Bolt from the Blue or Avoidable Failure? Revisiting September 11 and the Origins of Strategic Surprise

Drawing on the strategic surprise, warning-response, and foreign policy literature, this article argues that the September 11 terror attacks should be regarded as a strategic surprise and examines a number of key factors that contributed to vulnerability and inhibited vigilance. Three broad explanatory "cuts" derived from the literature—psychological, bureau-organizational, and agenda-political—are deployed to sift through the rapidly expanding empirical record in an effort to shed light on the processes and contextual factors that left the United States vulnerable to the attacks. The article aims to improve our understanding of generic processes and practices that enhance or detract from vulnerability and vigilance.     

Implementing the artist's resale right directive

Legal context: Directive 2001/84/EC, on the resale right for the benefit ofthe author of an original work of art, introduced the harmonisationof artist's resale right within the EU (and subsequently withinthe EEA). Resale right already existed in many EU States, butthe Directive also required its creation in others (such asthe UK) to which it was previously unknown. The implementationof the Directive in the UK was accordingly a matter of somecontroversy. Key points: This article concentrates on the legal difficulties involvedin that implementation, viewed against the background of theUK Government's stated general policy on the transposition ofEU Directives. From several points of view, the rules laid downin the Directive called for elaboration or clarification, andin a number of cases such an approach was appropriate. In othercases, however, this turned out not to be appropriate. Practical significance: As a result, although in the main it was possible to transposethe Directive into a clear and workable set of domestic rules,a number of issues had to remain unresolved. Among the mostimportant were: whether works of ‘applied art’ shouldattract resale right, and the territorial scope of the transactionscovered by the right.     

Russian Terror/ism and Revisionist Historiography

Interest in the violence of the Soviet regime has been a concern primarily of more conservative historians, while those on the Left have either been discomforted by the excessive brutality of the Russian Civil War and Stalinism or have looked for rationalizations for the necessity of violence. One tendency in the historiography has been to see violence as deeply embedded in the Bolshevik project, part of the Marxist or Leninist effort to transform the world or perfect the human being. Revolutionary and Stalinist violence are seen as similar or intimately linked, and differences between them have been largely effaced. This essay argues that the violence and terror of the Civil War years is best understood as part of wartime exigencies as well as choices made by the Bolsheviks and their enemies, while Stalinist violence was much more the product of the will of Stalin and his closest collaborators in their consolidation of autocratic power, and was far more gratuitous and irrational than the violence of the fledgling Soviet regime.     

Metropolitan Planning Organizations and the New Regionalism: The Case of Louisville

This article outlines the new regionalism movement and its metropolitanagenda, reviews federal efforts to promote new regionalism underISTEA and TEA–21, considers how the new federal policieschanged the role of metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs)in transportation planning by examining the MPO for the Louisvillemetropolis, and assesses the MPO process in Louisville. Thelocal decision of whether to build a new bridge across the OhioRiver was a major test of the enhanced MPO process. Federaltransportation policies enhanced regional coordination and cooperationin transportation planning in the Louisville metropolis resultingin a consensus plan to build two bridges across the Ohio River.However, the MPO process did not lead to the development ofa metropolitan-wide interest or perspective. Moreover, the newregionalist agenda was not advanced because sprawl was not afactor in the decision on whether and where to build the bridges.     

Entry barriers and evolution of banking systems: Lessons from the 1980s Canadian western bank failures

Abstract: As federal policy‐makers revise and update the Bank Act, any change should be seen in the context of public policy towards financial institutions in Canada. Rather than being condemned to repeat history, both policy‐makers and potential bank entrepreneurs would be well advised to re‐examine the Report of the Inquiry into the Collapse of the ccb and Northland Bank (August 1986), chaired by the Honourable Willard Z. Estey. Public policy for financial institutions faces the challenge of reconciling competing interests. Since 1867, Canada has experienced a nationally controlled banking system that is highly stable (i.e., few bankruptcies) and that has enabled in‐flows of capital needed for national economic development. The Canadian Commercial Bank failure raised a fundamental challenge to the government's policy agenda. When asked what the government's position should be, the three officials recommended the rescue package. All three participants from the political side advised against it. Future policy must learn the lessons from this important and atypical moment in Canadian financial history. Sommaire: Alors que les decisionnaires federaux revoient et mettent à jour la Loi sur les banques, toute modification devrait être envisagée dans le contexte de la politique gouvernementale visant les institutions financières au Canada. Plutôt que d'être condamnés à répéter les mêmes erreurs, les décisionnaires et les banquiers potentiels feraient bien mieux de réexaminer le Rapport de la commission d'enquête sur la faillite de la Banque commerciale du Canada et la Norbanque (août 1986), présidée par l'honorable Willard Z. Estey. La politique gouvernementale concernant les institutions financières a la tâche difficile de réconcilier des intérêts opposés. Depuis 1867, le Canada connaît un système bancaire contrôléà l'échelle nationale qui est très stable, ayant enregistré peu de faillites, et qui a permis des rentrées de fonds nécessaires au développement économique national. La faillite de la BCC a lancé un défi fonda mental au programme de politique gouvernementale. Lorsqu'on leur a demandé quelle devrait être la position du gouvernement, les trois responsables ont recommandé le programme de renflouement. Les trois participants du secteur politique ont conseillé le contraire. Les futurs décisionnaires doivent tirer des leçons de cet évènement important et exceptionnel dans l'histoire financière canadienne.