Negotiation requires communication, but not necessarily verbal exchanges. Adjustments can be achieved incrementally by other means. This article will examine how some parties have managed to strike a deal in situations characterized by total distrust and even hostility, asymmetric power relations, major cultural differences, extreme logistical difficulties in reaching the place in which the trade is to be made, and several additional process risks by employing a type of bargaining known as “dumb barter.” This process presents a distinct paradigm with a specific and unique rationale. Sometimes called “silent trade,” it has been observed in many places (especially West Africa) for more than two millennia. It may well be the oldest form of trade negotiation and is still practiced in some parts of the world. An examination of this unlikely but real and effective process can also provide negotiation theorists with some useful insights into the fundamental nature of negotiation. 相似文献
This article makes recommendations as to “Best Practices” for the training of mediators in court‐connected settings. The authors’ findings cover issues including the design of training programs, the importance of experiential learning through role‐plays, teaching methods for adult learners, class size and length, training ethical mediators, suggested trainer qualifications, and recommended regulatory practices for administrators. Data comes primarily from an assessment of mediation training and regulation in Florida, but the findings hold insights for court‐connected mediation programs throughout the United States. Additionally, the authors highlight the benefits of a collaborative assessment approach involving all stakeholder groups and facilitating smooth implementation of any needed changes. 相似文献
This article provides an in‐depth assessment of lone actor terrorists’ attack planning and preparation. A codebook of 198 variables related to different aspects of pre‐attack behavior is applied to a sample of 55 lone actor terrorists. Data were drawn from open‐source materials and complemented where possible with primary sources. Most lone actors are not highly lethal or surreptitious attackers. They are generally poor at maintaining operational security, leak their motivations and capabilities in numerous ways, and generally do so months and even years before an attack. Moreover, the “loneness” thought to define this type of terrorism is generally absent; most lone actors uphold social ties that are crucial to their adoption and maintenance of the motivation and capability to commit terrorist violence. The results offer concrete input for those working to detect and prevent this form of terrorism and argue for a re‐evaluation of the “lone actor” concept. 相似文献
Narrative is not only entertainment but also a mode of engaging in negotiation with others, and culture is one of the things negotiated thereby. Stories are structured by an internal and external authority in terms of origin, coherence, and effectiveness in the world. Cultural managers will inevitably be involved in situations where narratives diverge, and they will discover that dealing with competing narratives involves a type of diplomatic communication with a range of participants in the arena of culture, from artists to civic authorities to audiences. Historical anecdotes from both classical and modern eras suggest how powerful cultural credit and cultural production can be and how ideas of culture can be deployed in politics. The slow and careful procedures of diplomacy—taken analogously as communication, protection, negotiation, and sovereignty—can prevent even domestic cultural management from provoking hostility or resistance to a perceived attempt to exert control. Ultimately, we are mostly living in a fluid rather than a precisely calibrated world, and cultural managers know that absolute justifications for cultural work are impossible to find. 相似文献
As we head toward the end of the millennium we, as specialists and experts in the field of international criminal justice, must pause to reflect seriously on the issue of global organized crime. Study in this regard requires that more rigorous attention be focused on the future directions of research, the creation of a network of regional and worldwide scholars to perpetuate a collaborative agenda, and data collection for comparison of various activities associated with law enforcement and correctional operations. We must find a more unified systemic approach to crime control. Regardless of whether a nation is large or small, developed or underdeveloped, rich or poor, every society is confronted with the task of controlling organized crime.
Organized crime is indeed a universal phenomenon. It has long been predicted that international organized crime will become a major force in the commercial, financial and military sectors of every country, eventually affecting directly the destiny of all countries. We may soon be confronted with an economic and financial crisis, in that governments everywhere cannot afford to watch events unfold by saying “there is no solution to the problem because it is beyond our ability to control the problem.” We must find a solution.
On June 26, 1995, American President William Clinton, commemorating the 50th anniversary of the United Nations at the ceremony held in San Francisco called for, “Support through the UN of the fight against forces of disintegration from crime syndicates and drug cartels. They cross borders at will. Nations can and must oppose them alone, but we know, and the Cairo Conference reaffirmed, that the most effective opposition requires strong international cooperation and mutual support.”
The original idea for a global high‐level conference on organized crime came from a magistrate who devoted his life to fighting the Mafia, Judge Giovanni Falcone, who died in a bomb attack in May 1992, in Italy. Following Judge Falcon's death, the Minister for Justice in Italy took on the idea of holding this conference in his address to the General Assembly that year. The conference was held in Naples two years later, organized by the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch of the Secretariat of the U.N., under the guidance of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice and in accordance with the Economic and Social Council resolution 1993/29 of July 27, 1993, and the recommendation of the Commission was made at the second session. The 142 states represented at the Conference unanimously adopted the Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan Against Organized Transnational Crime, which was later approved by the General Assembly by resolution 49/159 on December 23, 1994.
For further information regarding the topic of international and transnational organized crime and associated issues, see World Ministerial Conference on Organized Transnational Crime, Naples, Italy, United Nations, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Newsletter, No.26/27, November 1995; speech by President William Clinton on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the U.N., San Francisco, June 26, 1995; A Law Enforcement Source book of Asian Crime and Cultures: Tactic and Mindset, Douglas D. Daye, CRC Press, Boca Raton, 1997; Transnational Criminal Organizations, Cybercrime and Money Laundering: A Handbook for Law Enforcement Officers, Auditors, and Financial Investigators, James R. Richards, CRC Press, Boca Raton, 1999; and Global Report on Crime and Justice, by UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, Graeme Newman, ed., New York, Oxford University Press, 1999. 相似文献
Civil society is generally seen as an important actor in peace processes. But when it comes to reaching an agreement during peace negotiations, much of the current debate is centered on the question of including or excluding civil society. Although most researchers argue that civil society participation makes the process more sustainable and democratic, most practitioners emphasize that enhanced civil society participation makes it more difficult to reach a peace agreement. I argue that practitioners and theorists must both move beyond this dichotomy and, instead, focus on the variety of ways in which civil society actors can be included in a given negotiation process. To this end, I present in this article a comprehensive overview of nine models of inclusion, from most to least direct involvement of civil society, supported by illustrative case studies. Analysis of these models suggests that it will be possible to broaden the participation of civil society in peace negotiations without decreasing the negotiations' effectiveness. 相似文献