《巴黎协定》下碳市场实施环境完整性风险及其应对研究

市场方法是减缓气候变化、降低减排成本的重要手段。继《京都议定书》灵活履约机制之后,《巴黎协定》第六条提供了减缓成果国际转让机制(ITMOs)和可持续减缓机制(SMM)两种碳市场机制,但在实施过程中却很容易导致环境完整性风险。从理论层面看,影响环境完整性的因素主要有转让单位的质量、国家自主贡献(NDCs)的多样性与力度、国际转让的稳健核算等。对此,未来国际气候谈判中针对《巴黎协定》碳市场机制的实施,应从完善国际报告和审查制度、设定资格标准以及完善相应调整等方面来确保环境完整性。同时,我国在国内碳市场建设中,也需要不断强化碳市场制度体系与能力基础设施建设,保障碳交易实施的环境效果,为有效衔接《巴黎协定》下国际碳市场进行充分准备。     

国际碳排放权交易机制对长三角区域建立碳排放权交易市场的启示

温室气体排放权交易市场迅速发展扩张,并已成为全球贸易中的新亮点。欧盟碳排放权交易体系的成功经验与美国芝加哥气候交易所的失败教训表明,强制减排是碳排放权交易市场持续发展的前提条件。该文提出,长三角区域具有建立我国区域性碳排放权交易市场的条件,可为进一步完善碳排放权交易市场积累经验,并在此基础上构成全国统一的碳交易市场。     

European Climate Policy: Toward Centralized Governance?

The EU emissions trading system (ETS) is the first large-scale international emissions trading system and a "cornerstone" in EU climate policy. A key element in the ETS implementation process is deciding upon the ceiling ("cap") for the emissions included in the ETS. Over time, a significant change and centralization of this model has taken place. In order to understand this development, we need to acknowledge the increasing acceptance of stronger centralized governance among the member states due to ETS pilot phase problems; take into consideration frustration in the European Commission over complex and differing National Allocation Plans; and add the fact that the Kyoto Protocol target was getting nearer and a good performance of the "flagship" ETS was becoming increasingly important. Hence, although the case supports the importance of acknowledging the multilevel character of the EU, it still emphasizes the key role of changes in member states' interests and positions for understanding outcomes.     

Restricting the import of ‘emission credits’ in the EU: a power struggle between states and institutions

This article examines the development of a cap on the use of so-called ‘project credits’ in the EU emissions trading scheme. It investigates how the issue of such a limit was addressed in the negotiations of the Linking Directive, and how it has been dealt with in the later implementation of this directive. The article applies two explanatory approaches: one based on intergovernmentalist theory, assuming that the cap reflected the preferences of the EU Member States; and one based on the multi-level governance model, assuming that the cap expressed the preferences of EU institutions rather than Member States. What is found is a two-stage development: during the negotiations of the Linking Directive, Member States managed to secure a no-cap solution allowing extensive use of the project credits. In the later implementation phase, however, when the emissions trading scheme was up and running and a certain legitimacy for the system had been established, the Commission managed to ‘regain control’ by bringing back a cap. Thus, the project credit cap—and by that, the very nature of the EU emissions trading scheme—has been the subject of a continuing power struggle within the EU—and different theoretical perspectives explain different stages of this process.