Registered cartels in Austria: an overview

Cartels were legal to a large extent in Austria until the country’s EU accession in 1995. We examine archival material on registered horizontal cartels to learn about their inner working. Applying content analysis to legally binding cartel contracts, we comprehensively document different collusion methods along the lines described by Stigler (J Political Econ 72:44–61, 1964). Quota cartels employ regular reporting schemes and use compensation mechanisms for departures from set quotas. Specialization cartels divide markets, and rely the least on information exchange and punishment. Price and payment condition cartels primarily aim to prevent secret price cuts, requiring information provision upon request, allow for discretionary decision-taking and (sometimes immediate) punishment. These stylized facts on the contractual arrangements suggest that the possibility to write legally binding agreements was employed to address the usual obstacles to sustain collusion.     

Social and legal control in China: a comparative perspective

This article exposes the reader to a different social and legal control system and a different way of thinking about crime--that of China. Chinese think positively about the nature of humans and their potential, and China's social control system weaves together a unique combination of formal and informal mechanisms with a strong emphasis on the latter. The criminal justice system constitutes a key element of the social control system, but it appears to be more of a last resort. It is hoped that through a comparative analysis, the reader can develop a deeper understanding of different social and legal systems.     

Detecting illegal activities: the case of cartels

This paper considers enhancements of a comparatively new method to detect cartels, the System of Cartel Markers (SCM), introduced by Blanckenburg and Geist (Int Adv Econ Res 15(4):421–436, 2009). The aim of SCM is to find illegal collusion on legal markets with observable market data. It uses expected behavior patterns such as low level of capacity utilization, slackness of price adjustments to exogenous shocks, excess rates of return, nearly constant capacities, less price changes and lower variance of capacity growth rate. However, the testing of cost efficiency is lacking so far. Following Leibenstein’s (Am Econ Rev 56:392–415, 1966) X-inefficiency theory, we assume that cartel members face lower competition and hence, tend to be less cost efficient. Therefore, we enhance SCM and use cost efficiency as a further marker in order to detect cartels. We apply SCM to the German cement cartel and find empirical support for some markers. The proposed methodology may be used for antitrust screening and regulatory purposes.     

Correlates of Formal and Informal Social Control on Crime Prevention: An Exploratory Study among University Students, Andhra Pradesh, India

Societies control crime through a variety of both formal and informal methods, and the balance between these methods varies widely by culture. This exploratory study surveyed a convenience sample of 434 students attending a university in Andhra Pradesh, India, in order to examine their social control views. Although there was strong support for both forms of social control, informal control mechanisms (family, neighbors/neighborhood, and peers) were more likely to be ranked higher in importance than formal control mechanisms (courts, police, and correctional facilities). Ordinary ordinal regression and ordinary least squares regression results indicated that views on shaming and group punishment were related to the views of formal and informal control. Further research is needed to examine the forces that shape the formal and informal crime control views of Indian citizens.     

CRIME BY COMMITTEE: CONSPIRATORS AND COMPANY MEN IN THE ILLEGAL ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY CARTEL, 1954–19591

We show how cartels rely on the adaptive social structure of committee meetings to ameliorate the competitive difficulties of markets. We distill the structure of the cartel committee and test hypotheses relating market structure to committee structure and ultimately to the efficacy of cartel price‐fixing. Cartel continuity and the corporate authority of the cartel are strong predictors of cartel effectiveness. Cartel continuity is responsive to market conditions that favor cartel formation. Centralization of cartel authority in decision making results in improved collusive pricing effectiveness. Centralization of cartel authority responds to expanding industry volume that bring about incentives to increase firm level market share at the expense of other cartel members.     

反垄断从宽处理制度及其中国化

反垄断从宽处理制度旨在减免公法责任以吸引卡特尔成员主动投案并揭发他人的违法事实,是国际上通行的一种发现和打击卡特尔的有效机制。从宽处理制度分为多种类型,其共同的先决条件有三个,即:提出申请、提供有效信息、完全配合反垄断执法机构的查处。中国具有与该制度相契合的传统法律土壤,也具备建构该制度的现实法律依据。但是,我国反垄断法律体系内部的冲突、执法权归属的模糊、行政法律责任的薄弱与缺失等因素,使得该制度在中国的实施面临隐忧。     

Leniency Program: A New Tool in Competition Policy to Deter Cartel Activity in Procurement Auctions

This paper discusses the impact of a leniency program on incentives within cartels. The objective of this program is to encourage a cartel member to confess and implicate his co-conspirators with hard evidence about their collusive agreement. We develop a simple model of cartel behavior under a first-price sealed-bid procurement auction and we show how an effective leniency program can prevent the internal coordination of cartel members.     

Too risk averse to stay honest?: Business corruption,uncertainty and attitudes toward risk

The presence of business-corruption provokes firms to make choices between legal business approaches and illegal bribery. The outcome of a chosen strategy will usually be uncertain at the time the decision is made, and a firm’s decision will depend partly on its attitude towards risk. Drawing on empirical results about business corruption, this paper describes the risks, uncertainties and benefits attached to bribery, and specifies their impact on firms’ propensity to offer bribes. It then demonstrates how risk averse firms can be more inclined to offer bribes than risk neutral and risk attracted firms.     

Formal and informal pharmaceutical economies in Third World countries: Synergetic, symbiotic or parasitical?

Informal economy functions without any formal social control for lack of a supervisory authority. Within a regulated locality the same activities would have an illegal character, but in that deviating situation those informal activities can thrive because the authorities do not intervene. Globalization of our western mixed market economy implies that also the aspect of government control takes on a global character. The fact that formal economies settle in places where an informal market is the rule leads to a combined action which, eventually, creates new market relations. In the present contribution we study the effects of a meeting between a formal and an informal market on the basis of a concrete case. An analysis of the market of medical products in Third World countries gives an idea of the new relations that arise when an informal market of natural medicines is confronted with a formal market of western medicines. We study both the situation in which there are no regulations and the situation in which the formal market is supported by economic regulations. This text illustrates how those situations can give rise to new opportunities for one group and to exploitation for another.     

指导性案例对网络非法集资犯罪的界定

鉴于非法集资犯罪所具有的涉众型特征和引发次生风险的严重社会危害性,这种犯罪目前已经成为我国司法领域打击的重点.尽管我国若干司法解释确立了非法集资犯罪的外延和特征,但随着互联网的快速发展,非法集资依托于金融科技的发展和新出现的金融产品,衍生出翻新变化和日趋复杂化的集资犯罪手段,导致对于非法吸收公众存款罪成立的四个特性、集...     

Morality, social norms and the rule of law as transaction cost-saving devices: the case of ancient Athens

The importance of the institutional framework for economic development is widely accepted today and it is duly stressed in the economic literature. The protection of property rights, the enforcement of contracts and an efficient legal system are the pillars of the contemporary rule of law. However, formal institutions cannot function without being internalized by the citizens and without the strong backing of social norms. Morality and social norms are the major elements of the informal institutional structure, the social capital, which is also critical for social welfare and economic development. In this paper we will discuss both the formal and the informal institutional framework of Ancient Athens, which was a free market society with economic problems similar to contemporary market societies. Athenians developed a highly sophisticated legal framework for the protection of private property, the enforcement of contracts and the efficient resolution of disputes. Such an institutional framework functioned effectively, cultivating trust and protecting the security of transactions. This entire system however was based on social norms such as reciprocity, the value of reputation and widely accepted business ethics. Conformity to social norms as well as moral behavior was fostered by social sanction mechanisms (such as stigma) and moral education. The Athenian example is a further proof of the importance of morality and social norms as transaction cost-saving devices even in quite sophisticated legal systems. Their absence or decline leads inevitably to the need for more regulation and litigation and to a growing preference for clear-cut rules instead of discretionary standards. Athenian law was pioneering in the development of rules and institutional mechanisms suitable for the reduction of transaction costs, many of them surviving in the most complex contemporary legal systems.     

Global Governance,Criminalisation and Environmental Change

This article examines the environmental impact of criminalisation. It argues that developing societies are increasingly drawn into globalised networks that inextricably link the global and local, the legal and illegal. This means that in order to understand the causes of environmental degradation it is no longer useful to focus on the formal institutions and practices of government and business. Instead, this article uses the concept of the shadow state to examine and understand the causes of environmental change in two illustrative cases of Madagascar and Belize.     

Business Collusion as a Criminological Phenomenon: Exploring the Global Criminalisation of Business Cartels

Over the last dozen years or so there has been a burgeoning of criminal law for purposes of dealing with business cartels in a number of jurisdictions (for instance, the new ‘cartel offence’ introduced under the Enterprise Act 2002 in the UK). The discussion here provides first of all some account of this process of criminalisation, mapping it in terms of jurisdictions and the legal character of this category of cartel offending. It then seeks to explain and account for the phenomenon and more particularly to determine the extent to which it may be seen either as an element of more forceful prosecution strategy, or alternatively as a sea-change in moral perception and evaluation. Put another way, is this a development led by legal policy, or a genuine shift in outlook, which has produced a new legal policy? It will be argued finally that, in a more pragmatic perspective, the success of the criminalisation project in any case depends on the emergence of a genuine sense of ‘hard core’ delinquency, without which effective regulation by means of criminal law is unlikely to be achieved. In this respect, a manufactured sense of moral censure, fostered by prosecutors to facilitate leniency programmes, may (outside the US) eventually prove to be a point of vulnerability in such strategies.     

Semiformal Organizations and Control During the COVID-19 Crisis in China

Scholars often compare China and Western societies in terms of dichotomous forms of control—formal and informal. Recent research indicates a nuanced form of social control—semiformal. Using a survey data collected during the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic in China, this study investigated the prevalence and importance of semiformal organizations, formal organizations, and informal groups participating in social control and social service and the predictors of the perceived importance of these three forms of social control mechanisms. Findings from this study revealed that formal organizations, the semiformal organizations, and informal groups all participated in community control and service. Semiformal organizations had the highest level of participation. This study found that education and age are the two major predictors of the views on the importance of formal, informal, and semiformal control and control mechanisms.

     

Female crime and household control in early modern Frankfurt am Main

This article investigates the way in which informal control by household authorities affected how female crime was prosecuted in early modern Frankfurt am Main. Crime historians have argued that female crime was a particular urban phenomenon during this period. They have attributed this to a relatively high level of independence of women and the existence of many formal social control institutions. This article shows that due to strongly enforced patriarchal ideals concerning household authority in the Holy Roman Empire supposedly ‘rural’ characteristics (low levels of independence and high levels of informal control) could also be found in distinctly urban settings, like Frankfurt am Main. As the household was viewed as the central location for social order, authorities required everyone to reside in an orderly household. Unlike regions in which household control was weaker, the majority of women, including migrants, were therefore incorporated in networks of informal control through their position in the household. This means that strong informal control within the household, which is normally associated with close-knit communities in the countryside, also played a dominant role in the urban community of Frankfurt. The criminal investigation records show that only few domestics were prosecuted formally; rather they were disciplined by their master – leaving a possibly very large dark number of female criminality. Most of the offenders appearing in the criminal investigation records were those that had failed to secure a position within a household. Owing to the reliance on household control, cities like Frankfurt am Main knew a distinct type of urban female offender.     

Tales of Deviance and Control: On Space,Rules, and Law in Squatter Settlements

In Latin American cities, around a third of the urban population lives in tenure situations that can be designated as informal, yet variation in the ways and extent to which these arrangements do not comply with law is extensive. Furthermore, informal dwellers often employ a variety of strategies to legitimize and ultimately legalize their tenure, implying a dynamic rather than a static relationship between illegality and legality. Conceiving of land tenure in dichotomous terms, as simply being either legal or illegal, therefore, fails to reflect this diversity, nor does it capture the evolving nature of the relationship between informal settlements and the state system. Drawing from the development of squatter settlements in Buenos Aires, this article proposes an alternative perspective and shows how settlements alternate strategies of noncompliance with adaptation to the state legal system to gradually increase their legality.     

Innovation in the Australian legal profession

Over the next decades, advances in technology and new business practices will challenge a traditionally conservative legal profession. With a focus on the Australian legal profession, this article explores the nature of the challenges and, in particular, considers whether the challenges pose a threat of disruptive innovation. The article aims to add to understanding of how Australian law firms are responding to the challenges by drawing on empirical data that examines the drivers and inhibitors of innovation in Australian law firms, the areas where Australian legal firms are innovating, and the outcomes of their innovation. The article concludes that there is limited evidence of incumbent displacement and that, gradually, the profession is rising to the challenges.     

试论法律社会渊源的理论基础

在正式的法律渊源之外 ,还有大量的非正式法律渊源 (本文迳称为“法律的社会渊源”)的存在 ,这已是学术界普遍承认的事实。然而 ,为什么必须由社会渊源来弥补正式渊源的不足 ,其理论基础究竟何在 ,在法理上则很少有研究性的文章。为此 ,作者通过择取“自然与约定”、“理性与经验”、“国家与社会”三对范畴 ,论述了社会渊源存在的理论依据。作者的观点是 :法律的社会渊源是法律的理论与实践所必须 ,也符合法律与社会关系的一般原理 ,具有正当性与民主性基础     

Paradoxes of Urban Housing Informality in the Developing World

This article addresses a series of paradoxes regarding informal settlements in cities in the developing world and their relation with the legal system. The first paradox regards the penalization of illegal land occupations on the one hand versus the legalization of that same practice on the other. Second, it looks at the relationship between land occupations as systematic violations of property rights, but with the goal of forming new property rights and thus paradoxically supporting private property as a substantive principle. Third, the reasoning behind the fact that the same system that denies legal access to housing for poor sectors simultaneously attempts to incorporate informal settlements in an ad hoc manner through legalization schemes is examined. It is shown that there is a logic to these paradoxes, which, although contradictory from standard legal perspectives, can be accommodated within a theoretical framework that distinguishes an internal normative order operating within informal settlements, from the state legal system, operative outside it. The proposed framework not only settles the paradoxes, but, this article concludes, can also guide attempts to deal with the enormous anticipated growth of informality in the developing world.     

Export Cartels: Is there a need for Global Rules?

One of the reasons sometimes given in support of internationalcompetition rules is the need to curb export cartels. Exportcartels, however, are not necessarily competition or welfarereducing. They are just as likely to enhance competition andwelfare. The evidence reveals that opinions are quite divided.However, there is one constant: no country has a strong incentiveto ban export cartels unilaterally. The reason for this is thatmost of the adverse effects generated by the cartel are experiencedabroad, not locally. Therefore, if there is a case for curbingexport cartels, the alignment of incentives means that an internationalagreement is probably necessary. This article suggests one possiblearrangement.