David and Goliath in the poll booth: group size,political power and voter turnout

ABSTRACT

This article analyses how the presence of a dominant group of voters within the electorate affects voter turnout. Theoretically, we argue that its absolute size affects turnout via increased free-riding incentives and reduced social pressure to vote within a larger dominant group. Its relative size compared to other groups within the electorate influences turnout through instrumental and expressive responses – in both the dominant and dominated groups – to the degree of electoral competition between groups. Empirical evidence from a large cross section of German municipalities is in line with these theoretical predictions. The observed effects should be taken into account when redesigning electoral jurisdictions through, for instance, municipal mergers or gerrymandering.     

Additional Notes on the Sadvitīyaprayoga

The present paper defends a position advanced in Oetke (J Indian Philos 41:43–55, 2013 (= BS)) to the effect that a piece of reasoning allegedly advocated by proponents of Indian Materialism (Lokāyata, Cārvāka) does not deserve to be dismissed as a sophism but embodies a significant philosophical criticism. In addition the article argues for the contention that for this type of theoretical assessment consideration of history of reception possesses at best a limited relevance and is even apt to impede the attainment of an adequate evaluation of the matter.     

Accommodating Islam and the Utility of National Models: The German Case

This article questions the claim that the way German governments have responded to Muslim demands for accommodating Islam fits a German national model. The empirical focus is on Islamic religious instruction in five German Länder. The evidence presented shows that there is not one but several German models. Länder with Christian Democratic dominance were more supportive of confessional religious instruction than Länder where the left was stronger. At the same time Christian Democrats initially were more reluctant to extend the privilege of religious instruction to Muslim groups. In Länder where Article 7 III of the German constitution applied, corporatist hurdles were an obstacle for Muslim groups, but this was less the case in Berlin. Religion–state institutions are important for understanding how European countries have dealt with the growing presence of Islam, but it is equally important to understand the politically contested nature of these institutions.     

德国犯罪原理的发展与现代趋势

一、导言 德国刑法是一种有体系的刑法,主要通过以判例为根据,也就是根据过去已经作出判决的真正案件来与其他法律制度加以区别.在刑法的基础中,人们不可以过高地评价这个区别,但也不可以过低地评价这个区别.一方面,德国刑法的发展,在很大程度上,不仅是通过立法和学术,而且是通过司法判决来向前推动的;<联邦最高法院刑事判例集>,一套多达50卷的汇编,是每个刑法学工作者,同时也是学生们经常使用的.但是,另一方面,我们的最高法官们不是在自由地创造法律,他们也需要以法律为根据,也需要以在一种所谓的刑法体系中加以总结的一般犯罪原理的基本原则为根据.     

A comparative insight into the status of the lobbying regulation debate in Estonia

This paper focuses on different approaches towards regulating lobbying. Special attention is paid to policy formulation regarding lobbying regulation in Estonia. The Estonian case study is juxtaposed with the regulatory solutions of lobbying in Scandinavian and post-communist countries. The reason for choosing such a comparative framework is justified by the fact that these two sets of countries have chosen rather dissimilar approaches in interpreting the role of lobbying in society. As Estonia's policy decisions are often determined by both of these two spaces of political culture, the article polemicizes over the question of which path Estonia could take in terms of regulatory framework for lobbying. The analysis concludes with policy recommendations to Estonia as well as with suggestions for further theoretical research directions for understanding better the policy impact of lobbying regulations designed and implemented by post-communist states. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Competitive party democracy and the Keynesian welfare state: Factors of stability and disorganization

This article addresses the question of what makes democratic political organization and capitalist economic organization mutually compatible on the macro-sociological level, and what has, more specifically, led to the absence of manifest tension between those two organizing principles in the post-World War II era in Western Europe. A hypothetical answer is provided, namely that the organization of mass participation through a competitive party system makes democracy safe for capitalism and that Keynesianism and the welfare state makes capitalism safe for democracy. The question of the extent to which one can expect the continuity of those arrangements under the conditions of political and economic crisis is then explored on a theoretical level. As a skeptical answer to this question, a number of factors are systematically discussed which seem to subvert both party competition as the dominant mode of mass participation and welfare-Keynesianism as the prevalent mode of economic policy.