数据加密原理分析及解密工具开发在一起案件中的应用

由于违法犯罪嫌疑人反侦查意识的增强,涉案的TF卡、U盘等存储介质内往往含有加密文件。在这些加密数据中往往包含着对侦查、起诉更有价值的信息。在这种情况下,对其中的数据进行解密成为数据能否成功提取的关键。本文针对一起涉及邪教案件中的加密解密原理进行研究,详细分析了基于异或运算的加密原理、解密原理及其方法,从而根据原理设计可以快速获取密钥的解密软件。在本案中,检验人员从检材中提取出加密程序,进行加密实验,通过对比加密前和加密后的数据,分析加密原理,研究解密方法。为了提高解密效率,检验人员通过C#语言开发Windows窗体应用程序,设计出了解密工具TFCrack。通过TFCrack可以方便快速获取密码,通过获取的密码可以快速解析出隐藏的数据。     

Buyer and Seller Differences in Business‐to‐Business Negotiations

The purpose of this article is twofold: first, to examine the differences between buyers' and sellers' use of negotiation tactics in face‐to‐face business‐to‐business (B2B) negotiations and second, to explore how negotiators' professed negotiation styles influence buyers' and sellers' use of tactics. The methodology is a multiple case study analysis of eighteen negotiators representing twelve companies in six real‐life buyer–seller negotiations in B2B settings analyzed using qualitative research methods, including both comparative analysis and frequency analysis. We found some difference between buyers' and sellers' use of negotiation tactics, which suggests this question deserves further empirical study. Buyers' and sellers' use of specific tactics differs according to which overall strategy the negotiators chose, and sellers generally use a greater number of negotiation tactics than buyers. The findings challenge previous findings that suggest that B2B negotiations are collaborative and that negotiators communicate in a collaborative manner. The findings also increase our understanding of buyers' and sellers' variable use of tactics in the course of everyday practice as well as the interplay between negotiation tactics and strategies.     

Negotiating democracy with authoritarian regimes. EU democracy promotion in North Africa

ABSTRACT

In order to better understand the dynamics of international cooperation on democracy promotion with authoritarian regimes, this article looks into the processes and results of negotiations on democracy (promotion) between the European Union (EU) and two of its North African neighbours (Morocco, Tunisia) in the decade leading up to the Arab uprisings. Asking if, how, and to what effect the EU and its Mediterranean partners have negotiated issues related to democracy promotion, it analyses official documents issued on the occasion of their respective association council meetings in 2000-2010. It shows that partners have indeed addressed these issues since the early 2000s, however, without engaging in substantive exchanges. Most of the time, conflicts have been neither directly addressed nor resolved. Where there are traces of actual negotiations leading to an agreement, these are clearly based on a logic of bargaining rather than arguing. These findings challenge the picture of harmony and cooperation between the EU and Morocco. Furthermore, they point to the low quality of these exchanges which reinforces the dilemma of international democracy promotion in cooperation with authoritarian regimes.     

The Culture of Interest: A Proposed Addition and Revision of the Three‐Culture Model

Negotiation and conflict resolution theorists have classified world cultures according to three types for the purpose of describing and predicting some of the ways in which individuals and groups within broad, geographically based cultural groups behave in conflict and negotiation‐related situations. These three broad categories, called “cultural syndromes,” have described these cultures according to the relative value they place on these three concerns: honor, face, and dignity. Based on our examination of the literature on the cultural dimensions of negotiation and conflict management, our own practice, and an analysis of literature and practice pertaining to the place and utility of the honor, face, interest, and dignity attributes within and between cultural groups , we propose a reformulation of this typology. Our reformulation would replace the broad “dignity” category with a new category that we call “interest,” which we believe better characterizes Northern European and North American cultures. We also argue that a cultural orientation toward dignity is universal and not geographically unique and is thus shared by all three cultures. This new formulation, we believe, more accurately characterizes the global range of orientations toward negotiation and conflict resolution and would, if adopted, help scholars and practitioners better understand culturally divergent conflict orientations and behaviors as well as the ramifications of such differences for negotiation and conflict resolution practice.     

论跨境电子证据司法协助简易程序的构建

跨国网络犯罪的增加使得跨境电子取证的实际需求日益旺盛,我国在2018年颁布了《国际刑事司法协助法》,目的之一是加强国际合作打击跨国犯罪,为我国履行国际条约义务提供法律依据。但在司法实践中,我国的跨境电子取证面临着理论困境和实践困境。网络主权、司法管辖权理论使得单边取证存在着非法性可能。传统跨境电子取证因数据本地化存储和"倒U型"取证结构而效率不高。现有的国际司法协助程序繁杂、时间冗长,无法满足打击跨境犯罪和电子证据取证的现实需求。因此跨境电子取证的简易程序构建具有必要性和紧迫性,对现有司法协助程序进行适当简化,遵循合法性原则和效率性原则,构建境内外双方执法者直接合作方式合法化、派员调查取证方式、建立个案电子取证协助机制三种途径。     

《民法典》视野下统一动产和权利担保登记制度的构造

在登记对抗主义之下，动产和权利担保登记的功能不在于创设一个新的权利，而在于为与担保人进行交易的第三人提供信息以及为确定竞存权利之间的优先顺位提供基础。如此，动产和权利担保登记系统应以声明登记制为基础而构建。《民法典》就动产和权利担保物权的功能主义立法方法为统一动产和权利担保登记制度提供了法律上的前提。在维持特殊动产、权利担保登记系统的前提下，统合没有所有权登记的标的物上的担保登记系统，并建立两大登记系统之间的电子链接。统一的动产和权利担保登记系统应是基于互联网的完全电子化的登记系统，其编制采取人的编成主义，并辅之以物的编成主义，涵盖所有在功能上起担保作用的交易类型。担保权人可以自主在线完成登记和查询，但为防止欺诈登记和虚假登记，担保人享有受领登记通知、请求注销或修正登记的权利，担保权人负有注销登记的义务。     

Why Do Peace Negotiations Succeed or Fail? Legal Commitment,Transparency, and Inclusion during Peace Negotiations in Colombia (2012–2016) and Turkey (2012–2015)

This article examines the ways in which the negotiation framework—i.e., the legal guarantees, information management mechanism, and degree of inclusivity in peace negotiations—shapes the likelihood of concluding a peace agreement. Codifying the peace negotiations in law, publicizing information about the content of negotiations, and including mediators and civil society actors in peace talks is likely to increase a government's short‐term costs. However, doing so alleviates the adversaries' information asymmetry and commitment problems, sets guidelines to insure the process against exogenous shocks, and increases the number of actors taking part in conflict management. Comparing the recent peace negotiations to end intrastate wars in Colombia and Turkey, this article argues that a legalized, public, and inclusive framework made a peace agreement possible in Colombia, while the lack of such a framework caused Turkey's peace talks to fail.     

Focal Points and Turning Points in Negotiation: A Comparative Analysis

In this article, we examine the roles of focal points and turning points in negotiation. Both concern impasses in negotiation, and negotiators can exploit them to move past impasses. Each term uses the word “point” differently, however. A focal point refers to a single salient coordinating concept shared by the parties. A turning point is a departure that takes place during the course of a negotiation, when the course seems to change. Precipitants precede turning points and consequences follow them. In this article, we focus on the relationship of these two negotiation concepts. We raise the following questions: Does the development of focal points precipitate departures, and, if so, how? Do departures lead to the development of focal points, and, if so, how? Are there circumstances in which focal points do not precipitate turning points and vice versa? Do negotiations that feature focal points create more or less durable agreements? Do negotiations that include turning points create more or less durable agreements? To help answer these questions, we have analyzed four cases. In the German Foundation Agreement negotiation, the development of focal points precipitated turning points. In the South African Interim Constitution negotiations, turning point departures precipitated the development of focal points. And in the negotiations to end the Burundi civil war and to reach the Nouméa Accord between France and New Caledonia, parties shared focal points that did not precipitate turning points. These case analyses provide insights into the role of focal points in producing effective and durable agreements. They also suggest opportunities for further research on the interaction between these concepts.     

Level Two Negotiations: Helping the Other Side Meet Its “Behind‐the‐Table” Challenges

A long analytic tradition has explored the challenge of productively synchronizing “internal” with “external” negotiations, with a special focus on how each side can best manage internal opposition to agreements negotiated “at the table.” Implicit in much of this work has been the view that each side's leadership is best positioned to manage its own internal conflicts, often by pressing for deal terms that will overcome internal objections and by effectively “selling” the agreement to key constituencies. Far less frequently have analysts considered how each side can help the other side with its “behind‐the‐table” barriers to successful agreement. Following Robert Putnam's two‐level games schema, I characterize such “behind‐the‐table” or “Level Two” barriers more broadly, offer several innovative examples of how each side can help the other overcome them, and develop more general advice on doing so most effectively. As a fuller illustration of a Level Two negotiator helping the other side with its formidable behind‐the‐table challenges, I pay special attention to the end‐of‐Cold‐War negotiations over German reunification in which former American Secretary of State James Baker played a key role.