当前泰国人的中国观

本文是对泰国450位各类人员进行问卷调查后写出的一篇调查报告,目的是了解泰国人对中国的看法.调查结果发现,泰国人对中国的看法基本上是正面的,但也反映出值得中国认真注意的一些负面看法.例如泰国人仍在很大程度上对中国不信任;对中国国内某些社会问题表示担忧;对中国人的文明行为评价较低;对中国的对泰政策表示不满,认为中国不够重视泰国,中国在中泰自由贸易中占了便宜.调查报告对这些问题进行了分析,并提出了一些看法和建议.     

Using self-prophecy to combat vote overreporting on public opinion surveys

Survey researchers have long struggled with respondents who, due to the pressure to adhere to socially desirable norms, erroneously claim to have voted in a previous election. In this paper, we develop a new approach to reducing the overreporting of voting in surveys by leveraging psychological theories that show people have a tendency to follow through on an action once they have predicted their behavior (e.g. Sherman, 1980). Using a survey experiment through the 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, we find that an overwhelming majority of respondents will agree to take an honesty pledge regarding their future vote report. Having pledged their honesty, they then overreport their vote at far lower rates than other survey participants. The observed effects are additive, since previously developed methods of reducing overreporting were present across all conditions. These findings have important implications for studies endeavoring to understand voting behavior and social desirability pressures.     

我国专利保护的强度及改进措施-以2013年数据中私营企业专利权人为视角

随着我国经济转型升级的日益加快，知识产权在经济发展中的贡献日益突出。全面深化改革的持续推进也进一步释放了私营企业的发展活力。据统计，占我国私营企业绝大多数的小微企业完成了65%的发明专利，已成为我国科技创新的主力军。在国家知识产权局开展的专利保护社会满意度调查工作基础上，基于私营企业专利权人的视角对当前我国专利保护的强度进行考察。数据分析显示，目前私营企业专利权人对我国专利保护的满意度有66.73分，仅仅刚达到及格水平；而私营企业专利权人在反馈意见建议时，同样表示希望相关部门加大专利保护力度。在加强专利保护的过程中，司法要充分发挥对专利保护的主导性，行政要充分发挥在专利保护中的主体性，非诉调解要充分发挥在处理专利纠纷时的主动性，私营企业专利权人则应充分发挥自身积极性，配合做好相关工作。     

Parallel publics? Support for income redistribution in times of economic crisis

This article investigates the dynamics of support for income redistribution in Europe. With European Social Survey data spanning 2006 to 2012, it assesses whether the Great Recession resulted in substantial parallelism or increasing polarisation in preference change across various sub‐publics. After introducing hypotheses based on claims that social groups are affected differently by economic insecurity, the article proceeds in two empirical sections. First, whereas prior research suggests that hard times fuel diverging attitudinal patterns, it is found that income groups, ideological groups and educational groups did not shift differently over time during the first years of the crisis, thus providing strong evidence for the ‘parallel publics’ hypothesis in the European context and in times of economic turmoil. Next, the article addresses the extent to which change in aggregate support for redistribution came from changes in small minorities of the population, supposed to be more responsive to their economic environment. Using multilevel analysis, it is shown that the most educated significantly contributed to the overall change more than the others. As a result, they may have been partly driving the economic mood during the first years of the Great Recession.     

From voter ID to party ID: How political parties affect perceptions of election fraud in the U.S.

This paper uses a survey experiment to assess what individuals understand about election fraud and under what circumstances they see it as a problem. I argue that political parties are central to answering both these questions. Results from the 2011 CCES survey suggest respondents are able to differentiate between the relative incentives of Democrats and Republicans where fraud tactics are concerned, but whether voters see these tactics as problematic is heavily influenced by partisan bias. The results show little support for the notion that partisan ideology drives fraud assessments, and suggest support for the idea that individual concerns for fraud are shaped a desire for their preferred candidate to win. These results offer insights that might be applied more broadly to questions of perceptions of electoral integrity and procedural fairness in democracies.     

The case of the missing victims: Gunshot woundings in the National Crime Survey

National Crime Survey (NCS) data yield an estimate that 171,000 Americans were nonfatally shot in criminal assaults, robberies, and rapes for the period 1973–1979. Comparing this estimate with the number of firearms homicides during this period suggests either that the death rate in gunshot cases is very high (over 1/3) or that the NCS estimate is low. Based on police-generated data appropriate to estimating the true death rate from gunshot wounds, it appears that the NCS estimate is low by a factor of about 3.0 compared with the number of criminal gunshot woundings known to the police. It is common knowledge that survey-based estimates of assault rates tend to be relatively unreliable, a fact that has been attributed to problems with respondents being willing and able to recall threats, fist fights, and other minor assaults. The current result indicates that the estimation problem is not limited to minor assaults. There is reason to think that the underestimate of gunshot woundings is the result of problems with the NCS sample as well as problems with respondent cooperation.     

Opinion formation in foreign policy: the Swiss experience

Applying John Zaller's model of opinion formation to survey data covering 15 years (1981–95) of direct democracy in Switzerland, this paper provides a contribution to the debate about opinion formation in foreign policy. On the one hand, the Swiss experience contradicts the widespread view that citizens are poorly informed about and little interested in foreign affairs. On the other hand, direct democracy often translates into governmental defeats in this field. We address these mixed results and show that opinion formation in foreign policy is not a special case, and differs from that in domestic policy only with respect to the circumstances under which it occurs. In particular, we highlight the unusual type and level of conflict within the elite on foreign policy issues, which translates into distinct patterns of attitudes among the public.     

Does China’s middle class prefer (liberal) democracy?

Many surveys show that China’s political regime, under the Chinese Communist Party’s authoritarian rules, enjoys a high level of public support. However, it is still uncertain whether China’s emerging middle class will become the “agent of democratization” as suggested by modernization theory. Using the data of Asian Barometer Survey conducted in China in 2011, this article demonstrates that the relationship between class identity and preference for liberal democracy in China may be inverted U-shaped. The Chinese middle class shows a higher preference to features of liberal democratic regimes than its counterparts of the lower- and upper-class. Members of the Chinese middle class also tend to regard democracy as the best form of government. Thus, the middle class has the potential to initiate democratization in China if the Chinese government fails to keep satisfying the middle class’ quest for economic well-being and protection of property rights.     

Emancipative values in Georgia: An individual level analysis

The main interest of the study is to determine whether and how an individual's perceived economic situation is related to emancipative values in Georgia. The analysis employs individual-level survey data from nationwide public opinion surveys conducted by the Caucasus Research Resource Centers (CRRC) in 2010 and 2011 in Georgia. Several dimensions of emancipative values are examined: gender equality, tolerance, participation, autonomy, interpersonal trust, satisfaction with life and religion. Level of education and age are brought in as alternative factors accounting for value change. The results are ambiguous and only partially confirm validity of the emancipative theory of democracy on an individual level in Georgia.     

The International Monetary Fund: A review of the recent evidence

A review of recent quantitative studies on the International Monetary Fund reveals that much of the conventional wisdom is incorrect. Recent studies have demonstrated a new degree of methodological rigor, have drawn more heavily upon insights from political science, and have asked a number of new questions. We review studies of participation in IMF programs, design of IMF conditionality, implementation and enforcement of IMF conditions, conventional program effects and catalytic effects. At every stage, we find substantial evidence of the influence of major IMF shareholders, of the Fund’s own organizational imperatives, and of domestic politics within borrowing countries. We conclude that very little is known with certainty about the effects of IMF lending, but that a great deal has been learned about the mechanics of IMF programs that will have to be taken into account in order to obtain unbiased estimates of those effects.