日本化学武器军控政策研究

日本自上世纪初形成生产、使用化学武器,并在侵华战争中大量使用了化学武器.1945年日本战败后,大量化学武器遗弃在中国境内,对我国居民造成了直接伤害.战后,日本政府热衷国际化学武器军控事业,积极寻找、销毁本国老化学武器,但在处理遗弃在华化学武器问题上推诿拖沓.这种鲜明的反差,受到国际和国内多重因素的影响.除非日本的外交战略、防务政策发生重大变化,近期内日本的化学武器军控政策不会轻易改变.     

全球安全治理视域下的自主武器军备控制

随着人工智能的飞速进展，不断智能化的自主武器日益显现出伦理和安全风险，使得限制或禁止自主武器成为全球安全治理领域的新兴议题。相比其他军控对象，自主武器军控进程在过去几年中获得较快推进，其中《特定常规武器公约》会议已决定设立政府专家组专门探讨自主武器问题。文章系统梳理了自主武器军备控制的概念、伦理和安全争议，旨在通过这种梳理更好地理解自主武器军控进程发展的动因，并对这一进程的未来走向做出预测。当前，自主武器军备控制的主要动因集中在道德层面，特别是让机器自主决策杀伤引发的伦理忧虑。而从安全层面看，自主武器蕴涵的安全风险在其他新兴技术领域同样存在，而发展和使用自主武器带来的战略红利依然显著，这使得主要国家推动自主武器军控的意愿并不强烈。在权力政治与道德政治的博弈下，自主武器军控在可预见的时期内将难以形成实质性成果，稍有可能的是通过“软法”等非约束性方式塑造一定的国际规范。在这个过程中，中国可以发挥更加积极主动的作用，在确保战略利益的同时营造有利的大国形象。     

The enemy within: rethinking arms availability in sub-Saharan Africa

Over the past decade small arms and light weapons availability has been singled out as one of sub-Saharan Africa's highest profile challenges. Yet the construction of the threat of arms availability as one of authorised trade and illicit trafficking across international borders has resulted in a narrow focus on regulating lawful exports and imports and brokers. While these are real and legitimate concerns, the authors contend that small arms and light weapons availability should be re-evaluated as a complex social phenomenon involving dynamic supply and demand dimensions. A limited emphasis on controlling authorised transfers to war zones glosses over the challenges of illegal markets, the gradual emergence of national arms production capacities across Africa and the systematic diversion of weapons and ammunition surplus from the domestic stocks of security services into civilian hands. It also obscures a more dynamic landscape of armed violence across the continent which extends beyond war zones. Whilst the conventional interpretation of arms availability is favoured by African diplomats and international arms control experts, such a reading potentially obscures the weaknesses of security governance and the myriad motivations and means shaping small arms and light weapons acquisition and misuse amongst armed groups and civilians.     

U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Reductions: Nonlinear Challenges,Practical Opportunities

The Obama Administration's desire to push forward with strategic nuclear arms reductions during the President's second term requires the navigation of numerous shoals and reefs. U.S. and Russian negotiators will have to overcome both political and military obstacles to accomplish post-New START reductions in long-range nuclear weapons. For example, efforts to reduce offensive nuclear weapons are complicated by U.S. and NATO plans for missile defenses deployed in Europe and by exigencies in U.S. and Russian domestic politics. In addition, the military-technical aspects of cyber war and nuclear deterrence can no longer be treated, analytically or practically, as isolated compartments. This article considers several aspects of the relationships among possible post-START offensive force reductions, advanced conventional weapons including missile defenses, and emerging cyber capabilities.     

Selling to Both Sides: The Effects of Major Conventional Weapons Transfers on Civil War Severity and Duration

Civil wars are primarily fought with small and light arms, but the availability of major conventional weapons to states and rebels can alter the nature of the war being fought. This study explores the impact of major conventional weapons transfers on civil war severity and duration. By using a recipient based approach to arms transfers, I find rebel acquisition of major conventional weapons from international sources leads to conflict escalation and deadlier conflicts. State importation of major conventional weapons is associated with longer conflicts. These findings provide researchers a means to account for rebel capabilities in civil war research and policy makers insight to limit the destructiveness of civil wars.     

Considerations on the Cyber Domain as the New Worldwide Battlefield

The convergence of telecommunication and computer technologies that has evolved in the field of information and communication technologies (ICT) in the last two decades has had very important effects on new war technologies and the ongoing process of battlefield digitisation. The Stuxnet worm, uncovered in 2010 and responsible for the sabotaging of a uranium enrichment infrastructure in Iran, is a clear example of a digital weapon. The incident shows what is meant by cyber war and what the particular features of this new warfare dimension are compared to the conventional domains of land, sea, air and space, with relevance both at the operational and strategic levels. But cyberspace also extends to the semantic level, within the complimentary field of information warfare involving the content of messages flowing through the Internet for the purposes of propaganda, information, disinformation, consensus building, etc. The overall cyber warfare domain needs to be put into perspective internationally as many countries are developing strong cyber capabilities and an ‘arms race’ is already taking place, showing that these technologies can potentially be used to undermine international stability and security. What is needed is a public debate on the topic and its impact on global stability, and some kind of regulation or international agreement on this new warfare domain, including an approach involving confidence building measures (CBMs).     

Art and disarmament: turning arms into ploughshares in Mozambique

Following the Renamo/Frelimo conflict and the 1992 Rome Accord ending hostilities, the Christian Council of Mozambique undertook to remove arms from the civilian population by trading them for development tools. The weapons were given to artists associated with a collective in the capital, Maputo. The weapons were cut into pieces and converted to sculptures that subsequently focused international attention on the Tools for Arms project, or TAE (Transformação de Armas em Enxadas). While succeeding in drawing attention to the proliferation of arms among civilians, and collecting a considerable number of arms and munitions, the project encountered difficulties in relating the production of art to the overall initiative. This paper examines the aspect of the project that produced art from weapons, with insights and observations based on fieldwork conducted for CUSO and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).     

The Geography of the International System: The CShapes Dataset

Sceptics of globalization attribute the proliferation of light weapons to economic openness. Increasing globalization apparently weakens public authority, leading to social disarray, anomic violence, and general conditions that make handgun ownership and use more likely. Pro-globalists might argue contrarily that trade openness can raise the premium on peace as violence is bad for business. Moreover, greater interdependence allows the diffusion of anti-proliferation norms and facilitates cooperative behavior among trading partners for stemming the demand for and proliferation of small arms. Using a unique dataset on small arms imports, we find that greater openness to trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) lowers small arms imports per capita. A policy measure of economic freedom is associated with higher small arms imports, but this association seems to be explained entirely by the association between economic freedom and strong bureaucracies. States that are de facto more open to the global trading system are less likely to be inundated with these weapons, but richer, better-governed countries import more small arms. Global policy should pay closer attention to the seepage of these weapons from the relatively wealthy, who manufacture and buy them in larger quantities, to the poor, among whom the ‘problems’ associated with small arms are often manifested. Curbing those factors that encourage globalization, however, would be counterproductive to reducing the trade in small arms and light weapons.     

Arms Transfers beyond the State-to-State Realm

Arms transfers beyond the state-to-state realm can have harmful effects for international security dramatically affecting the relations and behavior of states. This article examines why an emerging international norm on "prohibiting states to transfer arms to nonstate groups" has failed to diffuse at the international level. It discusses the already available international law framework existing at the regional and international levels upon which the potential norm could be built. The failure of the norm to diffuse at the international level can be primarily explained by the existence of a long-consolidated norm: the customary practice of states to transfer weapons to nonstate actors, that is, groups they deem legitimate to, without any interference or constraint. ¹ The unrestrained transfer of weapons is an established foreign-policy practice. It is the way states form, uphold alliances, extend friendships, and build spheres of influence ( Sorokin 1994 ). Clearly, no state willingly wants to give this up. Therefore, the multilateral agreement on a norm barring most or all transfers of weapons to nonstate actors would curtail the freedom of action to build spheres of influence as states please. There are genuine ethical and moral dilemmas in this discussion, a nonstate actor may be a freedom fighter or a terrorist depending on different perspectives. The distinction between the categories "state" and "nonstate" actors may risk classifying actors in two camps: the good and the bad, respectively. This is problematic as a few states are known to be the most brutal perpetrators of egregious violations against their own citizens, whereas certain nonstate actors are legitimately fighting for the protection of vulnerable populations.     

第二次世界大战后武力使用规范的演进

在国际法体系中,武装冲突法可谓编纂得最为完备的一个分支。经过数百年的积累和铺垫,第二次世界大战后武力使用规范逐渐发展成为完整的规范体系并呈现出四大特征:即为了适应国际关系的新变化武装冲突法扩大了适用范围;使用核武器是否合法成为国际法的重要问题;出现了在武装冲突中"反向"使用武力以达到实现和平目的的新方式——联合国维持和平行动以及在武装冲突中出现了大量作为作战手段而使用的性暴力行为等。然而进入21世纪以后,武装冲突的形态与样式均发生了重大变化,一方面,以无人机、自主作战机器人、纳米生物武器和网络战为代表的新型作战手段方法层出不穷;另一方面,非国家行为体在武装冲突中使用武力的情况有所增加,更出现了私人军事安保公司等法律地位在国际法上尚处于空白的交战主体。以朝核危机为标志,核武器对于国际和平与安全的巨大的潜在甚至是现实的威胁再次凸显,迅速成为国际政治和国际法中的热点核心议题。值得注意的是,即使武装冲突法的基本原则依然相对稳定,但是不断出现的新作战手段和方法,仍然给国际法和国际安全提出了一系列亟须应对的新挑战。     

Rethinking small arms control in Africa: it is time to set an armed violence reduction agenda

Policy-makers and practitioners concerned with small arms control have traditionally focused narrowly on ‘supply-side’ forms of regulation and containment. Concerned that excessive arms availability might destabilise fragile and post-war countries, they typically advance a host of activities such as weapons embargoes, export and import controls, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes and weapons collection schemes. These initiatives often achieve fewer dividends than expected. This article argues for a broader conceptualisation of ‘availability’ that accounts for both supply and demand dimensions. Availability would thus extend from arms production and diverse forms of weapons circulation to the manifold factors shaping acquisition and the multiple ways arms are used and misused. A broad spectrum treatment directly acknowledges the many faces of armed violence and allows for more sophisticated diagnosis, treatment and cure. This article considers how a host of ‘second generation’ armed violence prevention and reduction activities might enhance efforts to promote security in the aftermath of Africa's wars.     

Weapons Transfers as a Soft Security Issue in Eastern Europe: Legal and Illicit Aspects

The article looks into the problem of weapons transfers in Europe from the perspective of soft security. While the military security dimension of the issue has traditionally received sufficient coverage, weapons transfers also have important implications for soft security of the European states, both in terms of the issues they are linked to, and policy measures designed to control the proliferation of weapons. The soft security aspects of arms transfers are outlined in the introduction, while the subsequent sections look into the trends of both legal and illegal movement of weapons in and from Europe, and policy measures controlling the spread of both major conventional weapons, and light weapons and small arms at the global, regional (European), and national levels. The conclusion assesses the effectiveness of these measures, and implications thereof for European security.     

Pre-emption,Deterrence, and Self-Defence: A Legal and Historical Assessment

The policy of the United States, outlined in the 2002 National Security Strategy, whereby the US claims a right under international law to engage in pre-emptive use of force to prevent a rogue state's development of nuclear weapons, or any weapons of mass destruction (WMD), is unnecessary and therefore unlawful under customary international law of self-defence. This conclusion is reached through a comprehensive and intensive assessment of the normative reactions of politically effective actors to China's development of nuclear weapons during a two-year period between the Cuban Missile Crisis and China's first test in October 1964. While pre-emptive use of force against China, a rogue state, was considered by both the United States and most likely by the Soviet Union, neither used force to prevent it developing nuclear weapons. Since a policy of pre-emptive use of force was unnecessary for either state's self-defence, it would have been unlawful under customary international law. Given that the current strategic scenario of states vis-à-vis rogue states is the same under most circumstances, notwithstanding the existence of international terrorist networks, the article concludes that the proposed claim of the United States is, prima facie, unnecessary to its self-defence, and therefore unlawful under customary international law of self-defence. It shifts the burden of proof to policymakers claiming that all rogue states can be lawfully prevented through pre-emptive use of force from acquiring nuclear weapons, to establish that a particular state cannot be deterred from the use of nuclear weapons. Though the preventive war claim of the US National Security Strategy 2002 may turn out to be an effective strategic bluff in limiting WMD proliferation, the wisdom of the threat should not be confused with the illogic of preventive war.     

The Future of Chemical Weapons: Implications from the Syrian Civil War

Abstract

With chemical weapons (CW) use in Syria raising questions about the health of the CW norm, this article analyzes whether the Syrian case will lead to further proliferation and use of chemical weapons by states. We examine the use of chemical weapons at Ghouta in 2013 and on the Hama Plains in 2014 and find that: first, chemical weapons have demonstrated limited military utility in Syria, either tactically or as a tool of civilian victimization; second, the costs of use have been repeatedly demonstrated by the international reaction to their use; and third, the use of sarin—a nerve agent—has attracted a stronger international response than the use of chlorine, a less lethal agent. Consequently, we conclude that the Syrian case is unlikely to lead to significant proliferation and use of chemical weapons; any that does occur is most likely to involve states already outside the CW norm.     

A Review of: “Devin R. Springer,James L. Regens,and David N. Edger. Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad. Stephen Vertigans (with contributions from Donncha Marron and Philip W. Sutton). Militant Islam: A Sociology of Characteristics,Causes, and Consequences. David Aaron. In Their Own Words: Voices of Jihad.”

Chinese arms sales to Africa have increased in recent years. In a region beset by conflict and unstable regimes, and where arms sales are a significant and positive predictor of an increased probability of political violence, this is inherently problematic. The sale of weaponry to a regime in Khartoum caught up in an alleged “genocide” in Darfur, the awkward appearance in 2008 of a Chinese ship loaded with weapons bound for Mugabe's Zimbabwe off the coast of eastern Africa, and the recent exposure in 2011 that Chinese arms companies offered to sell around $200 million worth of arms to Muammar Gaddafi's regime are emblematic of an issue in Africa's political violence that needs analysis. This article seeks to discuss the rationale behind China's arms sales to Africa and the effect that they have had on political violence in recipient countries. It also provides an analysis of the supply-and-demand circumstances of Chinese arms transfers to Africa, Beijing's attempts to control such transfers, and evidence that Chinese policies on proliferation are (slowly) evolving.     

Forever young: START and aftermath

Abstract

The New Strategic arms reduction treaty nuclear arms control agreement signed by US President, Barack Obama, and Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, in 2010 is likely to achieve ratification in both Washington and Moscow, but it is too early to break out the champagne or vodka. Even successful ratification of this agreement is, at best, an important but incremental part of the US–Russian policy ‘reset’ and the larger agenda for both states with respect to arms reduction and nonproliferation. Further reductions in both states’ inventories of strategic nuclear weapons are a necessary preface toward credible leadership in stopping the spread of nuclear arms – especially in the looming test cases of Iran and North Korea. In addition, both states have to decipher a policy-strategy nexus for emerging missile defense technologies: in particular, whether missile defenses should be seen as possible means of cooperative security, as between NATO and Russia, or whether they are firewalls in the way of further progress in offensive nuclear arms reductions.     

拜登政府对华网络空间政策与中国应对

拜登政府执政以来,为了保持美国的网络空间技术优势和掌握其规则制定权,在网络空间领域仍对中国持强硬态度。拜登政府的对华网络空间政策具体举措,包括增强技术能力、强化供应链安全、炒作中国网络威胁、强化联盟关系、制定国际网络规则五个方面。拜登政府此举主要基于四方面考量:将中国视为最为强劲的竞争对手;重视网络安全;以网络空间合作为抓手修复联盟关系;重视国际制度领导权,谋求掌握制定网络空间国际规则的权力。拜登政府的对华网络空间政策,将会增加中美网络空间"技术脱钩"风险,也会导致中美战略竞争难以缓解,致使美国的盟国在网络空间领域的战略选择更加困难,进而影响全球网络空间治理。因此,中国需要在增强自身网络空间实力的基础上,化解美国在国际上的对华联合施压,缓解中美在网络空间领域的竞争,破解美国对华网络空间的污名化,增强中国在网络空间治理方面的话语权。     

Arms Negotiation,War Exhaustion,and the Credibility of Preventive War

Why do some states agree to suspend their weapons programs in exchange for compensation while others fail to come to terms? I argue that the changing credibility of preventive war is an important determinant of arms construction. If preventive war is never an option, states can reach mutually preferable settlements. However, if preventive war is not credible today but will be credible in the future, a commitment problem results: the state considering investment faces a “window of opportunity” and must build the arms or it will not receive concessions later on. Thus, agreements fail under these conditions. I then apply the theoretical findings to the Soviet Union’s decision to build nuclear weapons in 1949. War exhaustion made preventive war not credible for the United States immediately following World War II, but lingering concerns about future preventive action induced Moscow to proliferate.     

美国《网络空间国际战略》评析

在信息化时代,网络空间承载着国家政治、经济、文化和军事发展与安全的重荷。网络空间存在的黑客攻击、网络犯罪和网络恐怖主义事件层出不穷,因此网络空间安全已上升到国家安全战略的层面,美国政府于2011年5月16日发布的《网络空间国际战略》引起世界各国瞩目。美国《网络空间国际战略》以"共同创造繁荣、安全、开放的网络世界"为基本宗旨,以"基本自由、隐私和信息流动自由"为核心原则,从经济、网络安全、司法、军事、网络管理、国际发展、网络自由等诸方面为美国未来网络安全战略的发展指明了方向。《网络空间国际战略》的出台表明美国政府已将网络安全提升到国际战略的新高度,它隐含着美国谋求网络空间霸权的战略目标,具有引领国际战略新变革和引发网络空间价值观冲突的现实战略效能,它对中美关系的影响和中国的应对之策也是值得认真分析和思考的。     

Democracy and Nuclear Arms Control—Destiny or Ambiguity?

Is there a particularly democratic way of dealing with nuclear arms control? Against the background of democratic peace (DP) theory, and using Immanuel Kant's writing as a starting point, this article argues that democracies should indeed develop a preference for arms control, but that Liberalism as well as the nature of nuclear weapons opens the possibility for contingent developments within a DP framework. While DP theory can thus account for the existence of variance, we maintain that a social constructivist complement based on role, identity, and enemy perception can best explain why a given democracy follows a specific path. Case studies of six Western democracies reveal a considerable variance in their nuclear arms control policies, which can indeed be traced back to the countries' respective roles, identities, and images of the Kantian “unjust enemy.”