Recent research has revealed the importance of China’s People Congress deputies for authoritarian resilience and explained the historical and individual variations in their behaviors, but the regional variation in the performance of deputies among different local congresses still has not been explored. Based on an original dataset of Municipal People’s Congresses across China, this article illustrates that the variation in the deputy activity of local congresses is mainly caused by the uneven development of the local economy. The results of different statistical models all show that the per capita numbers of deputy proposals of congresses are higher in the regions with larger GDP per capita. The study provides a new explanation for the behaviors of People’s Congress deputies in China and contributes to the research on the performance of subnational authoritarian parliaments.
The revolving door of private entrepreneurs in China is considered to be a crucial strategy of the Chinese Communist Party to adapt to the market transition and contributes much to the compliance of private entrepreneurs. However, based on the data from the official National Survey on Private Enterprises in 2006, this article finds that the Xiahai entrepreneurs revolving out of the Party-state were significantly and robustly more confrontational than those without state employment backgrounds. We argue that the unique path of the market transition in China makes the former political and economic elites more confrontational and has a significant effect on who might turn into potential challengers of the current regime among the economically powerful social class. 相似文献