乳牛肝MTP基因mRNA定量检测模板的构建

应用RT-PCR方法,克隆394 bp的MTP片段,连接到pMD 18-T载体上构建pMD-MTP394重组质粒;应用限制性内切酶ApaⅠ消化重组质粒pMD-MTP394,切下一194 bp的小片段,回收大的线性片段,T4 DNA连接酶连接,成功构建了一个重组的竞争模板质粒pMD-MTP200,为建立竞争性RT-PCR法检测乳牛肝MTP基因mRNA奠定了基础。     

海峡两岸省域电子信息产业竞争力评价及分析

近年来,海峡两岸电子信息产业已由最初的互补转为互补与竞争共存,且省域间产业竞争力差距较大。本文根据新贸易竞争优势理论,通过构建两岸省域电子信息产业竞争力评价体系,运用因子分析法对2008—2012年间台湾与大陆31个省、区、市（统称＂省域＂）的电子信息产业竞争力进行测算和分析,结果表明：在时间维度,台湾与大陆电子信息产业竞争力强省的差距在逐渐缩小,与电子信息产业竞争力水平低下省份的差距在逐渐扩大;在地域分布上,两岸电子信息产业竞争力呈现台湾地区向大陆东部沿海地区再向中西部内陆地区递减规律;效益因子、技术投入因子对竞争力影响最大,社会环境因子和经济环境因子次之。针对两岸省域竞争力得分因子差异,本文提出促进两岸电子信息产业合作的建议：大陆高水平区域可利用巨大市场优势与台湾共建技术标准,研发设计符合大陆市场的产品;大陆中高水平区域依托良好的基础设施条件和经济基础可与台湾在电子信息产业高技术、高智力密集度的领域深入合作;大陆中低水平区域凭借劳动力和土地成本优势拓宽与台湾合作区域以承接东部沿海的生产基地;大陆低水平区域应发挥资源优势完善基础设施吸引台商投资。     

Long-Term Performance of Political Parties

Abstract

Whilst politicians can “buy” votes in the short-term, most political parties are more interested in maintaining power over a period of years in order to implement their policies. This paper explores whether political parties can be considered to possess long-term competitive resources that sustain their competitive advantages. It employs the well-established strategic management concept of the Resource-Based View of strategy development for this purpose. Because such a concept has not previously been applied to political parties, the paper begins by considering the nature of the competition that exists between political parties and the role of resources in developing superior political performance. A series of theoretical propositions about why some parties maintain political power and influence for lengthy periods is then developed. We argue that the competitive resources of a political party such as its policies, leadership, organisational and communications skills require long-term investment and development, rejecting the notion that long-term electoral success is based primarily on the promises and resources deployed in the final election campaign.     

Continuity despite change: Kenya's new constitution and executive power

What explains the continuation of strong executive power despite the introduction of new formal constraints on presidents? This article focuses on the elites working within the state agencies that execute presidential power, who benefit materially from their authority and have incentives to defy formal constraints placed on their own power. To evaluate this claim, I examine Kenya's 2010 constitution, which intended to reduce the power of Kenya's “imperial presidency” through formal constraints on the executive. As implementation has progressed, however, the executive bureaucracy – the Provincial Administration (PA) – has not changed in size, structure, or function, contrary to the explicit goals of the constitution's drafters. Using original interview and archival evidence, I find that the persistence of this agency – and by extension strong executive power – is due to PA administrators’ attempts to protect their material interests. This article shows that formal rule change may be insufficient to spur democratization in the face of entrenched authoritarian bureaucracies with strong incentives to maintain their pre-existing interests.     

Populism and competitive authoritarianism in the Andes

Although military rule disappeared in Latin America after 1990, other forms of authoritarianism persisted. Competitive authoritarianism, in which democratic institutions exist but incumbent abuse skews the playing field against opponents, emerged in Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador during the post-Cold War period. This article seeks to explain the emergence of competitive authoritarianism in the Andes. It argues that populism – the election of a personalistic outsider who mobilizes voters with an anti-establishment appeal – is a major catalyst for the emergence of competitive authoritarianism. Lacking experience with representative democratic institutions, possessing an electoral mandate to destroy the existing elite, and facing institutions of horizontal accountability controlled by that elite, populists have an incentive to launch plebiscitary attacks on institutions of horizontal accountability. Where they succeed, weak democracies almost invariably slide into competitive authoritarianism. The argument is demonstrated through a comparative analysis of all 14 elected presidents in Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela between 1990 and 2010.     

鸭疫里氏杆菌双抗体夹心ELISA检测方法的建立

为快速检测鸭疫里氏杆菌,以纯化的兔抗1型鸭疫里氏杆菌抗体作为捕获抗体,以纯化的鸭疫里氏杆菌单克隆抗体作为检测抗体,建立了双抗体夹心ELISA方法。最佳的方案为用184ng/孔纯化的多抗包被过夜,100mL/L小牛血清37℃封闭2h,检测抗原、单抗、酶标抗体均为37℃作用1h,显色20min后终止反应,D450nm值高于0.330且P/N>2.1判定为阳性。该方法特异性强,与禽源巴氏杆菌、大肠杆菌、沙门菌无交叉反应,最低检测剂量为104 CFU/mL。与传统细菌分离方法相比,该方法的敏感性为100%,符合率为85.2%。本研究首次建立了检测鸭疫里氏杆菌的双抗体夹心ELISA方法,且特异、敏感。     

免疫荧光及双抗体夹心ELISA在人狂犬病检测中的应用

目的探讨免疫荧光和双抗体夹心ELISA在人狂犬病检测中的应用。方法4例临床诊断狂犬病死亡患者的大脑、小脑、脑干、海马,分别于冰箱和甲醛固定后保存,用上述方法检测。感染狂犬病毒CVS株的鼠脑组织和急性胰腺炎死者脑组织分别作为阳性和阴性对照。结果-70℃保存的人脑和阳性对照狂犬病毒均为阳性,甲醛固定的人脑和阴性对照均为阴性。结论免疫荧光和双抗体夹心ELISA可用于人狂犬病检测,但脑组织要低温保存,不能用甲醛固定。     

从《反垄断法》的颁布看市场竞争机制的法律构建

在市场经济条件下,企业要真正地开展市场竞争,必须创造一个良好的市场竞争环境。《反垄断法》的颁布实施可以说为建设一个公平竞争的市场环境,在立法上已迈出了最重要一步。但从实际的情况来看,要真正构建一个公平竞争的市场环境,仍然任重而道远。     

竞争法与消费者权益保护刍议

我国竞争法主要分为反不正当竞争法和反垄断法两大类,它们承担着对消费者进行保护和对企业社会责任进行规制的双重任务。由于存在某些漏洞,今后还需对我国竞争法再作进一步的完善。     

竞技体育暴力行为之法律认知——关于竞技体育暴力行为的调查报告

竞技体育暴力行为不仅仅是一法律问题,也是一社会问题。针对社会大众对竞技体育暴力行为的一般性认知、行为性质的认知、意涵界定的认知、责任承当方式的认知的社会调查结果,是刑法介入竞技体育暴力行为的前提和基础,而且是学术研究和立法完善的实证依据。