Persistence and desistance: Examining the impact of re-integrative shaming to ethics in Taiwan juvenile hackers

The Internet community has been addressing the unethical behavior of juvenile delinquents for years. Nevertheless, the concepts of hacker shame and ethics have received little empirical study from a theoretical perspective in the field of cyber criminology. Braithwaite's re-integrative Shaming Theory posits that it can restrain individuals from committing future offenses, and that those who participate in this shaming process are less likely to consider breaking the law in the first place. Among the abundance of criminological theories, the re-integrative Shaming Theory may be the most suitable theory to restrain hacker activities. This study focuses on the working relationship between nine juvenile delinquents and the shaming mechanism applied to them. However, applying this approach to reduce recidivism among computer hackers requires a great deal of time and effort. It is proposed that the state of shame or remorse is associated with the compounded affective processes of hacker ethics. The proposed solution creates a code of ethics for hackers, distinguishes right from wrong, and ensures a greater success for Braithwaite's re-integrative shaming methods. This paper discusses the problems and solutions related to the Shaming Theory, as well as their usefulness in the context of community-based restorative justice. It is argued that re-integrative shaming, without appropriate consideration for the offender's personal code of ethics, is insufficient when handling hacking offenses committed by juveniles. Our main concern is to find out how to help or encourage the offender's reintegration and re-entering into the community, and how s/he can avoid failure. It is hoped that our proposed strategy can prevent future offending behaviors by these juveniles. Implications drawn from the findings are discussed, and suggestions are offered to ensure the success of this theory when applied to juvenile hackers.     

SoTE: Strategy of Triple-E on solving Trojan defense in Cyber-crime cases

Cyber activity has become an essential part of the general public's everyday life. The hacking threats of Cyber-crime are becoming more sophisticated as internet communication services are more popular. To further confirm the final finding of Cyber-crime, this study proposes three analytical tools to clarify the Cyber-crime issues by means of Ideal Log, M-N model and MDFA (Multi-faceted Digital Forensics Analysis) strategy, where Ideal Log is identified as a traceable element of digital evidence including four elements of IP Address, Timestamp, Digital Action, and Response Message. M-N model applies a formal method for collating and analyzing data sets of investigation-relevant logs in view of connected time with ISP logs. MDFA strategy attempts to outline the basic elements of Cyber-crime using new procedural investigative steps, and combining universal types of evidential information in terms of Evidence, Scene, Victim, and Suspect. After researchers figure out what has happened in Cyber-crime events, it will be easier to communicate with offenders, victims or related people. SoTE (Strategy of Triple-E) is discussed to observe Cyber-crime from the viewpoints of Education, Enforcement and Engineering. That approach is further analyzed from the fields of criminology, investigation and forensics. Each field has its different focus in dealing with diverse topics, such as: the policy of 6W1H (What, Which, When, Where, Who, Why, and How) questions, the procedure of MDFA strategy, the process of ideal Logs and M-N model. In addition, the case study and proposed suggestion of this paper are presented to counter Cyber-crime.