Direct Discrimination, Indirect Discrimination and Autonomy

Western liberal democracies tend to impose duties on publicand private bodies that are often formulated as an obligationnot to discriminate. For instance, the European Union prohibitsdirect and indirect discrimination on certain grounds in certaincontexts. Under this model, indirect discrimination involvesa measure that, although it does not directly (i.e. explicitly)discriminate on the basis of a proscribed ground, produces adisparate impact that correlates with such a proscribed ground.Indirect discrimination is generally viewed, both conceptuallyand politically, as subordinate to direct discrimination. ProfessorJohn Gardner has argued that anti-discrimination law is justifiedon the basis of duties to respect other people's autonomy. Onthe base of this analysis, he argues that indirect discriminationis a secondary concept to the paradigm wrong of direct discrimination.I contend in this article that, if one adopts Gardner's autonomy-basedanalysis of anti-discrimination law, indirect discriminationis not a secondary concept to direct discrimination. Further,I argue that autonomy does not provide a convincing justificationfor the prohibition of either direct or indirect discrimination.I tentatively suggest, however, that the widespread impact ofcertain types of discrimination (alluded to by Gardner) maysupport an equality-based justification for the prohibitionof both direct and indirect discrimination.     

Developments in European political science journal and electronic literature during 1997

Abstract. This article continues the annual review of developments in European political science periodical literature. The review covers not just traditional print media but also electronic publishing, and therefore begins with an overview of a pilot project in integrated electronic publishing, the lsquo;SuperJournal' project, which links a range of British–published political science journals in an electronic cluster that facilitates ease of access by individual users. We continue with a summary of developments in political science journal publishing in central and eastern Europe in the aftermath of the political upheavals after 1989. The article concludes with a listing of the contents of the 1997 issues of selected European political science journals from a range of European countries (normally, those published by national political science associations) and comments on their content.     

The Political Economy of Policy Volatility in Latin America

Why are some Latin American states plagued by persistent policy volatility while the policies of others remain relatively stable? This article explores the political economy of natural resource rents and policy volatility across Latin America. It argues that, all else equal, resource rents will create incentives for political leaders, which will result in repeated episodes of policy volatility. This effect, however, will depend on the structure of political institutions. Where political institutions fail to provide a forum for intertemporal exchange among political actors, natural resource rents will result in increased levels of policy volatility. Alternatively, where political institutions facilitate agreement among actors, resource rents will be conducive to policy stability. This argument is tested on a measure of policy volatility for 18 Latin American economies between 1993 and 2008. The statistical tests provide support for the argument.     

Congress, the Deficit, and Budget Reconciliation

President Clinton's veto of the 1995 reconciliation bill, the largest and most ambitious such legislation ever passed by Congress, was the first time a reconciliation bill was ever rejected by a president. It was also the first reconciliation bill in two decades to include a tax reduction rather than a tax increase. The fate of this bill, and its scope and contents, suggest the need to assess the evolution of reconciliation within the congressional budget process. In the early 1980s, Congress altered budget reconciliation procedures, putting in place a powerful new capability for deficit reduction. Reconciliation became the primary means within the budget process of restraining entitlement spending and increasing taxes as part of congressional efforts to reduce the deficit. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings magnified certain problems Congress encountered in using reconciliation to control entitlements, producing increased pressure to cut discretionary spending. While the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 included new authority to use reconciliation to restrain entitlements, congressional spending priorities combined with the Peace Dividend to maintain the relative sanctuary entitlement programs have enjoyed. The limits of reconciliation as a deficit reduction tool, both in terms of increasing revenues and curtailing entitlements, are detailed. The inherent procedural advantages accorded to entitlements are contrasted with the treatment of discretionary programs, explaining in part the widening gulf between these two categories of spending. Congress has attempted, without success, to find alternatives to reconciliation. The failure of the seven-year, deficit-eliminating reconciliation bill of 1995 may indicate that certain Limits on the use of reconciliation may have been reached.     

The Budget Enforcement Act in 1991: Isometric Budgeting

The immediate effect of the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1990 was to cancel a pending $110 billion sequester and to change the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit targets. These and other changes allowed Congress and the administration to escape responsibility for increases in the deficit if discretionary spending was kept within the caps and no new entitlement programs or revenue enhancements were added. This assumption and others relating to the empowerment of the Appropriations Committees and the new authority of the OMB are explored in this article.