Child Sexual Abuse Perpetrated by Women: Case Series and Review of the Literature

The literature on child sexual abuse (CSA) perpetrated by female sexual offenders (FSOs) is exiguous, and many studies have focused on judicial databases. The present retrospective study, instead, analyzed clinical and judicial data of a group of both victims and alleged FSOs, to additionally include women who have not been convicted by the criminal justice system, but who hold strong clinical suspicions of being perpetrators of CSA. The medical records and the Court files of 11 children and their eight suspected FSOs have been collected and critically reviewed in light of the literature to date. This approach allowed for a deeper understanding of the relationship between child and FSO. The authors hypothesize that the victims’ severe psychopathological outcomes were a result of a failure to develop appropriate attachments with their prospective caregivers, which could have been damaged by the pathological relationship with FSOs, who were the victims’ caregivers.     

From environmental policy concepts to practicable tools: Knowledge creation and delegation in multilevel systems

The problem‐solving capacity and problem‐generating potential of multilevel systems entail the need for the delegation of authority. When the problem concerned is about how to put an abstract policy concept into a practicable policy tool, the choice of the respective delegation trajectory depends on the policy models or the policy‐relevant knowledge that the respective political levels can supply. When regarding the European Union (EU) level as the starting point of knowledge creation and delegation trajectories, and concentrating on transaction costs, policy knowledge and models generated at the international level provide the most cost‐effective solution. Only when the international level is not able to provide further policy knowledge and innovation does the EU delegate its definitional authority, first downward to the member states and then sideways to EU agencies. We illustrate the plausibility of our dynamic understanding of multilevel governance by using Environmental Policy Integration as an example.     

MI Implementation in Juvenile Justice: A Case Report

Motivational interviewing (MI) is a communication style focused on enhancing clients’ own motivation towards change. In the justice system MI has evidence to support that it enhances communication and change behaviors in youth. As most MI training is designed for healthcare settings training and implementation of MI must be adapted to fit the juvenile justice model. This includes both rehabilitation and restorative justice. Here we describe the details that allowed one county small county in Pennsylvania to roll out MI training and initial skills review in less than 6 months. The case reviews the details of planning, trainings, and timing of activities. We then discuss what elements of those details fit into a greater implementation plan that may be applied elsewhere. Four key elements were instrumental to implementation: 1) appreciation of JPO time constraints, 2) cost containment 3) using blending to enhance JPO flexibility with MI use, and 4) policies that normalize use of MI. This outline may assist other courts in their own implementation efforts.     

ICC Pre-Trial Chamber Allows Victims to Participate in the Investigation Phase of Proceedings

The decision rendered by the International Criminal Court (ICC)Pre-Trial Chamber I on 17 January 2006 allows victims to beinvolved in ICC proceedings at an early stage of the investigation.The Prosecutor, who has filed an appeal against this decision,has consistently argued that the right of victims to participatein the proceedings does not cover the investigation phase. Itis argued that the impact of this decision goes far beyond theissue of victims’ participation in the investigations;it has general implications for the balance of power betweenthe judiciary and the prosecution in proceedings before theICC.     

SUBSTITUTING COMPLEMENTS

The presence of multiple sellers in the provision of (nonsubstitutable)complementary goods leads to outcomes that are worse than thosegenerated by a monopoly (with a vertically integrated productionof complements), a problem known in the economic literatureas complementary oligopoly and recently popularized in the legalliterature as the tragedy of the anticommons. We ask the followingquestion: how many substitutes for each complement are necessaryto render the presence of multiple sellers preferable to a monopoly?Highlighting the asymmetries between Cournot (quantity) andBertrand (price) competition and their dual models, we showthat the results crucially depend on whether firms compete bycontrolling price or quantity. Two substitutes per componentare sufficient when firms choose price. However, when firmschoose quantity, the availability of substitutes, regardlessof their number, is ineffective. Considering more complex casesof multi-complementarity, we ask the related question of howmany complements need to be substitutable and offer commentson equilibrium prices and quantities under different scenarios.     

Tolerance and the Law

Analyzing the legal dimension of tolerance in the field of international law (especially in international U.N. Declarations and Covenants on human rights), the author emphasizes how the principle of tolerance implies not merely a legal system "agnostic" to religious truth but also the development of minorities and the principle of non-discrimination in a democratic system. Non-discrimination appears to be particularly important in the face of the current phenomena of religious extremism and intolerance; development of a multicultural society is recognized in the U.N. Declaration against Intolerance and Discrimination of 1981.     

Public Co-Financing of Private Sector's Investments: Subsidiarity and Corruption

The literature on corruption makes unclearpredictions on the relations betweensubsidiarity principle, according to whichpublic decisions should be done at thelower level government possible, andcorruption of public officials. In thispaper, we compare two alternative regimes,centralised vs. decentralised, forthe public co-financing of privateprojects. We show that, in the absence ofcorruption, the two regimes give the same results. Borrowing from the Chamberlin's analysis ofmonopolistic competition and from therent-seeking literature, we introducecorruption in the model as a selling costfor the private suppliers. We show that acentralized regime causes higher corruptionlevels because of the higher number ofprivate suppliers of competing projects. Asa result, a central government tends tohave a higher level of public capitalexpenditure than two (equally corruptible)regional governments.     

Learning-Shaping Crises: A Longitudinal Comparison of Public Personnel Reforms in Italy, 1992‒2014

Abstract

This article analyses the attempts to reform public administration, notably personnel management, in Italy between 1992 and 2014, with a focus on implementation and the period following the multiple crises that have unfolded since 2008. By untangling the policy learning processes between multiple crises, past reform attempts and domestic and European “contexts in motion”, the article finds that efficiency-oriented reforms have floundered regardless of the political color of governments or indeed of the nature – political or technocratic – of the governments. Domestic factors, notably the frequency of government alternation, i.e. government instability, and European pressure have further reinforced the orientation towards single-loop lessons, i.e. the almost exclusive effecting of short-term cost-cutting measures.     

Introduction to welfare economics

We show that a transfer received by a minority of the population may be sustained by majority voting, however small the minority targeted may be, when the attribution of the transfer is seen as stochastic by voters. We build a simple model wherein voters differ in income and vote over a proportional tax whose proceeds are distributed lump-sum, and each voter has a probability of receiving the transfer that depends on his income. In progressive steps, we present intuitively appealing sufficient conditions on this probability function for the social program to be supported by majority voting. We also develop intuitive conditions for the emergence of the “paradox of redistribution”, whereby more focused targeting reduces the size of the transfer program chosen by the majority. We finally apply our framework to the French social housing program and obtain that our model is consistent with a majority of French voters supporting a positive size for that program.