拉美金融脆弱性的根源及启示

拉美国家普遍具有金融脆弱性这一特征。这一现象归因于结构缺陷、汇率制度僵化、过早金融自由化、高度财政赤字化和债务化等多个方面。它带给发展中国家的启示是应选择适宜的汇率制度、外汇与债务管理制度、宏观经济政策 ,以期保持经济长期可持续发展     

中国金融发展如何才能做到为实体经济服务

该文指出，应对未来严峻挑战最关键的步骤就是要尽快发展和健全中国的金融体系，而不能像过去那样过度仰仗货币政策被动的对冲手段来缓解。该文提出了“企业家金融”、“关系型金融”、“供应链金融”、“财富金融”、“消费金融”、“政府金融”、“国家金融”和“全球化金融”等不同的改革与发展模式来适应中国经济转型各个环节对金融服务的紧迫要求。     

日本银行体系的脆弱性与其金融安全网的演变

金融安全网作为保持金融体系、尤其是银行体系安全稳健运行而建立的危机防范和管理的一系列制度安排,一直受到各国金融监管当局和相关学者的关注。日本从二战后至80年代金融业处于长期稳定状态,使许多人推崇日本当时的金融安全网。然而,正是这个安全网阻碍了市场约束发挥作用,掩盖了日本银行体系长期积累下的脆弱性。进入90年代,随着金融环境的变化,日本传统的金融安全网明显失效,其金融业进入长达十余年的不稳定时期。安全网也随之发生变革。     

From failed states to fragile cities: redefining spaces of humanitarian practice

It has become commonplace to claim that cities are becoming conflict zones, or ‘war zones’. This article traces some of the discursive and conceptual shifts that made it possible to define the city as a new frontier for international humanitarian action in states of the Global South. In order to represent cities as humanitarian spaces, concepts of ‘failure’ and ‘fragility’ have been problematised and subjected to reinterpretations that legitimised new strategies applied to the urban realm. I argue that this re-scaling of humanitarian practices enables a de-coupling and inclusion of so called new ‘urban conflicts’ in strategies of global liberal governance. Moving from failed states to fragile cites is a key development to understand changes in the practices that redefine humanitarian spaces today. The definition of urban violence as a new type of conflict informs a new cycle of expansion of the humanitarian order focused on the city. The article analyses the problematisation of concepts of failure and fragility as a decisive move to redefine the boundaries of humanitarian spaces.     

Measuring state fragility: a review of the theoretical groundings of existing approaches

State fragility has become a resonant term in the development discourse over the past decade. In its early days it served as a catch-all phrase used by donor organisations to draw attention to the need to assist ‘fragile states’. In response to the call for a better understanding of how to deal with these countries, there was a surge in measures of fragility. However, it was not long before academics pointed to the murkiness and fuzziness of the term, and identified several caveats to most of the proposals for quantification. This paper reviews existing approaches to operationalise this concept, distinguishing between those that offer no ranking or only partial rankings of fragile states, and those providing ordinal lists of countries. The examination of their theoretical underpinnings lends support to the critical view that most existing approaches are undermined by a lack of solid theoretical foundations, which leads to confusion between causes, symptoms and outcomes of state fragility.     

Predicting Revolt: Fragility Indexes and the Level of Violence and Instability in the Arab Spring

This article is one of the first to systematically assess the ability of state fragility measures to predict violent protests and adverse regime changes in countries. We focus on the Arab Spring as an example of a situation that such measures ought to predict. Through a variety of analyses, we find that none of the measures are predictive. We then create a simple model using the literature of protest and revolts to predict both the level of violence and the extent of regime change in the Arab Spring countries. This simpler model does a better job of predicting the level of involvement in the Arab Spring than any of the complex State Fragility Indexes. Thus, the goal of this article is not to explain the causes of the Arab Spring, but to add to the discussion of the predictive value of measures of instability.     

Precipitating state failure: do civil wars and violent non-state actors create failed states?

This article examines whether the incidence of civil wars and the presence of violent non-state actors have an effect on state failure. Research on failed states has thus far prioritised armed conflicts as one of the key causes of state failure. This study challenges that claim and posits that civil war incidence has limited impact on the transition from fragility to failure. Global quantitative analysis of state failure processes from 1995 to 2014 shows that although armed conflicts are widespread in failed states, civil violence does not lead to state failure and large numbers of failed states become engulfed by civil war only after the failure occurs. By contrast, this study demonstrates a direct link between the presence of violent non-state actors and state failure.     

The European Union’s ambiguous concept of ‘state fragility’

Although scholars and practitioners alike perceive ‘state fragility’ to be a key challenge for security and development, there are significant variations in the definition of this phenomenon. This article analyses the European Union’s notion of ‘state fragility’. Based on a document analysis covering the years 2001–12 and expert interviews conducted in November 2012, the article reveals that the EU has not (yet) decided on a clear-cut definition of ‘state fragility’. Three factors explain this lack of decisiveness: the EU’s complex institutional framework, which impedes policy coherence; developments at the international level that require the EU’s compliance; and the organisation’s diplomatic efforts to maintain cooperative relationships with aid-recipient countries that have been labelled ‘fragile’. The result is conceptual ambiguity that potentially reduces the EU’s capacity to respond to fragile situations.     

The Use of Statebuilding Research in Fragile Contexts: Evidence from British Policymaking in Afghanistan,Nepal and Sierra Leone

Statebuilding has risen to the forefront of international donor policies toward the security and development of fragile states, with governments now investing millions in statebuilding research every year. However, no serious study has examined the ways in which research influences policy in fragile states. Based on in-depth interviews with officials and researchers, this article begins to shed light on the central dynamics pertaining to research use in such contexts by exploring in some detail the experience of British in-country policymakers in three countries—Afghanistan, Nepal and Sierra Leone. The picture that emerges is a mixed one, with evidence of extensive use of different forms of research combined with worrying practices and lingering deficiencies in some key areas.     

Sub-State Diplomacy in Malfunctioning States: The Case of the Republika Srpska,Bosnia and Herzegovina

Diplomacy is no longer the preserve of the state. It is increasingly used by sub-state actors to contest state-level authority. In malfunctioning states like Bosnia and Herzegovina, where lengthy state-building efforts have not alleviated the risk of instability, this possibility is a cause for concern. This article builds on paradiplomatic and state-building studies to examine specific aspects of the Republika Srpska's (RS) bid for diplomatic actorness. Based on the content analysis of official documents and interviews, it assesses the level of diplomatic actorness of the RS in four dimensions (legal authority, external presence, internal presence, autonomy) and examines whether this has grown in collaboration or competition with state-level diplomacy. The article shows that the development of the RS's paradiplomatic activities is driven by ethno-political competition, facilitated by state and sub-state actors’ mutual disregard, and that it both echoes and amplifies the systemic malfunctioning of Bosnia and Herzegovina.