Who Can Keep the Peace? Insurgent Organizational Control of Collective Violence

Every armed organization seeks the ability to turn violence on and off by getting fighters to fight when ordered and to stop fighting when similarly ordered. This ability is a defining feature of what makes organized violence, in fact, organized. While state militaries develop clear hierarchies and disciplinary procedures to accomplish this goal, the complexity of civil war makes the task more difficult for insurgent groups. I argue that the leaders of insurgent organizations are able to turn violence on and off when they have deliberately established resource control through the direct, and exclusive, distribution of resources to their followers and those followers are socially embedded, meaning that members are united by strong horizontal ties and group norms. In contrast to existing approaches, I argue that material and social endowments do not predetermine whether leaders can establish resource control or embeddedness. Further, laying out the precise organizational mechanisms that determine when organizations can turn violence on and off challenges the utility of conceptions such as “fragmentation” or “cohesion” for explaining insurgent behavior and conflict outcomes. I test the theory by examining variation in behavior over time in two organizations facing different structural contexts—Jaysh al-Mahdi in Iraq and the Viet Minh in Vietnam—and find strong support for my argument while casting doubt on existing explanations.     

Rethinking the Role of Ideology in Mass Atrocities

There is a widespread sense amongst theorists of genocide and other violent atrocities that ideology matters. But in spite of this agreement all is not well with actual efforts to theorise ideology's role. Theoretical and empirical coverage has been uneven, and there has been little if any effort to incorporate theories and research from the actual specialist field of contemporary ideology studies. As a result, overarching theoretical accounts of the role ideology plays in violent atrocities remain limited and problematic. This article aims to encourage theorists to think about ideology in a more systematic and productive fashion by analysing four questions: (a) what do we mean by ideology?; (b) who, in cases of atrocity, might be relevantly affected by ideology?; (c) how do these people come to be influenced by atrocity-justifying ideologies?; and (d) how might ideology encourage these people to commit, or permit, mass violence? In discussing these four questions, I aim to clear up a number of misconceptions or vagaries that frequent current analyses of ideology in works on atrocity and political violence. I ultimately offer a suggestive account of six recurring “justificatory mechanisms” which collectively describe some of the common features of ideology's role across cases of mass atrocity.     

Bringing the Insurgents Back In: Early Wars in British India

What role do weaker actors play in determining the outcomes of irregular wars? The literature on counterinsurgency outcomes has tended to explain weak-side victory either as a result of informational asymmetries caused by constraints on counterinsurgent forces, or as a result of suboptimal strategic choices by the state. We suggest that this underplays the role of insurgents themselves; we attempt to “bring the insurgents back in,” giving variation in insurgent polity a role in explaining their own victories and defeats. In order to do so, we focus inductively on a relatively novel pool of cases: Great Britain's wars in India from the mid-eighteenth to early nineteenth centuries. Doing so allows us to hold the counterinsurgent side constant while evaluating variance among the insurgents themselves. We find that variance on the insurgent side is indeed significant in determining outcomes, and suggest possible reasons why this occurs.     

Beheading the Hydra: Counterinsurgent Violence and Insurgent Attacks in Iraq

We evaluate the effectiveness of anti-insurgent violence as a means to suppress insurgency with micro-level data from the Iraq War. Our findings suggest that while violence against insurgents increases the incidence of future insurgent attacks, the intensity of this violence can significantly influence the outcome. Rather than shifting monotonically, the effect is actually curvilinear, first rising, and then contracting. We argue that at low to moderate levels, violence against insurgents creates opportunities for these groups to signal strength and resolve, which enables them to build momentum, heighten civilian cooperation, and diminish political support for counterinsurgency efforts in these forces’ home countries. The result is an escalation in insurgent attacks. However, at higher levels, this effect should plateau and taper off as insurgent attrition rises, and as civilian fears over personal safety displace grievances that might otherwise provoke counter-mobilization. Our empirical tests on data from the Iraq War, 2004–2009, demonstrate robust support for this argument.     

“Journalism ideology” and its influence on the producers of Radio Sonder Grense radio current affairs

In the same way that people can have a political or a personal ideology, their professional identities and how they practise a craft or an occupation may be influenced by what can be labelled as a “professional ideology”. Through conducting interviews with the producers of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) Afrikaans radio programmes Monitor, Spektrum and Naweek-Aktueel, this article reports on research which showed that there is indeed such a thing as a “journalism ideology”. The interviews focused on how “internal influences” – such as a journalist's background and training, newsroom routines – and “external influences” – such as the audience – influenced the decisions they made in choosing news stories and producing content. This “journalism ideology” influences the producers and in turn the news content of these current affairs programmes that are listened to daily by almost two million listeners. The conclusion drawn from the study is that, although the participants’ “journalism ideology” largely determines the news stories for their programmes, structural forces, newsroom routines and organisational constraints often dictate their actions. Finally, although all the participants saw themselves as “watchdogs of democracy”, internal pressures within the SABC could endanger that role.     

Sectarianism Revisited: The Provisional IRA Campaign in a Border Region of Northern Ireland

This article revisits the debate, hosted by this journal in the 1990s, on whether the Provisional IRA campaign was sectarian. In the light of current debates about how Northern Ireland deals with its past, it challenges the analysis that emphasises the non-sectarian ideology of republicanism and ignores the effects of IRA violence. It uses research on the IRA campaign in Fermanagh and south Tyrone to argue that the campaign was unavoidably sectarian but rejects current attempts to label it a form of “ethnic cleansing.”     

The aesthetics of “everyday” violence: narratives of violence and Hindu right-wing women

“Right-wing” movements see significant participation by women who espouse their exclusionary and violent politics while at the same time often contest their patriarchal spaces. Women also serve as discursive and symbolic markers that regularly form the basis of the rhetoric, ideology, actions and policies of the right-wing. However, even as women’s roles and politics within the right-wing remain diverse and important, dominant feminist scholarship has had uneasy encounters with right-wing women, labelling them as monolithic pawns/victims/subjects of patriarchy with limited or no agency. This article aims to question this notion by examining the aesthetics and visual and oral imagery appropriated, (re)constructed, transformed and mediated by right-wing women. Based on ethnographic and visual research conducted in 2013–2014 with women in the cultural nationalist Hindu right-wing project in India, I argue that right-wing women use a variety of visual and oral narratives (from images to storytelling) to negotiate with spatialities and carve out independent “feminine” discourses within the larger language of the right-wing. I also argue that these narratives are “ritualised” and performed in various spaces and styles and remain crucial to the “everyday” politics and violence of right-wing women. The “everyday” politics of right-wing women often contest, subvert and bargain with the patriarchal goals of the larger projects, rendering narratives as sites of examining agency. Using specific examples of visual and oral narratives from the aforementioned movement, this article articulates how everyday violence is shaped by the aesthetics of the nation and the body, and how these aesthetics shape everyday violence.     

The Role of Hezbollah in Lebanese Domestic Politics

Hezbollah emerged in 1982 as a manifestation of Iran's influence and a response to Israel's massive invasion of Lebanon. Hezbollah (cooperating with Syria) won legitimacy by resisting Israel's occupation, but it also offered Shias a credible ideology and an array of institutions. The party is now deeply embedded in Lebanese politics. After Israel's unilateral withdrawal in 2000, Hezbollah continued to assert its “national resistance” role, but this claim has been openly challenged, especially after the 2006 war. Since then, the government and the opposition have been at a dangerous impasse, with compromise elusive and the dangers of new violence growing.     

The subjective and objective violence of terrorism: analysing “British values” in newspaper coverage of the 2017 London Bridge attack

This article examines how ?i?ek’s analysis of “subjective” violence can be used to explore the ways in which media coverage of a terrorist attack is contoured and shaped by less noticeable forms of “objective” (symbolic and systemic) violence. Drawing upon newspaper coverage of the 2017 London Bridge attack, it is noted how examples of “subjective” violence were grounded in the externalisation of a clearly identifiable “other”, which symbolically framed the terrorists and the attack as tied to and representative of the UK Muslim community. Examples of “systematic” violence were most notable in the ideological edifice that underpinned this framing but also in the ways in which newspaper reports served to draw upon British values in the aftermath of the attack. This directed attention away from the contradictions within the UK, towards narratives that sought to “fix” these contradictions through eradicating the problem of “the other” and/or by violently protecting the British values “they” seek to undermine. As a consequence, newspaper coverage worked to uphold the illusion that “peace” could be achieved by eradicating terrorism through further forms of objective violence, including, internment without trial; the “ripping up” of human rights; and closer surveillance of Muslim communities. Indeed, it was this unacknowledged violence that worked to maintain British values in the press' coverage.     

Analysis and Evolution of the Global Jihadist Movement Propaganda

The Global Jihadist Movement (GJM) has a series of well-defined objectives, which constitute the central points of their ideology. In the realization of these goals, propaganda and public communication play a central role. This article studies the evolution of the principal characteristics of GJM propaganda, analyzing over 2,000 documents issued by the GJM between 1996 and 2005.     

Suicide Bombers in Iraq, 2003–2010: Disaggregating Targets Can Reveal Insurgent Motives and Priorities

Extending data reported by Mohammed Hafez in 2007, we compiled a database of 1,779 suicide bombers who attempted or completed attacks in Iraq from 2003 through 2010. From 2003 through 2006, monthly totals of suicide bombers show a pattern different from the pattern of non-suicide insurgent attacks, but from 2007 through 2010 the two patterns were similar. This biphasic pattern indicates that suicide attacks sometimes warrant separate analysis but sometimes are just one tactic in a larger envelope of insurgent violence. We also show that only 13 percent of suicide bombers targeted coalition forces and international civilians, primarily during the early years of the conflict, whereas 83 percent of suicide bombers targeted Iraqis (civilians, members of the Anbar Awakening Movement, Iraqi security forces, and government entities) in attacks that extended throughout the duration of the insurgency. These results challenge the idea that suicide attacks are primarily a nationalist response to foreign occupation, and caution that “smart bombs” may be more often sent against soft targets than hard targets. More generally, our results indicate that suicide attacks must be disaggregated by target in order to understand these attacks as the expression of different insurgent priorities at different times.     

Broader,vaguer, weaker: The evolving ideology of the Caucasus Emirate leadership

ABSTRACT

In October 2007, veteran Chechen field commander Dokka Umarov proclaimed the formation of the Caucasus Emirate (IK), formalising the victory of the North Caucasus insurgency’s Islamist wing over its nationalist-separatists. During Umarov’s time as leader, the North Caucasus experienced sustained violence and the IK claimed responsibility for multiple terrorist attacks in and beyond the region. However, despite the importance of ideology in understanding insurgent behaviour, the IK’s ideology and Umarov’s role in shaping it remain understudied. Using Social Movement Theory’s concept of framing to analyse Umarov’s communiqués throughout his lengthy tenure (June 2006–September 2013), this article identifies three distinct phases in Umarov’s ideological positioning of the insurgency: nationalist-jihadist (June 2006–October 2007); Khattabist (October 2007–late 2010); and partially hybridised (late 2010–September 2013). The article contributes to debates over typologies of jihadist actors by highlighting the difficulties in applying them to the North Caucasus and provides a clearer understanding of the IK’s ideological transformation and the limits to its engagement with external actors. The article also illustrates that weakness was a key factor in explaining that transformation and identifies several avenues for research that could further enhance our understanding of the IK’s ideology and the role it plays.     

Rebel-to-political and back? Hamas as a security provider in Gaza between rebellion,politics and governance

ABSTRACT

After winning the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections and subsequently taking control of the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2007, the Palestinian Hamas – a hybrid political, social and military actor – undertook a complex process to ascertain authority and control over Gaza. The article focuses on understanding Hamas’s performance as a political party and a “rebel government” as well as the impact of this newly acquired role on the group’s strategy. Relying on primary sources, field-work and interviews with members of the Hamas government and its security sector, the study looks at Hamas’s role as a security provider and analyses the complex relationship between the institutionalized security sector and the group’s insurgent armed wing. Examining Hamas’s logic as a security provider and exploring the inherent tensions between political and insurgent logics allows for a better understanding of both the rebel group’s role as a political actor and the broader challenges behind the successful rebel-to-political transformations of non-state armed organizations. In doing so it contributes to the emerging literature on non-state actors’ shifts between ballots and bullets and on their potential role as alternative governance providers.     

Gangsters or Gandhians? The Political Sociology of the Maoist Insurgency in India

This article combines concepts from political sociology with evidence from newspaper reports, insurgent and state documents, and ethnographic studies in order to understand the nature of the Maoist insurgency in India. The first section argues that the insurgency should be conceptualized as a state building enterprise rather than organized crime. It demonstrates that both insurgent violence and fundraising serve, on the whole, the collective interests of the state building enterprise – i.e., to consolidate insurgent control in their base areas – rather than the private interests of individual insurgents. The second section seeks to understand how Maoist state builders undermine and fragment the Indian state’s monopoly of the means of violence and administration in areas where they operate. In some areas the state is totally absent, while in others the state forms alliances with the insurgents at the local level in order to maintain the semblance of a sovereign and democratic ruler.     

Restorative justice in the aftermath of politically-motivated violence: the Basque experience

ABSTRACT

An emerging body of literature discusses how restorative justice can contribute to the response to terrorism. This paper expresses concerns about the uncritical acceptance of many orthodox assumptions about terrorism inherent in the search for a “restorative response” to terrorism. When restorative justice embraces the label “terrorism” in what appears to be a politically neutral sense, rather than opening up a critical discussion of realities of political violence and the factors that had propelled it, it may form part of the efforts designed to inculcate “truths” that help control political dissent. With its key aspiration being to restore a presumed healthy order disrupted by terrorist offences, restorative justice may be enlisted to help entrench social relations that led to the violence in the first place. The paper illustrates this danger by examining attempts to use restorative justice techniques by Spanish authorities in the aftermath of ETA or Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (“Basque Homeland and Freedom”) violence. It is argued that rather than searching for a “restorative response” to terrorism, a more adequate framework for restorative justice in the aftermath of politically motivated violence may be found within broader projects of reparation for historical injustices, remembering and political reconciliation.     

Battlefield Outcomes and Rebel Cohesion: Lessons From the Eritrean Independence War

This article uses data from the Eritrean war for independence to refine existing theories of rebel fragmentation. The author argues organizational performance affects the emergence of factional infighting within rebel organizations in unique and novel ways. While battlefield losses increase the likelihood of internal fragmentation, so do battlefield gains. The implication is battlefield stalemates possess unique properties that promote organizational cohesion in war, a relationship this study refers to as “cohesive stalemates.” The article extends an emerging literature on the internal politics of insurgent groups that has linked the coherence of rebel organizations to rebel losses.     

“The Movement Moves Against you”: Coercive Spoiler Management in the Northern Ireland Peace Process

More than a decade on, the Northern Ireland peace process can largely be considered a success. Despite the failure of the Provisional Republican Movement to achieve a united Ireland free of British control, the large-scale violence of “The Troubles” has been relegated to the past. Applying the logic of coercive diplomacy, this study examines the role of threats and the use of selective and limited violence by the Provisional Movement to manage real and potential opponents and challengers that have emerged within its own ideological ranks to maintain its position of dominance and prevent a spoiling of the peace process. This study shows that the Provisional Movement retained the capability to employ violence and demonstrated the credibility of coercive threat through a willingness to use force against its opponents on the Republican spectrum, and was able to do so with a high degree of impunity.     

Too many enemies: Mobilization,marginalization, and political violence

Over the past decades, a pattern has emerged across the Islamic world of secular actors struggling to build sustainable social movements while Islamists show a higher success rate in doing so—a dynamic often accompanied by high levels of violence and little space for dialogue between actors from across the political spectrum. In this article, we illustrate the utility of social movement theory (SMT) in explaining the ability of some movements to mobilize en masse, while others become marginalized. Furthermore, we suggest that SMT is useful in understanding the processes that produce socio-political dynamics conducive to violent rather than non-violent tactics. Through a case study of Bangladesh, where in 2013 the secular Shahbag mobilization was derailed by a massive Islamist counter-mobilization, this article shows how movements not only capitalize on, but actually contribute to, shifts in cultural discourse through political maneuvering and long-term socialization. By anchoring their ideology in pre-existing religio-cultural imagery, Islamists have been successful in casting themselves as “authentic” defenders of Islam and their secular opponents as “atheists.” In such a socio-political context, the space for dialogue among the various political actors is severely limited and the impetus to employ violent tactics strong.     

Flipping the Switch: Combat,State Building,and Junior Officers in Iraq and Afghanistan

Contemporary us counterinsurgency doctrine in Iraq and Afghanistan requires junior leaders to engage in both combat and state-building activities. This study aims to explain the fundamental challenge in merging these. I argue that difficulty lies in separating insurgents from civilians, and translating doctrine from senior to junior officers. Junior officers consistently develop a similar ad hoc decision-making tool— role-switching—to simplify complex situations to a binary of “hostile or not.” They understand themselves to fill only two roles, the violent “on” role and the non-violent “off” role and develop several tools to minimize the difficulty of role-switching, help their subordinates switch, and signal switching to local populations. Ultimately, however, problems with role-switching—role stickiness, inappropriate switching, and role bias—can in some cases encourage indiscriminate and excessive violence, pointing to the fundamental failures of using military forces as a one-size-fits-all solution to state-building projects abroad.     

Making sense of terrorism: a narrative approach to the study of violent events

ABSTRACT

How does violence become understood as terrorism? In this article, we show how a narrative approach to the study of violent events offers a conceptually productive way to understand the process of “seeing” an event as a terrorist act, one that explicitly integrates the phenomenology of violence. While the collective practice of defining terrorism in academia and the policy arena has struggled to produce a universal definition, we identify a set of “common sense” characteristics. We argue that if the framing of violent events prominently features these characteristics as discursive anchors, this primes processes of sensemaking toward interpreting violence as terrorism. While terrorism markers are often articulated as being pragmatic and apolitical indicators of terrorist acts, we show that they are indeed at the core of political contests over historical and physical facts about violent events. The narrative approach we develop in this article underscores that intuitive leanings toward interpreting violence as terrorism are a sign of political agency precisely because they are produced through the stories political agents tell.