Party brand hate in political market: antecedents and consequences

ABSTRACT

Brand hate is defined as a severe dislike for a product or service by the consumer. Although brand hate has been recognized as a critical element, in the political market, there is a lack of understanding of the impact of brand hate on voters. This study is an attempt to examine the antecedents and consequences of brand hate in the political market. The study reveals that unmet expectations, symbolic incongruity, and ideological incompatibility of electorates have a significant positive impact on brand hate intensity. The result shows that political product involvement significantly mediates the relationship between unmet expectations, symbolic incongruity, and ideological incompatibility and brand hate intensity. The study further reveals that as an outcome of political brand hate, electorates put emphasis on either brand avoidance and/or brand extremism. The outcome of this study may help political parties gain knowledge about the impact of political brand hate.     

Government fragmentation versus fiscal decentralization and corruption

This research examines the influence of government decentralization on corruption in the United States. Previous research has focused primarily on fiscal decentralization. We address whether the structure of local governments??measured in terms of the scope of services offered and the population served??has a bearing on corruption. Results show that government decentralization does not necessarily reduce corruption??the type of decentralization matters. Specifically, more general-purpose governments contribute to corruption. In contrast, the effect of special-purpose governments is mixed. The findings uniquely reveal the tension between fiscal decentralization and fragmented local governments in terms of impacts on corruption.     

Global corruption and the shadow economy: spatial aspects

Using a large sample of nations, this paper examines the relation between corruption and the shadow economy, focusing especially on geographic spillovers. The results point to complementarity between corruption and the shadow economy. We find evidence of own contagion across nations in both corruption and shadow economy activity, while cross-contagion mostly points to substitution between own shadow economy (corruption) and neighboring corruption (shadow economy). These findings are fairly robust across different estimation techniques and measures of the shadow economy.     

Nascent entrepreneurship and inventive activity: a somewhat new perspective

This paper focuses on the nexus between nascent entrepreneurship (NE) and inventive activity. It questions how NE affects inventive activity (including innovation and patenting) while analyzing the views and predictions that have used patenting as an indicator of entrepreneurial behavior. Using data on German researchers and controlling for their personal, professional and institutional attributes, the findings show that NE increases both patenting and innovation. Implications for technology policy are discussed.     

Drivers of innovation productivity of academic researchers through career advancement

The Journal of Technology Transfer - This paper studies the innovation productivity of academic researchers across their career advancement. Taking patents and invention disclosures as indicators...     

Female owners versus female managers: Who is better at introducing innovations?

The Journal of Technology Transfer - This paper uses firm-level survey for more than 100 countries to examine whether firms’ female managers or female owners were better at bringing...     

Corruption and government size: A disaggregated analysis

Using annual state-level data over 1983–1987, this paper examines the effect of government size on corruption by public officials by including both demand and supply side incentives for engaging in corrupt practices. Our objectives are twofold. First, we assess the relationship between the incidence of corruption and overall measures of the size of the federal government and the state-local sector in each state. Second, we explore what kinds of government activities are more likely to be successful in deterring abuse of public office. Our results are generally supportive of Becker's “crime and punishment” model. Regarding the primary focus of the paper, our results show that government size, in particular spending by state governments, does indeed have a strong positive influence on corruption.