A mixed DNA profile controversy revisited

Semaan et al. (J Forensic Res, 2020, 11, 453) discuss a mock case “where eight different individuals [P₁ through P₈] could not be excluded in a mixed DNA analysis. Even though … expert DNA mixture analysis software was used.” Two of these are the true donors. The LRs reported are incorrect due to the incorrect entry of propositions into LRmix Studio. This forced the software to account for most of the alleles as drop-in, resulting in LRs 60–70 orders of magnitude larger than expected. P₁, P₂, P₄, P₅, and P₈ can be manually excluded using peak heights. This has relevance when using LRmix which does not use peak heights. We extend the work using the same two reference genotypes who were the true contributors as Semaan et al. (J Forensic Res, 2020, 11, 453). We simulate three two-donor mixtures with peak heights using these two genotypes and analyze using STRmix?. For the simulated 1:1 mixture, one of the non-donors’ LRs supported him being a contributor when no conditioning was used. When considered in combination with any other potential donors (i.e., with conditioning), this non-donor was correctly eliminated. For the 3:1 mixture, all results correctly supported that the non-donors were not contributors. The low-template 4:1 mixture LRs with no conditioning showed support for all eight profiles as donors. However, the results from pair-wise conditioning showed that only the two ground truth donors had LRs supporting that they were contributors to the mixture. We recommend the use of peak heights and conditioning profiles, as this allows better sensitivity and specificity even when the persons share many alleles.     

On the Undecidability of Legal and Technological Regulation

Law and Critique - Generally, regulation is thought of as a constant that carries with it both a formative and conservative power, a power that standardises, demarcates and forms an order, through...     

It Comes with the Territory: Why States Negotiate with Ethno-Political Organizations

Given that minority ethno-political organizations are generally weaker than states yet seek to change their policies or remove the ruling regime from power, why would negotiation occur? States prefer to ignore or repress such organizations, which typically have little to offer in return amidst negotiations that can legitimize them while delegitimizing the state. When a challenging organization establishes governing structures and controls movement in part of a state's territory, however, it can easily inflict significant economic and political costs on the state while also possessing a valuable asset to exchange for concessions. An organization with territorial control cannot be ignored, while the state will have a strong incentive to negotiate before the state loses more face, the group gains more legitimacy, neighboring states are more likely to invade, and the international community is more likely to formally recognize any facts on the ground as a new status quo. Our analysis of 118 organizations in the Middle East and North Africa from 1980–2004 reveals that territorial control is the most important determinant of intrastate negotiation. In regards to existing scholarship, this suggests that a certain type of successful violence works—not all violence and not only nonviolence—while certain types of strong organizations—those that control territory—are more likely to reach negotiations with the state than weak ones.     

War-Power Reform in Australia: (Re)considering the Options

The decision to go to war in Australia remains the prerogative of the Executive. The lack of parliamentary authorisation of perhaps the most significant decision a democracy can make has seen sustained, but unsuccessful, efforts to reform legislation. In the wake of the costly invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, repeated calls for legislative reform of Australia's war powers have failed to find traction amongst Coalition and Australian Labor Party (ALP) leadership. Lamenting the lack of transparency and accountability in the current system, those favouring legislative reform would see authorisation of combat missions placed in the hands of Parliament. However, given the lack of support from either of the major parties, any legislative reform remains unlikely. Given this impasse, this article argues that a compromise option, in the form of a new war-powers convention, may be a small step towards democratising the decision of going to war. While not legally binding, this constitutional convention would represent an agreement by the major parties that overseas combat operations will be properly debated in Parliament.     

The End of Wilderness: Conflict and Defeat of Wilderness in the Grand Canyon

In the early 1970s, Grand Canyon National Park intended to designate its land to “Wilderness,” including the controversial Colorado River corridor. However, by the end of the 1970s the potential for Wilderness designation was off the table, and would never seriously return for genuine consideration. Using Schattschneider's model of conflict, we explain how the organization of this conflict privileges the “causal story” of Wilderness opponents, and therefore why the canyon is not designated. It is our contention that members of Congress will not stand forward to support Wilderness designations without simultaneously providing benefits for extractive land use because (1) congressional representatives are more penalized for supporting than opposing Wilderness designations, (2) Wilderness advocacy groups do not pressure congressional delegates as firmly as opposition groups, and (3) key local congressional members are not likely to see Wilderness as a salient issue worth the risk of negative exposure. If these findings hold, the implication is that we may have reached the end of significant Wilderness designations in highly visible areas, unless critical aspects in land use conflict change.     

Four Lessons for Developing Countries from the Trade Negotiations Over Access to Medicines

After the Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) came into operation in 1995 developing countries have found themselves in a process of continual negotiation over intellectual property rights and access to medicines. These negotiations have taken place in the World Trade Organization and in the context of free trade agreements. The paper suggests that the only real win for developing countries has been the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health in 2001. What have been the lessons for developing countries in a decade of negotiations over access to medicines? Drawing on themes of rule complexity and regulatory ritualism the paper discusses four key lessons for developing countries. It concludes by arguing that developing countries will do better if they adopt a networked governance approach to negotiation rather than continuing to rely on traditional coalition formation.     

CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES

From a conflict resolution perspective, it is clear why the child support guidelines are not going to reduce the adequacy and compliance gaps in child support payment conflicts between parents. As it stands, the conflict over equally sharing child support is destructive rather than positive. The guidelines do not reframe the conflict for the parents, enabling them to believe the interests of children are more important than their own interests to win the child support battle. To transform conflict from destructive to positive, the elements of conflict–expression of the conflict, scarce resources and rewards, and interdependency–must be transformed. It is argued that the guidelines do not transform the conflict but facilitate it. Courts and attorneys are also significant players in the child support conflict.