Civil War and the Social Contract

In this contract-theoretic modelthe government promises a transfer to itspotential opponent in return for notengaging in a civil war. Two causes ofcivil war are identified: (i) imperfectcredibility increases the cost of therequired transfer, and may make itunfeasible; (ii) asymmetric informationfaces the government with the classicefficiency/rent-extraction trade off, andcivil war is used as a screening device.This problem can be solved by creating amixed army. The model determines whether amilitary regime or a redistributive stateprevails in a peaceful equilibrium. Astatistical illustration is presented,using African data.     

Strikes and Political Activism of Trade Unions: Theory and Application to Bangladesh

The behavior of Bangladeshi trade unions is characterized bypolitical activism and momentous strikes, called hartalsthere, have played a crucial part in most political changes inthis country. We offer a theoretical framework for discussingthis fact, and we test empirically its main prediction bybringing out the political cycle that characterizes theoccurrence of strikes in Bangladesh.     

The roles of foreign aid and education in the war on terror

This paper presents a theoretical framework and some empirical results showing that the level of foreign aid received reduces the supply of terrorist attacks by recipient countries, as does the recipient country’s level of education. Due account is taken of endogeneity problems in producing these results. They suggest that Western democracies, which are the main targets of terrorist attacks, should invest more funds in foreign aid with a special emphasis on supporting education.     

How to pay for the peace? A theoretical framework with references to African countries

This paper analyses a simple game-theoretic model to highlight the choice of the government between raising its defence expenditures or giving away some “gifts” to his opponents, as a means to defend his position in power. If the government is a Cournot-Nash player, then there is no gift in equilibrium, and any increase in the budget will lead to more inefficient defence expenditures. However, if the government is a Stackelberg-leader, then he will use the “gift” as a tool in his policy for staying in power.     

Intergenerational Occupational Mobility among Men in India

We examine the intergenerational occupational mobility among men born during 1945–1985 in India. We distinguish between prevalence and association, and use the Altham Statistic as a measure of distance between son-father occupation associations across birth cohorts/social groups. We also attempt to isolate the specific odds ratios that account for the largest part of the distance. We find that the mobility in the 1975–1984 birth cohort is higher than the mobility in the 1945–1954 birth cohort. Scheduled Castes/Tribes born during 1965–1984 experienced a higher mobility compared with the entire 1965–1984 birth cohort or higher castes born during 1965–1984.     

Why suicide-terrorists get educated, and what to do about it

This paper tries to reconcile the observed fact that suicide-terrorists have a relatively high education level with rationality. It brings out the conditions under which potential students choose to acquire some education in a rational-choice model where this yields a non-zero probability of blowing up the resulting human capital in a terrorist attack. The comparative-statics of the rational expectations equilibrium of this model demonstrate how economic development, on the one hand, and repression, on the other hand, might reduce terrorism under some parameter restrictions.     

Crop sales,shortages and peasant portfolio behaviour: An analysis of Angola

The article focuses on the influence of economic factors on sales of agricultural products in Angola. Between the early 1970s and the mid‐1980s the volume of sales declined by around 90 per cent, while during the late 1980s there was a significant recovery. This was partly due to non‐economic factors such as war and drought. However, the rural economy also experienced extraordinary regulatory changes which led to a severe shortage of consumer goods. The theory of peasant supply response in a rationed economy therefore provides a starting point for the analysis and is further extended to incorporate features particular to Angola.     

Democracy and development: A theoretical framework

A simple framework is set up to discuss the relationship between democracy, material welfare, and development. Democracy is regarded both as a good in its own right, and as an input in the production of material welfare. The optimum level of democracy is then related to the level of development. At the optimum point, the marginal cost of democracy in terms of foregone output is positive, and growth is a decreasing function of the level of democracy. Deviations from the optimum path are described as either repressive or populist. Democratization is not unambiguously an optimal response to exogenous shocks.     

Thermal requirements of immature stages of Chrysomya albiceps (Diptera: Calliphoridae) as a common forensically important fly

Entomological material may be used to estimate the time since death occurred (postmortem interval, PMI) in forensically obscure cases. The method that is commonly used to calculate minimum post-mortem interval (mPMI, i.e., the least amount of time since one can be confident death occurred) is based on the relationship between insect development and ambient temerature. Isomegalen and isomorphen diagrams are among methods allowing to calculate the age of necorphagous insects, yet thermal summation models provide the most precise and acurate estimations. The digrams are prepared based on the length or the developmental stages of the larvae as a function of time and mean ambient temperature. A knowledge of thermal requirements, in particular lower temperature threshold (D_z) at which development of a species terminates, is of essential importance to calculate ADD (Accumulated Degree Days). In this study different temperature regimes were used to construct the isomorphen diagram, examinate changes in larval body length at different ambient temperatures and to estimate the thermal requirements for developemnt of Chrysomya albiceps, the most common dipteran species reported on human and animal cadavers in Iran. Six development events including hatching, 1st ecdysis, 2nd ecdysis, wandering, pupariation and eclosion were studied under eleven constant temperature regims (17–37 ⁰C). The development rate of Ch. albiceps increased as temperature increased. The larval length peaked at the end of third stage and then decreased at wandering stage. The maximum larval length occurred at 72 h post oviposition at either 31, 33, or 35 °C. At 17 °C, larvae did not hatch from eggs and at 37 °C wandering larvae did not proceed to pupariation, and thus larval development were analysed at the nine left over temperatures. The development stages required at least (D_z ± SE) 13.04 ± 0.37, 14.29 ± 0.45, 15.69 ± 0.56, 15.18 ± 0.56, 14.94 ± 0.48, and 11.23 ± 0.41 °C to reach one of the successive developmentl events, respectively. The estimated thermal summation constant (k) for those the six events were 10.43 ± 0.27, 19.31 ± 0.32, 27.87 ± 1.3, 55.94 ± 1.82, 66.69 ± 3.5, and 143.52 ± 5.61 ADD accordingly.     

Provoking insurgency in a federal state: theory and application to India

This paper presents a model of provocation in a federation, wherein the state government triggers an insurgency with a view toward acquiring control of some economic assets with the help of the central government. Some econometric support for this model is found using data on the Naxalite conflict in eight states of India. The tests performed control for endogeneity of the state government’s police force interventions. They suggest that the latter are meant to trigger the violent activity of the insurgents, so as to lure the central government into intervening and helping clear the ground for mining purposes in the lands of tribal people.