Bounded rationality and social interaction in negotiating a climate agreement

An agreement on climate change mitigation hinges on large-scale international cooperation. Rational agents are supposed to consider the cost and benefits of cooperation, which then determine their negotiation positions. Behavioral economics provides experimental evidence that decision-making in negotiation-like situations is influenced by systematic cognitive biases and social interaction. In this paper, we examine the impact of bounded rationality and social preferences on bargaining in international climate negotiations and illustrate how particular deviations from full rationality affect the incentives to cooperate. Of special interest are fairness preferences for burden-sharing rules and behavioral responses to different framings of climate change and policy, as well as implications of these for communication about climate change. The analysis will further address different levels of representation, including individual citizens, politicians, experts, and (professional) negotiators. The consequences of the most prominent nonstandard preferences and biases for negotiating a climate treaty are assessed, and specific strategies to foster cooperation are suggested.     

Globalization and populism in Europe

Public Choice - Recent micro-level studies have suggested that globalization—in particular, economic globalization and trade with China—breeds political polarization and populism. This...     

Political Cleavages in Indigenous Representation: The Case of the Norwegian and Swedish Sámediggis

Abstract

Using Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage theory in an Indigenous context, the article compares political cleavages in internal Sámi politics in Norway and Sweden. The authors discuss the historical legacies of each country’s policies toward the Sámi and subsequent development of party systems before using survey data to analyze cleavages within the Sámi electorates. The analysis shows a prominent cleavage in Sámi politics in Norway regarding the extent of Sámi self-determination, whereas the main cleavage in Sweden can be found in the category-split between reindeer herders and other Sámi created by state policy. Contemporary cleavages in Indigenous politics may, thus, be deeply rooted in nation-building processes.     

More politicians,more corruption: evidence from Swedish municipalities

In the literature on political economy and public choice, it is typically assumed that government size correlates positively with public corruption. The empirical literature, however, is inconclusive, owing to both measurement problems and endogeneity. This paper creates a corruption index based on original data from a survey covering top politicians and civil servants in all Swedish municipalities. The effect of more politicians on corruption problems is analyzed using discontinuities in the required minimum size of local councils. Despite the fact that Sweden consistently has been ranked among the least corrupt countries in the world, the survey suggest that non-trivial corruption problems are present in Sweden. Municipalities with more local council seats have more reported corruption problems, and the regression discontinuity design suggests that the effect is causal.