论国际法上的禁止使用武力

国际法上的禁止使用武力原则是当代国际社会的和平基石。在具体实践中, 应当对“武力”一词进 行狭义的解释, 即仅指武装力量或军事力量。传统国际法中的习惯法并不禁止武力, 禁止武力原则是19世纪末20 世纪初以后逐步由协定国际法确立的。禁止使用武力原则已经是国际法中最重要的原则之一, 并且是一项强行法 规则, 任何武力的使用都应该受到控制, 并被限制在联合国的框架内。     

国际法上的“使用武力”问题与联合国 集体安全机制的改革和完善*

近20 年来，联合国集体安全机制的法律性质无疑已经发生了重大变化，与1945 年 联合国初创时提出的理念渐行渐远。在国际关系中，西方国家倡导的“人道主义干涉”和“为维护民 主实施的干涉”盛行，严重冲击着国际法上关于使用武力的原则规则；联合国屡次背离长期坚持的 “不偏不倚第三方”立场，强行介入国内武装冲突，招致重大损失；有关国家集团在联合国体制内或 者体制外使用武力产生了极为消极的法律后果；某些国家或者国际组织未经当事国同意实施“强 制和平”行动，个别经济类区域组织越权对会员国采取军事行动；为配合联合国的政治行动国际 刑事法院多次对在任国家元首发出逮捕令。这些做法在使国际法的制裁和强制功能得到加强的同 时，也从理论和实践上试图根本颠覆传统国际法上的一系列原则规则制度。因此，我们必须用一种 批判和反思的态度对待当前的联合国集体安全机制，并在条件许可的情况下与国际社会一道对其 进行改革和重构，使其在强化维持国际和平与安全功能的同时与中国国家安全战略目标相契合， 以最大限度地维护中国国家利益。     

从国际法视角看冷战后联合国维和行动

联合国维和行动是介于宪章第六章规定的和平方法和第七章规定的强制方法之间的一种维护国际和平与安全的国际干预手段。冷战后,联合国维和行动有了重大变化,对国家主权、不干涉内政、禁止使用武力等国际法基本原则造成了极大的冲击。为了摆脱困境,联合国维和行动必须准确定位,坚持维和三原则,尽快制定专门的联合国维和行动法典,正确对待人道主义干涉,完善国际干预机制,由此才能更好地维护国际和平与安全。     

从国际法角度析“先发制人”战略

9·11 事件后美国提出的“先发制人” 对外战略对以国家主权平等原则为基础的现行 国际法律秩序产生了重大影响, 很可能成为大国使用武力推行其对外政策的理由, 从而威胁到二 战后经过几十年努力建立起来的联合国集体安全体制。“先发制人”战略并不能从国际法上的国家 自卫权中找到法律根据, 它是对国家自卫权的滥用。要维护国际和平与安全, 必须发挥联合国集 体安全体制的作用。     

儿童兵规范的演变:国内武装冲突局势下的儿童保护

冷战结束后,在国内武装冲突中,儿童沦为国家武装部队与武装组织招募的对象。儿童兵的出现在某种程度上使得儿童从武装冲突的受害者转变为施暴者,导致国内武装冲突更加血腥、更难结束。为说服武装冲突各方放弃招募和使用儿童兵、打破"冲突—招募—冲突"的恶性循环,联合国及其相关机构采取了诸多举措,积极致力于倡导和传播儿童兵规范,把武装冲突局势中的儿童保护问题提升至国际与国内的和平与安全议程。从理论层面而言,儿童兵规范兴起与传播的动力和逻辑值得关注。第一,联合国及其相关机构作为规范倡导者,在儿童兵规范的兴起、发展与扩散阶段发挥了重要作用。第二,儿童兵规范的传播对象突破了国家行为体的范畴,日益重视对武装组织等非国家行为体的教化。第三,儿童兵的议题特征也有助于其规范的广泛传播。第四,时代背景也为儿童兵规范的兴起和传播创造了有力的政治条件。     

体系转型与当代国际法使命

体系变迁影响法律规范的内容与走向,但同时也受到法律规范的型塑和建构.冷战后时代,全球化进展迅猛,国际法社会基础出现重大变化.安全、发展、人权、环境保护等共同利益把国际社会联结成为一个日益紧密的整体,大批国际组织的功能得到新的发展,对国家的约束作用越来越强大.全球化条件下体系转型的加快,多种力量的并起特别是中国的和平发展取得重大进展以及世界的多极化走向,要求国际法不但应适应形势,因时而变,而且应主动发挥其建构功能和规范作用,以国际组织为平台,通过调整利益奠定秩序,通过法律规范形成"确信",从而推动体系有序演进,避免国际纷争和动荡.     

试论安理会授权使用武力的法律规制

安理会授权使用武力是联合国在维持国际和平与安全的实践中发展起来的一种武力强制措施的实施方式,由于制度性不足,在实践中出现了很多问题,甚至异化为霸权主义的工具.授权使用武力是基于国际政治的现实需要,为维持国际和平与安全发挥了一定的作用,联合国应该将之作为集体安全制度改革中的重要内容,并就其法律依据、目的、效力范围、接受授权国家的权限、实施的保障措施等实体和程序性规则作出具体规定.     

论国际法在战争中的运用

从历史的教训中, 可以认识国际法对于维护国家利益的重要意义。以国际法为核心 的法律战, 对于战时国家安全具有心战、人道、政治和军事价值。国际法是制约战争和武装冲突、维 护国家主权和国际安全的一个重要武器     

网络军备控制的困境与出路

网络军事化已成为不争的事实,网络军备竞赛愈演愈烈,严重威胁国际安全与稳定。国际社会呼吁以条约形式约束网络武器的发展,但目前面临着许多需要克服的障碍和难题,包括在网络武器、网络攻击等概念界定上没有共识,现有国际法无法认定网络战是否属于"武装冲突",各国在发展网络上的战略利益冲突,以及网络军备核查技术瓶颈等。本文认为,确立国家网络行为规范,采取透明与信任建设措施是达成网络军控条约的基础;改变国际互联网治理现状,将有助于降低网络军备竞赛的烈度,有助于条约的达成;网络军控条约化还需要对现有的《武装冲突法》进行必要的修正,使之适应已经出现的网络战现实。     

从阿富汗战争看反恐背景下的国家责任

“ 9?11 事件”后联合国安理会的一系列反恐决议填补了现行国际法的空白 , 加诸各国 不得默许、窝藏、支持恐怖分子在其境内活动的义务。然而,在这些义务没有得到履行的情形下,其 他国家若要对其采取相应的武力措施,是否有适当的国际法依据？如果国家想要打击恐怖分子, 那么它应以何种理由在另一国的领土上实现这一目的？实际上,在当前的国际法框架之下,若是 一国不愿意采取适当措施避免其领土为恐怖组织所用,受到恐怖活动袭击的国家便可对该国诉诸 武力,以惩治国际恐怖主义,维护国际和平与安全。因此,《国家对国际不法行为的责任条款草案》 在国家责任构成要件和承担形式方面应做修改与完善。     

Problems of maintaining defense security in today's world

This article addresses critical problems relating to Russian defense requirements in the first decades of the twenty‐first century. In the modern system of defense security two interrelated problems come clearly into view. On the one hand, political‐diplomatic, economic, informational and other non‐military means are necessary to resolve antagonisms, prevent conflicts, and provide for the national defense. On the other hand, when all these capabilities are exhausted, one must be ready to use military force. The author discusses the international environment confronting Russia, the threats facing the state, the organization of national defense, force structure, the nature of possible armed conflicts and the ways in which the armed forces and other troops may be used, and military training and education of personnel.     

Toward an effective international legal order: from coexistence to concert?

In forbidding the use of force except in self‐defence against armed attack or when authorised by the Security Council, the UN Charter appears to be the culminating development of a system of international order based on the doctrine of state sovereignty. The cumulative result of international‐law‐related acts, omissions and declarations of the Bush administration since its inception can be construed as a fundamental challenge to the sovereign state system. The administration's stated security strategy is one possible response to undoubtedly grave challenges to national and human security. In fact, only an institutionalised partnership between the US and regional powers such as China, India, Brazil and Germany can hope to address those challenges successfully, in part because only it would have the requisite legitimacy. That partnership or concert could be organised within the UN framework, albeit intensifying its hierarchical elements.     

The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia

Most contemporary intrastate military conflicts have a criminalized dimension: In various ways and to varying degrees they use smuggling networks and criminal actors to create and sustain the material basis for warfare. Despite its importance, the criminalized side of intrastate war and its legacy for postwar reconstruction is not a central focus of analysis in most scholarly accounts of armed conflict. A detailed examination of the Bosnian conflict illustrates the explanatory usefulness of a "bottom up," clandestine political economy approach to the study of war and post-war reconstruction. Drawing on interviews with former military leaders, local and international officials, and in-country observers, I argue that the outbreak, persistence, termination, and aftermath of the 1992–1995 war cannot be explained without taking into account the critical role of smuggling practices and quasi-private criminal combatants. The article suggests the need for greater bridging and broadening of the study of security, political economy, and crime.     

Self-Defense and the Use of Force: Breaking the Rules, Making the Rules, or Both?

This article examines shifts in international law regarding the use of force—the jus ad bellum —that emerged in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and subsequently were invoked in part by the United States and United Kingdom to justify military intervention in Iraq. These shifts import some elasticity—in time, space, and place—into the preexisting legal understanding of self-defense. To be sure, the general consensus that supported the use of force in Afghanistan as a legitimate exercise of self-defense has diluted as the use of that force expanded into other theaters of operation. It is therefore unsurprising that considerable controversy envelops claims by some states that international law entitles them to use force in self-defense in a preemptory manner. This article explores the articulation of this and other justifications for the military intervention in Iraq. It also unpacks the difficult question whether these entitlements are constitutive of inchoate legal rules or simply deviations from the still operational old rules. Moreover, this article encourages scholars and students of international law and relations to consider why a movement is afoot to change the rules and how this affects the architecture of collective security. To facilitate this process of reflection, this article explores the policy implications of retaining the old rules or adopting the newly alleged rules.     

The New Law of War: Legitimizing Hi–Tech and Infrastructural Violence

This article examines how humanitarian laws of war have been recast in light of a new generation of hi–tech weapons and innovations in strategic theory. Far from falling into disuse, humanitarian law is invoked more frequently than ever to confer legitimacy on military action. New legal interpretations, diminished ad bellum rules, and an expansive view of military necessity are coalescing in a regime of legal warfare that licenses hi–tech states to launch wars as long as their conduct is deemed just. The ascendance of technical legalism has undercut customary restraints on the use of armed force and has opened a legal chasm between technological haves and have–nots. Most striking is the use of legal language to justify the erosion of distinctions between soldiers and civilians and to legitimize collateral damage. Hi–tech warfare has dramatically curbed immediate civilian casualties, yet the law sanctions infrastructural campaigns that harm long–term public health and human rights in ways that are now clear.     

The Downside of Decentralization: Armed Clientelism in Colombia

In recent years, decentralization and regional autonomy measures have figured prominently in negotiations designed to end some of the world's most important conflicts, including in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan. Reforms that shift powers to subnational units deserve the attention of those who are trying to promote security via institutional design, but the risks associated with these territorial reforms are considerable. When political and economic resources are transferred to subnational governments in the attempt to create meaningful access to the political system for former combatants, the great risk is that these same resources can be used to finance a continuation of the armed struggle instead. In response to the popularity of territorial reforms in many post-conflict settings, this paper sounds a cautionary note by evaluating the negative impact of decentralization on security in Colombia, site of Latin America's longest and deadliest armed conflict. After analyzing the design decisions of reformers who hoped that decentralization would help end the conflict, I argue that decentralization in fact financed the expansion of armed clientelism by illegal groups on both the left and right. Thanks to the weakness of the police in much of the national territory, guerrillas and paramilitaries have been able to use decentralized resources to destabilize the state, limiting even further its monopoly over the use of force and creating what are in effect parallel states on the left and right.     

"New Wars" and Rumors of "New Wars"

Recently, there has been a growing tendency to suggest "new" classes of wars that are presumably different from all wars we have known and studied. In this article, we discuss the extent to which the landscape of armed conflict has changed so dramatically that it has necessitated a revision of the prevalent typology of war, a reconsideration of the correlates of war, and a reconceptualization of the theoretical assumptions regarding the etiology of war. While it is clear that patterns of warfare shift across time and space, it is not clear that war itself has changed "fundamentally" and has become inexplicable in light of theoretical arguments in world politics as many "new war" theorists suggest. Our analysis demonstrates that many of the "new wars" are simply amalgamations of various interstate, extrastate, and intrastate wars-i.e., the "old wars"-that have been lumped into a single category. The result is a hodgepodge of armed conflicts whose different correlates derive from their diverse morphologies rather than their novelty as wars unlike any we have experienced previously.     

Putin's Silovarchs

Since the late 1990s, most of Boris Yeltsin's oligarchs have left the political stage. In their place, a new business elite has sprung up, most from the network of security service and law enforcement veterans known as the siloviki (roughly, “power agents”) who form the backbone of President Putin's administration. Indeed, the security forces’ takeover of corporate boardrooms is coming to define Putin's regime. Silovarchs can deploy intelligence networks, state prosecutors, and armed force to intimidate or expropriate business rivals. Their temptation to use secret service tools and techniques predisposes the regime toward authoritarian politics. Western policy towards Russia will have to recognize these realities. The most promising path toward authentic democracy in Russia involves the cooptation of leading siloviki into the international business world.     

Considerations on the Cyber Domain as the New Worldwide Battlefield

The convergence of telecommunication and computer technologies that has evolved in the field of information and communication technologies (ICT) in the last two decades has had very important effects on new war technologies and the ongoing process of battlefield digitisation. The Stuxnet worm, uncovered in 2010 and responsible for the sabotaging of a uranium enrichment infrastructure in Iran, is a clear example of a digital weapon. The incident shows what is meant by cyber war and what the particular features of this new warfare dimension are compared to the conventional domains of land, sea, air and space, with relevance both at the operational and strategic levels. But cyberspace also extends to the semantic level, within the complimentary field of information warfare involving the content of messages flowing through the Internet for the purposes of propaganda, information, disinformation, consensus building, etc. The overall cyber warfare domain needs to be put into perspective internationally as many countries are developing strong cyber capabilities and an ‘arms race’ is already taking place, showing that these technologies can potentially be used to undermine international stability and security. What is needed is a public debate on the topic and its impact on global stability, and some kind of regulation or international agreement on this new warfare domain, including an approach involving confidence building measures (CBMs).