The psychiatrist's guide to right and wrong: judicial standards of wrongfulness since M'Naghten

In insanity defense litigation, the precise legal definition of wrongfulness is often critically important. References in the M'Naghten Rules to the appropriate standard of wrongfulness were ambiguous, resulting in a divergence of judicial opinion as to whether wrongfulness means legal wrong, subjective moral wrong, or objective moral wrong. This article reviews and analyzes these three judicial standards of wrongfulness in the context of case law from jurisdictions that follow each of the respective standards. The evolution of knowledge of right and wrong tests of criminal responsibility is traced back to its philosophical roots. Most psychiatrists claim no expertise in matters of morality or law. The American Psychiatric Association would bar psychiatric expert testimony on the ultimate issue of insanity, on the grounds that there are "impermissible leaps in logic" when psychiatrists opine on the probable relationship between medical concepts and moral-legal constructs. Whether or not they testify on the ultimate issue, psychiatrists should ascertain the applicable standard of wrongfulness in order to properly relate their findings to the relevant legal criteria for insanity and thereby enhance the probative value of their testimony.     

Impulse control and criminal responsibility: lessons from neuroscience

Almost all of the world's legal systems recognize the "M'Naghten" exception to criminal responsibility: the inability to appreciate the wrongfulness of action. This exception rests on the assumption that punishment is morally justified only if the defendant was able to choose whether to do wrong. Jurists and jurisdictions differ, however, on whether to extend M'Naghten's logic to cases where the defendant understood the wrongfulness of an act but was incapable of resisting an impulse to commit it. In this article I ask whether contemporary neuroscience can help lawmakers to decide whether to adopt or retain this defense, known variously as the "irresistible impulse" defense or the "control" or "volitional" test for insanity. More specifically, I ask firstly, whether it is empirically true that a person can understand the wrongfulness of an act yet be powerless to refrain from committing it; and second (assuming an affirmative answer to the first), whether the law of criminal responsibility can practically accommodate this phenomenon? After canvassing the relevant neuroscientific literature, I conclude that the answer to the first question is "yes." After examining the varied treatment of the defense in the United States and other nations, I also give an affirmative answer to the second question, but only in limited circumstances. In short, the defense of irresistible impulse should be recognized, but only when it can be shown that the defendant experienced a total incapacity to control his or her conduct in the circumstances.     

Moral wrongfulness and insanity: a New Zealand sample

Introduction: This study sought to identify the common characteristics amongst defendants found legally insane, compared to those who were psychiatrically evaluated yet convicted of their crime. Method: A retrospective review of court-ordered psychiatric court reports and legal outcomes was conducted, for all defendants referred for insanity evaluations in the largest city in New Zealand (and its surrounding rural regions) for a 7-year period. Results: The majority (60%; 37) of those referred for evaluation were found legally insane. The opinion regarding moral wrongfulness was the single factor that differentiated successful insanity defendants from those who were found guilty. Conclusions: Despite the centrality of the insanity defence to forensic psychiatry, few studies internationally consider characteristics of those found insane, particularly in comparison with those who are found guilty. Psychiatrically evaluated defendants in this sample were relatively homogenous, perhaps due to the court liaison nurse screening process.     

Criminalization,Legitimacy, and Welfare

A standard view about criminal law distinguishes between two kinds of offenses, “mala in se” and “mala prohibita.” This view also corresponds to a distinction between two bases for criminalization: certain acts should be criminalized because they are moral wrongs; other acts may be criminalized for the sake of promoting overall welfare. This paper aims to show two things: first, that allowing for criminalization for the sake of promoting welfare renders the category of wrongfulness crimes largely redundant. Second, and more importantly, accepting welfare as a legitimate ground for criminalization implies a certain view about legitimate state action, which makes criminalization for wrongfulness more difficult to justify. If I am right, the view that keeps the two categories of criminalization as largely separate is untenable. I conclude with some remarks about the advantages of welfare (and not wrongfulness) as the basis for criminalization.     

精神病辩护：历史、社会与现实

精神病辩护制度在普通法国家具有长久之历史,特别在美国,其不仅具有比较完善的刑事责任能力法则,而且其精神病辩护的案件也备受社会各界瞩目。而精神病辩护制度、相关立法或者司法实践活动并不是与世隔绝、生活在真空中的产物,其受到社会、政治、伦理道德等各种因素的影响。同时,即使在精神病辩护制度最为发达的美国,与人们印象中不同的是,实际上精神病辩护并未获得多大的成功,从而形成想象与现实的落差。对于我国而言,应从精神病辩护制度之历史、社会与现实多个视角或者因素考虑,从而确立一种渐进的或者改良的中国刑事责任能力法则或者辩护制度。     

Comment on Andreas von Hirsch: The Roles of Harm and Wrongdoing in Criminalisation Theory

Whereas liberals tend to emphasize harm as the decisive criterion for legitimizing criminalisation, moralists take a qualified notion of wrongfulness as sufficient even when no harm is at hand. This comment takes up Andreas von Hirsch’s “dual element approach” requiring both harm and wrongfulness as necessary conditions for criminalisation and argues that Joel Feinberg’s account of harming as violation of moral rights is perfectly compatible with it. Subsequently, two issues from the liberalism-moralism debate on criminalisation are examined: The difficulty of how to determine wrongfulness beyond the scope of harming, and the so far disregarded question of whether the democratic legislator is free within the framework of constitution to criminalise whatever conduct he wants to prevent irrespective of philosophical constraints.     

The insanity defense: effects of abolition unsupported by a moral consensus

The insanity defense reflects the moral judgment that some criminal defendants do not deserve criminal sanctions because of mental incapacity. This Note examines the alternative formulations, such as guilty but mentally ill and diminished responsibility, that some states have enacted in the face of growing controversy over the insanity defense. It observes that the alternatives, if used in lieu of the insanity defense, distort the criminal law and do not comport with the legal doctrine of responsibility, which eschews punishing mentally ill defendants. The Note concludes that the insanity defense should not be abolished unless the moral consensus changes regarding the criminal responsibility of mentally ill defendants.     

The psychiatrist's guide to right and wrong: Part III: Postpartum depression and the "appreciation" of wrongfulness

Whether or not the psychiatrist testifies on the ultimate issue in insanity defense cases, it is critically important that he familiarize himself with the applicable legal standards and interpretations in order properly to relate his clinical findings to the relevant criteria for insanity and thereby enhance the probative value of his testimony. This is the third in a series of articles which attempts to explicate judicial and statutory standards of insanity and correlate them with the psychiatrist's findings of psychopathology. This article analyzes the Model Penal Code formulation of insanity, with special emphasis on the all important distinction between "know" and "appreciate." This formulation permits the defendant possessed of mere surface knowledge or cognition to be exculpated, requiring that he have a deeper affective appreciation of the legal and moral import of the conduct involved if he is to be held criminally responsible. The Model Penal Code approach more readily lends itself to application as a standard of responsibility in cases involving affective disorders. An important disorder within this group, postpartum depression, is discussed in the context of raising the insanity defense in a case of infanticide.     

Excusing Necessity and Terror: What Criminal Law Can Teach Constitutional Law

This essay proposes a theory of excuse that, without blending it into exculpation, avoids the condonation of crime. The question it takes up is: given that neither compulsion by circumstances nor by human threats removes the legal reason for punishing, how can its exonerating force be rendered compatible with the state’s general duty to punish the guilty? The chapter criticizes various proposals for reconciling excuse with the duty to punish the guilty, including the moral involuntariness theory, the concession to frailty theory, and the conformity to moral expectation theory. It then proposes a solution: moral blamelessness exonerates because it simulates the conditions for legal exculpation. Just as the exculpated actor acknowledges the legal norm of mutual respect for agents, so does the excused actor acknowledge the public reason of the self-sufficient political community of which the legal norm is a part. The author argues that this theory would excuse the altruistic no less than the self-preferring murderer.     

Acting on delusions: the role of negative affect in the pathway towards serious violence

Acting violently on delusions is a significant clinical problem. Recent research has identified state anger as key component in the pathway from persecutory/threat delusions to serious violence. To determine the magnitude of the effect of delusional anger and to investigate a dose-response relationship we carried out a prospective follow-up study of forensic in-patients discharged into the community. Men and women (n = 409) were assessed before/after discharge at 6 and 12 months (Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale, MacArthur Community Violence Interview). No association was found with a content un-specific measure of delusions, thought disorder, hallucinations, grandiosity and violence. Suspiciousness/persecution was significantly associated with both violence and anger. Anger was also associated with violence. Mediation analyses suggested that 84% of the association between suspiciousness/persecution and violence was explained by anger. Key target of interventions should primarily be the anger; treatment of delusional beliefs plays a secondary role in the management of risk.     

侵权构成要件的不法性功能论

违法性是大陆法系侵权法保护范围的"调节器"、法律秩序的"信号灯",并在规范层面对侵权责任形态多样化、特殊责任构成和违法性阻却有重要意义。对违法性要件之取舍,我国侵权责任立法应结合侵权法的发展趋势、价值取向和体系构成作出选择。     

Soldiers as Public Officials: A Moral Justification for Combatant Immunity

How can we make moral sense of the international humanitarian law doctrine of combatant immunity? The doctrine is morally shocking to many: It holds soldiers on both sides of a war immune from criminal prosecution for their otherwise criminal acts of killing, maiming, destroying property, etc., carried out as part of their country's war effort. That is, soldiers who kill as part of an attack benefit from the immunity just as much as those defending their country. Traditionally, just war theorists have tried to provide situation‐specific arguments to show that soldiers on both sides had a good moral justification for their actions. Recently, self‐styled “revisionist just war theorists” have suggested that the doctrine of combatant immunity is just a convention designed to minimize harm. In this article, I suggest that the moral foundation of the doctrine lies in the status of soldiers as public officials in the service of their country. The reason why we hold them immune from prosecution for their war‐making acts is that such acts are properly thought of as acts of a state, rather than as acts of a particular individual. And the reason why states are immune from prosecution for their acts is one of moral standing: No other state has the moral standing to tell another how to carry out the matters that define its jurisdiction. So as long as a country deems (however implausibly) that it must use force to defend itself from aggression, then it may do what is required to defend itself. No other state has the standing to prohibit such acts or to punish those who carry them out. This argument is rooted in an understanding of how individuals may interact as free and equal under law. It does not aim at the perfection of human action, but it does serve to eliminate the worst forms of tyranny.     

The social construction of criminal responsibility and insanity

This study examines the effects of judicial instructions (traditional American Law Institute [ALI] not guilty by reason of insanity [NGRI] instructions contrasted with ALI instructions supplemented with the guilty but mentally ill [GBMI] alternative) and case information cues (delusional content and planfulness) on student and community subjects' attributions of responsibility. GBMI instructions substantially reduced the probability of NGRI and guilty verdicts in response to vignettes portraying highly psychotic defendants and altered the pattern of variability in responsibility construal ratings. Variation in delusional content cues (self-defense versus non-self-defense) influenced ratings of criminal appreciation but did not affect the verdict distributions. Less planfully commited crimes resulted in higher proportions of insanity verdicts. However, individual differences in responsibility construals of the defendant and in attitudes toward the insanity defense were stronger predictors of verdicts than the design variables, suggesting that individual differences in social-moral cognition are at least as relevant to the attribution of responsibility as are case cues or legal frames of reference. Contrary to previous studies,Witherspoon death penalty attitudes were not related to verdicts, but people without conscientious scruples toward the death penalty were more likely to render guilty verdicts.     

精神病辩护制度研究——基于美国精神病辩护制度的思考

由于刑事责任的承担要求行为人对自己行为的社会危害性有认识和控制能力,某些精神病人对自己行为的社会危害性没有认识或无法控制,因而无法对自己的行为承担刑事责任,精神病也就成了刑事辩护的重要事由。在美国刑事审判中,精神病是无罪辩护的重要理由,判例法与刑事立法共同形成了一套较为完善的精神病辩护制度。在美国,精神病辩护制度的存废问题一直备受争议;精神病法律标准处于变化之中,各法域标准不一;精神病辩护的提出、审理程序、证明责任分配与证明标准、裁定及专家证人的作用有其特点;因精神病而判无罪者的关押与释放形成了特定规则。我们可以借鉴其制度的某些合理因素,健全和完善我国的精神病辩护制度。     

'Manifest Madness': Towards a New Understanding of the Insanity Defence

This article introduces a new concept which can serve as a theoretical frame for understanding the way in which insanity is proved for the purposes of the criminal law. With reference to George Fletcher's concept of 'manifest criminality', it introduces the concept of 'manifest madness'. This concept constructs madness (a shorthand for the types of mental abnormality known to the criminal law as insanity) in criminal law as evident to lay observers, and its meanings, which are derived from collective knowledge of it, as encoded in the defendant's acts. Through an historical analysis of the way in which insanity has been proved in criminal law, the article argues that 'manifest madness' is useful for understanding how knowledge about insanity is structured in the criminal courtroom. The concept of 'manifest madness' provides a frame that incorporates evidentiary and procedural features of the insanity defence that have resisted systematic theoretical analysis.     

The Wrongfulness Constraint in Criminalisation

If conduct must be wrongful in order to be justifiably criminalised, how should its wrongfulness be established? I examine a conception of wrongfulness put forward by A. P. Simester, which makes wrongfulness turn on whether the reasons favouring the performance of an action are, all things considered, defeated by the reasons against its performance. I argue that such a view can only generate appropriate substantive constraints in the context of criminalisation if it can distinguish between the sorts of reasons that a verdict of wrongfulness, as a concept distinct from stupidity or selfishness, should attend to, and the sorts of reasons it should leave out. Assuming that this conception of wrongfulness should operate as a constraint on criminalisation in a liberal-democratic state, the only reasons it should include are other-regarding reasons. What matters is whether the agent commits an other-regarding wrong. This conception of wrongfulness helps us further to resolve fundamental questions concerning mala prohibita and the legitimate reach of any duty to obey the law.     

Post-Hinckley insanity reform in Oregon

The 1983 Oregon legislature responded to public pressure to narrow the application of the insanity defense by eliminating personality disordered individuals from consideration for an insanity verdict. This article examined the effects of the statutory change, and found no significant change in the frequency of insanity acquittals of personality disordered subjects between the three pre-reform years (n = 21) and the three post-reform years (n = 14). We also reviewed how the Psychiatric Security Review Board handled these patients once committed to their jurisdiction. We constructed a matched comparison group of psychotic acquittees and found that in the pre-reform years the personality disordered subjects spent less time in the system and less time in the hospital than the psychotic patients. However, in the post-reform years their time in the system and time in the hospital was the same as the psychotic controls. There were fewer decisions to discharge personality disordered patients from the system after the reform, although this difference may be due to factors other than the statutory reform itself. The conclusion is that narrowing the insanity defense is a worthy goal which may be difficult to achieve.     

Self-Mediated Risk in Criminal Law

The paper addresses the question whether ‘self-mediated risk’ – risk whose coming-to-fruition depends on future volitional conduct by the actor himself – bears on the wrongfulness of an actor's present conduct. Moral philosophers have long been divided on this question. ‘Actualists’ take the view that an actor's present moral obligations do, in fact, depend on what he or she actually is likely to do in the future. In contrast, ‘possibilists’ take the view that an actor's present obligations depend only on what he or she will have the capacity to do in the future. This paper argues that actualism better captures the morality that underlies the criminal law. The paper also explores actualism's implications for criminal law. Among these is the implication that the locus of moral fault in criminal cases sometimes is temporally removed from the conduct that triggers the assignment of blame.     

Multiple Wrongdoing and Offence Structure: A Plea for Consistency and Fair Labelling

Crimes come in all shapes and sizes, but relatively little work has been done on offence structure – Robinson's recent functional analysis is perhaps the one obvious exception. This article concentrates on incidents of multiple wrongdoing and suggests that the current substantive law is both inconsistent and confusing. Burglary, for example, is unnecessarily narrowly defined and should be expanded to include broadly similar scenarios. The law is confusing because it conflates qualitatively very different incidents under the same umbrella – serial killers, for example, commit the same crimes as those who kill multiple victims by one act. Not only does the law fly in the face of common sense but it conflicts with the principle of fair labelling – that crimes be defined to reflect their wrongfulness and severity – which seeks to fulfil some important functions in the criminal justice system.     

Two year's experience under Utah's mens rea insanity law

The author examined the records of the seven defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) under Utah's mens rea insanity law during the first two years of its operation. In all of the cases the attorneys, judges, and experts seemed unaware of the new law or confused about its meaning. Examination revealed that the findings of insanity were negotiated with either ignorance of or indifference to the mens rea law. Under the mens rea NGI law, the rate of insanity findings for Utah increased.