Constructing Victims and Villains: Unintended Outcomes of Contact Prohibition Orders

Contact prohibition orders (besöksförbud) are by now an institutionalized form of preventing violence and protecting the integrity of individuals from non‐strangers' intrusion in their lives. On the basis of an analysis of, primarily, in‐depth interviews with people intended to be protected by such orders, it is argued that this legal practice has unintended consequences for the parties' interaction and relationship. In order to obtain and maintain CPOs, the individuals have to regard and present the other party's acts as criminal cases and watch their own behaviour to preclude accusations of having provoked violations. They are also expected to evidence the other's crimes. In court they have to present themselves as credible witnesses and at the same time as suffering victims in order to retain the victim role. To make sense of the new situation, they tended to re‐construct the other party as inherently criminal, and they accounted for their common past as based upon the other's deception. Hence, it is claimed that the encounters with the criminal justice system have a decisive impact on the individuals' understanding of themselves, the other party, their relations and interaction.     

Is Timing Everything? Retirement and Seat Maintenance in the U.S. House of Representatives

Literature on open‐seat elections has focused on the individual attributes of a candidate and/or institutional arrangements. When a seat becomes an open contest could be a significant indicator as to how likely the incumbent party is able to maintain the seat. Examining data on open U.S. House seats from 1996 to 2008, we use OLS regression and logistic regression analysis, finding that time is a significant predictor for incumbent party fund‐raising and seat maintenance. We conclude that political parties have an interest in encouraging members of Congress to announce their retirement early in the election cycle.     

The Elastic Ceiling: Gender and Professional Career in Chinese Courts

Since the 1990s, the number of women in Chinese courts has been increasing steadily. Many women judges have risen to mid‐level leadership positions, such as division chiefs and vice‐chiefs, in the judicial bureaucracy. However, it remains difficult for women to be promoted to high‐level leadership positions, such as vice‐presidents and presidents. What explains the stratified patterns of career mobility for women in Chinese courts? In this article, we argue that two social processes are at work in shaping the structural patterns of gender inequality: dual‐track promotion and reverse attrition. Dual‐track promotion is dominated by a masculine and corrupt judicial culture on the political track that prevents women from obtaining high‐level promotions, but still allows them to rise to mid‐level leadership positions on the professional track based on their expertise and work performance. Reverse attrition enables women to take vacant mid‐level positions left by men who exit the judiciary to pursue other careers. Taken together, the vertical and horizontal mobility of judges in their career development presents a processual logic to gender inequality and shapes women's structural positions in Chinese courts, a phenomenon that we term the “elastic ceiling.”     

Candidate gender and voting in the 1997 British general election: Did labour Quotas Matter?

The proportion of women MPs elected in the 1997 British general election reached an historic high of 18.2 per cent, the vast majority from the victorious Labour Party. The large increase in the proportion of women Labour MPs was partly due to the policy of establishing women‐only shortlists for winnable seats. This paper examines the distribution of women candidates in the election and analyses the factors that affected the votes they attracted. The results show that Labour women selected on the women‐only shortlists attracted significantly more votes than women nominated on open shortlists. This was mainly a consequence of their selection for marginal seats, but the greater organisational effort that was concentrated on those seats was also an important factor. Overall, there was no evidence that voters discriminated against women candidates in the election, regardless of party and regardless of how they were selected. The large number of women MPs raises issues concerning the formulation and articulation of a distinctive women's policy agenda at Westminster.     

REPRESENTATION DISPARITIES AND IMPARTIALITY: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PARTY PERCEPTION OF FEAR,PREPARATION, AND SATISFACTION IN DIVORCE MEDIATION WHEN ONLY ONE PARTY HAS COUNSEL

While other authors have regarded both the presence and the absence of attorneys in family law mediation as cause for concern, little attention has been given to the questions raised when one party is represented and the other is pro se. This article presents data on mediating parties' premediation concerns, fears, and feelings of preparedness, as well as their postmediation satisfaction with the mediation process. The mediating parties are grouped based on each couple's representation status, for example, both represented by attorneys, both pro se, or one attorney‐represented party and one pro se party (mixed representation cases). The data show that mixed representation cases are the most likely to report concern, fear, and unpreparedness. Mixed‐representation cases also reported the lowest levels of satisfaction after the mediation. Some implications for mediation practice are discussed, as are suggestions for future research.     

Work Rules: How International NGOs Build Law in War‐Torn Societies

Drawing on socio‐legal literature and fieldwork in South Sudan, this article argues that international aid groups operating in conflict settings create and impose a rules‐based order on the local people they hire and on the domestic organizations they fund. Civil society actors in these places experience law's soft power through their daily, tangible, and mundane contact with aid agencies. As employees they are subject to contracts and other rules of employment, work under management and finance teams, document routine activity, and abide by organizational constitutions. In analyzing how South Sudanese activists confront, understand, conform to, or resist these externally imposed legal techniques and workplace practices, this article decenters state institutions as sites for understanding law's power and exposes how aid organizations themselves become arenas of significant legal and political struggle in war‐torn societies.     

Hidden Law‐Making in the Province of Medical Jurisprudence

Judges articulate their role in controversial cases of medical ethics in terms of deference to Parliament, lest their personal morality be improperly brought to bear. This hides a wide range of law‐making activities, as parliamentary sovereignty is diffused by ‘intermediate law‐makers’, and judicial activity is more subtle than the deference account implies. The nature of litigation raises questions about the contributions of other legal personnel and also the nature of the parties' interests in test‐cases. While judges demonstrate an awareness of some of these issues and anxiety about the constitutional legitimacy of their work, a more nuanced account is needed of their proper role. This may be built on Austin's theory of tacit legislation. It may draw from human rights law. However, considerable work is required before the complexities of hidden law‐making can be properly incorporated into the province of medical jurisprudence.     

证明标准建构的乌托邦

如何建构一个科学判断诉讼中当事人证明是否成立的标准 ,一直是人们所企望的。但基于标准的客观化、具体化的要求 ,要求获得一种抽象的、又依赖于法官主观认识的证明标准是不可能的 ,这种标准的建构只能是一种“乌托邦”式的空想。证明度的判定 ,只能是在某种理念和原则的指导下 ,依靠法官的良心和知识 ,根据案件的具体情况来把握。     

Agenda Power in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1988–2000

We present strong evidence that governing coalitions in Italy exercise significant negative agenda powers. First, governing parties have a roll rate that is nearly 0, and their roll rate is lower than opposition parties' roll rates, which average about 20% on all final‐passage votes. Second, after one controls for distance from the floor median, opposition parties have higher roll rates than government parties. These results strongly suggest that governing parties in Italy are able to control the legislative agenda to their benefit. We also document significantly higher opposition roll rates on decree‐conversion bills and budget bills than on ordinary bills—results consistent with our theoretical analysis of the differing procedures used in each case.     

Decentralizing Pork: Congressional Roll‐Call Voting,Decentralized Administration,and Distributive Politics

Congress packages pork‐barrel spending in complicated proposals that belie theories of distributive politics. We theorize that roll‐call voting on such bills depends on grant programs' administrative centralization, party ties with presidents or home‐state governors, and differences in geographic representation between chambers. Analyzing votes between 1973 and 2010 using a within‐legislator strategy reveals that House members are less likely to support decentralized spending when they are copartisans with presidents, while senators support decentralization regardless of such party ties. When House members or senators share affiliation with only governors or with neither chief executive, the likelihood of support rises with decentralization.     

The Conditional Effect of Electoral Systems and Intraparty Candidate Selection Processes on Parties' Behavior

How do electoral systems and intraparty candidate selection procedures affect party unity? In this article, I distinguish theoretically and empirically between electoral systems and candidate selections and argue that the influence of selection processes on parties' behavior is conditional on electoral system (and vice versa). Measuring parties' unity using Rice and weighted Rice scores, and applying hierarchical models to a new data set of 249 parties in 24 countries, I find support for the claim that the influence of selection processes on behavior is greater under electoral systems that encourage personal vote‐seeking incentives than under electoral systems that encourage party centeredness.     

Ideological cohesion between congress and the president: Does the road to the white house matter?

This study examines the impact of US presidential nomination politics on congressional‐executive relations. In particular, we pose the critical question of whether nomination reforms have had any systematic effect on the inter‐branch ideological gap. Using an indicator of liberal voting in Congress and a derived liberalism score for presidents, we analyse the ideological disparity between the branches over a 40‐year period from 1949 to 1993. Results do not support the view offered by Polsby and others that a shift toward more open and participatory decision making in the post‐reform nomination process has increased the probability that presidents will be ideologically distant from their fellow partisans in Congress. Indeed, the situation is quite the opposite, with post‐reform presidents being closer to the ideological centre of gravity of their parties in Congress than are presidents who reached the White House in the pre‐reform era.     

Unintended Consequences: Anticipation of General Election Outcomes And Primary Election Divisiveness

This article offers the first theory to explain the relationship between primary election divisiveness and general election outcomes that is grounded in candidates' own behavior. Conventional wisdom holds that divisive primaries cause candidates to do poorly in general elections. I show that primary divisiveness does not cause this or any other pattern of general election results. Rather, expectations about general election results cause primaries to be divisive. Non‐incumbents enter races they think they can win, and they think they can win where the incumbent is vulnerable. More candidates enter those races than others, splitting the vote among them. This stampede creates divisive primaries in which incumbents are most likely to do poorly, and challengers well, in the general elections. As a result, divisiveness is associated with (but does not cause) better general election performances among challengers and worse performances among incumbents. In this manner, primary divisiveness is an unintended consequence of behavior directed towards the goal of winning the general election. I tested these propositions using data from major‐party House primaries between 1976 and 1998 and found that (a) candidate expectations of victory determine when and where divisive primary elections occur, (b) those expectations drive the correlation between primary divisiveness and general election results, and (c) primary divisiveness correlates with incumbents doing poorly, and challengers well, in general elections.     

Presidential Influence on Police Practices: The U.S. President’s Indirect Impact on Fourth Amendment Case Outcome Through Supreme Court Appointments

Utilizing presidential influence theory as a conceptual framework, this study examines the extent to which U.S. presidents effect police practice case outcome through the Supreme Court justices they nominate. Through their confirmed nominees, presidents can have an enduring political impact long after they have left office. Results from a sample of 253 Fourth Amendment police practice cases from 1953–1997 demonstrate that presidents do have an indirect influence on police search and seizure practices. While presidents do not vote in Supreme Court cases, they still have an effect on case outcome because their appointees generally vote along similar ideological lines. Specific results, study limitations, and policy implications for law enforcement agencies are discussed.     

Electoral Rules and Party Switching: How Legislators Prioritize Their Goals

Stemming from ambition theory, a vast body of studies has demonstrated how politicians' pursuits of different goals can explain their behaviors. Among other goals, politicians strive for re‐election or to attain a better office. However, little is known about the way politicians prioritize these goals. This article uses the phenomenon of legislative party switching to address this void and examines how hierarchy between goals determines legislator strategies. The study exploits the 2008 Romanian electoral reform, which rendered the electoral system more candidate centered. Drawing on data from more than 3,900 individual‐level observations over the period from 1996 to 2012, this article shows how vote incentives alter the trade‐offs between re‐election and office motivations. The findings suggest that politicians will pursue office goals only if the goal of re‐election is to be achieved.     

When Are Local Incumbents Held Accountable for Government Performance? Evidence from US School Districts

Do voters hold local officials accountable for government performance? Using over a decade of panel data on school district elections and academic achievement in California, I causally identify the effect of test score changes on school board incumbent re‐election rates and show that incumbents are more likely to win re‐election when test scores improve in their districts—but only in presidential election years. This effect disappears in midterm and off‐years, indicating that election timing might facilitate local government accountability.     

The Effect of the Size of Voting Blocs on Incumbents' Roll‐Call Voting and the Asymmetric Polarization of Congress

Candidates face a trade‐off in the general election between taking a more‐moderate position that appeals to swing voters and a more‐extreme position that appeals to voters in the party's base. The threat of abstention by voters in the party's base if their candidate takes a position too moderate for them moves candidates to take more‐extreme positions. I discuss hypotheses regarding how this trade‐off affects candidate positioning and describe my tests of those hypotheses using data on House members in the 107th Congress and Senate members for the period 1982–2004. I then present data on how the distribution of voters in the electorate has changed over the past three decades and discuss how, in light of my empirical findings, these changes might explain the observed pattern of asymmetric polarization in Congress in recent decades.     

Presidential influence on parliamentary election timing and the electoral fate of prime ministers

Most presidential heads of state in parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies have constitutional powers to influence early election calling, which enable them to influence the conditions under which prime ministers are held accountable by the electorate. We examine whether presidents use theses powers to shape the timing of early elections for partisan advantage and to influence the electoral performance of prime ministers. Drawing on data from 193 elections in 18 European democracies (1945–2013), we find that presidents with significant dissolution powers enable incumbents in governments that include the president’s party to realise a significant electoral bonus compared with governments that exclude the party of the president.     

Presidential Support in the Russian State Duma

Recent comparative research on presidential systems has analyzed the ways in which presidents build majorities for their legislative agendas. Through an analysis of roll‐call votes from the 2000‐03 Russian State Duma on a set of issues reflecting President Putin's legislative agenda, I examine the impact of parliamentary party affiliation, policy preferences, issue type, and electoral mandate type on structuring floor support for the president. I also assess the implications of a mixed electoral system for building legislative coalitions in multiparty legislatures. Further, my findings shed light on Putin's recent reforms of the Duma's rules and procedures and the country's electoral system.