It Comes with the Territory: Why States Negotiate with Ethno-Political Organizations

Given that minority ethno-political organizations are generally weaker than states yet seek to change their policies or remove the ruling regime from power, why would negotiation occur? States prefer to ignore or repress such organizations, which typically have little to offer in return amidst negotiations that can legitimize them while delegitimizing the state. When a challenging organization establishes governing structures and controls movement in part of a state's territory, however, it can easily inflict significant economic and political costs on the state while also possessing a valuable asset to exchange for concessions. An organization with territorial control cannot be ignored, while the state will have a strong incentive to negotiate before the state loses more face, the group gains more legitimacy, neighboring states are more likely to invade, and the international community is more likely to formally recognize any facts on the ground as a new status quo. Our analysis of 118 organizations in the Middle East and North Africa from 1980–2004 reveals that territorial control is the most important determinant of intrastate negotiation. In regards to existing scholarship, this suggests that a certain type of successful violence works—not all violence and not only nonviolence—while certain types of strong organizations—those that control territory—are more likely to reach negotiations with the state than weak ones.     

Mobilising the Periphery: Brazil's My House My Life Programme and the Homeless Workers' Movement

Brazil's Movimento de Trabalhadores Sem Teto (MTST, Homeless Workers' Movement) has grown dramatically in recent years. This growth was partly provided for by the use of a large government housing programme, Minha Casa Minha Vida (MCMV, My House My Life), which allowed the MTST to construct housing for its members and swell its ranks with thousands of new members. Yet some have argued that the MCMV programme used by the MTST may compromise the autonomy of civil society organisations. This article, by contrast, argues that while the MCMV programme encouraged bureaucratic practices, it also helped to promote the cultural politics of the MTST.     

On the politics of traditional rulership

Conclusion We have in this paper tried to set out a framework which can facilitate analysis of the current and future situation of traditional rulership in contemporary African society. Our presentation of a proposed model for such an analysis is no doubt still in its elementary stages of formation. Much more work needs to be done. Nevertheless, our analysis has revealed certain salient elements and uncovered certain unresolved issues. If traditional rulers genuinely care about their own future they will have to devise techniques of legitimation which not only endear them to the government and the non-traditional elites, but also, and more importantly, to the mass of the people. True, the original role of the traditional rulers may be no more; still, it may be possible to salvage what is left.     

确保俄罗斯经济竞争力的战略思考

在合理配置国家资源条件下,使用指示性计划的国际经验表明,指示性计划必须结各国具体的经济、社会和政治情况。俄罗斯在融入全球化的过程中,需要建立起符合自身条件的市场机制,处理好全球化进程中俄罗斯国民税收体系改革和人力资本问题,从而使俄罗斯摆脱沦为西方发达国家原材料提供者的危险境地。要建成国家投资和创新的发展模式,走上可持续增长的轨道,并将居民的生活质量提高到一个新的水平,从战略的角度考虑,俄罗斯需要提高国家在社会经济发展中的作用,建立起社会取向型国家的劳动和社会福利关系。