平等理念视角下的行政决策分析

平等理念融入行政法是现代行政发展的必然趋势，其内涵着行政主体与行政相对人在人格、地位以及权利等方面的平等。行政决策必须在平等理念的指引下，把利益平等视为决策之核心，同时赋予民众对等的决策权利，通过多元利益主体的平等博弈，推进行政决策的科学化、民主化和法制化，从而最终实现社会利益的合理分配以及人民福祉的增进。     

The new great game in Central Asia post 2014: The US “New Silk Road” strategy and Sino-Russian rivalry

With the planned US and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014 looming ever closer, and Central Asia's own future increasingly in doubt, major powers are all competing to enhance their influence in Central Asia. 2014 may mark a regional tipping point, but none can accurately predict how the regional balance might shift after the NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan. During 2009–2010, the signs of growing Russian dependence on China in terms of economy and energy were palpable, as were the signs of China successfully subordinating Russia to its Central Asian economic agenda. In 2011–2012, it was difficult to see Russia simply acquiescing in its subordination to China without reacting to that situation negatively. Since 2011, to avoid this dependence on China, Russia has vigorously pushed for its regional integration schemes. 2011 marked the launch of the US “New Silk Road” initiative. Great power regional integration schemes, however, undermine both regional and national development.     

“和而不同”:全面深化改革需要的共识智慧

在全面深化改革的今天,凝聚改革共识必须贯彻一种"和而不同"的思维方式,在承认差异、个性的前提下寻求共同利益。凝聚改革共识,必然会使人民的合理利益诉求在改革进程中得到充分彰显,必然能为改革提供强大的思想动力。     

美国的新重商主义贸易政策与中美贸易摩擦发展趋势分析

新重商主义是重商主义贸易思想基于不同的利益与价值诉求在新时期的一种新形式的选择。在美国新重商主义贸易政策的影响下,频发的中美贸易摩擦有向长期化、高端化发展的态势。美国的新重商主义贸易政策主要体现在两方面:从鼓励出口的政策看,推动美元贬值提升制造业出口竞争力,并以绿色技术、设备、新能源为突破口,形成新的出口增长点与出口导向型战略;从限制进口的政策看,"两反两保"等贸易救济措施、"炭关税"等绿色贸易壁垒频出。     

Evolution and the Production of Rules—Some Preliminary Remarks

The notion of an evolutionary process was not imported from biology into social theory. The idea of spontaneous processes producing an unintended outcome was commonplace in the social sciences long before Darwin (Scottish Enlightenment).At whatever level an evolutionary perspective may be applied, it always presumes the operation of three mechanisms: (a) a mutation mechanism, i.e., a process by which constantly variation and novelty are introduced—in Popper's terms: new tentative solutions—(b) a selection mechanism, i.e a process of systematic selection among the variants—in Popper's terms: a process of error-elimination—(c) a replication mechanism, i. e., a process by which variants or tentative solutions are preserved, reproduced or propagated.Although both economists and biologists resort to equilibrium explanations—because a full and detailed specification of all causal forces cannot be given—the analogy between natural selection in biology and evolutionary processes in human societies is not that close.The selection mechanism that is operating in cultural evolution works directly on the behaviour pattern itself, i.e., on the rules that govern behaviour, without necessarily wiping out unfit carriers. Moreover, cultural evolution—which is a matter of trial and error learning and imitation—is very fast when compared with genetic evolution.Hayek works out the implications that follow from an evolutionary epistemology for the issue of socio-economic-political organization. His main subject is the social dimension of the knowledge problem or the problem of social learning. This problem has two distinct aspects.Hayek's theory of the spontaneous order of the market—which is best known for its emphasis on the capacity of markets to utilize dispersed knowledge—delivers the insight that if we want to generate in society any particular order of a certain degree of complexity, we should look for general rules of conduct which, if followed by individuals, would tend to induce that order to form spontaneously. Hayek presents an instrumental justification of a particular type of rules. Rules of just conduct exhibit certain structural characteristics—they are negative, purpose-independent, abstract, universal and permanent—but Hayek's account offers only a very general schema which has to be filled in in detail.As they are defined by Hayek, the general rules of conduct which allow for the formation of spontaneous orders, are not necessarily self-enforcing in the technical game-theoretic sense, contrarily to a widely held view.It is Hayek's emphasis on the theme of the interrelation between the system of rules and its systematic outcome at the level of the order of actions that qualifies him as a Law-and-Economics theorist.Hayek's theory of cultural evolution suggests that the abstract rules which contribute to the formation of a spontaneous order are themselves an unintended product of evolutionary processes. His theory of cultural evolution becomes disputable where it seems to argue that because of our incurable ignorance we ought necessarily to rely largely on unquestioned traditional rules instead of attempting to choose rationally or construct the system of rules that we want to follow.The question of how the different kinds of rules differ in their nature (rules of conduct vs organizational rules) must be distinguished from the question of how they originate (whether they spontaneously evolve or are deliberately designed). The two dimensions are conceptually distinct.The extension of the market analogy to the constitutional level, i.e., to the rules and institutions within which market coordination takes place, is not corroborated by the game-theoretic analysis of invisible-hand processes. This analysis does not warrant the conclusion that invisible-hand processes will always operate to generate efficient results.The game-theoretic analysis involves several simplifications however. The arguments that are based on it cannot be considered conclusive.The most developed parts of the theory of cultural evolution are the theory of nomos, as exemplified by the evolution of the common law, and the theory of the role of the judge.In the theory of the common law and the role of the judge the emphasis is on the coordination of individual activities through a process of systematic mutual adjustment of expectations. The function of the judge is to assure a maximal coincidence of—legitimate—expectations, i.e., to create a situation in which the chance to form correct expectations is as great as possible.The theory suggests that the role of the judge in making law is analogous with the role of an entrepreneur launching a new product: the entrepreneur is consciously trying to make a profit, thus unintentionally contributing to the overall allocation of resources. The judges, by upholding those rules which make it more likely that expectations will match and not conflict, are consciously trying to give greater internal coherence to the law. Each is unintentionally playing a part in the formation of a spontaneous order—in one case, the body of the common law, i.e., a system of rules of conduct conducive to the efficient operation of the order of actions which rests on it, in the other, the overall allocation of resources.The analogy is not flawless: while it seems plausible to assume that the entrepreneur, when unintentionally assisting in the overall allocation of resources, is trying to make a profit, i.e., is guided by the profit motive, it is not clear why we should assume that judges are guided by the search for greater coherence. With respect to the role of the entrepreneur, private vices may be supposed to coincide with public benefits, since only those entrepreneurs who de facto achieve positive profits in one way or another and can therefore be assumed to serve the interests of consumers better, will thrive and prosper, whereas entrepreneurs who do not succeed in doing so are eliminated sooner or later. But insofar as judges are public officials, the analogy seems to be particularly weak. Judges hardly constitute a homogeneous group and their interests and motivation may be highly varied.Insofar as judges adjudicate particular cases by means of custom and precedent, stare decisis can be said to account for the transmission or replication mechanism in the evolution of the law.It is explicitly recognized that grown law requires correction by legislation. It seems that legislation can be required both to generate novelty—i.e., as a mutation mechanism—and to eliminate errors in past developments—i.e., as a selection mechanism.Evolutionary analysis as such does not provide us with a satisfactory normative framework for comparative institutional analysis. Hayek's limits of reason argument implies that, at least to some extent, we will have to rely on the explorative potential of open-ended, competitive, evolutionary processes and on the kind of experience that accumulates in trial and error learning processes. But it should not imply that we adopt an attitude of uncritical acquiescence in evolutionary drift.One direction in which such a framework for comparative institutional analysis has been explored recently, is provided by the research programme of Constitutional Political Economy. The basic framework is derived from the contractarian analysis of multi-level individual choice.An alternative direction in which the evolutionary perspective may be provided with a normative benchmark consists of complementing it with a realist ethical theory. Popper has found in evolutionary theory a forceful argument for objectivism and realism. An elaboration of this theme would go beyond the scope of the domain of Law-and-Economics.     

信息不对称条件下的个体互动与制度设计

信息在交易双方的分布是不对称的,从而影响到供需双方在市场中的行为选择。不对称信息思想的形成并受到重视经历了较长的时间。逆向选择和道德风险问题是信息不对称影响个体互动的基本表现。博弈论是研究信息不对称的主要工具和方法,经济学运用它分析影响个体行为的制度和组织,并设计实现个人理性和集体理性一致性的制度。不对称信息理论研究六大领域的内容,将推进和完善我国社会主义市场经济理论,对于解决国企改革等问题具有重大的现实和理论意义。     

中国工会在劳动关系中的合作博弈及运行机制

劳资博弈是市场经济下劳动关系主体双方利益分化的必然表现，通过博弈制衡实现社会的公平正义是对中国工会的时代要求。中国工会追求的是以合作博弈方式达成劳资之间的利益平衡。工会既要合作又要博弈，才能在构建和谐劳动关系中发挥作用。而合作是相对的，博弈是绝对的，这就需要为工会的博弈制衡运行机制开拓制度空间。     

中药知识产权国际化保护问题解决方法论初探

新技术竞争时代,中国的国际化进程离不开传统优势产业知识产权的最佳保护。方法论是提供最终解决方案的前提,所以在强弱保护的利益博弈及国际公约的履行谈判过程中,如何探寻一种被国内外理论和实践印证科学的法学方法论,凸显紧迫和重大。研究发现,实效主义法学及其博弈均衡分析工具试图基于经济学原理立足法理学的视角,从实效结果推测解决方案,它为中药国际化问题的解决应以国家利益最大化为核心提供了一定的逻辑依据。同时,中药国际化问题基本适合实效方法论的重要工具博弈均衡理论应用的条件。由此,我们认识到博弈兴邦理论不失为解决中药国际化问题理性利己的科学选择。     

The Protest Game: Animal Rights Protests and the Life Sciences Industry

In 1997 a small group of animal rights protesters devised a strategy of legal and illegal protests that almost closed down one of Europe's largest animal testing firms, Huntingdon Life Science (HLS). The animal rights protesters successfully disrupted the operations of HLS and severed its links with some of the world's largest financial institutions. This case study examines the "protest game" that was played between the animal rights protesters, HLS, and its business partners. In the first section, I describe the interactions between the parties to the dispute, applying negotiation analytic concepts to better explicate the structure of the game, the alternatives available to the players, and the psychological heuristics and biases that influenced decision making. The conclusion suggests alternative ways in which the protesters and the life sciences industry could resolve the dispute over the ethics and cruelty of animal testing.     

A game-theoretic model of the participants in the rural migrant workers＇ work-related injury insurance system

According to the game theory, the efficiency of a policy depends on the coherence between the Nash equilibrium and policy maker＇s ideal focal point. A game-theoretic model is used to study the relationships among rural migrant workers, enterprises and governments under the policy that rural migrant workers were requested included in urban social insurance system. As each participant seeks to maximize his utility, the problem can best be analyzed as an n-person cooperative game. This paper tries to relocate the roles of governments, and put forward some policy suggestion on promoting rural migrant workers＇ work-related injury insurances system with effective incentive and restrictive mechanisms.