Mismeasuring Militias: Limitations of Advocacy Group Data and of State‐Level Studies of Paramilitary Groups

The errors associated with measuring the number of militia and patriot groups may cast doubt on conclusions drawn from prior studies of the spatial variation of these movements. Most studies of militias have been qualitative investigations of a single group, state, or region. A growing number of studies, however, have used quantitative techniques to assess the hypothesis that the number of militia groups by state covaries with structural and cultural forces. We outline a number of concerns with the validity of the counts, conducted by the Anti‐Defamation League and the Southern Poverty Law Center, used by these studies. We re‐estimate models from previous studies using the four alternative measures of these groups employed in prior studies. We find that many inferences drawn for identical theoretical models differ based upon the measure used. These discrepancies apply not simply to tangential control variables but to indicators of key theoretical constructs. In other words, the decision as to whether or not a particular theoretical framework receives empirical support often depends upon which measure of the dependent variable is used. This suggests that the inconsistent findings in prior research may be due to measurement error and makes it difficult to assess the validity of the conclusions drawn from these studies. It is important to be aware of these weaknesses since scholars studying political crimes and related phenomena often use information from similar sources, making this specific example relevant to a more general area of research.     

A Stone’s Throw from the Metropolis: Re-Examining Small-Agency Homeland Security Practices

Police agencies nationwide have enhanced their homeland security preparedness capacity since the 9/11 attacks. Evidence suggests that departments have not uniformly adopted measures to prepare for and respond to critical incidents. Rather, larger agencies are more likely than their smaller peers to take such steps. Small agencies do not constitute a homogenous group; some experience geographic isolation while others are near major metropolitan areas. Unclear is whether small agencies (25 or fewer full-time sworn personnel), those that are commonly found to be less prepared, benefit from proximity to large-agency peers. This study examined whether physical and relational proximity to large departments contributed to homeland security preparedness in over 300 small departments. A structural equation model revealed that interactions with large agencies facilitated preparedness but physical proximity had no direct effect. Increasing geographic isolation from large-agency peers indirectly affected preparedness by stifling the level of inter-department interactions.     

Lethal Connections: The Determinants of Network Connections in the Provisional Irish Republican Army, 1970–1998

Using stochastic methods we illustrate that the Provisional Irish Republican Army's (PIRA) network is clustered along three primary dimensions: (a) brigade affiliation, (b) whether the member participated in violent activities, and (c) task/role within PIRA. While most brigades tended to foster connections within the brigade (that is, “closure”), the tendency to do so varied across the organization. Members who engaged with violent activities were far more likely to connect with each other; in later periods there is polarization into those who engage in violent activities and those who do not. Across brigades, those who engage in a particular task and role (improvised explosive device [IED] constructor, IED planter, gunman, robber/kidnapper/drug smuggler/hijacker) are more likely to connect with others who do the same task or play the same role than with other members who fulfill other roles. Standard forms of homophily (that is, the tendency to make connections with people who are similar in terms of demography or status) play a very weak role in explaining which members interact with one another. Finally, our analysis illustrates clear patterns of relational change that correspond to changes in the formal structures that PIRA's leadership promoted.     

International Cooperation,Spoiling, and Transnational Terrorism

Do interstate relations influence the sources and targets of transnational terrorism? A considerable body of recent research suggests that the answer to this question is yes, and that one state may sponsor terrorist attacks to weaken the bargaining positions of other states. We suggest, in contrast, that positive or cooperative actions invite terrorist attacks from a different source: nonstate groups wishing to spoil interstate cooperation that they oppose. We assess this argument with a dyadic dataset using monthly data on transnational terrorist attacks and cooperative and noncooperative actions between states. Our results suggest that spoiling in response to interstate cooperation is an important determinant of transnational terrorism.     

Terrorism Research: The Record

Looking back at the beginnings of academic research on terrorism just over 40 years ago, it is extraordinary to see that what was once a marginal subject for social science has developed into a full-fledged program of “terrorism studies.” In fact, recently a sociologist considered the subject of sufficient importance to write a doctoral dissertation and then a book on the “social construction” of the field (Stampnitzky 2013). This essay highlights some examples of the contributions scholars from different disciplines have made to understanding terrorism. There is no consensus on any general theoretical laws of terrorism (there is no equivalent of a democratic peace theory, for example), but researchers have defined key concepts and deepened explanations of cause, effect, and process.What follows identifies four interrelated areas of explanatory inquiry into terrorism that have emerged over years of research: the effectiveness of terrorism as a strategy of opposition, the determinants and consequences of counterterrorism policies, how campaigns or waves of terrorism end, and how analysis of terrorism can be situated in a broader theoretical framework rather than treated as a phenomenon sui generis. Particular emphasis is placed on studies that are comparative and/or that situate the specific case of terrorism in a general theoretical perspective.     

The Escalation of Terrorism: Microlevel Violence and Interstate Conflict

Following the 9/11 attacks, transnational terrorism is seen as a potential catalyst for interstate war. Yet, the willingness of states to fight in response to terrorist violence is puzzling, given that the damage created by terrorism is relatively marginal. This raises the question: if terrorists are so weak and create such little damage, and interstate conflicts are so costly, why are states willing to initiate seemingly ruinous wars to fight terrorist groups? This essay proposes an explanation to address this question using current theoretical and empirical research on terrorism and interstate violence. Recent work indicates that while terrorists appear weak compared to states, terrorists can wield significant coercive power in smaller geographic areas. I argue that if these areas are strategically crucial to the government, such as areas with oil wells or mineral deposits, terrorist activity may precipitously weaken states relative to their rivals. I therefore argue that even if groups are only capable of killing at low levels, terrorism may lead to macrolevel power shifts, which may contribute to interstate violence.     

Fighting terrorism in Africa by proxy: the USA and the European Union in Somalia and Mali

The French intervention in Mali in early 2013 emphasizes that the decision-makers in Paris, Brussels, and Washington considered the establishment of the radical Islamist regime in Northern Mali a threat to their security interests. The widespread instability including the rise of radical Islamist groups in Somalia was perceived as a threat to western interests. It is the core argument of the paper if western powers decide to provide security in Africa, they will be inclined to use proxy instead of deploying own troops. Security provision by proxy in African means that African troops are doing the actual fighting and peacekeeping on the ground while western powers basically pay the costs, the logistics, and the training of local African troops. The paper concludes that the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in Somalia and The African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) in Mali are proxies for the USA and the European Union.     

Editors’ introduction: critical terrorism studies: practice,limits and experience

The articles in this special issue are drawn from papers presented at a conference titled Critical Terrorism Studies: Practice, Limits and Experience. The conference was organised by the Critical Studies on Terrorism Working Group of the British International Studies Association (BISA). The event was supported by both a BISA workshop grant and by Loughborough University’s Centre for the Study of International Governance (CSIG) and was held at Loughborough University from 9–10 September 2013. The conference aimed to explore what we know about terrorism and counterterrorism and importantly to ask how we know it. Reflecting the recent “materialist”, “everyday”, “experiential” and “narrative” turns in the fields of International Relations (IR), Geography and Cultural Theory, the event brought together scholars and practitioners to reflect on practices of research and knowledge production in Critical Terrorism Studies and related fields. The articles in this special issue reflect those aims.     

Bombing Alone: Tracing the Motivations and Antecedent Behaviors of Lone‐Actor Terrorists,,

This article analyzes the sociodemographic network characteristics and antecedent behaviors of 119 lone‐actor terrorists. This marks a departure from existing analyses by largely focusing upon behavioral aspects of each offender. This article also examines whether lone‐actor terrorists differ based on their ideologies or network connectivity. The analysis leads to seven conclusions. There was no uniform profile identified. In the time leading up to most lone‐actor terrorist events, other people generally knew about the offender's grievance, extremist ideology, views, and/or intent to engage in violence. A wide range of activities and experiences preceded lone actors' plots or events. Many but not all lone‐actor terrorists were socially isolated. Lone‐actor terrorists regularly engaged in a detectable and observable range of activities with a wider pressure group, social movement, or terrorist organization. Lone‐actor terrorist events were rarely sudden and impulsive. There were distinguishable behavioral differences between subgroups. The implications for policy conclude this article.     

恐怖主义的嬗变及法律规制

以平民为目标,严重危害社会安全、破坏国际秩序的恐怖主义,是基于政治动机而使用暴力手段的现象,始于18世纪,20世纪以后演变为有组织的犯罪.当前,恐怖主义已从国内发展到国际,是国际社会安全的主要威胁之一.它是经济、政治、民族和宗教等各种矛盾的综合产物,有着深刻的历史背景,因而单纯地用军事手段不能彻底地解决问题.在当今世界,有效地防范和惩治恐怖主义,需要世界各国间的国际合作,尤其是推行打击恐怖主义的国际法律合作.进一步完善打击恐怖主义的国内法律机制,充分发挥已有的国际公约、国际组织和国际合作方式在打击恐怖主义方面的作用,缔结全面统一的打击恐怖主义的全球性国际公约.