美国精神病辩护制度研究

对于不负刑事责任的精神病人应当免除处罚是刑事司法的一项原则,由此诞生出精神病刑事辩护制度。精神病辩护起源于英国,在美国得到继承与发展。美国虽然建立了一套比较完善的精神病辩护制度,但是,精神病辩护的存废一直存在争议;精神病辩护的法律标准一直处于发展变化当中,联邦法院与州法院系统之间也采用了不同的法律标准;精神病辩护的审理包括精神病辩护的提出与审理程序、证明责任分配与证明标准、专家证人的作用以及对精神病犯罪者的裁定与处理等重要内容。研究美国精神病辩护制度,可以为我国构建精神病辩护制度提供借鉴。     

司法精神病辩护中证明模式的反思与完善

司法精神病辩护是刑事辩护制度中的一项重要内容.当前世界范围内存在两种精神病辩护证明模式:职权式精神病审查模式与对抗式精神病辩护模式.我国目前的精神病辩护证明模式属于职权式精神病审查模式,在实践中存在诸多问题值得反思.司法精神病鉴定因涉及精神病医学、心理学、法学等诸多领域的专门知识而呈现复杂性,而科学、合理的诉讼证明程序可以抵消司法精神病鉴定中的消极因素.我国职权式精神病审查模式应当吸收对抗式精神病辩护模式中的合理因素,在权力配置上逐渐限缩职权机关的权力,赋予当事人更多的权利;在证明责任上由辩护方承担推进责任,由控诉方承担说服责任;在证明标准上建立司法精神病鉴定启动与精神病辩护二元化的证明标准体系.     

精神病辩护：历史、社会与现实

精神病辩护制度在普通法国家具有长久之历史,特别在美国,其不仅具有比较完善的刑事责任能力法则,而且其精神病辩护的案件也备受社会各界瞩目。而精神病辩护制度、相关立法或者司法实践活动并不是与世隔绝、生活在真空中的产物,其受到社会、政治、伦理道德等各种因素的影响。同时,即使在精神病辩护制度最为发达的美国,与人们印象中不同的是,实际上精神病辩护并未获得多大的成功,从而形成想象与现实的落差。对于我国而言,应从精神病辩护制度之历史、社会与现实多个视角或者因素考虑,从而确立一种渐进的或者改良的中国刑事责任能力法则或者辩护制度。     

律师刑事辩护豁免权制度研究

(一)刑事辩护业务的特点要求律师享有辩护豁免权。律师是社会法律工作者，是凭自己的法律知识为当事人提供法律服务的社会自由职业者，他们相对独立于国家机关，具有不受官方干预的独立性。在刑事辩护中，律师的职责是依据事实和法律，提出证明被告人无罪、罪轻或减轻免除其刑事责任的材料和意见，维护当事人的合法权益。也就是说，一般情况下，法律     

美国刑事法中的能力减弱辩护制度及其启示

美国刑事法中的能力减弱辩护制度是基于被告人患有精神病或存在精神缺陷而否定犯罪成立要件中的犯意要素,从而达到否定指控的罪名或减轻罪责目的的辩护制度。虽然对于该辩护制度的存废无论是理论界还是司法实务界均存在一些争议,但该制度目前仍被美国部分州法院适用。能力减弱辩护一般于开庭审理前由被告方向法院提出,同时需要提交被告人患有精神病或存在精神缺陷的证据。在庭审的过程中一般由被告方对其能力减弱的事实承担证明责任,由事实裁判者裁定被告人患有的精神病或存在的精神缺陷是否影响到其被指控的犯罪所需的特定犯意的形成,并作出其是否构成被指控的犯罪以及应否减轻其刑事责任的判决。美国刑事法中的能力减弱辩护制度具有一定的合理性,对完善我国相关的辩护制度不乏启示意义。     

控诉与辩护的对立统一

<正> 控诉和辩护是刑事诉讼中含有对立意义的两种诉讼活动。控诉是被害人或对犯罪行为侵害的客体负有保护责任的国家机关向司法机关控告犯罪人,提起刑事诉讼,要求追究被告人刑事责任的一项诉讼活动。辩护是被指控犯有罪行的被告人及其辩护人,根据事实和法律,提出反驳控诉的材料和意见,以证明被告人无罪、罪轻或者应当减轻、免除其刑事责任的诉讼活动。我国刑事诉讼中,行使刑事控诉权的主体,主要是人民检察院,只有少数危害性不大的案件的控诉权,才由被害人自己行使。当人民检察院在侦查过程中已经查     

从有效辩护原则看我国的辩护制度改革

在刑事司法中,辩护制度是"决定现行法生死存亡的核心点",是预测刑事司法未来的关键。刑事诉讼的历史就是辩护权不断扩大的历史。刑事辩护,是指犯罪嫌疑人、被告人及其辩护人为维护犯罪嫌疑人、被告人的合法权益,从事实和法律两方面反驳控诉方的指控.提出有利于被告人的证据和理由,从实体上证明被告人无罪、罪轻或者减轻、免除其刑事责任,以及从程序上维护犯罪嫌疑人、被告人的诉讼权利的活动。所谓辩护,是以"辩"的方法、手段来达到"护"的目的。可见,辩护这种活动所追求的是效果上的辩护。     

论辩护律师在刑事诉讼中的地位──兼论我国刑事辩护制度的完善

论辩护律师在刑事诉讼中的地位──兼论我国刑事辩护制度的完善李纵坤辩护律师是指在刑事诉讼过程中接受被告人的委托或人民法院的指定，根据案件事实和法律，反驳控诉人对被告人的控诉的一部或全部，以证明被告人无罪、罪轻、减轻处罚免除刑事责任具有律师身份从事律师业...     

刑事辩护准入制度与有效辩护及普遍辩护

刑事辩护在国家法治建设与人权保障中的应然重要性与我国允许非律师承担辩护职责的实然性之间存在明显反差.实证调查证明,无论是从律师的数量上还是辩护质量上,在我国取消非律师担任辩护人的规定,建立刑事辩护准入制度的时机和条件已经成熟.这一制度既可实现有效辩护的目的,也不违背普遍辩护的要求.故应当在现实国情允许的情况下,从死刑案件开始,分步骤、分层次地设立刑事辩护的准入制度;同时,设置与准入制度配套的管理监督机制、惩戒机制以及退出机制,并从辩护律师执业环境和刑事辩护收费制度等方面为刑事辩护准入制度的构建与实施营造良好的制度运行环境.     

美国无效辩护制度及其启示

无效辩护制度是有效辩护制度良好运行的必要保障。通过对美国无效辩护制度的考察，可以看到，无效辩护制度在一定程度上提高了刑事辩护的质量。我国辩护制度运行状况堪忧，委托辩护质量不高，指定辩护在司法实践中流于形式。就目前情况看，在所有案件中借鉴无效辩护制度的时机还不成熟，而率先在死刑案件的审判过程中，将无效辩护制度应用于委托辩护与指定辩护，不仅可行，而且紧急。但是，因为司法传统以及刑事诉讼制度的差异，对于无效辩护的判断标准、证明责任、救济程序、律师责任的承担等，我国应采取不同于美国的思路。     

The insanity defense: effects of abolition unsupported by a moral consensus

The insanity defense reflects the moral judgment that some criminal defendants do not deserve criminal sanctions because of mental incapacity. This Note examines the alternative formulations, such as guilty but mentally ill and diminished responsibility, that some states have enacted in the face of growing controversy over the insanity defense. It observes that the alternatives, if used in lieu of the insanity defense, distort the criminal law and do not comport with the legal doctrine of responsibility, which eschews punishing mentally ill defendants. The Note concludes that the insanity defense should not be abolished unless the moral consensus changes regarding the criminal responsibility of mentally ill defendants.     

A comparison of insanity defense standards on juror decision making

Following the Hinckley acquittal, 17 states and the federal government made changes to the insanity defense, including revising the standard, reassigning the burden of proof, and altering the standard of proof. Two studies were conducted to determine whether the specific insanity standard (including the assignment of burden of proof and standard of proof) employed had a significant effect on mock jurors' verdicts. Participants' comprehension of insanity defense instructions was measured and the factors jurors used to decide whether to find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) were also assessed. Participants' comprehension of insanity defense standards was very low. When asked to identify the factors they considered important in determining whether to find a defendant NGRI, only three elements of insanity defense standards were identified as significant. The results may have important implications for policy decisions regarding the insanity defense.     

The psychiatrist's guide to right and wrong: judicial standards of wrongfulness since M'Naghten

In insanity defense litigation, the precise legal definition of wrongfulness is often critically important. References in the M'Naghten Rules to the appropriate standard of wrongfulness were ambiguous, resulting in a divergence of judicial opinion as to whether wrongfulness means legal wrong, subjective moral wrong, or objective moral wrong. This article reviews and analyzes these three judicial standards of wrongfulness in the context of case law from jurisdictions that follow each of the respective standards. The evolution of knowledge of right and wrong tests of criminal responsibility is traced back to its philosophical roots. Most psychiatrists claim no expertise in matters of morality or law. The American Psychiatric Association would bar psychiatric expert testimony on the ultimate issue of insanity, on the grounds that there are "impermissible leaps in logic" when psychiatrists opine on the probable relationship between medical concepts and moral-legal constructs. Whether or not they testify on the ultimate issue, psychiatrists should ascertain the applicable standard of wrongfulness in order to properly relate their findings to the relevant legal criteria for insanity and thereby enhance the probative value of their testimony.     

A judge's three worlds: proof, philosophy, and the prison

Tensions between the world of science and the world of law may arise because of their differing viewpoints and philosophies. Disagreements may center around such questions as what constitutes proof, around human behavior, and around the use of the insanity defense in criminal cases. The just deserts model is examined and is criticized as being harsh and possibly unrealistic in today's society.     

Impulse control and criminal responsibility: lessons from neuroscience

Almost all of the world's legal systems recognize the "M'Naghten" exception to criminal responsibility: the inability to appreciate the wrongfulness of action. This exception rests on the assumption that punishment is morally justified only if the defendant was able to choose whether to do wrong. Jurists and jurisdictions differ, however, on whether to extend M'Naghten's logic to cases where the defendant understood the wrongfulness of an act but was incapable of resisting an impulse to commit it. In this article I ask whether contemporary neuroscience can help lawmakers to decide whether to adopt or retain this defense, known variously as the "irresistible impulse" defense or the "control" or "volitional" test for insanity. More specifically, I ask firstly, whether it is empirically true that a person can understand the wrongfulness of an act yet be powerless to refrain from committing it; and second (assuming an affirmative answer to the first), whether the law of criminal responsibility can practically accommodate this phenomenon? After canvassing the relevant neuroscientific literature, I conclude that the answer to the first question is "yes." After examining the varied treatment of the defense in the United States and other nations, I also give an affirmative answer to the second question, but only in limited circumstances. In short, the defense of irresistible impulse should be recognized, but only when it can be shown that the defendant experienced a total incapacity to control his or her conduct in the circumstances.     

The psychiatrist's guide to right and wrong: Part III: Postpartum depression and the "appreciation" of wrongfulness

Whether or not the psychiatrist testifies on the ultimate issue in insanity defense cases, it is critically important that he familiarize himself with the applicable legal standards and interpretations in order properly to relate his clinical findings to the relevant criteria for insanity and thereby enhance the probative value of his testimony. This is the third in a series of articles which attempts to explicate judicial and statutory standards of insanity and correlate them with the psychiatrist's findings of psychopathology. This article analyzes the Model Penal Code formulation of insanity, with special emphasis on the all important distinction between "know" and "appreciate." This formulation permits the defendant possessed of mere surface knowledge or cognition to be exculpated, requiring that he have a deeper affective appreciation of the legal and moral import of the conduct involved if he is to be held criminally responsible. The Model Penal Code approach more readily lends itself to application as a standard of responsibility in cases involving affective disorders. An important disorder within this group, postpartum depression, is discussed in the context of raising the insanity defense in a case of infanticide.     

Deconstructing the Criminal Defence of Insanity

The significance of this article is in its deconstruction of the criminal insanity defence in a meta-legal critical context. The article’s objective is to critically review beliefs that the insanity defence was designed solely for public protection from insane violent people, or, for criminal deterrence. Arising from the long and continued use of the Roman Law concept of non compos mentis, the question arises as to what has become of the practical meaning of the term “insanity”, when used as a defence. The article tries to show that the defence of insanity is a public act of judicial denunciation against the accused, while the accused may have no effective responsibility for the crime. Argument begins with a critical discussion on the character of common-place denunciation as an appeal to public agreement. Then, it follows how the idea of “manifest criminality”, of the 1800s, might be cognate to modern ideas of “manifest madness”, linking into the origins of the English special verdict of insanity. This will allow a short critical analysis of the M’Naghten Case. Argument is completed with analysis of a psychologists’ expert construct of insanity and its relationship to jury perception. The article will suggest strongly that arguments based on the common law rules of insanity tend to expose juries more to denunciation of the accused, than to a reasoned account of the nature of his insanity and to the defects in his responsibility. Duly persuaded jurors would tend to acquiesce and participate in the denunciation of an accused person, whose unusual and unhealthy behaviours emanated from his sufferings by dint of his unbearable circumstances.     

"Insanity" in civil law

The issue of "insanity" is rarely alluded to in the area of civil law. As a consequence, the legal standard for insanity is not clearly understood by many psychiatrists. The standard derives from case law and is based upon statutory law in the criminal sector. A civil case will be presented where the question of "insanity" was raised. In this case an individual committed suicide and his insurance company refused to pay the beneficiaries of his life insurance policy based upon a provision in his policy that excluded payment in situations of suicide. His beneficiaries sued, claiming that the deceased was insane at the time of his suicide and therefore not responsible for his actions. The standard for insanity in New Jersey and the reasoning of the psychiatrists will be presented.