Local leaders and the distribution of central government funds: Evidence from 18 European democracies

This article looks at the relationship between the political affiliation of local leaders and the distribution of government funds with the help of a new dataset on local elections from 18 European countries between 2000 and 2013. It finds that central governments are more likely to target regions with high density of local councils affiliated with the parties in government only under certain institutional arrangements. The relationship exists where local councils enjoy little power and thus are less able to claim credit for the funds independent of the central government. The relationship is also present where local leaders are involved in the selection of candidates for national office.     

The power of contact: Europe as a network of transnational attachment

In times of multiple crises and a looming partial breakup of the European Union, the question of what binds Europeans together appears more relevant than ever. This article proposes transnational attachment as a novel indicator of sense of community in Europe, arguing that this hitherto neglected dimension is substantially and structurally different from alternative ones such as cross‐border trust and identification. Combining Eurobarometer 73.3 data on ties between all EU‐27 countries with further dyadic data, it is shown empirically that the European network of transnational attachment has an asymmetric core‐periphery structure centred on five extremely popular countries (the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Spain). In line with transactionalist theory, cross‐border mobility and communication are strongly related to transnational attachment. Furthermore, the article demonstrates that the network of transnational attachment is much denser among those with a higher level of education than among those with a lower level. The results suggest that offering European citizens incentives to travel to peripheral countries may help counterbalance the current asymmetric structure of transnational attachment, thereby increasing Europe's social cohesion.     

Legislative Behavior in Romania: The Effect of the 2008 Romanian Electoral Reform

This article analyzes the impact of electoral rules on legislators’ rate of vote defection from their party position in legislatures while accounting for how party‐leadership strength mediates this impact. To this end it looks at the effect of the 2008 Romanian electoral reform. The reform shifted the electoral system from a closed‐list proportional representation to one in which all candidates run in single‐member districts. The analysis finds that because party leaders have maintained their leverage intact, the impact of the reform was minimal, with legislators being more likely to defect in less important votes only, in which party leaders allow defection. Also, after the reform legislators are more likely to use other means to impress their voters, such as legislative initiation and cabinet questioning. These forms of behavior are more accepted by party leaders.