网络安全的战略选择

随着网络空间的迅速扩张及其对社会各领域的全面渗透,网络空间不断增长的财富、战略价值以及世界经济社会运行对网络空间的深度依赖,使网络空间整体安全问题的重要性日益凸显,网络安全已成为国际社会面临的又一全球性公共问题。网络安全问题虽然属于国家安全范畴内的非传统安全领域,但国家对于安全的偏好没有改变,对安全追求的逻辑路径依旧。从理论的角度看,由于体系压力以及国家对于安全的追求,国家会选择制衡的战略,但在现实中,制衡经常缺位或迟到。受到非传统安全环境影响,地缘战略中分而治之、领土补偿、加强军备、联盟以及平衡手的存在等制衡方式和作用、意义同时发生了变化。细分到网络安全领域,沟通机制的不同、威慑效果不同、行为体的多样、行为判断的困难等特殊性,导致在网络安全领域,国家选择追随或合作将成为更优选择。     

Preparing NATO for the Future – Operating in an Increasingly Contested Environment

The global proliferation of precision-strike systems may be challenging the foundations of Western military-technological supremacy. Relatedly, the development of so-called Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities across the globe threatens to complicate Western freedom of military movement and access, and could give way to a more contested military-strategic environment. The twin challenges of precision-strike proliferation and A2/AD strongly impact NATO’s agenda, which revolves around strengthening deterrence and defence in Eastern Europe, and addressing the different threats emanating from the so-called Southern European neighbourhood. In order to address or mitigate such challenges, the Alliance needs to produce operational concepts and capabilities able to deliver deterrence and expeditionary warfare in a maturing precision-strike environment, one characterised by the emergence of A2/AD capabilities.     

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the context of South Caucasus regional security issues: An Armenian perspective†

For more than a quarter-century, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been one of the most important factors influencing the political map of the South Caucasus. On 12 May 1994, Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia, and Azerbaijan signed a cease-fire agreement that ended military operations in the conflict zone and has been observed until recently. Negotiations for a peaceful settlement have been underway within the framework of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Minsk Group co-chaired by the USA, Russia, and France since 1992, but society and the elite in Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Azerbaijan remain largely unprepared for compromise. Considering the settlement process a zero-sum game, they have generally accused one another of escalating the conflict and of a lack of willingness to restore peace. Other countries and international organizations involved in the negotiations do not share a vision of the future and frequently pursue their own interests. Accordingly, the Karabakh conflict could remain unresolved for decades more. The aim of the paper is a general assessment of the current stage and dynamic of this conflict and the impact of new trends and old obstacles on the prospects for further settlement.     

Examining Prison Effects on Recidivism: A Regression Discontinuity Approach

The “get-tough” era of punishment led to exponential growth in the rate of incarceration in the United States. Recent reviews of the literature indicate, however, that limited rigorous research exists examining the effect of imprisonment on the likelihood of future offending. As a result, scholars have called for assessment of this relationship, while using methodologies that can better account for selection effects. This study addresses these calls directly by applying regression discontinuity, a methodology well suited to account for selection bias, on a cohort of felony offenders in Florida. Results suggest that prison, as compared to non-incarcerative sanctions, has no appreciable impact on recidivism. Although no differential effects surfaced across race/ethnicity, the analyses indicated that imprisonment exerts a differential effect by gender with the effect being more criminogenic among males than females.     

TESTING THE TRANSITIVITY OF REPORTED RISK PERCEPTIONS: EVIDENCE OF COHERENT ARBITRARINESS

An often implicit assumption of perceptual deterrence tests is that the elicited values pertaining to arrest risk reflect stable underlying beliefs. But researchers in other disciplines have found that reported expectations are highly susceptible to exogenous factors (e.g., anchors and question ordering), indicating that such values are somewhat arbitrary responses to probabilistic questions. At the same time, reported expectations are coherent within persons, such that respondents rank order them rationally. For deterrence, then, absolute values reported on arrest risks are likely not stable but individuals still rank order specific crimes in meaningful ways. We examine the interpretability of reported arrest risk for three possibilities: 1) Reported risks are stable probabilistic values; 2) reported risks are arbitrary and uninformative for deterrence research; or 3) reported risks display “coherent arbitrariness” with unstable values between individuals but stable rank ordering of crimes within individuals. Through the use of three random experiments of college students, our results indicate that elicited risk perceptions are arbitrary in that they are influenced by the presentation of anchors and question ordering. Nevertheless, the rank ordering of crimes within and across conditions is unaffected by the presentation of anchors, suggesting that reported risks are locally coherent within persons.     

Perceived Sanction Threats and Projective Risk Sensitivity: Auto Theft,Carjacking, and the Channeling Effect

Although sanction threats promote fear, among committed offenders, that fear can become a resource with which to sculpt emerging crime preferences. In such cases, criminality is not deterred but channeled. We explore the channeling process here as it relates to auto theft and carjacking. Our qualitative findings reveal that auto thieves are reluctant to embrace the violence of carjacking due to concerns over sanction threat severity they attributed to carjacking—both formal (higher sentences) and informal (victim resistance and retaliation). Meanwhile, the carjackers are reticent to enact auto theft because of the more uncertain and putatively greater risk of being surprised by victims, a fear that appears to overcome the enhanced long-term formal penalty of taking a vehicle by force. We examine the implications of offenders’ decision-making for the analytic intersection of rational choice and deterrence, offering the notion of projective risk sensitivity to encapsulate the process.     

Reasons for South Korean attitudes towards the death penalty: exploring the nexus between strong public support and history of misapplication

As of this writing, South Korea (officially, the Republic of Korea) is an abolitionist-in-practice nation; capital punishment is legal, but no death sentences have been carried out since a moratorium was enacted in 1997. Public support for the death penalty has decreased over time; however, the factors that determine support for or opposition to the death penalty of the South Korean general public are largely unknown. Using survey data from a nationwide sample of 416 respondents, this study examined the potential predictors for public attitudes towards capital punishment support. A majority of survey respondents (83%) supported the death penalty, a higher percentage than recent surveys of the South Korean general public. The deterrence and retribution perspectives were positively related to death penalty support, while crime severity, neighbourhood safety, the brutalisation effect, and innocence were negatively related. This study provides the first multivariate analysis of factors associated with South Korean attitudes towards the death penalty.     

Reassurance: A Strategic Basis of U.S. Support for Israel

This article argues that Israel experiences a unique perception of the perils of anarchy that drives it to a strategic preference for disproportionately offensive action against rivals and enemies. Actions taken pursuant to that doctrine have caused serious inconvenience to U.S. foreign policy in the Mideast for over four decades. This article argues that by reassuring Israel, both diplomatically and with arms sales, that the United States is committed to its survival, the United States has obtained significant measures of strategic restraint on Israel's part. That restraint has brought significant benefit to the United States as it seeks to guarantee regular access to the vital resources of the Middle East. This article provides examples of both successful reassurance and reassurance denied to illustrate the argument that U.S. support produces tangible strategic benefits for the United States.     

The Economics of Cruel and Unusual Punishment

It has sometimes been argued that one way to reduce the costs of law enforcement would be to reduce the probability of detection and conviction (hence saving those costs), while at the same time increasing the size of the punishment. Following this strategy would keep the expected costs (to a risk neutral criminal) of committing a crime constant and hence keep the deterrence level constant; it would have the benefit, though, of reducing costs to the rest of society.There are some well-known objections to such a policy. One such objection deals with marginal deterrence: A convicted murderer serving a life sentence with no chance of parole in a jurisdiction which bans capital punishment has nothing to lose from killing a prison guard—there is no marginal deterrence to the commission of a more serious crime or any additional crime for that matter. In fact, so long as there remains any upper limit to the amount of punishment that can be inflicted upon a convicted criminal, the only ways to create some type of marginal deterrence are to reduce the punishments for less serious crimes, which will either reduce the deterrence of those less serious crimes, or alternatively to require the use of more of society's scarce resources to increase the probabilities of apprehension and conviction.It is possible to reduce this marginal deterrence problem, however, by practicing cruel and unusual punishment on perpetrators of serious crimes, i.e. by raising the limits of allowable punishment. Anecdotal evidence suggests this practice is followed unofficially with child molesters and killers of prison guards and hence provides some additional deterrence against these crimes.Despite the theoretical validity of this argument, our society has chosen to impose a constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Furthermore, over time we seem to have lowered the threshold of what is considered cruel and unusual. Following Dr. Pangloss, the concluding section of the paper examines why rational maximizers would choose to give up this additional potential deterrence. The explanations depend upon an assumed positive income elasticity of demand for humanitarianism or for insurance against the costs of punishing the innocent. While there are some reasons to accept the humanitarianism argument, the insurance argument seems more persuasive.