GENDER BIAS IN THE DISPOSITION OF JUVENILE COURT REFERRALS: THE EFFECTS OF TIME AND LOCATION*

Theory based on sex role traditionalism predicts a more punishing decision for female than for male offenders, while theory based on chivalry (paternalism) predicts greater leniency by the courts for female offenders. This paper tests these two models using a large sample (36,680) of juvenile court referrals in metropolitan, urban, and rural locations spanning a nine-year period. Nonparametric analysis of covariance is used to control for differences in offense, previous contact with the court system, and other background variables. Evidence of gender bias in dispositions was found. The patterns of bias across time, location, offense committed, and previous referral to the court system supports the persistence of chivalry and a decline in sex role traditionalism in court decisions. Greater punishment for girls than boys was found only for repeat offenders committing more serious offenses. Even in those cases, girls were more likely to be taken out of the home environment by the courts through a custody transfer while boys were more likely to be sent to a lock-up facility.     

Congressional Performance,Incumbent Behavior,and Voting in Senate Elections

Conventional wisdom suggests that individual members of Congress have no real incentive to act in ways that might improve public evaluations of their collective body. In particular, the literature provides no clear evidence that public evaluations of Congress affect individual races for Congress, and little reason to expect that voters would hold specific individuals responsible for the institution's performance. We suggest that this conventional wisdom is incorrect. Using multiple state‐level exit polls of Senate voting conducted by Voter News Service in 1996 and 1998, we arrive at two key findings. First, we find that evaluations of Congress do have a significant effect on voting within individual U.S. Senate races across a wide variety of electoral contexts. Second, we find that punishments or rewards for congressional performance are not distributed equally across all members, or even across members of a particular party. Instead, we find that the degree to which citizens hold a senator accountable for congressional performance is significantly influenced by that senator's actual level of support for the majority party in Congress, as demonstrated on party votes.