引入辩诉交易探讨

作为美国独具特色的刑事法律制度,辩诉交易制度在提高诉讼效率方面起到了一定的积极作用。在我国目前的法律环境下,引入辩诉交易制度是可行的、必要的。只要运用得当,对于实现刑事诉讼公正与效率的双重价值目标具有重要意义。应结合我国当前普通程序简易审和量刑建议改革,建立符合我国国情的辩诉交易制度。规范操作辩诉交易制度的一个总的原则就是应当处理好社会、被告人和被害人三者利益的关系。     

论被保证人破产时保证债权的行使——从利益平衡视角分析

被保证人破产时保证债权的行使问题在破产法实务中是比较复杂而又具有重要意义的,从保证债权人和保证人的利益平衡的视角出发,对保证债权人债权、一般保证人先诉抗辩权和保证人追偿权关系进行分析,认为在不损害债权人利益的前提下,应当充分保障一般保证人先诉抗辩权和连带责任保证类型中特定情形下(债权人不申报破产债权并且通知了保证人)保证人的预先追偿权.我国担保法和最新的破产法都没有对这一问题做出科学规定,因而其完善成为我国当前现实之亟须.     

推进工资集体协商，促进构建和谐稳定劳动关系

当前，在市场经济条件下，工资问题是企业中各方利益的核心问题。因此，推行工资集体协商涉及到国家的发展、改革、稳定、执政等各个方面，也是构建社会主义和谐社会的基础和重要内容。     

Race and the probability of pleading guilty

The legal ramifications of pleading guilty and findings of an interdependence between pleading guilty and sentence severity suggest that the guilty plea decision is a significent turning point in case processing. The present research examines the variables affecting the probability of pleading guilty. The first analysis involves estimating a single probit equation of main effects of variables previously found to be related to pleading guilty. A second analysis is conducted estimating the same equation separately for black defendants and white defendants. Findings from the first part of the analysis indicate that physical evidence, number of charges, and confessing to the crime during police/prosecutor interrogation increase the probability of pleading guilty, whereas the number of witnesses, use of a weapon, and offenses carrying a minimum penalty of 5 years in custody with no maximum prison term decrease the probability of pleading guilty. Findings from the second analysis indicate that the effect of marital status, prior record of felony convictions, type of counsel, number of charges, and use of a weapon on the probability of pleading guilty varies by defendant's race. The research concludes by offering several competing explanations of these findings in hope of stimulating further research on the variables affecting the route of case disposition in felony processing.     

对英国集体谈判制度形成过程的历史考察

英国是资本主义的先行者，也是最早成立工会、最早进行集体谈判的国家。随着工人运动的发展，英国的集体谈判也经历了萌芽到成熟、非法到合法的过程，并形成了独特的传统：自由放任。这一传统既是英国资本主义经济政治特征的体现，也是工人与资本家斗争的结果，对英国劳资关系的发展有着深远影响。     

辩诉交易相关制度之借鉴

世界各国普遍存在与美国辩诉交易相类似的制度,究其原因在于辩诉交易的实践价值.各主要国家普遍存在着辩诉交易的相关制度,对于被告人自愿认罪的案件在程序上予以简化,并在实体上从轻处理.我国不宜全面移植辩诉交易.应当借鉴其合理内核,打破现有简易程序和普通程序简化审的划分,重构我国的认罪案件处理程序.     

论我国民事被告答辩制度的缺陷与改进

我国现有的民事被告答辩制度存在一些缺陷。在修改民事诉讼法、实现民事诉讼现代化的现实语境中,应在尊重历史和国情的基础上,借鉴国外的做法,在期限、形式、内容和法律后果四个方面对其进行改进。     

论市场经济国家对劳资冲突的法律规制

西方市场经济国家劳资关系经历了一个较长发展时期,逐步形成一套比较完整的规制劳资冲突的法律制度。主要表现为通过劳动基准、团结权、集体谈判和产业行动立法,规制双方行为,将冲突纳入法制化轨道中。同时,建立完善的劳资争议处理法律制度,作为解决劳资冲突的底线。     

辩诉交易与诉讼效率——基于成本—收益的经济学分析

法律经济分析方法的引进,以一个全新的视角突出了诉讼效率在现代司法中的重要性。在辩诉交易制度的引进过程中,同样存在着成本与收益的问题,同时其成本与收益具有自己的特点。通过对辩诉交易的成本—收益分析,达到定量分析的效果,从而对这一制度在我国的现实应用产生有益的启示。     

To Waive or Not to Waive: The Right to Trial and Plea Bargaining

Criminal defendants in many countries are faced with a dilemma: If they waive their right to trial and plead guilty, they typically receive charge or sentence reductions in exchange for having done so. If they exercise their right to trial and are found guilty, they often receive stiffer sanctions than if they had pled guilty. I characterize the former as ‘waiver rewards’ and the latter as ‘non-waiver penalties.’ After clarifying the two and considering the relation between them, I briefly explicate the grounds for a moral right to trial. I then assess the defensibility of such rewards and penalties. In addition to considering whether waiver rewards and non-waiver penalties serve the aims of legal punishment, I address the three main arguments for permitting them. The first suggests that defendants willing to plead display more remorse for their crimes and thus are deserving of lighter sentences. The second defends waiver rewards and non-waiver penalties in cases where prosecutors are alleged to know that defendants are guilty but face problems establishing their guilt at trial. The third holds that guilty defendants who are willing to plead conserve scarce state resources and should be rewarded for it, whereas those unwilling to plead squander such resources and should be penalized accordingly. I contend that none of these arguments provides persuasive grounds for waiver rewards or non-waiver penalties, even on the assumption that we can distinguish those defendants who should waive their right to trial from those who should not. This conclusion presents a fundamental challenge to contemporary plea bargaining practices.