安倍治下的日本对华政策:从战略制衡到战术避险

日本的对华外交深受国际体系和中美日三角关系的影响。由于中美两个大国在全球层面的战略竞争加剧,以2017年为分水岭,第二次安倍内阁领导下的日本的整体对华外交政策经历了从"战略制衡"向"战术避险"方向的转变。在2017年以前,日本为了联美对华实施"战略制衡",在外交方面,以"印太战略"孤立中国;在安全方面,加强岛屿防卫能力和强化日美同盟;在经济方面,大力支持"跨太平洋伙伴关系协定"和对"一带一路"倡议持冷淡态度。在2017年以后,在中美关系的不确定性增大的情况下,安倍领导下的日本对华实施"战术避险"。在外交方面,加强印太战略的开放性、领导人互访和对华自制;在安全方面,继续强化国防上的内部制衡;在经济方面,有条件地认同"一带一路"倡议并对华展开第三方市场合作。展望未来,令和时代的日本将是一个拥有部分战略自主的中等强国,在日美同盟框架下维持与中国有距离的交往,力图在瞬息万变的国际政治角力中实现日本国家利益的最大化。     

灾后日元升值初探

短期来看,日元汇率没有因经济受到巨大损失而贬值却转向迅速升值在于投资者形成"保险机构或企业资金的资金回流"的预期,投机力量就借助这个题材不断的推升日元。长期来看,这一轮日元升值并不是因贸易摩擦、美国压迫日本的结果,而是与金融危机过程中动荡的国际货币体系有关。日元在国际货币体系内主要执行价值贮藏的功能,而其贸易结算功能相对较弱。日元快速升值的根本原因是日元在估值上存在升值压力,以及日元发挥避险货币和套利交易的作用。中日两国都面临着美元贬值的巨大风险,可采取相互增持对方货币资产的方法,逐渐减少降低外汇储备中美元的比例,建立区域汇率稳定性机制。     

Playing the Diversity Card: Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy under the Salmans

ABSTRACT

Since the 2003 regime change in Iraq and the 2011 Arab uprisings, the political map of the Middle East has been in flux. Regional actors have taken advantage of emerging windows of opportunity, which have affected the outcome of this process. Saudi Arabia’s role as an aspiring regional hegemon in the region is salient: the country’s assertive course in shaping its neighbourhood coincides with a more independent foreign policy that goes beyond the traditional US alliance and seeks to diversify its international partners. This diversification of Saudi foreign policy since the ascension to the throne of King Salman in 2015 is explained by using the IR concept of hedging.     

Hedging in search of a new age of non-alignment: Myanmar between China and the USA

Abstract

The American ‘return’ to East Asia is currently characterized by a particularly high degree of competition with Beijing among the small and medium powers of Southeast Asia, where the recent Chinese ‘charm offensive’ achieved its most significant outcomes.

This article, hence, aims to explore the nature and patters of this ongoing process of strategic repositioning put into practice by Myanmar within the political triangle with Washington and Beijing. Against this backdrop, we will draw upon the conceptualization of ‘hedging strategy’, which identifies a set of multidimensional ‘insurance policies’ adopted by small actors in their relations vis-à-vis great powers.     

ASEAN and evolving power relations in East Asia: strategies and constraints

This article seeks to examine constraints and challenges that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states are confronted with in formulating and implementing their strategies in response to evolving regional environments represented by the rise of China. It argues that China's southern neighbours have adopted purposeful strategies in order to mitigate potentially negative effects from China's growing capabilities in East Asia. These strategies led to the expansion of membership in the East Asia Summit (EAS) and positive involvement in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, encouraging America's substantial commitments to the Asia-Pacific. However, ASEAN has failed to form the unified front on the EAS and TPP because its members have adopted diverse stances on and policies towards the two institutions. Moreover, an identity issue constitutes a crucial impediment to promoting cooperation between ASEAN members and the USA. While Washington has intensified diplomatic linkages with ASEAN, the US identity shown in its adherence to the results-oriented approach still provokes some concerns among the ASEAN members.     

Small state diplomacy: Cambodia's foreign policy towards Vietnam

Cambodia's foreign policy behavior towards Vietnam can be characterized as using a strategy of ‘hedging’, whose nature is different from the one suggested in the existing literature. Such a strategy can be discerned from Cambodia's omni-directional policy responses, ranging from economic pragmatism, limited bandwagoning, binding engagement and soft-balancing. Furthermore, the case of Cambodia's foreign policy towards Vietnam suggests that non-state actors, such as the opposition party and the population (voters) play a significant role in shaping the state's foreign policy, even though it is formed under the authoritarian ruling party. This study also suggests that the foreign policy decisions of an authoritarian state are not solely shaped by the personal attributes of their leader.     

A middle power’s trade policy under U.S.-China FTA competition: South Korea’s double hedging FTA diplomacy

Existing studies on the roles and foreign policies of middle powers place too much focus on their security policies, while there is a dearth of scholarship on their trade policies. Middle powers have used free trade agreement (FTA) politics not only to obtain economic benefits through trade expansion, but also to achieve broader foreign policy goals. Given the U.S.-China FTA competition in East Asia, as a middle power, South Korea, has developed double hedging FTA diplomacy by supporting both powers’ FTA initiatives in order to avoid potential conflicts and maintain favourable relationships with both powers. Specifically, Korea has tried to maximize its national interest and, furthermore, to maintain regional stability by establishing two bilateral FTAs, the Korea-U.S. FTA and the Korea-China FTA, and by showing interest and participating in larger FTA discussions, such as the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership and the China-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.     

(Nuclear) Change of Plans: What Explains Nuclear Reversals?

What explains a state’s decision to give up its nuclear weapons program? While instances of nuclear reversal figure prominently in international politics, evidence in the literature has been largely piecemeal. We offer a novel conceptualization of the proliferation process as nonlinear, potentially including instances of reversal, as well as pursuit of a nuclear program and acquisition of nuclear weapons. Employing this theoretical framework, we consider states’ cost-benefit calculations in each phase of the proliferation process, and we test our theory using a multistate model. Two counterintuitive findings emerge from this framework. First, nuclear latency increases the likelihood of pursuit and acquisition but also increases the likelihood of reversal by reducing the costs of restarting a program in the future. Second, the nonproliferation regime discourages states without a nuclear program from pursuing and acquiring nuclear weapons while at the same time making states with nuclear programs less likely to reverse course.     

In search of the ‘Other’ in Asia: Russia–China relations revisited

This paper argues that Russia and China are partners of consequence and that the neglect of the normative dimension of the Sino-Russian relationship has led its impact on global governance to be undervalued and misunderstood. Following a constructivist approach, the paper examines the shared norms underlying an ever closer Sino-Russian partnership, despite divergent interests in a number of areas. A first section examines how shared norms lead Russia and China to define their identity similarly, facilitate joint actions, and constrain their individual policy choices. For Russia, elaborating its own unique identity is crucial to its claim to global status, though complicated by interactions with multiple ‘Others.’ Russia's effort to engage Asian partners is often viewed as hedging against China, but as second section argues that Russian engagement in Asia is better understood in terms of Russia's effort to define an Asian identity. A third section highlights the securitization/desecuritization dynamic in Sino-Russian economic relations. Xi Jinping's efforts to redefine China's global role reinforces its tendency to desecuritize the vulnerabilities that lead China to seek economic cooperation with Russia. Russia, fearing becoming a ‘resource appendage’ of China, then securitizes economic relations with China.     

A harmonized Southeast Asia? Explanatory typologies of ASEAN countries’ strategies to the rise of China

Abstract

In the face of a rising China, some scholars have argued that ASEAN countries will choose to either bandwagon with or balance against China, while others believe they will respond with a more moderate policy known as ‘hedging’. In considering these options, ASEAN countries must take into account their individual interests within the economic and security structure of this region. In this research, we argue that each ASEAN country confronts divergent sets of security and economic relations with China, which play a major role in shaping their policy responses. We can characterize their responses into four quadrants. Each cell can be categorized in terms of a high or low degree of threat perception (HT or LT) from China, as well as a positive or negative economic expectation (PE or NE) with China. We thus hypothesize that ASEAN countries in the HT–NE situation will balance against China; those in the LT–PE situation will bandwagon with China; those in the HT–PE or LT–NE situations will hedge against China. Hypotheses are supported by three case studies, Vietnam–China (HT–NE), Cambodia–China (LT–PE) and Singapore–China (HT–PE) relations.