Reverse coattail effects in undemocratic elections: an analysis of Russian locomotives

This article argues that the effectiveness of the tactics ruling parties use to control the electoral arena may depend on the electoral experience of its subordinates. To substantiate this point, the work examines Russia’s “locomotives” – the practice of placing regional governors on the list of the ruling party, United Russia, during national legislative elections. It argues that electoral payoffs also came from select regions without locomotives. Given the move to appointed governors, list exclusion likely indicated gubernatorial vulnerability. As a result, governors left off United Russia’s list may have responded by seeking to demonstrate their electoral utility, and those with longer tenures were more likely to succeed in these efforts. An analysis of the 2007 Duma elections shows that United Russia’s vote share was higher in regions where long-serving governors were left off the list. Since Russia’s appointment system dramatically changed the gubernatorial corps between 2007 and 2011, the article also considers changes in the effects of list placement over time. It finds that the relationship between list exclusion and higher vote shares for United Russia disappears as governors with electoral experience were removed from office.     

Running to stand still: aggressive immobility and the limits of power in Russia

The common conception of Russian politics as an elite game of rent-seeking and autocratic management masks a great deal of ‘mundane’ policymaking, and few areas of social and economic activity have escaped at least some degree of reform in recent years. This article takes a closer look at four such reform attempts – involving higher education, welfare, housing and regional policy – in an effort to discern broad patterns governing how and when the state succeeds or fails. The evidence suggests that both masses and mid-level elites actively defend informality – usually interpreted in the literature as an agent-led response to deinstitutionalization and the breakdown of structure – creating a strong brake on state power. More than a quarter century into the post-Soviet period, this pattern of “aggressive immobility” – the purposeful and concerted defense by citizens of a weakly institutionalized state – has in fact become an entrenched, structural element in Russian politics.     

Election observer effects: A field experiment in the Russian Duma election of 2011

The literature on elections and election monitoring is divided between those who take a skeptical view, suggesting that monitors are often political rather than objective in their judgments, and those who see monitors as a real force for cleaner, more honest elections. Studies that use field experiments to look for the effect of monitors generally support the optimists, indicating that the mere presence of election observers can have powerful effects. This is surprising given the extent of the resources available to incumbents who wish to conduct electoral fraud. We present the results of an experiment in which 768 observers were randomly assigned to polling stations in 21 cities in Russia in the 2011 parliamentary elections. Unlike most previous studies of election observers, our results suggest that observer effects on turnout and vote for the ruling party are small. The results suggest the need to study more carefully the circumstances that shape the impact of observation missions.     

Stability and Change in Putin's Political Image During the 2000 and 2012 Presidential Elections: Putin 1.0 and Putin 2.0?

There has been a lot of research done on “Western” politicians and political systems with regard to political marketing. But what about other countries, especially those that possess a different political standard? This article seeks to address one particular Russian politician: Vladimir Putin. He rose from obscurity to become Russia's second president (after Boris Yeltsin). Two presidential elections form the focus of attention, 2000 Putin, V. (2000). First person. London, UK: Hutchinson. [Google Scholar] and 2012. The aim is to discover the consistencies and breaks in the manufacturing of Putin's political image and reputation. A number of breaks and continuities were discovered in terms of how Putin is marketed. This seems to be a reflection of the changes taking places in Russia's political environment, which then needs to be taken into consideration when political marketing is conducted.     

Political Campaigning Environments in Latvia: From a Global to a Local Perspective

Political campaigning is a global phenomenon in the sense that the methods for achieving political goals are becoming similar all over the globe where elections are being used as a tool for the legitimation of a political elite. This article addresses the question of the extent to which the political campaigning environment in Latvia is influenced by global trends. Globalization in this case is viewed from the perspective of Latvia's geopolitical location between the West and Russia and a comparison of political campaigning practices in Western democracies and authoritarian Russia. What methods of political campaigning are more appropriate in Latvia, those such as used in old democracies or the authoritarian regime? At the same time, there are also considerable local peculiarities in every country that affect the strategic planning and implementation of political campaigns. Therefore, the second research question relates to the main areas that determine the specific framework of the political campaigning environment in Latvia. The results of the research reveal that the influence of both Western and Russian styles of political campaigning are detectable in Latvia, although the international effect is rather limited, because Latvia as a political campaigning environment is dominated by its own unique characteristics. The main aspects that determine the local framework of the political campaigning environment in Latvia are the media system, political parties, and political culture.     

Do Russian research universities have a secret mission? a response to Forrat

This paper challenges the central claim of Natalia Forrat’s article that university support programs under Putin targeted the suppression of anti-regime student mobilization. Empirical evidence, both on the national-policy level and on the level of higher education institutions, suggests that the government introduced support programs in order to establish a research capacity at Russian flagship universities and to develop a more competitive national science system. The low level of students’ political engagement can rather be attributed to the outdated structures of student representation, inherited from the Soviet period.     

The political economy of Russian higher education: why does Putin support research universities?

This article argues that Vladimir Putin's regime launched support programs for the leading Russian universities in 2005 because of a perceived threat of the political mobilization of youth, similar to the one that triggered “color revolutions” in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine. The support programs created cleavages in the university community, covered an attack on university autonomy, and made the containment of possible anti-regime student mobilization a part of an implicit agreement between the regime and the universities. The historical coincidence of the “demographic hole,” which caused a shrinkage of the higher education market, and high oil prices, which provided the necessary resources for the regime, made this implicit agreement possible. The article contributes to the research on authoritarianism, youth mobilization, authoritarian backlash after the color revolutions, and the development of research universities in Russia.     

Resurgent authoritarianism: the case of Russia's new NGO legislation

Following the protest demonstrations of the 2011–2012 electoral cycle, tensions between the limited modernization efforts of Medvedev and the resurgent authoritarianism of Putin have become increasingly manifest. These are seen not only in the relationship between society and the state, but also in the “para-constitutional” institutions of the dual state. This article argues that whereas Medvedev created an arena for liberalization within these para-constitutional structures, Putin has firmly rejected these policies, among other things by revising the 1995 law on NGOs amended in 2006. Using the perspective of the dual state, the article argues that with the introduction of the Law on Foreign Agents (2012), the original law draft On Public Control (2014), a key element in Medvedev's modernization program, was delayed and substantially altered. Together, these amendments create precarious conditions for NGOs, pressuring their independence by threats of dissolution and reducing the quality of civil control over state organs.     

Responsibility to Protect: Russia’s Approaches

Abstract

Russia’s predominantly suspicious and even negative attitudes toward R2P are closely related to its traditional attachment to the notion of sovereignty, but its reluctance to ‘bless’ the use of force with R2P also serves as a pretext to cover various instrumental goals. Russia’s more assertive foreign policy has exacerbated this trend. Disagreements stem from differences between Russia and the West both in their conceptual approaches to security and in their assessments of specific cases. In particular, Russia has an existential concern over possible application of R2P by extra-regional actors in its immediate post-Soviet vicinity. However, in the conflicts around South Ossetia (2008) and Crimea / Southeastern Ukraine (2014-), there was a noticeable trend to refocus R2P-related arguments in support of Russia’s own actions. By and large, R2P continues to be perceived as a Western attempt to establish certain rules of behaviour which require caution and prudence. Nevertheless, more positive attitudes do not seem impossible. To play a prominent role in the evolving international system, Russia will have to make the R2P segment of its foreign policy more salient and overcome the lag in promoting this concept as a working tool indispensable for cooperative and responsible leadership.     

Against All Odds? Russia’s Financial Crisis and Global Geopolitics

Over the past 15 years, Russia’s model of political-economy has evolved around three main channels of global economic integration: 1) export of natural resources and a national system of redistribution of export revenues; 2) financialisation, acting as a boost for domestic consumption/demand; and 3) the offshore integration of Russian capital into global capital markets. The current crisis is affecting all three channels of Russia’s global political economy. Together, reduced export revenues, the deepening financial crisis and the dominance of offshore-sourced investments into Russia, serve as crisis transmission mechanisms, and thus constitute three sets of (inter-related) dilemmas for the Russian authorities. Four scenarios of possible development of the current situation are provided.