International Convention for the Peaceful Use of Cyberspace

Cyber weapons now are an extension of state power. In hopes of gaining a strategic advantage, many countries including the United States, Russia and China are developing offensive cyber capabilities to disrupt political, economic, and social institutions in competitor nations. These activities have led to a cyber arms race that is spiraling out of control. This imminent global threat challenges the international community to be proactive. The purpose of this article is to propose an international convention to throttle the development, proliferation and use of cyber weapons before they cause electronic Armageddon. We begin by examining three successful efforts in arms control and use the lessons learned to draft a convention that can serve as a starting point for formal multilateral negotiations.     

The Pivot in Perspective: American Naval Power,Then and Now

The article examines the reorientation of the defense policy of the United States, initiated during the Bush and Obama Administrations, toward giving increased priority to the Asia Pacific region. It begins with the historical perspective of the development of American naval power in the twentieth century. The world wars, in which Europe represented the primary theater of conflict, had the effect of shifting a greater share of American military assets toward the Euro-Atlantic theatre, while the onset of the Cold War after 1945 required the United States to develop a navy of truly global strategic reach in which Atlantic and Pacific commitments were kept in balance. With the diminished concern for European security since the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the People's Republic of China as a strategic competitor in the Asia Pacific region, the United States is required in an age of defense austerity to refocus attention again to the Pacific.     

Security and Solvency

The American defense establishment has come to think of itself as the victim of complex and demanding threats, political irresponsibility and public apathy. While true, such conditions are often the case in American history. “Don’t fight the problem” is a standard instruction in war games. The Department of Defense should adopt that approach with its budget and strategy: stop submitting budgets in excess of legislated limits and devise a strategy consistent with them. It should explore alternative ways to achieve policy objectives, develop a concrete means of assessing risk, and on that basis build greater support for its preferred strategy.     

Reflections on the Iraq War: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy

Our foreign policy elites, the press, our elected representatives and the general public internalize “lessons” from each war, although the lessons may be wrong or misapplied. How we arrive at such consensus lessons is a mystery. It is too early to predict what lessons from Iraq will guide future U.S. decision-making. But on the situation as it now stands, it is possible to make some broad generalizations concerning what went right in Iraq and what went wrong.     

U.S. Engagement in East Asia: A Case for ‘Track Two’ Diplomacy

As the Bush presidency draws to a close, the foreign policy community is taking stock of contemporary U.S.-Northeast Asian relations, assessing the challenges and opportunities that are likely to confront the next administration. China presents both in abundance, as reflected in ongoing tensions and misunderstandings in the Sino-American bilateral relationship. This article assesses the prospects for Washington to improve its relations with China through the mechanism of “track two” diplomacy. First, we expand on the track two concept by examining its main components and functions with illustrative examples. We extend the existing conceptualization of track two beyond its traditional conflict resolution functions and develop an account of it as a mechanism for policy coordination and the reorientation of regional dynamics from conflict to cooperation. Second, we identify major areas of U.S. interest in Northeast Asia and show how track two diplomacy might usefully be pursued within these contexts. Our analysis culminates with recommendations on how the Unites States should apply track two strategies in its relations with China.     

How Will We Fight?

In considering the question “How will we fight?”, this article begins by examining the threats we face from conventional, insurgent, and hybrid enemies as well as terrorists and super-empowered individuals. It then outlines how America can fight effectively against each threat—as well as identifying the deficiencies in our current force structure that will hinder that response. The analysis argues that America needs a well-balanced, medium-weight joint force. It then provides recommendations for each of the services, as well as special operations forces, to achieve that goal. It concludes by describing what is needed to insure our force is capable of the rapid innovation in wartime required of successful nations.     

The United States and the Promotion of Democracy in Latin America: Then, Now and Tomorrow

The United States has been deeply involved in Latin American affairs for over a century, but promoting democracy has only recently become a priority. The end of the Cold War presented a unique opportunity to provide greater support for democracy in the Western Hemisphere. This article examines the main multilateral and bilateral actions undertaken by the United States to promote democracy in Latin America in recent decades. It makes use of a newly available dataset that specifies the investment made on democracy in different countries and sectors between 1990 and 2005. It also addresses the challenges that the United States confronts in promoting democracy in the region at the current time and the possible scenarios for the near future.     

Leveraging Strength: The Pillars of American Grand Strategy in World War II

This article argues that U.S. leaders navigated their way through World War II challenges in several important ways. These included: sustaining a functional civil-military relationship; mobilizing inside a democratic, capitalist paradigm; leveraging the moral high ground ceded to them by their enemies; cultivating their ongoing relationship with the British, and embracing a kind of adaptability and resiliency that facilitated their ability to learn from mistakes and take advantage of their enemies’ mistakes.