Predicting success: A research study based on law degree courses at Trent Polytechnic

Abstract

THIS STUDY was set up to investigate the possibility of a relationship between the General Certificate of Education ('G.C.E.’) ‘A’ level qualifications of the entrants on to the law degree courses at Trent Polytechnic and their degree classifications.

Very little evidence was found of any such significant relationships. Further analysis of both G.C.E. ‘A’ and ‘O’ level qualifications similarly showed no significant relationships except in the case of ‘O’ levels. The most clear finding was that significant relationships do exist between being a full‐time female student and obtaining a good honours classification, and that all LL.B. Legal Studies (four‐year sandwich) students have a better chance of obtaining good honours than do LL.B. Law (three‐year full‐time) students.

Various other analyses were also attempted, but no other significant relationships were found, although it is possible that choice of final‐year options may influence degree classifications.

Overall, this study suggests that while G.C.E. results may be suggestive of a basic ability to complete degree courses successfully, they do not predict degree classifications. From this I draw the conclusion that G.C.E. results should not be used to exclude students from these, and possibly other, courses in higher education.

In considering the possible predictive value of the ‘A’ level G.C.E. qualifications of entrants on to the law degree courses at Trent Polytechnic and their degree classifications, other possible predictive relationships and factors were also investigated, in order to examine whether any other (reasonably available) variables were linked to degree classifications. Analyses were therefore carried out in relation to ‘O’ level G.C.E., gender, age of student, course, G.C.E. subject‐groupings and course progress. Other variables were not possible to test because of the quality of the information available.     

Chinese Prosperity Doesn't Bring Democracy

The United States accuses China of subsidizing its entire export economy through artificially undervaluing its currency. China accuses the United States of fiscal profligacy while flooding the world with easy credit to keep its economy afloat. This dispute reflects the reality that the world's two largest economies are built on opposite dynamics of production and savings vs. consumerism and debt. In Europe, the wages of unsustainable debt that financed the welfare state have also come due. Rebalancing the global economy in this context is not only a matter of fixing exchange or interest rates and extending the retirement age. It must also involve a recalibration of democracy in both East and West. Two Nobel economists, the Greek prime minister, a ranking Chinese economist and the former chief economist of the IMF address these issues.     

The heart of Asia and the roof of the world

This article concentrates almost entirely on the events of 1971 and the author's involvement in the “sometimes complicated and frustrating negotiations and consultations” which led up to the signing at the end of 1971 of the various Treaties of Friendship as Britain withdrew from the Gulf, leaving behind a number of independent states, including the United Arab Emirates.     

Managerialist advocate or “control freak”? The Janus‐faced Office of the Auditor General

Abstract: This article highlights the contradictions in the role of the Office of Auditor General (OAG) and identifies the sources as well as the consequences of the office's Janus‐like character as both a managerialist advocate and “control freak.” This character, it is argued, is shaped by institutional factors and the knowledge‐basis on which the office relies to fulfil its mission. Three causes of “institutional schizophrenia” are identified: the OAG'S mandate in relation to financial and value‐for‐money audit (VFMA); the combination of the OAG'S institutional permeability and the structure of the management consulting market; and the tensions between the “negative” and “positive” dimensions of the office's mandate. On the consequences side, the author discusses three elements: the limited capacity of the OAG to develop a coherent position about managerialism; the fact that the advocacy of managerialist principles is drawing the OAG closer into the political realm; and the fragility of professionalism as a mechanism for regulating the management consultant's role of the OAG in relation to VFMA. Sommaire: Le but de cet article est de mettre en relief les contradictions dans le rôle du Bureau du vérificateur général (BVG) et d'identifier les causes et les conséquences du caractére schizoïde du Bureau qui est à la fois partisan du managérialisme et obsédé du contrôle. Ce caractère spécifique du Bureau est façonné par des facteurs institutionnels et le type de connaissance dont il dépend pour remplir sa mission. Trois causes de schizophrénie institutionnelle sont identifées:le mandat du BVG en ce qui concerne la vérification financière et l'optimisation des ressources; l'interaction entre la perméabilité institutionnelle du Bureau et la structure du marché du conseil en management; et les tensions entre les dimensions positives et négatives du mandat du Bureau. En ce qui conceme les conséquences, cet article aborde trois aspects:l'incapacité du BVG À développer une position cohérente à l'endroit du managérialisme; le fait que la promotion d'idées managérialistes amène le BVG À s'impliquer dans la sphère politique, et la fragilité du professionalisme en tant que comme mécanisme pour réguler le rôle de consultant du BVG en ce qui concerne la vérification d'optimisation des ressources.     

Interests,Instruments and Institutional Preferences in the EU Comitology System: The 2006 Comitology Reform

This paper seeks to reveal the institutional interests of the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament and the Commission in the comitology system. This is done by an investigation of the 2006 comitology reform, which introduced the regulatory procedure with scrutiny. This reform was the result of developments in four areas: the Lamfalussy reform in the area of financial regulation; the controversial use of comitology in the area of GMOs, food safety and the environment; the failed Constitutional Treaty; and the amending of the 1999 comitology decision. The analysis shows that the reform was the result of a two‐dimensional constitutional struggle. The first dimension concerns the relative supervisory position of the two legislative actors, the Council and the European Parliament. The second dimension concerns the relationship between the legislative and the executive branch of the EU system. In theoretical terms, the analysis demonstrates an example of T.M. Moe's ‘politics of structural choice’. The paper ends by drawing lessons for the negotiations on the new comitology system following the Lisbon Treaty.