disarmament may actually help promote peaceful, democratic outcomes of states emerging from civil war. It concludes by discussing the implication of the analysis for the study of democratization and for policies aimed at democracy promotion.     

Modernization,ethnic fractionalization,and democracy

In recent years, a number of studies have examined the relationship between ethnic fractionalization and democracy – so far with inconclusive results. We argue that the lacking robustness of existing findings is due to a theoretical and empirical misspecification of how ethnic fractionalization may influence the level of democracy. Ethnic fractionalization does have an impact on the regime form because it moderates the well-established positive effect of modernization on democracy. In other words, at low levels of ethnic fractionalization, modernization has a strong positive effect on democratization, but with increasing levels of ethnic fractionalization, the positive effect of modernization decreases. This relationship is documented empirically by using data on 167 countries since 1972.     

International Influences on Nonviolent and Violent Contention

ABSTRACT

How do international actors influence dissidents’ decisions whether to challenge their states using violent means, nonviolence, both or neither? We argue that the presence of important actors affects dissident decisions to engage in violent or nonviolent contention by affecting whether dissidents expect that governments will repress or concede to dissident demands in response to this contention. We examine the effect of two prominent types of actors – powerful states with close ties to the government and Highly Structured Inter-Governmental Organizations (HSIGOs) on dissident behavior in all national-level elections in Africa from 2000–2012. Using integrated data drawn from four leading conflict events datasets, we find that dissidents are less likely to engage in violent contention when their government receives higher levels of military aid from the United States and in former French colonies, and more likely to engage in both violent and nonviolent contention when their state is a member of a greater number of HSIGOs.     

Institutional stepping stones for democracy: how and why multipartyism enhances democratic change

Scholars of electoral authoritarianism and comparative institutions have emphasized how authoritarian regimes implement multiparty elections to stabilize authoritarian rule and diffuse political opposition. Consequently, the literature has advised against the notion that multiparty elections constitute a general lever for democratization. This article presents evidence in support of a more positive understanding of multipartyism and democracy. We argue that multiparty elections create an institutional space for oppositional parties, instrumentally motivated to promote further positive democratic change. We hypothesize that multiparty regimes are (1) generally more likely to experience positive democratic change, and (2) more importantly, more likely to do so when faced by internal or external regime threats. We test these hypotheses using cross-section time-series data on 166 countries in the period 1973–2010. Our results show a general positive effect of multipartyism for democratic change, and that multiparty regimes are more likely to improve their levels of democracy when faced with demonstrations and economic crisis.     

#Democracy: social media use and democratic legitimacy in Central and Eastern Europe

Since 1989, many of the former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have made the dramatic change from communist regimes to democratic nations that are integrated in the European sphere. While these sweeping changes have given rise to a successful transition to democracy unlike any the world has ever seen, there remain issues with governance as well as citizen support for the regime. While other studies have shown that mass media can influence a person's attitudes and opinions in the region, none has explored what effect social media can have on orientations toward democracy in the region. In the following paper, I build several hypotheses based on previous studies of media effects and democratic survival. I then employ survey data to empirically test whether social media increases support for democracy. The study finds that not only does using social media increase support for democracy, but also simple usage rather than information seeking provides more consistent effects on a person's support for democracy in CEE.     

Present at the Destruction? The Liberal Order in the Trump Era

Abstract

The election of Donald Trump in 2016 sent shock waves across political classes globally and prompted debates about whether his ‘America first’ agenda threatened the liberal international order. During his first year in office, Trump seemed determined to undermine the hallmarks of the liberal international order: democracy, liberal economics and international cooperation. So, are we witnessing the emergence of a “post-liberal” and “post-American” era? Four sources of evidence help frame – if not answer – the question: history, the crisis of liberal democracy, Trump’s world view, and the power of civil society (globally and nationally) to constrain any US President. They yield three main judgements. First, continuity often trumps change in US foreign policy. Second, the liberal international order may have been more fragile pre-Trump than was widely realised. Third, American power must be put at the service of its own democracy if the US is to become the example to the world it used to be.     

Does substantive democratization create more committed democrats? Surprising evidence from Africa

A growing body of evidence holds that citizens support democracy when they believe the regime has provided individual freedoms and political rights. Put simply, citizens develop legitimacy attitudes by learning about democracy. These findings, however, are based on citizens' evaluations of the procedural elements of democracy. Democratization also entails substantive reforms that likely impact legitimacy attitudes. This article provides the first test of how the success – and failure – of substantive democratization shapes legitimacy attitudes. Using data from the second round of Afrobarometer surveys, I find surprising results. Citizens who judge the regime to be more successful in substantive democratization are actually less likely to be committed democrats. I conclude with possible explanations of these surprising findings and reflect on the challenges for both future research and for the new democracies facing this situation.     

Multilateral donors and the security-development nexus: discourse and practice in conflict-affected states

This article assesses how the ‘security-development nexus’ has impacted multilateral aid to conflict-affected states; an area until now understudied. Using a mixed methods approach, we examine both the policy discourse and aid commitments of the major multilateral donors: the European Commission, the World Bank and the UNDP. We investigate the extent to which these donors fund the sectors identified within the policy discourse as crucial to ensuring peace and stability – democratisation and peace, conflict, and security activities – and examine the impact of ‘Western’ security concerns on multilateral aid in conflict-affected states. Our new data indicate that in contrast to policy discourse, post-conflict states receive no more multilateral funding for democracy–building than states which have not suffered from conflict and furthermore, that in the context of the security-development nexus, multilateral aid to conflict-affected states is influenced by the key transnational security concerns of Western states. These results point to a potentially dangerous gap between policy and actual aid commitments, ignore the long-term nature of development and weaken the impartiality of multilateral aid.