Eating Peas with One’s Fingers: A Semiotic Approach to Law and Social Norms

This paper proposes a semiotic theory of norms—what I term normative semiotics. The paper’s central contention is that social norms are a language. Moreover, it is a language that we instinctively learn to speak. Normative behaviour is a mode of communication, the intelligibility of which allows us to establish cooperative relationships with others. Normative behaviour communicates an actor’s potential as a cooperative partner. Compliance with a norm is an act of communication: compliance signals cooperativeness; noncompliance signals uncooperativeness. An evolutionary model is proposed to explain how this comes about: evolution has generated an instinctual proficiency in working with these signals much like a language—a proficiency that manifests in an emotional context. We see these social rules as possessing a certain ‘rightness’ in normative terms. This adaptive trait is what we call internalization. Internalization enhances the individual’s ability to speak this code. Because these signals communicate who is and who is not a reliable co-operator, sending and receiving cooperation signals is crucial to individual survival. Individuals who internalized the entire process and thus became more adept at speaking the language were at an advantage. Law seeks to shape the language of norms by maintaining the collective standards of society; as such, understanding how and why this normative language emerges is critical to understanding a core function of law.     

The place of law in a business studies curriculum

Abstract

LEGAL ETHICS are the values that inform the practice of law. This article establishes what and how Australian law schools teach about legal ethics and suggests what and how Australian law schools should teach about legal ethics.

First, the article establishes that Australian law schools tend to teach legal ethics as if it were only concerned with the law of lawyering. It also establishes that Australian law schools tend to teach legal ethics discretely over the course of one subject out of the whole undergraduate curriculum.

Secondly, this article suggests the adoption of a new approach to legal ethics as the ability to exercise legal ethical judgment. It also suggests a pervasive method of instruction that integrates issues of legal ethics and the process of legal ethical judgment into every subject in the undergraduate curriculum in combination with discrete subjects on the context and substance of the law of lawyering.     

Teaching company law to business students: an effective framework

Business students learning company law face a number of unique challenges. Therefore, instructors who teach company law to business students must carefully consider how their courses will meet these unique needs. This article will reflect on the challenges faced by business students studying company law before going on to consider how these challenges can be overcome. This work emphasises the importance of focusing on the learning outcomes of business students undertaking company law and the need for the module to be structured in order to meet the learning outcomes that provide business students with an understanding of the key principles relating to company law and its role and influence on business decision-making. Recommendations in relation to engaging business students with company law will also be provided.     

Assessing oral skills—time for reflection,time for risk

Abstract

THIS PAPER aims to establish a framework from which we can explain our dissatisfaction with defining what we teach and what and how we assess within legal education. To what extent can we, the professions or the public, have confidence that our assessment processes predict effective professional competence?

We will try to establish this framework by placing the discussion in the context of a workshop of assessment of oral skills run at the 2001 Bar Vocational Course conference. The workshop raised issues which we believe encapsulate the difficulties of measuring performance in such a way that it reliably predicts professional effectiveness. From this we will attempt to highlight the shortcomings of the current teaching, learning and assessment strategies more generally.

We go on to consider the role of student reflection in support of summative assessment: is it a reliable way of helping to plug the competence‐performance gap we have identified? What is its role in summative assessment? What demands does it make on tutor and learner? Since we cannot guarantee to find the best solutions first time, we make a plea for taking the risk of failure as well as success, and trying out ideas.     

Why Evolutionary Biology Is (So Far) Irrelevant To Legal Regulation

Evolutionary biology – or, more precisely, two (purported) applications of Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection, namely, evolutionary psychology and what has been called human behavioral biology – is on the cusp of becoming the new rage among legal scholars looking for interdisciplinary insights into the law. We argue that as the actual science stands today, evolutionary biology offers nothing to help with questions about legal regulation of behavior. Only systematic misrepresentations or lack of understanding of the relevant biology, together with far-reaching analytical and philosophical confusions, have led anyone to think otherwise. Evolutionary accounts are etiological accounts of how a trait evolved. We argue that an account of causal etiology could be relevant to law if (1) the account of causal etiology is scientifically well-confirmed, and (2) there is an explanation of how the well-confirmed etiology bears on questions of development (what we call the Environmental Gap Objection). We then show that the accounts of causal etiology that might be relevant are not remotely well-confirmed by scientific standards. We argue, in particular, that (a) evolutionary psychology is not entitled to assume selectionist accounts of human behaviors, (b) the assumptions necessary for the selectionist accounts to be true are not warranted by standard criteria for theory choice, and (c) only confusions about levels of explanation of human behavior create the appearance that understanding the biology of behavior is important. We also note that no response to the Environmental Gap Objection has been proffered. In the concluding section of the article, we turn directly to the work of Owen Jones, a leading proponent of the relevance of evolutionary biology to law, and show that he does not come to terms with any of the fundamental problems identified in this article.     

Cyberpornography,Cyberidentities and Law

In this research, I take the established trilogy of pornography, identity and law and explore the question of what happens when 'cyber' is added to the equation. Informed by cyberpunk writings, cybertheorists and academic sources, and using such theoretical frameworks as queer theory, post-feminism and cyberfeminism, I look at how the (inter)relationship between pornography, identity and law can be understood and analysed in a cyber age: what new cyberpornographies and cyberidentities will evolve before the law, and what forms might law take in relation to them?     

Postmodern Jurisprudence: Contesting Genres

It has become a common place of contemporary legal theory, particularly postmodernist legal theory, to reject modernist jurisprudence’s assumption of law’s disciplinary autonomy. Within this enthusiasm for interdisciplinary approaches to law, what is less common is detailed analysis of precisely how interdisciplinarity is figured, rhetorically and epistemologically, in the discourse of contemporary legal theory. It is with a view to detailed analysis of this kind that this paper emerges. Its aim is to explore in detail how interdisciplinarity might be figured, and with what consequences, in the jurisprudence of postmodernity. The particular site of this exploration will be Costas Douzinas and Ronnie Warrington with Shaun McVeigh’s Postmodern Jurisprudence: the Law of Text in the Texts of law. Published in 1991, this text remains widely influential – it has become a contemporary classic in its genre. It is not the intention of this paper, however, to represent this text as exemplary. Rather, this paper intends to read this text in its particularity, to focus on its particular vision of postmodern jurisprudence. Specifically, this paper argues that Postmodern Jurisprudence figures interdisciplinarity in terms of genre; and that this understanding of interdisciplinarity is problematised by the unacknowledged contradictions between the different conceptions of genre – one associated with Jacques Derrida and the other associated with Jean-François Lyotard – which the text invokes. This paper argues that the project of postmodern jurisprudence – as title and as label – appears rather differently if it is imagined, on the one hand (following Derrida) according to the logic of the passe-partout and, on the other hand (following Lyotard), according to the logic of the differend. The paper concludes that this internal tension should at least give us pause for thought when approaching the complex phenomenon of interdisciplinarity in postmodern legal scholarship more generally.     

The peripheral core of law and criminology: On postmodern social theory and conceptual integration

Despite significant challenges to some of the ideological underpinnings of the postmodern critique, critical theory building in law and criminology increasingly is subjected to the wholesale advances of this growing, albeit heterodox, school of thought. One greatly underexamined component of postmodern research is a provisional treatment of how its various formulations might suggest alternative approaches to understanding criminal justicians, their research, and their practice. Accordingly this essay assesses core themes (both sociological and epistemological) informing the regard of this perspective for theory construction in law and criminology. Several topics are considered: the social structure of society, role formation, human agency, discourse construction, knowledge or sense making, and social change. Building on Milovanovic's conceptual distinctions between the modernist and the postmodernist projects, the author concludes by speculating on what a model of postmodern conceptual synthesis might encompass, and on how this vision of reality promotes a more humanistic justice than the conventional forms of theoretical integration.     

Corporate Liability for International Crimes under Canada's Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act

Given that the Rome Statute does not provide jurisdiction totry corporations for breaches of international criminal law,it has been suggested that national jurisdictions might be usedto fill this impunity gap. The author presents several arguments.First, the international criminal law system, including theRome Statute — and particularly the principles of universaljurisdiction and complementarity — provides the theoreticalgrounding for states to assert jurisdiction over internationalcrimes wider than the International Criminal Court (ICC). Second,Canada, owing to interactions between its domestic legislationimplementing the ICC Statute and existing national criminallaw, is now able to prosecute corporations for breaches of internationalcriminal law. Finally, this increased jurisdiction of Canadiancourts is consistent with the current status of corporationsunder international criminal law. What is really interestingabout Canada's approach, however, is not so much that it hascreated a new legal principle, but rather that it is one ofthe first countries to establish jurisdiction over internationalcrimes committed by corporate entities which were previouslycommitted with impunity.

By stating that I could not guaranteethat the army is not using forced labour, I certainly implythat they might, (and they might) but I am saying that we donot have to monitor the army's behaviour: we have our responsibilities;they have their responsibilities; and we refuse to be pushedin to assuming more than what we can really guarantee. Aboutforced labour used by troops assigned to provide security onour pipeline project, let us admit between Unocal and Totalthat we might be in a grey zone.¹

     

A Critique of Alexy’s Claim to Correctness

This article offers an overview of the difficulties in Robert Alexy’s idea of law’s “claim to correctness.” The inquiry takes us deep into the nature of simple communication, back out to what it means to have a theory about the nature of law, and also in the direction of wondering about the interaction of legal theory and practical reasoning—reasoning about how we should best act. The article offers reasons to question whether law in fact makes claims, at least in any straightforward sense. Even if one brackets that matter, there are reasons to raise doubts about what is in fact implicit in the act of lawmaking. At one level, an act of lawmaking does implicitly assert the authority to act in that way. Whether it also implies that the content of the action is morally good, or at least not clearly morally bad, is, at a minimum, a harder question.     

Critical Autopoiesis and the Materiality of Law

Autopoietic theory is increasingly seen as a candidate for a radical theory of law, both in relation to its theoretical credentials and its relevance in terms of new and emerging forms of law. An aspect of the theory that has remained less developed, however, is its material side, and more concretely the theory’s accommodation of bodies, space, objects and their claim to legal agency. The present article reads Luhmann’s theory of autopoietic systems in a radical and material manner, linking it on the one hand to current post-structural theorisations of law and society, and on the other hand extending its ambit to accommodate the influx of material considerations that have been working their way through various other disciplines. The latter comprises both a materialisation of the theory itself and ways of conceptualising the legal system as material through and through. This I do by further developing what I have called Critical Autopoiesis, namely an acentric, topological, post-ecological and posthuman understanding of Luhmann’s theory, that draws on Deleuzian thought, feminist theory, geography, non-representational theory, and new material and object-oriented ontologies. These are combined with some well-rehearsed autopoietic concepts, such as distinction, environment and boundaries; Luhmann’s earlier work on materiality continuum; more recent work on bodies and space; as well as his work on form and medium in relation to art. The article concludes with five suggestions for an understanding of what critical autopoietic materiality might mean for law.     

WHAT FAMILY LAWYERS ARE REALLY DOING WHEN THEY NEGOTIATE

How should lawyers negotiate? This article outlines an empirical study of how lawyers rate each other in negotiation behaviors. After discussing what skills are needed for effective negotiation behavior, we then look more closely at how family lawyers in particular are negotiating. Examining some troubling data, we find that family lawyers appear to be more adversarial and less problem solving than other types of practitioners. We conclude by discussing why this might be so and what the family law bar and family law professors should be doing in the future to address this problem.     

“正犯主犯化”:趋势、原因及启示

主犯与正犯分别处于我国和德日刑法共同犯罪人的核心地位,有必要明确二者的关系。在德日刑法史上,正犯的内涵经历了主观说、形式客观说和实质客观说的演变。随着重要作用说和犯罪事实支配理论成为学界通说,正犯的认定标准倒向了实质客观说。德日刑法中的正犯与我国刑法中主犯的界限日益模糊,呈现出"正犯主犯化"趋势。该趋势的形成与哲学思潮由自然(实证)主义向新康德主义的转变有关;在刑法领域,该思潮的转向主要通过把刑罚的合目的性引入到犯罪论的方法,以化解犯罪论与刑罚论的冲突和消弭"李斯特鸿沟"。"正犯主犯化"趋势对我国共同犯罪的研究具有重要启示:一方面,不能以德日刑法中的正犯、共犯概念代替主犯、从犯的规范用语;另一方面,不能割裂定罪与量刑的关系,引进所谓的"双层区分制"。对于外国刑法理论,应该在明确该理论产生的社会背景和发展动向的基础上,回归到中国的具体现实,结合具体问题分析我国刑法的优劣,再做出坚持还是借鉴的选择。     

Legal Judgment as Self-Mastery

Many legal theorists see legal judgment as a largely professional or technical task. This is not how law sees itself. When looked at from the perspective of the engaged judge, law requires from us that we arrive at a certain internal governance of our thoughts and emotions. Legal scholarship and legal procedure tell us that law creates true reasons that override other, personal, reasons, even those of the utmost importance to us. A philosophical understanding of law requires a distinct argument that explains how such overriding reasons can be associated with the law and how there can be a personal duty to adapt our reasoning when we make authoritative legal judgments in order to change the lives of others. The philosophy of law needs to explain how legal judgment can be a form of self-mastery.     

Guilt Beyond Guilt: From Political Theory to Metaphysics with Herbert Morris

As it is presently conceptualised and applied in criminal law, moral guilt is bound by a narrow, legalistic framework that is rooted in a liberal political philosophy. In this paper, drawing on the work of Herbert Morris, I seek to open up and deepen the concept of moral guilt. I do this through the development of a four‐fold typology of guilt that charts Morris's journey from political theory to metaphysics that includes the following forms: moral‐legal guilt; moral‐psychological guilt; quantum guilt; and metaphysical guilt. In deepening our understanding of moral guilt, the typology compels us to consider alternative conceptions of guilt that would take into account a person who feels guilt not only towards others, but also towards themselves and the world. I argue that Morris's journey has important implications for how we think about the critical relationship between theory and law as well as restorative justice.     

Law as a culture: Global thoughts from a small Island*

ABSTRACT

This paper will seek to address the challenges of teaching legal ethics to undergraduate law students, both generally and in my own institutional context. Ethical conduct has long been held to be a central feature of professionalism and, traditionally, codes of ethics constituted one of the hallmarks and defining characteristics of the professions. The legal profession is no exception to this; however, it has not always been recognised that university law schools have an important role to play in preparing law students for the ethical challenges of legal practice. More recently this indifference has given way to an acceptance of the importance of this area of learning. Rather than being whether to teach legal ethics to law students, therefore, the two fundamental questions for educators are, first, what do students need to learn from the teaching of legal ethics and, secondly, how this is to be achieved. This study also aims to consider the specific challenges of teaching legal ethics to law students from widening participation backgrounds. These issues are particularly important in my own professional context as programme leader for an undergraduate qualifying law degree at an institution with a high population of widening participation students.     

Reviewable Automated Decision-Making

In this paper we introduce the concept of ‘reviewability' as an alternative approach to improving the accountability of automated decision-making that involves machine learning systems. In doing so, we draw on an understanding of automated decision-making as a socio-technical process, involving both human (organisational) and technical components, beginning before a decision is made and extending beyond the decision itself. Although explanations for automated decisions may be useful in some contexts, they focus more narrowly on the model and therefore do not provide the information about that process as a whole that is necessary for many aspects of accountability, regulatory oversight, and assessments for legal compliance. Drawing on previous work on the application of administrative law and judicial review mechanisms to automated decision-making in the public sector, we argue that breaking down the automated decision-making process into its technical and organisational components allows us to consider how appropriate record-keeping and logging mechanisms implemented at each stage of that process would allow for the process as a whole to be reviewed. Although significant research is needed to explore how it can be implemented, we argue that a reviewability framework potentially offers for a more useful and more holistic form of accountability for automated decision-making than approaches focused more narrowly on explanations.     

法律交易论

在一部民法典中对“民事法律行为”作出专门规定,这在法律逻辑上是有问题的。考察所谓“民事法律行为”的由来及其本质,可知产生这样的问题是必然的。因为我们在上个世纪初接受西方法律,特别是德国民法时,并没有完全把握《德国民法典》中法律交易的实质及其整个理论体系,一开始就将法律行为与法律交易混淆,从而导致了一系列理论上的混乱。在德国民法中,法律行为与法律交易是明确区分的,前者的法律后果是法律规定的,而后者的法律后果则是交易人意思指向的。就此而言,法律交易的合法性乃毋庸置疑的题中之义。与此同时,它又必然是民法的核心。因为它既从根本上体现着私人自治和意思自治的法律理念,又从技术和制度上表明着最基本法律活动的最一般抽象。从法律史上考察,这种思路早在古代罗马法中就已现端倪,但最终形成于19世纪德国法学。至于现今我们民法中所谓的“法律行为”或“民事法律行为”,其实就是德国民法中的法律交易。它原本是民法中的一个专属概念,但由于我们原始的概念混淆与误解,才不得不用“民事”加以限定,以至于造成不用“民事”限定就无法区别于法律行为,若用“民事”限定就导致逻辑问题的尴尬与两难。解决这个问题的途径只能是:从整个法律理论,特别是民法理论体系上梳理把握法律交易和法律     

Regulatory Threats to the Law Degree: The Solicitors Qualifying Examination and the Purpose of Law Schools

Two major regulatory changes are affecting the provision of undergraduate legal education in England and Wales. On the one hand, the Qualifying Law Degree is being deregulated, meaning law schools are free to make significant changes to how and what they teach. On the other hand, higher education in England has seen a significant overhaul through the creation of the Office for Students, which treats students as consumers. Now more than ever, law schools need to ask themselves existential questions which will not only test their continued relevance or indeed viability within the ‘market’ for higher education, but also the status of the discipline of law as a whole. The regulatory landscape may indeed present a significant threat, but it is also an opportunity to reflect on what law schools are for, and consequently what changes could result from the academic freedom that comes with deregulation. Whilst different law schools will interpret their mission differently, they should caution against either generalised inertia or succumbing to an outcomes-oriented provision that simply prepares students for the new Solicitors Qualifying Examination. Instead, law schools will find their proper purpose in critical reflection and academic self-grounding, providing undergraduate students with a ‘question everything’ mentality, and showing them that law is something to be experienced and not merely learnt.

     

The Two Faces of Law and Inequality: From Critique to the Promise of Situated,Pragmatic Policy

Over the course of my career, I have navigated a research agenda that moves between scholarly and policy‐oriented research. Building on this experience, I argue that it is time for law and society scholars to take seriously a commitment to engaged scholarship that speaks to a wider audience of stakeholders and policymakers. Three themes frame my proposal to get back in the game of advocacy and policy. First, I consider why we need to rekindle this commitment at this historical moment: inequalities in wealth, income, and social mobility and the rise of mass incarceration and its collateral consequences diminish the foundation required for effective democratic governance to thrive. Second, what our scholarship has to say is key to the framing of pragmatic policy: law and society's focus on law in action and the culture of law are key to understanding the ways in which most policies tend to deliver unintended consequences. Finally, we need to consider how to go about the next step to make our work visible to a wider audience of stakeholders?